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Abstract 
Financial reporting fraud is a concern for investors, regulators, external auditors, and the public. Although 
the responsibility for fraud detection lies upon management and those charged with governance, external 
auditors are likely to come under scrutiny if fraud scandals come to light. Despite the audit regulators’ efforts 
in fighting fraud, evidence from prior literature revealed that external auditors still need guidance in assessing 
and responding to fraud risks. Hence the current study aims at helping external auditors properly assess and 
respond to the risk of financial reporting fraud in an effort to increase the likelihood of detecting it. In order 
to achieve this, the current study sought to explore the significance of various fraud factors in assessing the 
risks of financial reporting fraud and examined how external auditors could assess these fraud factors. The 
current study also explored the likely motivations behind management fraud, the impact of management 
motivations on the financial statements, and how external auditors could assess the impact of management 
motivations. 
The data for the current study was collected from external auditors working at various audit firms in Egypt 
via the use of mixed research methods, namely through an online questionnaire and semi-structured 
interviews. The findings of the current study revealed that management motives are the most significant 
factor in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. Hence the current study suggests that external audit 
should be viewed in terms of management motivations rather than just the audit of financial statements’ 
figures and disclosures. The current study offers detailed guidance to external auditors in this area. The 
findings of the current study also revealed that management integrity is a significant factor in assessing the 
risk of financial reporting fraud and that rationalisation of fraud should be assessed as part of management 
integrity rather than a separate fraud risk factor. The current study found that fraud perpetrators’ capabilities 
are equally significant to the opportunity to commit fraud factor yet it is currently ignored by the audit 
standards and thus should be assessed as part of opportunity to commit fraud. The current study was the first 
to explore financial reporting fraud and the extent by which external auditors comply with ISA 240 in the 
Egyptian context. The current study offered recommendations to external auditors, audit firms, audit 
regulators, and the Egyptian government on how to combat financial reporting fraud. Potential areas for 
future research were also identified by the current study. 
Keywords: Financial reporting fraud; management motivations; Egypt; external audit; ISA 240; ESA 240; 
the audit expectation gap; the audit of management motivations; the fraud triangle factors; management 
integrity; fraud perpetrators’ capabilities; financial reporting fraud detection; corporate governance; fraud 
risk assessments; audit procedures. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction: 
Financial reporting fraud is a concern for various stakeholders including investors, regulators, external 
auditors, and the public. It could result in serious consequences to investors, employees, and the wider society 
(Chen et al., 2013). Fraud in general involves intent, deceit, breaking the law or violating regulatory 
framework(s), and harm to its victim(s) (Johnson and Rudesill, 2001; O’Gara, 2004; Alleyne and Howard, 
2005; Wells, 2009; Lord, 2010; Jones, 2011). Corporate fraud was defined by Wells (2005, p.5) as “The use 
of one's occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or application of the employing 
organisation's resources or assets".  
Corporate fraud has three main categories which are financial reporting fraud, asset misappropriation, and 
corruption (Wells, 2005; ACFE, 2002). However, the focus of the current research is only on “financial 
reporting fraud” for various reasons. First, financial reporting fraud is the most costly type of corporate fraud 
as reported by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) in its global fraud study in 2016 where 
the median loss caused by financial reporting fraud was $975,000.  Second, following the scandals in large 
companies like Enron, WorldCom, Xerox, Lehman Brothers, AIG, and Freddie Mac, investors’ concerns 
about fraudulent financial reporting in particular has increased (Kassem and Higson, 2012a). Third, the cost 
of financial reporting fraud goes beyond financial losses. For instance, financial reporting fraud could lead 
to loss of investors’ confidence in the audit profession and the capital market. The dismissal of executives 
who were accused of financial reporting fraud could lead to loss of productivity especially when they are 
replaced with less-informed executives (Rezaee and Riley, 2010). Financial reporting fraud could also affect 
the employees who will lose their jobs, as well as the economy and the society as a whole (Kalbers, 2009; 
Centre for Audit Quality, 2010).  
Fraud detection requires the efforts of corporate governance professionals, including the board of directors, 
the audit committee, top management, internal auditors, and external auditors (Dorminey et al., 2012). 
However external auditors are likely to be blamed if a financial reporting fraud case goes undetected (Cooper 
and Fargher, 2011; Kassem and Higson, 2016).  
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Although external auditors are not directly responsible for fraud detection, they are expected to play a 
significant role in it. This is because external audit serves a fundamental purpose in promoting confidence 
and reinforcing trust in the financial information issued by firms (ICAEW, 2005; Chen et al., 2013). There 
is a difference in the expectations of the public and that of external auditors with regards to external auditors’ 
responsibility for fraud detection. This difference is called “the audit expectation gap” (Porter, 1993; Monroe 
and Woodliff, 1993; Humphrey et al, 1993; Epstein and Greiger, 1994; Koh and Woo, 1998; Gay et al, 1998; 
Dewing and Russell, 2002; Alleyne and Howard, 2005). As a result of this audit expectation gap and the 
increasing number of fraud scandals, there are tremendous pressure on the audit profession to enhance audit 
quality and to exert more efforts in fraud detection (The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales (ICAEW), 2005). 
The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) issued the International Audit 
Standards (ISAs) number 200 and 240 that detailed the responsibility of external auditors with regards to 
fraud. ISA 200: Overall Objectives of the Independent Auditor and the Conduct of an Audit in Accordance 
with International Standards on Auditing stated that external auditors are responsible for detecting material 
misstatements in the financial statements whether due to errors or fraud. ISA 240: the Auditor’s 
Responsibility Relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements requires external auditors to assess and 
respond to the risk of financial reporting fraud while taking into consideration management integrity and the 
three fraud triangle factors (i.e. motives to commit fraud, existing opportunity to commit fraud, and 
rationalisation of fraud). However, despite the efforts of audit regulators in combating fraud, evidence from 
prior research showed that external auditors still need guidance on how to properly assess and respond to the 
risk of financial reporting fraud (Glover et al, 2003; Payne and Ramsay, 2005; Zikmun, 2008; Brazel et al, 
2010; Kassem and Higson, 2012a). This motivated the current study to explore a way that could help external 
auditors properly assess and respond to the risk of financial reporting fraud in an effort to increase the 
likelihood of detecting it. 
This chapter thus introduces the aims and motivation of the current study, the current research questions, the 
methods used for data collection, and the contribution of the current study. The rest of the chapter is 
structured as follows. Section 1.2 explains the aims, motivation, and research questions of the current study. 
Section 1.3 describes the research context, the methods used for data collection and the philosophy 
underpinning the current research. Section 1.4 shows the contribution of the current research study. Section 
1.5 explains how the thesis is structured. Section 1.6 is a summary of chapter one. 
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1.2 Research Aims, Motivation, and Questions 
 
Research Aims  
The current study aims at helping external auditors properly assess and respond to the risk of financial 
reporting fraud. That is in an effort to increase the likelihood of detecting it. In order to achieve this, the 
current study sought to explore the significance of the three fraud triangle factors, management integrity, and 
fraud perpetrators’ capabilities in assessing the risks of financial reporting fraud and how external auditors 
could assess these fraud factors. The current study examined the likely motivations behind management 
fraud, the impact of management motivations on the financial statements, and how external auditors could 
assess the impact of management motivations. The current study was conducted in Egypt and thus it was 
also important to understand the nature of the audit profession and the likelihood of financial reporting fraud 
in the Egyptian context. Hence the current study explored the extent by which external auditors in Egypt are 
aware of and are complying with ISA 240. It also explored the nature, likelihood, and types of financial 
reporting fraud in Egypt as well as alleged financial reporting fraud in the country.  
 
Research Motivation  
The current study was motivated to fill in the current gaps in knowledge and practice in the area of financial 
reporting fraud detection. The audit standard (i.e. ISA 240) requires external auditors to consider 
management integrity and Cressey’s fraud triangle model in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. 
However, reviewing prior literature showed limitations in Cressey’s fraud triangle model which raises 
concerns about its effectiveness as a tool for assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. Identifying fraud 
risk is a significant element of assurance services and requires a model that reflects the current thinking 
surrounding the fraud event. This is more likely to make investors believe that external audit is an effective 
fraud deterrence and governance mechanism (Dorminey et al., 2012). The limitations of the current fraud 
triangle model could have an impact on the quality of fraud risk assessments and thereby the likelihood of 
detecting financial reporting fraud. Hence, this motivated the current study to shed light on these limitations 
and look for a more effective technique and/or model that might help external auditors properly assess and 
respond to the risk of financial reporting fraud.  
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Reviewing prior literature showed mixed results with regards to the significance of the fraud factors that 
could help in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud and possibly in detecting it. These factors are 
management’s integrity, motives to commit fraud, opportunity for fraud, rationalisation of fraud, and fraud 
perpetrators’ capabilities. The international audit standard (ISA 240) also lacked guidance in this area. This 
might make external auditors assume that all fraud factors have the same significance and thus overlook the 
most significant one(s). This in turn might impact the quality of fraud risk assessments and the likelihood of 
detecting financial reporting fraud. The strength or influence of the relationship between the three factors of 
the fraud triangle, management integrity, and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities in assessing the risk of financial 
reporting fraud was hardly ever tested or examined. This further motivated the current study to explore the 
significance of these fraud factors in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud and the reasons behind 
this significance. The assessment of these fraud factors has never been explored in prior literature and the 
audit standards did not provide any guidance to external auditors in this area either. The lack of guidance in 
this area will lead to inconsistencies in the assessment and response of external auditors to the risk of financial 
reporting fraud which will impact the likelihood of detecting it. This motivated the current study to explore 
how external auditors could assess all these fraud factors. 
A stream of prior research argued that understanding management motivations could actually help external 
auditors properly assess the risk of financial reporting fraud and thereby increase the likelihood of detecting 
it. Few of these studies argued that external audit should be viewed in terms of the audit of management 
motivations. However prior studies showed mixed results as to what might actually motivate management 
to commit financial reporting fraud, very little evidence was found on the impact of management motivations 
on the financial statements, and no study has actually explored how external auditors could audit 
management motivations. This motivated the current study to explore what might motivate management to 
commit financial reporting fraud, the impact of management motivations on the financial statements, and 
how external auditors could assess management motivations and its impact on the financial statements.  
Egypt was an attractive context for the current study because of the scarcity of fraud research in this context. 
Hence, this allowed the current study to expand knowledge in an area and in a context that has hardly been 
explored before. The existence of personal contacts who are working as audit professionals in Egypt and 
their willingness to participate in the current study also made the Egyptian context a more attractive choice 
for the current study. It was thus important for the current study to have a thorough understanding of the 
nature of the audit profession, the governance issues, and the likelihood of financial reporting fraud in Egypt.  
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Reviewing prior literature revealed that there is a lack of empirical evidence with regards to the nature and 
frequency of financial reporting fraud in Egypt and the extent by which external auditors are aware of and 
are complying with ISA 240. Little empirical evidence was also found with regards to governance issues in 
Egypt that could impact audit quality and the likelihood of detecting financial reporting fraud in the country. 
This motivated the current study to explore these areas. In particular, the current study was motivated to 
explore the extent by which external auditors in Egypt are aware of and are complying with ISA 240, and 
financial reporting fraud in Egypt. The current study also explored some of the governance issues that could 
impact audit quality in Egypt which in turn might impact the likelihood of detecting financial reporting fraud 
in the country. The findings of the current study shed light on important governance issues that impact audit 
quality in Egypt and the likelihood of detecting financial reporting fraud.  
 
Research Questions  
In order to achieve the aim(s) of the current study, the current study sought to answer the following research 
questions which are discussed in detail in chapters three, four, and five.  
 
 Q1: To what extent external auditors in Egypt are aware of and are complying with the 
requirements of ISA 240/ESA240 with regards to financial reporting fraud? How useful is ISA 
240/ESA240 in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud and why? 
 Q2: How common is financial reporting fraud in Egypt? What are the most common types of 
financial reporting fraud in Egypt? How often do external auditors in Egypt discover financial 
reporting fraud cases where management is involved? How do external auditors detect financial 
reporting fraud in each case and what are the actions taken by external auditors in these cases?  
 Q3: To what extent are the following fraud factors (i.e. management motives, management 
integrity, opportunity to commit fraud, rationalisation, and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities) 
significant in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud? Why? How could external auditors 
assess these factors?  
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 Q4: What motivates management in Egypt to commit financial reporting fraud? How could 
management motivations impact the financial statements? How could external auditors assess the 
impact of management motivations on the financial statements? 
1.3 Research Methodology and Methods 
The current study followed the critical realism philosophy which as stated by Bisman (2010) offers the 
opportunity to investigate the economic consequences of accounting as well as perceptions and perceptual 
biases of accountants and managers in their use of accounting information. This suited the aims of the current 
study that seek the perception of external auditors on the significance of the various fraud factors, 
management motivations behind financial reporting fraud, the impact of management motivations on the 
financial statements, and the implications of that for external auditors. 
The current study was conducted in the Egyptian context and data was collected from external auditors 
working at various audit firms in Egypt. The data for the current study was collected by means of mixed 
research methods, namely through the use of an online mixed methods questionnaire and semi-structured 
interviews. The use of mixed methods helped in depicting a complete picture of the current research issues. 
Quantitative data was analysed using SPSS while qualitative data was analysed using conventional and 
summative content analysis. Details about the research context, and the methods used for data collection and 
analysis are discussed in detail in chapters five, six, seven, and eight.  
1.4 Research Contribution  
The current study contributed to both knowledge and practice in various ways.  
The current study was the first to explore the significance and interaction of the three fraud triangle factors, 
management integrity, and fraud perpetrators' capabilities in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. 
The findings of the current study in this area could help external auditors focus their efforts more on the most 
significant fraud factor(s). The current study sheds light on a significant fraud factor (i.e. fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities) that was ignored by the audit standards in fraud risk assessments. The traits that might enhance 
management’s capabilities to commit financial reporting fraud was also explored by the current study for the 
first time. This might enhance the quality of fraud risk assessment and thereby the likelihood of detecting 
financial reporting fraud.  
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The current study was the first to explore how external auditors could assess the three fraud triangle factors, 
management’s integrity, and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities. Hence it added to the current body of 
knowledge in this area as well as provided detailed practical guidance to external auditors in this area that 
might help them properly assess and respond to the risk of financial reporting fraud.  
The motivation behind management fraud in the Egyptian context has hardly been explored before in prior 
literature. Hence the current study was the first to expand knowledge about fraud in a context that has hardly 
been explored before. A list of motivations behind management fraud in the wider context was also compiled 
by the current study for the first time. The list was based on findings from prior literature. A list of 
management motivations in Egypt was also compiled based on findings from the current study. The findings 
of the current study provided evidence that what motivates management the most to commit financial 
reporting fraud in Egypt is not different from that in other countries around the world. This could help alert 
external auditors to the most likely motivations behind management fraud so they could give them more 
attention during the audit of financial statements. The current study was among very few studies that explored 
the impact of management motivations on the financial statements. However, it was the first to provide 
detailed guidance to external auditors in this area. The current study was the first to explore how external 
auditors could deal with management motivations and its impact on the financial statements. The audit 
standards did not provide external auditors with any guidance in this area. Hence, the current study was the 
first to contribute to knowledge and practice in this area.  
 The current study explored financial reporting fraud in a context that has hardly been explored before in 
prior literature. Most of prior studies were focusing on developed countries while hardly any study explored 
financial reporting fraud in the Egyptian context. There were huge gaps in the literature in areas related to 
the nature and likelihood of financial reporting fraud in Egypt, whether external auditors in Egypt actually 
consider fraud risk assessments in their audits, and whether the audit profession faces any challenges. There 
was also no empirical evidence as to the extent by which external auditors in Egypt comply with ISA 240. 
All these gaps were filled in and explored by the current study.  
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The current study was the first to explore the usefulness and limitations of ISA 240 in assessing the risk of 
financial reporting fraud. This might help audit regulators around the world to reconsider the guidance 
provided to external auditors in this area in order to enhance audit quality and increase the likelihood of 
detecting financial reporting fraud. Corporate governance issues in Egypt were also discussed and explored 
by the current study while showing the impact of these issues on audit quality and the likelihood of detecting 
financial reporting fraud.  
The current study provided guidance and recommendations to external auditors and audit regulators in the 
area of financial reporting fraud detection. This might help external auditors properly assess and respond to 
the risk of financial reporting fraud. This in turn might increase the likelihood of detecting financial reporting 
fraud, narrow the audit expectation gap, and reinforce investors’ confidence in the audit profession. The 
findings of the current study also have implications for audit regulators. The guidance provided to external 
auditors in the current study will not only benefit the audit profession in Egypt but also in other contexts that 
comply with the international audit standards. The current study offers recommendations to researchers and 
the Egyptian government that might help them combat financial reporting fraud.  
Publications from the PhD  
The following academic papers were published from the current PhD thesis.  
 Kassem, R. and Higson, A. W., 2015. Combating Fraud: Is Egypt Ready – Insights from the 
Literature. Journal of Emerging Trends in Economics and Management Sciences (JETEMS). Vol 1 
(5), pp. 290-298 
 Kassem, R. and Higson, A.W., 2012a. Financial Reporting Fraud: Are External Auditors and 
Standards’ Setters Doing Enough? International Journal of Business and Social Sciences. Vol.3 
No.19, October, pp.283-290 
 Kassem, R. and Higson, A.W., 2012b. The New Fraud Triangle Model. Journal of Emerging Trends 
in Economics and Management Sciences (JETEMS). 3(3), pp.191-195. ISSN: 2141-7024.     
 Kassem, R., 2012c. Earnings Management and Financial Reporting Fraud: Can External Auditors 
Spot the Difference? American Journal of Business & Management, Vol.1 (1), pp.30-33 
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Conference papers 
 Kassem, R. and Higson, A.W., 2016. An Examination of the Fraud Triangle Model: Implications for 
External Auditors and Audit Regulators. The British Accounting and Finance Association (BAFA). 
Oxford University, UK, May.  
 Kassem, R.H. and Higson, A.W., 2013. Fraud Detection: Implications of Management’s Motivations 
for External Auditors. European Accounting Association Conference, Paris, France, May. 
 
1.5 Structure of the PhD Thesis  
The rest of the thesis continues in chapter two by providing an overview of financial reporting fraud. This 
includes the nature of financial reporting fraud, its impact, categories, and how each is committed and 
concealed. Chapter two also discusses financial reporting fraud from a governance perspective including the 
responsibility of external auditors for financial reporting fraud detection and reporting suspected fraud. 
Chapter three assesses the effectiveness of the current techniques available for detecting financial reporting 
fraud by critically reviewing prior literature in this area. The chapter identifies gaps in the literature and the 
audit standards related to financial reporting fraud detection and presents some of the research questions 
addressed by the current study.  
Chapter four critically reviews prior studies into management motivations, the impact of management 
motivations on the financial statements, and identifies gaps in this area in both prior literature and the audit 
standards. The chapter also presents some of the research questions addressed by the current study. Chapter 
five describes the Egyptian context while focusing on the accounting and audit profession in the country, 
some of the governance issues, financial reporting fraud, and fraud research in the Egyptian context. The 
chapter also presents the research questions that are related to the Egyptian context. Chapter six describes 
the philosophy underpinning the current research, how the current research was designed, and how the data 
was collected and analysed in the current study. The chapter also discusses how research ethics was taken 
into consideration by the current study. Chapter seven and chapter eight explain how the data from the 
questionnaire and semi-structured interviews were analysed and interpreted to address the current research 
questions. Chapter nine presents the main findings and contribution of the current study. Chapter ten includes 
the conclusion, and offers some recommendations to external auditors, audit firms, audit regulators, and the 
Egyptian government on how to combat financial reporting fraud. The chapter also identifies opportunities 
for future research.  
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1.6 Summary of Chapter One 
Chapter one has introduced the aims and motivation of the current study, the gaps in current knowledge and 
practice in the area of financial reporting fraud detection, and how the current study sought to address these 
gaps. This chapter also provided a brief summary of the philosophy underpinning the current research and 
the methods used for collecting and analysing the current research data. Chapter one explains the contribution 
made by the current study as well as the structure of the thesis. The next chapter provides an overview of 
financial reporting fraud.  
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Chapter Two 
Overview of Financial Reporting Fraud 
 
2.1 Introduction 
A proper understanding of the nature and scope of financial reporting fraud might increase the likelihood of 
detecting it. This was supported by (Jo-Kranacher and Stern, 2004; Wells, 2005; Lister, 2007; Carpenter, 
2008; Vona, 2008; Chemuturi, 2008; Jones, 2011) who stated that understanding the various categories of 
fraud that can be perpetrated against an organisation will assist external auditors in understanding the fraud 
risks inherent in this organisation. Hence this Chapter aims to provide an overview of financial reporting 
fraud including its nature, cost, categories, how each is committed and concealed, and financial reporting 
fraud from a governance perspective including who is responsible for detecting it. The chapter also discusses 
the reasons behind the audit expectation gap.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 explains and describes the meaning, nature, and 
cost of financial reporting fraud Section 2.3 presents and explains the different categories of financial 
reporting fraud and how each could be committed and concealed. Section 2.4 explains financial reporting 
fraud from a governance perspective including the responsibility of external auditors with regards to financial 
reporting fraud detection. Section 2.5 evaluates the efforts of external auditors and audit regulators in 
combating financial reporting fraud through the discussion of the reasons behind the audit expectation gap. 
Section 2.6 is a summary of chapter two  
2.2 The Meaning, Nature, and Cost of Financial Reporting Fraud 
Financial reporting fraud is one of the types of corporate fraud and refers to fraud committed when the 
financial reports contain misrepresentation of material facts or such material facts have not been adequately 
disclosed in such reports. Financial reporting fraud could also be referred to as management fraud because it 
is more likely to be committed by management (Goel and Gangolly, 2012; Brennan and Mcgrath, 2007; 
Wells, 2005). This was evident in many fraud cases in large companies like Enron, WorldCom and Tyco, 
where management was involved in committing financial reporting fraud. For instance, in Enron, executives 
were charged with generating accounting schemes to make Enron appear more profitable than it really was 
in order to get personal rewards (Neuman, 2005).  
 
12 
 
The ACFE study in 2014 reported that most financial reporting fraud cases were committed by top 
management and executives (26.3% out of 156 cases). ISA No. 240 also stated that: 
Management is in a unique position to perpetrate fraud because of management’s ability to manipulate accounting 
records and prepare fraudulent financial statements by overriding controls that otherwise appearing to be operating 
effectively. Due to the unpredictable way in which such override could occur, it is regarded as a significant risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud (para.31, 2009).  
 
Financial reporting fraud involves intentional misstatements including omissions of amounts or disclosures 
in financial statements designed to deceive financial statement users (Soltani, 2007; Hopwood et al, 2008; 
Elder, et al., 2010). Financial reporting fraud was also defined by Rezaee (2005) as a deliberate attempt by 
corporations to deceive users of the financial statements by preparing materially misstated financial 
statements. The International Standard on Auditing (ISA) No. 240 stated that: 
  Financial reporting fraud may be accomplished by the: manipulation, falsification (including forgery), or alteration 
of accounting records or supporting documentation from which the financial statements are prepared, 
misrepresentation in, or intentional omission from, the financial statements of events, transactions or other significant 
information, and intentional misapplication of accounting principles relating to amounts, classification, manner of 
presentation, or disclosure (2009, para. A2, p.167). 
 
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) conducted a global fraud study in 2016 and found 
that financial reporting fraud although the least common type of occupational fraud was the most costly type 
of fraud causing a median loss of $975000. The ACFE report also stated that financial reporting fraud affect 
the overall reported financial position and results of the organisation rather than just the reported assets or 
revenue.  The immediate effect of financial reporting fraud on a company is a serious drop in share price 
once the financial statement fraud becomes public (Bernnan and Macgrath, 2007). However, losses from 
financial reporting fraud goes beyond financial losses as it could lead investors to lose confidence in the audit 
profession and the capital market, as well as dismissal of executives who were accused of financial reporting 
fraud leads to loss of productivity especially when they are replaced with less-informed executives (Rezaee 
and Riley, 2010). Financial reporting fraud could affect the employees who will lose their job, as well as the 
economy and the society as a whole (Kalbers, 2009, Centre for Audit Quality, 2010).  
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The findings from the ACFE study in 2016 revealed that financial reporting fraud tends to occur more in 
larger organisations than smaller businesses. Financial reporting fraud seems to be more common in the 
following industries: construction, services, health care, banking and financial services, and manufacturing. 
The report also stated that the number of financial reporting fraud cases has increased since the previous 
report in 2014.  
Dorminey et al (2012) added that with knowledge of the company, the industry, and the operating 
environment, an assessment of fraud risk can focus on those fraud schemes that are most likely to occur and 
have the potential to be material. Hence it is important for external auditors to understand the nature of 
client’s business and industry prior conducting the audit. This is more likely to help external auditors properly 
assess and respond to the risks of financial reporting fraud.  
2.3 The Categories of Financial Reporting Fraud – Methods and Concealment  
The most common categories of financial reporting fraud based on real fraud cases were found to be: 
improper revenue recognition and timing difference, concealed liabilities and expenses, improper assets 
valuation, and improper disclosure (Weld, et al., 2004; Wells, 2005; ACFE, 2014). This is supported by the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) that studied financial 
reporting fraud and developed a taxonomy of these schemes applicable to publicly traded companies. The 
COSO report identifies schemes in the following areas:  Improper revenue recognition, overstatement of 
assets, understatement of expenses/liabilities, and inappropriate disclosure (Hopwood, et al., 2008). On the 
other hand, Jones (2011) argued that financial reporting fraud can be categorised in two major ways. First, it 
is when a company uses accounting practices which are outside those permitted by the regulatory framework. 
Second, it is where transactions have been recorded in the books, such as fictitious sales or fictitious 
inventory. Figure 2.1 illustrates the main categories of financial reporting fraud cited from the ACFE report 
in 2014. 
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Figure 2.1 Categories of Financial Reporting Fraud 
 
Source: ACFE (2014, p.11) 
 
Figure 2.1 shows that financial reporting fraud can be committed by either understating revenues and/or 
assets or overstating revenues and/or assets. The methods used in each case include the use of timing 
differences to manipulate revenues, creating fictitious revenues, understate revenues, conceal and understate 
liabilities and expenses, improperly valuate assets, and improper disclosure. Some studies found that 
improper revenue and improper assets valuation are common methods for committing financial reporting 
fraud. For instance Beasley, et al. (2000) stated that in a study released in March 1999 by the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) where they analysed 200 Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) financial statement fraud actions brought against public companies from 1987 
to 1999, the findings showed that about 50% of the fraud instances involved the improper recording of 
revenues (fictitious or premature), and about 50% of the fraud instances involved the improper recording of 
assets (fictitious or overstated). While, expense and liability understatements were less frequent.  
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Others found that financial statement fraud is concentrated in selective industries, but also the nature of 
financial fraud differs by industry. For example, revenue overstatements were found to be prevalent in the 
technology industry, whereas asset overstatements occurred more in the financial services industry 
(Makkawi and Schick, 2003). This was supported by ISA 240 (2009) that stated that: 
The risks of fraud in revenue recognition may be greater in some entities than others. For example, there may be 
pressures or incentives on management to commit fraudulent financial reporting through inappropriate revenue 
recognition in the case of listed entities when, for example, performance is measured in terms of year over year 
revenue growth or profit. Similarly, for example, there may be greater risks of fraud in revenue recognition in the 
case of entities that generate a substantial portion of revenues through cash sales (Para A29, p.176).  
 
2.3.1 Improper Revenue Recognition and Timing Differences 
The most common accounts manipulated when perpetrating financial statement fraud are fictitious revenues 
and inflating revenues and it is also the easiest way to improve the apparent financial condition of a company. 
Fictitious revenues draw more attention from auditors and regulators than the intentional early recognition 
of transactions (Rezaee, 2005; Albrecht, 2006; Coenen, 2009). Brennan and Mcgrath (2007) found that 
recording false sales was the most common method of financial reporting fraud. The Enron Corporation 
disclosed that it had overstated earnings by more than half a billion dollars and established private 
partnerships that kept billions of dollars of debt off its books. Enron used sophisticated financing vehicles 
known as Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) and other derivative instruments to increase leverage without 
having to report debt on the balance sheet (Sterling, 2002). Elder, et al. (2010) argued that there are three 
main types of revenue manipulations: fictitious revenues, premature revenue recognition, and manipulation 
of adjustments to revenues. Table 2.1 summarises the techniques used to commit revenue manipulation and 
timing difference schemes based on the findings from prior literature.  
As a result of the frequency of financial reporting frauds involving revenue recognition, the International 
Accounting and Auditing Standards Board (IAASB) issued ISA 240 in 2009 which specifically requires 
auditors to identify revenue recognition as a fraud risk in most audits. ISA 240 stated that: 
 Material misstatement due to fraudulent financial reporting relating to revenue recognition often results from an 
overstatement of revenues through, for example, premature revenue recognition or recording fictitious revenues. It 
may result also from an understatement of revenues through, for example, improperly shifting revenues to a later 
period (Para A28, p.176).  
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Table 2.1 How revenue manipulation and timing difference schemes are committed 
Techniques Source  
Falsified sales and shipping documents (Hopwood, et al. 2008) 
Misstatement of the percentage of completion (Hopwood, et al., 2008) 
Recording gross, rather than net revenue Albrecht (2006), Rezaee (2005), and 
Coenen (2009) 
Unauthorised shipments (Hopwood, et al., 2008) 
Overstating real sales Albrecht (2006), Rezaee (2005), and 
Coenen (2009) 
Creating sales orders at the end of the accounting period by 
shipping goods that have not been ordered 
(Hopwood, et al., 2008) 
Recording sales for items produced but not yet shipped or partially 
shipped 
Coenen (2009) 
Not properly recording allowances for returned goods. Lord (2010) 
Not recording returned goods from customers  
 
Albrecht (2006), Rezaee (2005), and 
Coenen (2009) 
Recording bank transfers as cash received from customers or 
manipulating cash received from related parties 
Albrecht (2006), Rezaee (2005), and 
Coenen (2009) 
Not recognising discounts given to customers. Albrecht (2006), Rezaee (2005), and 
Coenen (2009) 
Improper recognition of consignment sales as completed sales Albrecht (2006), Rezaee (2005), and 
Coenen (2009) 
Abuse of cutoff date of sales (some companies keep the books open 
after the closing date and include the next period’s sales on the 
current period income statement 
Hopwood, et al., (2008); Coenen 
(2009) 
Recognising legitimate sales early Coenen (2009) 
Booking sales but delaying shipment to customers (bill and hold) Coenen (2009); Lord (2010) 
Issuing side agreements that modify the terms of the sales 
transaction in a way that does not qualify as a sale under GAAP. 
Example: unrestricted return of goods if not sold by the customer 
Elder, et al. (2010); Lord (2010) 
Improper cutoff periods to move revenue between accounting 
periods 
Lord (2010) 
Recording returned goods after the end of the period 
 
Albrecht (2006), Rezaee (2005), and 
Coenen (2009) 
Writing off uncollectible receivables in later periods 
 
Albrecht (2006), Rezaee (2005), and 
Coenen (2009) 
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Illegitimate cutoff of sales transactions at the end of the reporting 
period.  
Albrecht (2006), Rezaee (2005), and 
Coenen (2009) 
Hiding sales returns and allowances from auditors to overstate net 
sales and income 
Elder, et al., (2010) 
Understate bad debt expense by understating the allowance for 
doubtful accounts. 
 
Elder, et al. (2010); Albrecht (2006), 
Rezaee (2005), and Coenen (2009) 
Not writing off uncollectible receivables  
 
Albrecht (2006), Rezaee (2005), and 
Coenen (2009) 
 
2.3.2 Improper Assets Valuation  
Manipulation of assets is often done to enhance a balance sheet, especially the important ratios involving 
assets (Wells, 2005). There are various ways fraud perpetrators can use to improperly valuate assets, some 
are summarised in table 2.2 based on the findings from prior literature. 
Table 2.2 How improper assets valuation schemes are committed 
Methods and concealment Cited by 
Manipulating the physical inventory count 
 
Wells (2005), Albrecht (2006), and 
Coenen (2008)  
Inflating the unit costs used to price out inventory  
 
Wells (2005), Albrecht (2006), and 
Coenen (2008)  
Failing to write down obsolete inventory or other assets with 
impaired values or collection problems 
Wells (2005), Albrecht (2006), and 
Coenen (2008)  
Failing to relieve inventory for costs of goods sold. This may 
usually involve the creation of fake documents such as inventory 
count sheets, receiving reports, and similar items.  
Wells (2005), Albrecht (2006), and 
Coenen (2008)  
Improperly capitalising inventory and startup costs Wells (2005), Albrecht (2006), and 
Coenen (2008)  
Overstating discounts or not reducing inventory cost 
 
Wells (2005), Albrecht (2006), and 
Coenen (2008)  
Overstatement of the quantity of inventory on hand by making false 
journal entries. This can further be concealed by phony shipping, 
receiving documents and invoices, and possibly by empty boxes 
stored in a warehouse 
Wells (2005), Albrecht (2006), and 
Coenen (2008); Jones (2011); Lord 
(2010) 
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Misstating provisions for obsolete and slow-moving inventory Jones (2011) 
Changing method for valuing inventory Jones (2011) 
Misstating the figure of production overheads which is included in 
the calculation of inventory. 
Jones (2011) 
Improper recognition of inventory on consignment (Lord, 2010) 
Improper recognition of obsolete or non-saleable inventory (Lord, 2010) 
overstatement of the value of inventory items (by not writing off 
obsolete inventory or not creating a proper reserve for inventory 
with a reduced value 
Coenen (2009) 
Recording fictitious receivables Wells (2005), Albrecht (2006), and 
Coenen (2008)  
Failure to write off accounts receivable as bad debts Wells (2005), Albrecht (2006), and 
Coenen (2008)  
overstating accounts receivable Wells (2005) 
Booking fictitious assets which affects account totals on a 
company's balance sheet by creating fictitious documents  
Wells (2005), Albrecht (2006), and 
Coenen (2008)  
 
Manipulating depreciation by either changing the lifetime of the 
asset or writing down the value of the fixed assets 
Jones (2011) 
 
Not recording depreciation   
 
Wells (2005), Albrecht (2006), and 
Coenen (2008)  
Reporting fixed assets at market values instead of the lower 
acquisition costs or at even higher inflated values with fake 
valuations to support them 
Wells (2005), Albrecht (2006), and 
Coenen (2008)  
 
Overstating asset costs with related parties   
 
Wells (2005), Albrecht (2006), and 
Coenen (2008)  
Misstating marketable securities with the aid of related parties Wells (2005), Albrecht (2006), and 
Coenen (2008)  
Overstating returns or record returns in an earlier period Wells (2005), Albrecht (2006), and 
Coenen (2008)  
The value of Property, plant, and equipment are simply overstated Wells (2005), Albrecht (2006), and 
Coenen (2008)  
Failing to write down assets with impaired values 
 
Wells (2005), Albrecht (2006), and 
Coenen (2008)  
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Manipulating estimates of fair market value 
 
Wells (2005), Albrecht (2006), and 
Coenen (2008)  
Manipulating reserves Wells (2005), Albrecht (2006), and 
Coenen (2008)  
Improper valuation of investments through intentionally 
misclassifying the investments 
Coenen (2009) 
Improperly recording the amounts attributable to mergers or 
acquisitions via recording market instead of book value. 
Coenen (2009) 
 
2.3.3 Concealed Liabilities and Expenses  
Concealed liabilities or expenses are much easier to commit than falsifying many sales transactions. Missing 
transactions are generally harder for auditors to detect than improperly recorded ones because there is no 
audit trail (Wells, 2005). Lord (2010) mentioned that when a fraud perpetrator steals cash or another asset, 
this will cause a missing debit and the best way to conceal this is to miss a credit to keep things balanced. 
Understating liabilities can be a very good way to hide the missing credit.  
One common method for concealing liabilities and expenses is by capitalising expenses. By reclassifying 
expenses the creative accountant not only increases profit, but also increases assets. The fixed assets will be 
depreciated and this means that the cost is spread over many years. In 2001, WorldCom, a US 
telecommunications company, capitalised enormous amounts of costs. The company showed $1.4 billion 
profit in 2001 rather than a loss. The company first paid costs such as wages and salaries to workers for 
performing maintenance on telecom systems. These were excluded from expenses and capitalised. Then 
overtime they were depreciated (Jones, 2011). Table 2.3 summarises some of the techniques used to conceal 
liabilities and expenses as cited in prior literature. 
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Table 2.3 How concealed liabilities and concealed expenses schemes are committed 
Methods and concealment Source 
Understate accounts payable by not recording accounts 
payable until the subsequent period or by recording 
fictitious reductions to accounts payable. This can be 
done by closing a period early on the payable side, 
preventing employees from entering additional 
accounts payable into the accounting system, even 
though items should have been recorded. 
Elder, et al., (2010); Wells (2005); 
Sterling (2002), AICPA (2007), Coenen 
(2008, 2009)  
 
 Failure to record liabilities such as unearned revenues, 
warranty reserves, service obligations, or contingent 
liabilities. 
Coenen (2009)  
 
Not accruing liabilities  
 
Wells (2005), Sterling (2002), AICPA 
(2007), Coenen (2008, 2009)  
Record accruals in later period 
 
Wells (2005), Sterling (2002), AICPA 
(2007), Coenen (2008, 2009)  
Recording unearned revenues as earned revenues Wells (2005), Sterling (2002), AICPA 
(2007), Coenen (2008, 2009)  
Under-recording liabilities  
 
Wells (2005), Sterling (2002), AICPA 
(2007), Coenen (2008, 2009)  
Not recording repurchase agreements and commitments Wells (2005), Sterling (2002), AICPA 
(2007), Coenen (2008, 2009)  
Recording contingent liabilities at too low an amount Wells (2005), Sterling (2002), AICPA 
(2007), Coenen (2008, 2009)  
Moving liabilities between long-term and current 
liabilities. This tactic aimed at improving financial 
ratios and adjusting the financial statements depending 
on the configuration of liabilities that is most preferable 
at the time.  
Wells (2005), Sterling (2002), AICPA 
(2007), Coenen (2008, 2009), Coenen 
(2009) 
Not recording purchases 
 
Wells (2005), Sterling (2002), AICPA 
(2007), Coenen (2008, 2009)  
Overstating purchase returns and purchase discounts 
 
Wells (2005), Sterling (2002), AICPA 
(2006), Coenen (2008, 2009)  
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Not booking expenses as they are incurred  
 
Wells (2005), Sterling (2002), AICPA 
(2007), Coenen (2008, 2009)  
Failing to write down assets such as accounts 
receivable, inventory, or buildings and equipment to the 
correct values under the accounting rules.  
Wells (2005), Sterling (2002), AICPA 
(2007), Coenen (2008, 2009)  
Reducing expenses by failing to report sales discounts, 
returns, and allowances 
Wells (2005), Sterling (2002), AICPA 
(2007), Coenen (2008, 2009)  
Capitalising smaller amounts of expenses which have a 
good chance of going unnoticed 
Wells (2005), Sterling (2002), AICPA 
(2007), Coenen (2008, 2009)  
Reporting cost of sales as a non-operating expense so it 
does not negatively affect gross margin 
Wells (2005), Sterling (2002), AICPA 
(2007), Coenen (2008, 2009)  
 
2.3.4 Improper Disclosure  
Most fraudulent financial reporting cases involve the intentional misstatement of amounts, rather than 
disclosures. Although less frequent, several notable cases of fraudulent financial reporting involve 
inadequate disclosure. For example, a central issue in the Enron case was whether the company adequately 
disclosed obligations to affiliates known as special-purpose entities (Elder, et al., 2010). Wells (2005) stated 
that, improper disclosure usually involves the following: liability omissions, subsequent events, related party 
transaction, and accounting changes. The Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) No. 57: 
Related Party Disclosures mentioned that: 
 The term related party transaction refer to both; transactions which are not alleged to be improper but which require 
disclosure as related party transactions and improper transactions which if proper would require disclosure as related 
party transactions. Within misstatements, failure to disclose a material related party transaction is itself a 
misstatement, whether or not the transaction included improperly reported elements or was economically 
disadvantageous to the company (FASB, 1982, p.2).  
 
Studies consistently show that related party transactions occur in companies with weak governance and 
monitoring mechanisms providing the possibility of opportunistic behaviour (Gordon et al., 2007; Kohlbeck 
and Mayhew, 2004). Henry, et al., (2007) mentioned that failure to identify related party transactions was 
found to be one of the top ten audit deficiencies. The use of related party transactions in fraudulent financial 
reporting aims to inflate reported income.  
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The concern as highlighted in Enron and Adelphia cases is that transactions between related parties may be 
for fraudulent purposes rather than for genuine business purposes or may be inadequately disclosed. Related 
party transactions are difficult to audit for many reasons. First, because auditors must rely on management 
to provide detailed information on related parties and related party transactions. The second reason is that 
internal controls have difficulty tracking related party transactions because of the wide variety of parties and 
types of transactions and because some transactions may not be given accounting recognition, e.g., receipt 
of free services from a related party. Except in the case of loans to some related parties (directors and 
officers), which are disallowed by Sarbanes Oxley, regulators generally do not prohibit related party 
transactions, but rather require disclosure (Coenen, 2009). 
The notes and disclosures included with financial statements can be misrepresented, inadequate, or non-
existent. This type of fraud impacts the financial statement user’s ability to fully evaluate the numbers. 
Typical misrepresentations or failures to disclose as noted by Coenen (2009) include:  
 Pending litigation or government investigation 
 Potential product liability or significant warranty issues 
 Significant events such as changes in product offerings or services or downturns in the market 
demand for a company’s products or services 
 Obsolescence of technology being used by the company especially if the company has historically 
relied on that technology to drive revenue. 
 Decline in the market value of significant investments held by the company. 
 Changes in accounting rules or their applications that may mean numbers between accounting periods 
are no longer comparable,  
 Existence of related party transactions or agreements that may not have been negotiated at arm’s 
length 
 Events occurring after the close of an accounting period that might have a material impact on the 
opinions of financial statement users. 
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2.4 Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting Fraud 
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled. Boards of directors are 
responsible for the governance of their companies through establishing formal and transparent procedures 
for maintaining fair financial reporting, effective risk management and internal control system, and for 
keeping good relationship with the company’s auditors. The shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint 
the directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place 
(The Financial Reporting Council, 2016).  
 
The responsibility for detecting and preventing fraud lies in the hand of management and those charged with 
governance (Wells, 2005; Elder et al, 2010). ISA 240 (2010) added that: 
It is important that management, with the oversight of those charged with governance, place a strong emphasis on 
fraud prevention, which may reduce opportunities for fraud to take place, and fraud deterrence, which could 
persuade individuals not to commit fraud because of the likelihood of detection and punishment. This involves a 
commitment to creating a culture of honesty and ethical behaviour which can be reinforced by an active oversight 
by those charged with governance. Oversight by those charged with governance includes considering the potential 
for override of controls or other inappropriate influence over the financial reporting process, such as efforts by 
management to manage earnings in order to influence the perceptions of analysts as to the entity’s performance and 
profitability (para 4, p.158). 
 
However external auditors have a responsibility as well which was detailed in the audit standards. For 
instance, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) issued the International 
Standard on Auditing (ISA) No.200 Overall Objectives of the Independent Auditor and the Conduct of an 
Audit in Accordance with International Standards on Auditing that stated that “external auditors are 
responsible for obtaining reasonable assurance that the financial statements taken as a whole are free from 
material misstatement, whether caused by fraud or error” (para.5, p.3). IAASB also issued ISA No. 240 the 
Auditor’s Responsibility Relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements that requires external auditors 
to assess and respond to fraud risks arising from only two types of internal fraud “asset misappropriation and 
financial reporting fraud”. ISA No. 240 (2010) thus requires external auditors to: (a) identify and assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud; (b) obtain sufficient appropriate audit 
evidence regarding the assessed risks of material misstatement due to fraud, through designing and 
implementing appropriate responses; and (c) respond appropriately to fraud or suspected fraud identified 
during the audit  
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ISA 240 also requires external auditors to assess and respond to the risk of financial reporting fraud and to 
categorise that risk into three categories: risk of motives/pressure to commit fraud, risk of opportunity to 
commit fraud, and risk of rationalisation of fraud (para A25, p.187). External auditors are also required to 
consider management’s integrity while assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud (para A64, p.186). The 
standard requires external auditors to use professional scepticism throughout the audit and to consider the 
risk of management override of controls (ISA 240, para 8, p.159). Professional scepticism is defined by ISA 
200: “Overall objectives of the independent audit and the conduct of an audit in accordance with 
international standards on auditing” (2009, Paragraph 13) as “An attitude that includes a questioning mind, 
being alert to conditions which may indicate possible misstatements due to error or fraud, and a critical 
assessment of audit evidence”.  ISA 240 (2010) stated that: 
The risk of the auditor not detecting a material misstatement resulting from management fraud is greater than for 
employee fraud, because management is frequently in a position to directly or indirectly manipulate accounting 
records, present fraudulent financial information or override control procedures designed to prevent similar frauds 
by other employees (para 7, p.159).  
 
As for reporting suspected fraud, ISA 240 requires external auditors to communicate any fraud related 
matters to management and those charged with governance on a timely basis. If external auditors suspect 
that management or those charged with governance might be involved in fraud, the standard requires auditors 
to determine whether there is a responsibility to report the occurrence or suspicion to a party outside the 
entity. The standard then stated that: 
 Although the auditor’s professional duty to maintain the confidentiality of client information may preclude such 
reporting, the auditor’s legal responsibilities may override the duty of confidentiality in some circumstances. (ISA 
240, Ref: Para. A65–A67, p.166) 
 
ISA 315 Assessing the risk of material misstatements requires a discussion among the engagement team 
members and the engagement partner about how and where the client’s financial statements may be 
susceptible to material misstatement due to fraud, including how fraud might occur (2009, para. A10–A11). 
Weak internal control system and poor governance could increase the risk of financial reporting fraud. The 
most prominent organisational weakness that contributed to corporate fraud in the ACFE global fraud study 
in 2016 was a lack of internal controls followed by an override of existing internal controls.  
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Ineffective board leadership could also increase fraud risks. The ACFE (2016) found that poor tone at the 
top was much more likely to contribute to financial reporting fraud schemes. Thus, weak corporate 
governance mechanisms are more likely to increase fraud risks. Hasnan et al (2013) argued that the 
opportunity to commit financial reporting fraud increases when the firm does not have strong corporate 
governance mechanisms. Dechow et al (1996 as cited in Dunn, 1999) found that weak governance structure 
provides the opportunity for firms to engage in financial reporting fraud. Beasley (1996, as cited in Dunn, 
1999) studied the importance of governance structures in preventing fraudulent financial reporting and found 
that the likelihood of fraudulent reporting decreases when there are more non-management directors on the 
board, the longer the tenure of the outside directors on the board, and the larger their ownership interest in 
the firm. Dunn (2004) found that financial reporting fraud is more likely to occur when there is a 
concentration of power in the hands of insiders where they regulate the flow of information needed to make 
decisions and also control the board through ownership interest. Johnson et al. (2008) found that fraud firms 
are high growth firms and have more insiders on their audit committees which imply a lower likelihood of 
fraud detection and thus lower expected costs of committing fraud. Rezaee (2005) and Hasnan et al (2008) 
found that lack of responsible corporate governance was one of the factors causing financial reporting fraud. 
Owens- Jackson et al. (2009) examined the association between audit committee characteristics and the 
quality of financial reporting. Their results revealed that the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting is 
negatively related to audit committee independence and number of audit committee meetings.  
External auditors serve as one of the few credible sources of external governance mechanisms capable of 
discouraging opportunistic behaviour of managers (Chen et al., 2013; ICAEW, 2005). In a study conducted 
by the ACFE in 2016, findings revealed that the presence of anti-fraud controls was correlated with both 
lower fraud losses and quicker detection and that external audits of the financial statements were the most 
commonly implemented anti-fraud control. External auditors could act as an effective fraud deterrent 
mechanism because most fraud perpetrators fear getting caught and the associated consequences (Rezaee 
and Riley, 2010; Dorminey et al., 2012). Smith and Baharuddin (2005) argued that due to the nature of their 
work, auditors cannot ignore the fact that they are among the parties that can detect fraud at the earliest 
stages. Zikmund (2008) added that although auditors cannot detect all types of fraud because of its collusive 
nature, this does not give them an excuse to refrain from looking for it.  
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Despite their responsibility with regards to financial reporting fraud, external auditors are likely to be blamed, 
if corporations suddenly fail or if it is revealed that management or key employees are involved in fraudulent 
activities (Cooper and Fargher, 2011; Kassem and Higson, 2016). This might result in high litigation costs 
and a loss of confidence in the usefulness of external audit. For instance, KPMG has agreed to pay $115 
million to settle lawsuits stemming from the collapse of Lernout & Hauspie, a software company as a result 
of a massive financial reporting fraud. The company were charged with forgery and stock price manipulation 
in Belgium. This involved the company’s executives and officers. A growing number of shareholders 
accused KPMG of being active participants in the fraud (Taub, 2004). Fraudulent financial reporting is a 
critical problem for external auditors because of the possible legal liability for failure to detect false financial 
statements and because of the damage that might be caused to the reputation of the audit profession as a 
result of public dissatisfaction about undetected fraud (Pincus, 1994; Reffett, 2010). Goel and Gangolly 
(2012) found that auditors face adverse legal and regulatory consequences if fraud goes undetected. In a 
study by Bernnan and Mcgrath (2007) findings revealed that external auditors are more likely to be sued as 
a result of management fraud. Palmrose (1987) studied the relationship between business failures or 
management fraud and legal actions against auditors. The findings showed that actions against auditors are 
more likely in cases of audit failure when management fraud is involved.  
2.5 The Audit Expectation Gap 
Following the fraud scandals in large companies like Enron, WorldCom, Xerox, and alleged fraud cases like 
Lehman Brothers, AIG, and Freddie Mac, investors’ concerns about fraud in general and fraudulent financial 
reporting in particular has increased (Kassem and Higson, 2012). There are varying perceptions over the role 
and level of assurance that could be expected from external auditors especially when it comes to fraud. This 
difference in perception about the auditors’ responsibilities was known as “The audit expectation gap” and 
was defined as a gap between what the public expects and what it actually receives (Humphrey et al, 1993; 
Porter, 1993; Monroe and Woodliff, 1993; Epstein and Greiger, 1994; Koh and Woo, 1998; Gay, et al., 1998; 
Alleyne and Howard, 2005; Dewing and Russell, 2002).  
Public expectations of external auditors’ role in detecting fraud could be the result of a lack of understanding 
of the responsibility of external auditors with regards to corporate fraud. However, these expectations may 
result in higher settlement costs for audit firms and thus need to be taken into consideration. Alabede (2012) 
stated that: the public expectation of the role of the auditors has changed and now auditors are required to 
play their role in increasing the likelihood of material fraud detection. Adeyemi and Uadiale (2011) added 
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that unless auditor’s role conforms to public expectation, the audit profession might risk social action of 
enforcement or penalty for nonconformity.  
Reviewing prior literature revealed that the reasons behind the audit expectation gap could be the result of 
not clearly defining the role of external auditors with regards to fraud throughout its history (Lee, 1986). The 
audit expectation gap could also pertain to limitations in the international audit standards. For instance, the 
nature of the audit standards allows inconsistencies in the application of fraud-related audit procedures by 
audit firms. This is because fraud-related audit procedures are suggested rather than required or enforced. 
The standards also provided little guidance to external auditors with regards to fraud risk assessment and 
response (Kassem and Higson, 2012a). ISA 240 requires external auditors to apply professional scepticism 
while assessing the risk of fraud however Higson (2011) argued that professional scepticism is not enough 
and that the audit profession should employ “critical thinking” which also requires an understanding of the 
motivations behind management fraud. This was supported by the Public Oversight Board (POB) (2000) that 
noted that Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) do not provide sufficient guidance to adequately 
implement the concept of professional scepticism because management usually is judged as possessing 
integrity despite the fact that management may have at least some motivation to perpetrate fraudulent 
financial reporting. 
Other researchers found the gap exists because external auditors are not doing enough to combat fraud. For 
instance, Zimbelman (1997) found limited evidence of an increase in the extent of audit procedures and no 
evidence of a change in the nature of procedures in response to fraud risk assessments. Shelton et al. (2001) 
conducted a study to determine whether there are differences in auditing firms’ fraud risk assessment 
practices. They found that auditors’ responses to identified fraud risk factors are different across firms, and 
the identification of a fraud risk factor did not cause a modification to the planned audit approach. Louwers 
et al. (2008) examined 43 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement actions against auditors 
related to the examination of related-party transactions, results revealed that the audit failures in these fraud 
cases were due to a lack of auditor professional scepticism and due professional care than any deficiency in 
current auditing standards. Hammersley, et al., (2011) conducted an experimental study on audit seniors to 
examine their responses to fraud risk factors as a way of providing evidence about the effectiveness and 
efficiency of audit seniors’ fraud risk assessments and fraud risk responses. Their findings revealed that 
auditors do not respond in an effective and appropriate way to heightened fraud risk.  
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Hassink et al. (2010) conducted a study in Denmark to determine the degree of external auditors’ compliance 
with auditing standards once they encounter fraud. The findings revealed that there are great differences 
among audit firms regarding compliance with the relevant auditing standards and that auditors appear to 
encounter corporate fraud only incidentally. They also found that in cases where the auditor has detected 
fraud, relevant procedures and regulations are not fully complied with. In a study by the ACFE (2014), the 
findings revealed that external audit was among the least effective methods for detecting corporate fraud. 
Their results showed that 3% of the fraud cases in their study was detected by external audit. This percentage 
seems to have decreased compared to the ACFE results in 2012 and 2010 where 3.3% and 4.6% of the fraud 
cases in their study were detected by external audit in 2012 and 2010 respectively. However, their results 
also revealed that in these fraud cases, external audit seemed to be more likely to help in detecting material 
financial reporting fraud than asset misappropriation and corruption. The Audit Inspection Unit of the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in the UK stated in its 2015 annual report that some of the issues that 
were identified in prior audit inspections continue to be common issues in most audit firms in the UK. These 
issues include insufficient scepticism in challenging the appropriateness of assumptions in key areas of audit 
judgment such as impairment testing and property valuation, insufficient or inappropriate procedures being 
performed in many audit areas including revenue recognition, and the failure of audit firms to adequately 
identify the threats and related safeguards to auditor independence.  
In order to narrow the audit expectation gap more efforts are needed from external auditors, audit regulators, 
and researchers to combat fraud. Improved fraud risk assessment and fraud detection techniques are also 
needed (Porter, 1993; Uddin, 2000; Jayalakshmy et al., 2005; Pincus, 1994 and Palmrose 1987 as cited by 
Uddin and Gillet, 2002; Golden et al., 2006 as cited by Reffett, 2010; Rezaee and Riley, 2010). The audit 
expectation gap can be reduced by designing effective fraud detection techniques, providing external auditors 
with guidance and training on how to properly assess and respond to fraud risks, and putting more efforts to 
ensure that audit firms are consistently complying with the requirements of the audit standards (Kassem and 
Higson, 2012a). This motivated the current study to explore an effective way or technique to help external 
auditors properly assess and respond to the risk of financial reporting fraud. This is more likely to increase 
the likelihood of detecting material financial reporting fraud and thereby reducing the audit expectation gap. 
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2.6 Summary of Chapter Two  
Financial reporting fraud is a concern for the public, external auditors, and audit regulators.. This chapter 
thus provides an overview of financial reporting fraud including its nature, cost, categories, and who is 
responsible for detecting it. The cost of financial reporting fraud goes beyond financial losses. It could also 
lead to loss of confidence in the capital market, the audit profession, and the current governance mechanisms. 
Financial reporting fraud is more likely to be committed by management and executives however it could 
also be committed by people in the finance, accounting, and sales department. No industry is immune from 
financial reporting fraud but financial reporting fraud is more prevalent in the manufacturing, oil and gas, 
construction, transportation and warehousing, and banking industries. Financial reporting fraud could be 
committed by either understating assets/revenues or overstating assets/revenues. The methods used include 
improper revenue recognition and timing difference, improper assets valuation, concealed liabilities and 
expenses, and improper disclosure.  
The main responsibility for detecting financial reporting fraud lies with management and those charged with 
governance in the first place. However external auditors have a responsibility with regards to financial 
reporting fraud. The audit standards required external auditors to provide reasonable assurance that the 
financial statements are free from material misstatements whether due to error or fraud. External auditors are 
also required to assess and respond to fraud risks arising from financial reporting fraud while considering 
circumstances that might increase the risk of pressure/motives to commit fraud, opportunity to commit fraud, 
and rationalisation of fraud. The standards also required external auditors to consider management integrity 
and the risk of management override of controls while applying professional scepticism.  
There are various perceptions regarding the responsibility of external auditors with regards to fraud. These 
various perceptions can be referred to as the audit expectation gap. This chapter discusses the reasons behind 
the audit expectation gap and what is required to narrow this gap. The reasons behind the audit expectation 
gap pertain to the lack of understanding of the role of external auditors with regards to fraud, limitations in 
the audit standards, and negligence from the external auditors’ part in complying with the requirement of the 
audit standards in relation to fraud risk assessment and response. The audit expectation gap can be reduced 
by designing effective fraud detection techniques, providing external auditors with guidance and training on 
how to properly assess and respond to fraud risks, and putting more efforts to ensure that audit firms are 
consistently complying with the requirements of the audit standards.  
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The current study aims to help external auditors properly assess and respond to the risk of financial reporting 
fraud.  This might increase the likelihood of its detection and narrow the audit expectation gap.  
The next chapter critically reviews prior studies into the techniques available for detecting financial reporting 
fraud. This includes an evaluation of the effectiveness of these techniques in detecting financial reporting 
fraud by providing evidence from prior literature. The chapter also identifies gaps in prior literature and the 
audit standards related to this area and shows how the current study addressed these gaps.  
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Chapter Three: 
Financial Reporting Fraud Detection Techniques – A Critical Review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to critically review prior studies into the techniques available for detecting financial 
reporting fraud. This includes an evaluation of the effectiveness of these techniques by providing evidence 
from prior literature. The chapter also identifies gaps in the literature as well as the audit standards related to 
the area of financial reporting fraud detection, and shows how the current study sought to fill in these gaps.  
Reviewing prior literature revealed that the techniques available for detecting financial reporting fraud 
includes the use of analytical procedures, red flags for fraud, statistical and data mining techniques, and the 
fraud triangle model. Hence, each of these techniques are discussed in detail in a separate section in this 
chapter.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents and critically reviews prior studies into 
the use of analytical procedures in detecting financial reporting fraud. Section 3.3 presents and critically 
reviews prior studies into the use of red flags in detecting financial reporting fraud. Section 3.4 presents and 
critically reviews prior studies into the use of statistical, digital, and data mining techniques in detecting 
financial reporting fraud. Section 3.5 discusses and critically reviews the use of the current fraud triangle 
model in detecting financial reporting fraud. Section 3.6 discusses the audit of management motivations as 
a technique for detecting financial reporting fraud. Section 3.7 is a summary of chapter three.  
3.2 Analytical Procedures and Financial Reporting Fraud Detection  
ISA 520: Analytical procedures (2009) defines analytical procedures as “evaluations of financial information 
through analysis of plausible relationships among both financial and non-financial data” (para.A1-A3). ISA 
520 required external auditors to obtain relevant and reliable evidence when using substantive analytical 
procedures, and to design and perform analytical procedures near the end of the audit to help the auditor in 
making an overall conclusion about whether the financial statements are consistent with the auditors’ 
understanding of the client’s nature of business. The standard also requires auditors to apply analytical 
procedures as risk assessment procedures to obtain an understanding of the entity and its environment and in 
the overall review at the end of the audit.  
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Reviewing prior literature showed that analytical procedures ranges from the use of simple procedures like 
ratio and trend analysis, to more complex procedures with the use of statistical models.  
Although the use of analytical procedures in detecting financial reporting fraud was supported by some prior 
studies, reviewing prior literature also showed mixed results regarding the effectiveness of analytical 
procedures in detecting financial reporting fraud. For instance, Dechow, et al. (2010) used financial ratios, 
two non-financial measures and market performance ratios to predict financial reporting tendencies and 
found that fraudulent firms had an increase in the price to earnings ratio, increase in book to market ratios, 
increase in debt to equity ratio and decrease in free cash flows. Brazel et al (2009) examined whether auditors 
can effectively use non-financial measures to assess the reasonableness of financial performance and thus, 
help detect financial reporting fraud. Their results provide empirical evidence suggesting that nonfinancial 
measures can be effectively used to assess fraud risk. However, their study suffered a number of limitations. 
First they did not provide auditors or other interested parties with a specific model or variable for detecting 
fraud, they only used publicly available empirical data to test the validity of claims by regulators and 
educators that non-financial measures provide valuable incremental information for assessing fraud risk. 
Second, non-financial measures can be manipulated by management to make it consistent with reported 
financial results. Third, the availability of non-financial measures varies by firm, thus auditors may need to 
develop different approaches for using non-financial measures to detect fraud. Fourth, it is difficult to 
determine if the change in non-financial measures should lead or show changes in revenue.  
Bell and Carcello (2000) investigated whether a logistic regression model including significant risk factors 
performs well in predicting fraud using 77 fraudulent engagements and 305 non-fraud engagements with 
various risk factors included as explanatory variables. They found that a simple logistic model outperforms 
auditors in fraud risk assessment. Spathis (2002) developed a model using logistic regression to identify the 
factors associated with financial reporting fraud. The results revealed that the model is capable of detecting 
financial reporting fraud. However, the main weakness of this study is that the author failed to examine 
qualitative factors such as the type of auditor used, auditor’s opinions, size of the company, and employee 
turnover for financial statement detection. Another limitation is that, the author did not mention whether the 
model is applicable to other firms in other countries for financial reporting fraud detection. He also used one 
method to develop the model rather than using other methods like discriminant analysis and multi-criteria 
analysis.  
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Chen and Sennetti (2005) applied a logistic regression model to a matched sample of 52 computer firms 
accused of fraudulent financial reporting by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the findings 
revealed that the model achieved an overall prediction rate of 91 percent for fraud and non-fraud firms. Grove 
and Basilico (2008) considered the experiences of fraudulent financial reporting companies in five industries 
in a study and developed a model using both financial and non-financial ratios to detect financial reporting 
fraud.  Their sample included the five companies committed fraudulent financial reporting: Enron, 
WorldCom, Global Crossing, Xerox, and Parmalt. Their results showed that the model worked very well in 
detecting fraudulent financial reporting with an overall 76 percent accuracy with 14 percent Type I errors 
and 10 percent Type II errors. Suyanto (2009) constructed a fraud prediction model, which accurately 
predicts fraud with a success rate up to 67.1%. However, a major weakness is that the predictive fraud model 
may misclassify non-fraudulent firms, which have in fact committed fraud, but have not been subject to the 
SEC enforcement.  
McAteer (2009) developed a model for detecting and preventing management fraud using three groups of 
financial ratios and the model was tested on community banks for a period of three years before the 
occurrence of management fraud. the conceptual framework reflected in his model is that financial statements 
provide a lens to view the actions of management and determine conditions that increase the likelihood of 
management fraud occurring. The results of the study supports that certain performance ratios are predictive 
of conditions that increase the likelihood of management fraud occurring. Yue, et al. (2009) used logistic 
regression to develop a model for detecting fraudulent financial statement of listed companies in China.  The 
results showed that the predictive ability of their model is 10% higher than other models. However, their 
model cannot tell auditors whether a firm is committing financial reporting fraud or not because it is built of 
financial ratios which are just warning signs rather than evidences of fraud. Srivastava, et al. (2009) 
introduced an evidential reasoning approach of combining probabilities in a network of variables to derive 
analytical models under the Bayesian framework. The objective of their research was to develop and illustrate 
the use of a formula for financial reporting fraud risk assessment. The evidential reasoning approach was 
used to derive a formula for fraud risk based on the fraud triangle factors. Their model allows a systematic, 
objective method of aggregating evidence from multiple sources regarding the likelihood of financial 
reporting fraud. They said their formula will facilitate the precise assessment of the impact of the presence 
or absence of and interrelationships between the factors of the fraud triangle. However, as a weakness in 
their model, they did not mention how their formula will facilitate the fraud risk assessment and how the 
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model can be used by external auditors. Besides, their formula still needs empirical research to help assess 
the probabilities included in the formula.  
Dechow et al (2010) examined 2,190 SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) issued 
between 1982 and 2005 and identified firms with misstated quarterly or annual earnings. They examined 
accrual quality, financial performance, non-financial measures, off-balance sheet activities, and market-
based measures for identifying misstatements. They also developed a scaled logistic probability known as 
the fraud score (F-score) this model is then designed, tested and proven to be an accurate indicator of material 
accounting frauds. They found that at the time of misstatements, accrual quality is low and both financial 
and non-financial measures of performance are deteriorating. However, their models generate a high 
frequency of false positives, which means many firms that do not have enforcement actions against them are 
predicted to have misstated their earnings. Another limitation in their study is that they identified only 
misstatements that were actually identified by the SEC, however, there could be many cases where a 
misstatement goes undetected or is at least not subject to SEC enforcement action.  
In support of the Dechow’s model, Skousen and Twedt (2010) applied the F-score model and determined the 
mean F-scores and their standard deviations for various countries and different industries within these 
countries. By using ten years’ worth of data (1998-2007) obtained from the compustat global 
industrial/commercial file database, they developed F-scores for 17,873 domestic and 27,566 foreign firms 
–years. They then compared the F-score data (mean and standard deviations) to that of the USA in order to 
give an overall picture of the level of fraud potential in various industries internationally. The results showed 
that the model correctly identifies manipulating firm-years over 60 percent of the time. However, the F-score 
is an indicator of fraud risk, but not an outright signal that fraud exists. This means auditors need to perform 
additional tests on a client that has a high F-score. Another limitation, the F-score does not indicate why a 
country or industry might have high F-scores and does not provide insight into the firm characteristics of 
fraud risk beyond country and industry. 
In contrast, evidence from the literature also showed that analytical procedures have limitations and thus 
should not be used solely for detecting financial reporting fraud. For instance, in a study by Knechel (1988) 
twelve analytical review procedures were assessed based on ratio and trend models to four sets of simulated 
accounting data which were seeded with different patterns of known overstatement errors. The findings 
revealed that analytical review procedures should not be relied on entirely to satisfy audit objectives.  
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Kaminiski and Wetzel (2004) performed a longitudinal examination of various financial ratios on 30 matched 
pairs of firms. Their findings revealed no difference in the dynamics between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
firms which indicates the limited ability of financial ratios to detect fraud. Churyk et al. (2009) argued that 
quantitative models often cannot detect deception early enough, is not always the most important indicator 
of the most successful and prediction model, and point only activities related to quantitative results and 
potentially ignoring attitudes and intentions that might be signals for fraudulent behaviours. Calderon and 
Green (1994) added that analytical procedures, whether simple or sophisticated, produce relatively high 
levels of false investigation signals, sophisticated expectation models could result in costly audit, and 
overreliance on analytical procedures in fieldwork may result in some inefficiency.  
Gao (2005) mentioned that regression models ignore the structure and interrelations between risk factors. He 
also noted that a linear combination of estimated coefficients might exhibit accuracy in certain situations but 
can hardly be expected to predict various types of fraud in different situations. Wuerges and Borba (2011) 
stated that the binary choice models (logit and probit) commonly used in the previous literature fail to account 
for undetected cases of fraud and thus present unreliable hypotheses tests. In their study they used a sample 
of 118 companies accused of fraud by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), estimated a logit 
model that corrects the problems arising from undetected frauds in U.S. companies and their research had 
three aims. The results showed that only 1.43 percent of the instances of financial reporting fraud were 
publicised by the SEC, and of the six significant variables used in the traditional model, only three remained 
significant in their model. This indicates that undiscovered fraud cases might lead to unreliable results in 
traditional, uncorrected models. They also noted that there is a need for theoretical development on the causes 
of fraud that allows for the identification of better models.  
Critics of ratio and trend analysis added that it is insufficient for fraud detection (Harrington, 2005, as cited 
by Pustylnick, 2009), involves subjectivity in identifying the ratios that are likely to indicate fraud (Hogan 
et al., 2008), leads to high rates of misclassification and thus yield limited success in identifying fraud 
(Bierstaker, et al., 1999 as cited by Brazel et al., 2009, Salehi and Mansoury, 2009), indicates fraud long 
after catastrophic financial results are irreversible (Churyk et al., 2009), is unlikely to be effective at detecting 
fraud because management can manipulate the financial data (PCAOB 2004, Carpenter, 2008), and lacks 
theoretical underpinning as a predictor of managerial fraud (Grazioli et al., 2007).   
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3.3 The Use of Red Flags and Financial Reporting Fraud Detection: 
Red flags are defined as conditions or circumstances that indicate potential fraud (Moyes and Hasan, 1996; 
Alleyne et al., 2010). They can also be defined as “a set of circumstances that are unusual in nature or vary 
from the normal activity” (Hancox, 2007, p.3). The use of red flags was supported by the audit standards in 
assessing the risk of fraud (ISA 240 and ISA 315). The use of red flags in detecting financial reporting fraud 
was also supported by prior literature. For instance, Loebbecke, et al., 1989 conducted a study to examine 
the frequency of occurrence of material irregularities, the nature of material irregularities, and the relevance 
of the red flags that might be associated with each as cited by previous research. They distributed a survey 
to 121 U.S. audit partners of KPMG Peat Marwick to collect their data. The results showed that respondents 
supported the use of red flags in detecting fraud and highlighted the red flags that had a very high frequency 
of occurrence.  
Weisenborn and Norris (1997) applied 86 red flags to 30 known fraud cases and found the presence of these 
red flags in most of the cases. Bell and Carcello (2000) developed and tested a logistic regression to estimate 
the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting using a sample of 77 fraud engagements and 305 non-fraud 
engagements, using the incidence of red flags as explanatory variables, the results revealed that the following 
5 significant red flags effectively discriminated between fraud and non-fraud engagements: management lied 
to the auditor, a weak internal control environment, an unduly aggressive management attitude, undue 
management emphasis on meeting earning projections, and significant difficult -to-audit transactions.  
Murcia and Borba (2007) constructed a framework of red flags to detect financial reporting fraud. Their 
selection was based on identifying the works that presented a set of red flags related to financial reporting 
fraud, selecting the main red flags that were mentioned twice, classifying the red flags into six clusters based 
on organisational structure and work environment, industry, management behaviour, financial situation of 
the company, the company’s accounting reports, and the work of the independent auditor. However, their 
research lacked empirical testing, and they did not mention the most significant red flags to financial 
reporting fraud occurrence. Webber, et al., 2004 examined how forensic experts at four big 5 professional 
service firms assess the fraud risk factors in SAS No.82. The assessments of forensic experts produced two 
different models of relative importance: a statistical model and a subjective model. The results showed a 
moderate to high degree of consensus among experts’ judgments about the relative importance of fraud risk 
factors. 
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 However, their models suffer from the following limitations: First, the factors were considered individually 
ignoring the fact that some risk factors might interact together and show a high likelihood of management 
fraud. Second, the data derived from the model cannot show how the auditor should respond if faced by a 
high fraud risk. Third, the author noted that there is a limitation in certain design choices in the models. For 
instance, the 100-point allocation measure used in the subjective model creates measurement error. Some 
researchers (Gazioli et al., 2007, and Alleyne et al., 2010) recommended auditors to adopt a high degree of 
scepticism and great awareness of red flags through training and education about fraud risk factors.  
However reviewing prior literature also revealed mixed results about the effectiveness of red flags in 
detecting financial reporting fraud. For instance, critics of red flags mentioned that they are merely indicators 
of potential fraud but do not automatically mean that fraud is occurring (Parodi, 2005 as cited by Murcia and 
Borba, 2007), too general and difficult to operationalise in empirical research (Owusu-Anash et al., 2002), 
not considered effective as it focuses attention on specific cues which in turn inhibit internal and external 
auditors from identifying other reasons that cause fraud to occur (Bierstaker, et al., 2006), difficult to 
combine and weight to assess overall fraud risk and formulate an audit plan (Patterson and Noel 2003 as 
cited by Hogan et al. 2008), and are very limited in terms of assessing overall risk of financial fraud (McKee 
2010). Kapardis (2002) constructed two models to help external auditors in fraud detection. She called her 
first model “Eclectic Fraud Detection model” or “EFD”.  Her second model was part of her first model and 
was called ROP or Rationalisation, Opportunity, and Crime-prone person model. Her first model was tested 
in Australia via a survey distributed to 125 external, internal, and public auditors, while her second model 
was tested in a study of 50 convicted serious fraud offenders in Victoria, Australia. Her model calls for the 
importance of considering about both individuals and companies proneness to fraud.  She also tested the 
ability of red flags to detect fraud. Her findings showed that red flags are not useful in alerting auditors to 
the existence of material irregularities at the planning stage if used alone.  
Gao (2005) argued that it is difficult for auditors to consider and remember risk factors that are not included 
in decision aids which limits their ability to conduct an effective fraud risk assessment. He explained that 
red-flag-based risk assessment models are subject to the “dilution” effect which occurs when people rely too 
much on non-diagnostic cues and rely too little on diagnostic cues. He added that red flags are developed to 
assess the overall fraud risk without assessing potential schemes used by management to perpetrate and 
conceal fraud.  
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Omar and Din (2010) conducted a mail survey to determine the perceptions of 200 external auditors, internal 
auditors, and governmental auditors in Malaysia about the effectiveness of a list of red flags in detecting 
fraud. The results revealed that the effectiveness of fraud risk indicators in the detection and investigation of 
financial fraud is still questionable and that level of usage of red flags by auditors in fraud detection is very 
low. Lundstrom (2009) assembled over 140 red flags, presented them in 16 tables by functional, operational, 
and general areas, and analysed them as positive red flags and negative red flags which he calls “red 
herrings”. Red herrings were defined as false signals that may cause problems if not investigated properly. 
He argued that red flags are no more than a set of circumstances that are unusual in nature or vary from 
normal activity and raise the auditor’s sense of suspicion. He concluded that red flags do not confirm that 
fraud is currently occurring or will occur in the future and that they may simply be red herrings if not further 
and properly investigated by professionals. His results was consistent with Hogan et al (2008) who 
summarised relevant academic research findings to contribute to the PCAOB project on financial reporting 
fraud and to offer insights and conclusions relevant to academics, standard setters, and practitioners. Their 
findings revealed that while symptoms of fraud are observed frequently, the presence of such issues is not 
necessarily indicative of fraud and investigation of such anomalies usually results in a conclusion that fraud 
was not the underlying cause. They further noted that due to attempts by perpetrators to conceal their acts, 
red flags may be relatively few in frequency and minor in amount, at least in the early stages of fraudulent 
financial reporting.   
Heiman-Hoffman et al (1996) asked auditors to rank 30 commonly cited potential red flags as to their relative 
importance for detecting fraudulent financial reporting. They found that respondents perceived attitude 
factors such as dishonest, hostile, aggressive and unreasonable management attitudes to be more important 
warning signs than situational factors. Their findings were different to the findings of Abul Majid and Tsui 
(2001) who found situational factors such as “difficulty to audit transaction” and “indication of going 
concern” are more important than attitude factors. Pincus (1989) examined the efficacy of a red flags’ 
questionnaire for assessing the risk of material fraud of a client using 137 auditors as subjects. Her findings 
suggested that the use of a questionnaire was dysfunctional for the fraud case where respondents assessed 
the fraud risk to be lower than nonusers. This was also supported by Eining et al (1997) who argued that a 
checklist give no mechanical assistance for weighting and combining the red flags cues into an overall 
assessment and suggest that a decision aid should mechanically combine those red flags in a manner that 
enhances the auditor’s reliance on the decision aid.  
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Moyes and Hasan (1996) found that the use of red flag questionnaires caused increased auditor 
comprehension and uniformity in data collection, as well as helped auditors in assessing the risk of fraud 
during the planning stage of the financial statement audits. This was supported by Glover et al (2003) who 
found support for the use of questionnaires by comparing pre and post SAS No.82 planning judgments. The 
authors find that post SAS No.82 judgments are more sensitive to fraud risk factors. For instance post SAS 
No.82 participants are more aware of the need to modify audit plans and are more likely to increase the extent 
of their audit tests in response to increased fraud risk as compared with the pre SAS No.82 participants.  
However, their research suffered from a number of limitations. First, they have significant firm effects that 
may suggest that the results for the first two hypotheses (post SAS No.82 participants demonstrated a greater 
awareness of the need to modify audit plans in response to changes in fraud cues relative to pre- SAS No.82 
participants and post SAS No.82 participants increased the extent of their audit plans in response to increased 
fraud risk, while pre-SAS No.82 participants did not) are due to changes in one firm but not the other. Second, 
their study was unable to attribute the support of these two hypotheses to SAS No.82 because many variables 
other than the adoption of SAS No.82 have changed during the four years that separate the two periods in 
their study and which could be the reason for their results. Examples of such variables include the private 
securities litigation reform act of 1995, firms have revised their audit approaches in ways other than to reflect 
the issuance of SAS No.82, and several large frauds occurred during this period, which may have influenced 
the way respondents of their study assessed fraud. Third, they did not determine the sensitivity of auditors to 
the use of electronic decision aids when responding to fraud risk.  
Asare and Wright (2004) examined the impact of alternative risk assessment (standard risk checklist versus 
no checklist) and programme development (standard programme versus no programme) tools on the quality 
of audit procedures and the propensity to consult fraud experts. An experiment was conducted on 69 auditors 
using a SEC enforcement fraud case to examine these relationships. The findings revealed that auditors who 
use a standard risk checklist made lower risk assessments than those without a checklist. This indicates that 
the use of checklist is not effective in fraud risk assessments. They noted that checklists may hinder the 
auditor’s ability to develop a clear picture of how fraud is committed and concealed, and are expected to 
process risk factors less deeply when they check boxes on a checklist than when they are required to identify 
and list risk factors. Their results were supported by Silverstone (2005) who believed that checklists led to a 
failure in assessing fraud risk, design appropriate procedures, or detect material misstatements caused by 
fraud.  
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Lin-Seow (2009) tested the effectiveness of decision aids in financial statements risk assessments, the results 
suggested that generic decision aids, such as the use of a red flag checklist, can be useful but only for less 
experienced decision makers. However, her study had the following limitations. First, the diagnostic and 
non-diagnostic factors incorporated into the experimental case and the decision aid cues were limited in 
number to keep the time needed to complete the experimental tasks at a manageable length. Second, all 
participants were students with no years of experience and cannot be a good representative for inexperienced 
directors or junior auditors. Alon and Dwyer (2010) used an experiment to investigate how the brainstorming 
component of SAS No.99 influences decision aid use and reliance, and the effectiveness of fraud risk 
assessment. Their findings showed that groups using a decision aid with fraud risk factors demonstrate 
superior decision quality and effectiveness even with lower decision aid reliance than individuals using 
decision aids. However, a major weakness in their study is that their participants were all 62 students, 58 
graduating seniors and 4 master’s-level students, with no experience in the audit field. Thus, they cannot act 
as surrogates for all level of external auditors, and consequently the results cannot be generalised to auditors, 
given the fact that the study sample is also small in size and cannot be representative of the study population.  
In summary, reviewing prior literature into the use of red flags in detecting financial reporting fraud showed 
mixed results. Uddin (2000) argued that one reason for the mixed results could be that most of the red flags 
have not been rigorously tested for any significant relationship to financial statement fraud. This indicates 
that the effectiveness of red flags in detecting financial reporting fraud is still questionable.   
3.4 The Use of Statistical and Data Mining Techniques and Financial Reporting Fraud Detection: 
Reviewing prior literature revealed that statistical and data mining techniques could be used in detecting 
financial reporting fraud. However there is a lack of consensus on their effectiveness in detecting financial 
reporting fraud. These techniques include the use of statistical models, content analysis, Benford’s law, game 
theory, decision trees, neural networks, Bayesian networks, and support vector machines. The main idea 
behind statistical, digital, and data mining techniques is to use the company’s own databases to search for 
accounting anomalies, unusual, or unexpected relationships between numbers (Albrecht et al., 2006).  
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3.4.1 Statistical Techniques and Financial Reporting Fraud Detection 
Research studies into the use of statistical models in financial reporting fraud detection involved the use of 
game theory (Matsumura and Tucker, 1992, Chau, 1996a, 1996b), content analysis (Churyk et al., 2009, 
Humpherys et al., 2011), and statistical models (Bai et al., 2008). Game theory is a decision aid that takes 
into account the consequences of the action taken by one party upon the actions of an opponent who is 
choosing from among alternatives. It can also be used as an advanced statistical tool that addresses risk and 
uncertainty (Chau, 1996a). Matsumura and Tucker (1992) provided insight into the strategic interaction 
between a manager and auditor via developing a theoretical foundation based on game-theoretic analysis and 
economic experimentation.  The game involved one decision by the manager and two by the auditor. The 
manager moves first, choosing a probability of committing fraud. The auditor then without observing the 
manager’s choice, decides whether to perform tests of controls and then decides the level of detailed tests of 
balance. Their study investigated the effects of four independent variables: auditor’s penalty, auditing 
standard requirements, the quality of the internal control structure, and audit fee, on tests of transactions and 
detailed tests of balances and incidence of fraud. The results showed that increasing the auditor’s penalty 
and increasing the testing requirements decreased fraud and increased fraud detection. One limitation in this 
study is that it encompasses all irregularities and not any specific aspect of management fraud. Another 
limitation of the use of game theory in general is that the model lacks real life example through which auditors 
can relate to their work easily (Chau, 1996b).  
Bai et al (2008) used Classification and Regression Trees (CART), a statistical technique, to identify and 
predict the impacts of fraudulent financial statements. They highlighted the financial statements 
manipulation tricks, indicators, and detecting techniques from both domestic and international literatures, 
then they looked into ten listed companies with known financial statements fraud history in China, and they 
employed CART in detecting financial reporting fraud and in measuring the seriousness of the data 
manipulation. Their findings indicate that CART is effective in distinguishing companies with fraudulent 
financial reporting from companies with no non-fraudulent financial reporting. They also concluded that 
CART outperforms Logit regression in identifying fraud cases and making predictions. However, their study 
had the following limitations. First, they used a very small sample size which means their results cannot be 
generalized. Second, they did not mention why CART can be better than other techniques used to detect 
financial reporting fraud in the literature. They did not even mention how their results could support or 
disagree with previous research studies.  
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Third, the fraud cases used in their research were all tackling one method of financial reporting fraud 
(revenue manipulation) and thus, the ability of their models to detect other tricks of financial reporting fraud 
needs to be empirically tested.  
Churyk et al. (2009) used content analysis to examine the words and grammatical cues used in business 
reporting for detecting fraud by management accounting professionals. They analysed management’s 
communication in the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section for cues regarding deception that 
might be used to conceal fraudulent activity. These cues are “lack of organisation, increased brevity, 
decreased expression of optimism, and less expression of certainty”. They used 118 firms as a sample for 
fraud firms obtained from Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases issued in the years 2000-2003. 
They also used a sample of non-fraud firms having similar characteristics as the sample of fraud companies. 
Data was analysed using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) software programme. The findings 
revealed that fraud companies used more words reflecting lack of organisation, increased brevity, decreased 
expression of optimism, and less expression of certainty than non-fraud firms. However, one of the major 
drawbacks in their research is that they did not mention why did they choose the mentioned variables in their 
study or how were they used as indicators in prior studies. They did not even mention any previous research 
that supported the chosen variables. Another limitation, the presence of these cues can be the result of any 
other reason rather than a fraudulent behaviour. For example, lack of organisation can be due to bad writing 
skills rather than a sign of ambiguity or a way of hiding facts. In addition, the use of colons is not a strong 
sign of an organised report. Also decreased optimism could be the attitude of a conservative management 
rather than a fraudulent behaviour and the same applies to decreased certainty. A third limitation, it is difficult 
to develop a practical fraud detection model using the results of this study. A fourth limitation, it is hard to 
determine what type of fraud was committed by management.  
Humpherys et al. (2011) used content analysis to identify some language cues that might indicate the 
likelihood of fraudulent behaviour. They used a decision support system called “Agent99 Analyzer” to 
analyse and identify the language cues in the M&D section of 101 companies alleged with fraudulent 
financial reporting and compare it with  101 non-fraud companies. The results of their analysis showed that 
fraud companies use more activation language, words, imagery, pleasantness, group references, and less 
lexical diversity than non-fraudulent ones. Some of their results are inconsistent with the results obtained 
from the study by Churyk et al. (2009).  
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For example Churyk et al., found that fraudulent companies use decreased brevity and less expression of 
optimism which is totally the opposite of what Humpherys et al found, where fraudulent companies in their 
study appeared to use more pleasantness and more words. This indicates that using linguistic cues are highly 
subjective and can be ineffective in detecting financial reporting fraud. Glancy and Yadav (2011) proposed 
a quantitative model for detecting fraudulent financial reporting called “Computational Fraud Detection 
Model” and abbreviated (CFDM). It is a quantitative and computational-based fraud detection model that 
provides a method for automating detection of potential fraud. It uses maximal information for detecting 
fraud in textual data. The model detects the attempt to conceal information in annual filings with the US 
SEC. The model uses all of the information contained in a text document for fraud detection. They examined 
a sample of 74 AAERs from the period that charged companies with fraud. Their model uses text mining in 
a manner that is replicable and reusable. The results showed that their model demonstrated significant ability 
to discriminate fraudulent companies from non-fraud companies using the Management Discussion and 
Analysis (MDA) section. The model detected the cues in a low presence, high re-hearsability, and low 
synchronicity media. Low presence is the lack of interaction, which means the text is presented without any 
indication of the writer’s identity. High re-hearsability is that without interaction, the writer has the time and 
ability to edit the text. However, there work can be criticised for limiting the training data set to 69 companies 
which is a small sample. Also the domain of their work is limited to MDA in 10-k filings, thus results cannot 
be generalised to other textual data. Besides, content analysis is highly subjective by nature and thus cannot 
be an accurate fraud detection tool. 
Few studies were found on the use of Benford’s law in detecting fraud. Benford’s analysis involves the use 
of digital analysis to compare the actual frequency of the digits in a data set with the expected frequency to 
investigate any deviations (Green and Choi, 1997, Jordan and Clark, 2011).  Benford’s law may be regarded 
as “a distribution of distributions of first digits, which turn up if random samples are taken independently 
from diverse datasets” (Todter, 2009, p.2). Benford’ law is built on the idea that each first digit demonstrated 
a unique quality, where the percentages decrease as the numbers increase. Thus by the expected probabilities 
of first/second digits, any set of information can be analysed and compared to the expected distribution in 
order to detect possible fraud (Tapp and Burg, 2001, Coderre, 2000).  Benford’s law is a mathematical law 
that predicts the frequency of naturally occurring numbers to investigate the occurrences of the intentional 
manipulation of reported financial statement numbers during recessionary times (Tilden and Janes, 2012).   
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Critics of Benford’s analysis argued that it is not likely to be fruitful in certain cases such as transactions that 
are not recorded or accounts that have a built-in threshold to be included (Durtschi et al., 2004), doubtful 
whether the Benford distribution is an appropriate tool for detecting fraud (Diekmann and Jann, 2010), 
applied only to numbers that describe similar items but does not apply to random or assigned numbers like 
personal identification numbers or lottery numbers, and broadly identifies the possible existence of fraud but 
does not tell the nature of fraud being perpetrated or the identity of the perpetrator, not applied where numbers 
are constrained or lies within a pre-defined range, and not working for non-naturally occurring numbers such 
as telephone numbers (Crowder, 1997, Albrecht et al., 2006, Tapp and Burg, 2001, Johnson, 2005, and 
Coderre, 2000). Cleary and Thibodeau (2005) recommended that auditors seeking to use Benford’s law must 
be aware of the costs of the potential type I errors that can occur during the analysis stage. Using an overall 
test-by-test approach makes it relatively easy to control the probability of type I error, but the results may 
not be as informative in the case where fraud actually has occurred. Also in a research paper by Todter 
(2009), where he reviews Benford’s law and examines its potential as an indicator of fraud in economic 
research, he concluded that Benford’s law do not provide an evidence for the existence of fraud, but they can 
help identify transactions/accounts that need closer inspection. Tilden and Janes (2012) used benford’s law 
and found that during recessionary times, there is certain level of financial statement manipulation that goes 
undetected. The tests in their study cannot distinguish between manipulations that may be within the 
parameters of GAAP and those that may cross the line into fraud.  
3.4.2 Data Mining Techniques and Financial Reporting Fraud Detection 
Prior studies into the use of data mining techniques showed mixed results. In support of the use of data 
mining techniques, Green and Choi (1997) developed a neural network fraud classification model that 
employed financial statement related data within the revenue cycle. Their model incorporated financial 
statement account data that would be examined analytically in the planning phase to determine whether such 
data are indicative of an increased risk of material misstatement due to fraud. They found that the neural 
network models generated few false classifications in the absence of fraud and signalled to the auditor to 
perform more additional substantive testing when fraud was present.  
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Ata and Seyrek (2009) applied decision trees and neural networks on several financial ratios derived from 
the financial statements of 100 Turkish companies listed in Istanbul Stock Exchange. Half of the firms 
showed some type of fraudulent financial reporting in the auditors’ reports and the other half did not. The 
results of the study showed that decision trees and neural networks can be used to highlight early warning 
signs for the possible engagement of financial reporting fraud. Zhou and Kapoor (2011) considered existing 
detection techniques based on data mining and suggested a new framework to detect financial reporting 
fraud. Their model included two stages, in the first stage, relevant external and internal variables that 
differentiate the industries, economic conditions, management’s choice, timing considerations and any other 
factors that have the potential to form domain knowledge are selected and experimented. However, in the 
second stage, the financial data of the firm in question is analysed based on this domain knowledge learned 
from the previous step. They then used a method called Response Surface Methodology (RSM) to estimate 
the relationships between the variables and the financial reporting fraud techniques. This system provides 
statistically validated predictive models that can be manipulated for finding the probability of different forms 
of possible financial reporting fraud s. However their framework and the system used need to be empirically 
tested to determine whether it performs better than other data mining techniques.  
Ravisankar et al. (2011) predicted the occurrence of financial reporting fraud in companies as accurately as 
possible using data mining techniques, and a sample of 202 Chinese companies, 101 companies were 
convicted with fraud and 101 were non-fraud companies, and 35 financial items for each of these companies 
were used. Data were analysed using the different data mining techniques. The results showed that 
Probabilistic Neural Network was the top performer followed by Genetic Programming. Kapardis et al. 
(2010) distributed a questionnaire to auditors attending a fraud detection seminar to test the use of artificial 
neural networks as a tool in fraud detection. The questionnaire was then used to develop seven artificial 
neural networks to test the usage of these models in fraud detection. The findings showed that artificial neural 
networks (ANN) can be used by auditors to identify fraud-prone companies with high accuracy level. 
However, some of the limitations in their study is that every few years the audit firm may need to retrain the 
ANNs depending on economic environments, new correlates of fraud identified, etc. Besides, a generalised 
ANNs cannot be developed and used by the same firm in another country. Thus, each firm in each country 
have to train its own ANN.  
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Perols (2011) compared the performance of six popular statistical and machine learning models in detecting 
financial reporting fraud under different assumptions of misclassification costs and ratios of fraud firms to 
non-fraud firms, the results showed that logistic regression and support vector machines perform well relative 
to an artificial neural network. Kirkos et al. (2007) investigated the usefulness and performance of Decision 
Trees, Neural Networks, and Bayesian Belief Networks in detecting fraudulent financial statements. They 
used a sample of 76 Greek manufacturing firms, where 38 of these companies were involved of fraud and 
the rest are non-fraud companies. The input data consists of financial ratios derived from financial statements. 
The results showed that Bayesian Belief Network model outperformed the other two data mining techniques.  
However critics of data mining techniques (Edge and Sampaio, 2009, Wuerges and Borba, 2011, Zhou and 
Kapoor, 2011) argued that they suffer from certain limitations in the detection of fraudulent activity. These 
limitations include: (1) supervised techniques such as neural and Bayesian learning algorithms require 
extensive training using labelled data sets for formulation of evaluative models against which to assess newly 
arriving transactional instances and to support the extraction of emerging fraud threats. This results in a 
highly time consuming and costly business operation during which new fraud instances may go undetected, 
(2) fraud evaluation is undertaken using a reactive data processing model at scheduled intervals over the 
organisations associated transactional data store, requiring associated entries to be present within the account 
database prior to application of employed data analysis techniques. As a result, fraud analytics may only be 
undertaken following transaction completion, fraudulent exchange of associated goods/services and 
movement of the associated monetary value, (3) studies into artificial intelligence showed difficulty in testing 
hypotheses, for example, it is not possible to test whether the likelihood of fraud is related to executive 
compensation, (4) neural networks is not accurate if the data is volatile or if the causal functionality evolves 
in a direction that is not pre-defined.  
Gao (2005) argued that neural networks are restricted to the assessment of the overall fraud risk and do not 
consider specific fraud schemes, which hinders external auditors’ ability to design effective procedures to 
detect the fraud because they will be misled by evidence manipulated by the management. It is also difficult 
to observe the structures of and the relationship between risk factors, which makes the prediction model less 
effective in identifying fraudulent actions and makes it difficult for auditors to design corresponding audit 
procedures to detect fraud. 
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3.5 The Fraud Triangle Model and Financial Reporting Fraud Detection  
Donald Cressey, a criminologist was the first to explore what drives people to violate trust. In 1950, Cressey 
interviewed about 200 embezzlers whom he called trust violators. He was interested in the circumstances 
that led them to violate trust. He excluded from his research those employees who took their job for the 
purpose of stealing and interviewed criminals over a period of five months whose behaviour met two criteria: 
(1) the person must have accepted a position of trust in good faith, and (2) he must have violated the trust.  
The findings revealed that the following three factors must be present for a person to violate trust: Non-
shareable financial problem, perceived opportunity to commit fraud, and rationalisation. Cressey mentioned 
that: “Persons become trust violators when they conceive of themselves as having incurred financial 
obligations which are considered as non-socially-sanctionable and which, consequently, must be satisfied by 
a private or secret means” (1953, page 741). He also added that perceived opportunity arises when the fraud 
perpetrators sees a way to use their position of trust to solve the financial problem, knowing they are unlikely 
to be caught. As for rationalisation, Cressey believed that most fraud perpetrators are first-time offenders 
with no criminal record and see themselves as ordinary, honest people who are caught in a bad situation. 
This lets them justify the crime to themselves in a way that makes it acceptable or justifiable. He found that: 
“In the interviews, many trust violators expressed the idea that they knew the behaviour to be illegal and 
wrong at all times and that they merely kidded themselves into thinking that it was not illegal” (1953, p. 
741).  
Over the years, Cressey’s fraud model has become well known as “the Fraud Triangle Model” as illustrated 
in figure 3.1. The first side of the fraud triangle represents a pressure or motive to commit the fraudulent act, 
the second side represents a perceived opportunity, and the third side represents rationalisation (Wells 2011). 
Lister (2007, p.63) defined pressure/motive as “the source of heat for the fire”. Albrecht, et al. (2008, 2010) 
classified pressure/motives as either financial or non-financial motives. They mentioned that examples of 
perceived financial pressures could be personal financial losses, falling sales, inability to compete with other 
companies, greed, living beyond one’s means, personal debt, poor credit, the need to meet short-term credit 
crises, inability to meet financial forecasts, and unexpected financial needs. They also gave examples of non-
financial pressure, such as; the need to report results better than actual performance, frustration with work, 
or even a challenge to beat the system. Opportunity is the second side of the fraud triangle. 
 
 
48 
 
 Lister (2007) saw opportunity as “the fuel that keeps the fire going” and he believed even if a person has a 
motive, he or she cannot perpetrate a fraud without being given an opportunity. He also gave some examples 
of opportunities that can lead to fraud like high turnover of management in key roles, lack of segregation of 
duties, and complex transactions or organisational structures. Albrecht et al. (2008, 2010) believed even with 
very strong perceived pressures, executives who believe they will be caught and punished rarely commit 
fraud. Vona (2008) argued that a person’s position in the organisation contributes to the opportunity to 
commit fraud and there is a direct correlation between opportunity to commit fraud and the ability to conceal 
the fraud. Dorminey et al. (2012) stated that perceived opportunity is the perception that a control weakness 
is present, and that the likelihood of being caught is remote. Dorminey et al., (2012) stated that perceived 
opportunity is the perception that a control weakness is present and importantly that the likelihood of being 
caught is remote.  
Rationalisation is the third side of the fraud triangle. Rae and Subramaniam (2008) defined rationalisation 
as a justification of fraudulent behavior due to an employee’s lack of personal integrity, or other moral 
reasoning. Lister defined it as “the oxygen that keeps the fire burning” (2007, p.65).  Albrecht et al. (2008, 
2010) gave some examples of rationalisation that executives can use to commit fraud, such as; “we need to 
keep the stock price high”, “all companies use aggressive accounting practices”, or “it is for the good of the 
company”.  
     Figure 3.1 the Current Fraud Triangle Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source (Wells, 2011, p.4) 
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The fraud triangle model was widely supported and used by audit professionals and audit regulators as a tool 
for detecting financial reporting fraud. For instance, in 1987, the Commission of the Treadway Committee 
reviewed both alleged and proven instances of fraudulent financial reporting and issued a report that supports 
Cressey’s findings. The results revealed that: 
“Fraudulent financial reporting usually occurs as the result of certain environmental, institutional, or individual 
forces and opportunities.  These forces and opportunities add pressures and incentives that encourage individuals 
and companies to engage in fraudulent financial reporting and are present to some degree in all companies.  If the 
right, combustible mixture of forces and opportunities is present, financial reporting may occur” (1987, p.23). 
 
In 2009, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) issued a revised version of 
International Standard on Auditing 240 (ISA 240): The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an 
Audit of Financial Statements which recommended external auditors identify events or conditions that 
indicate an incentive or pressure to commit fraud or provide an opportunity to commit fraud in evaluating 
fraud risk factors (para. 24, A23). The standard provided examples for the three fraud risk factors. For 
example, Incentive or pressure to commit fraudulent financial reporting may exist when management is under 
pressure, from sources outside or inside the entity, to achieve an expected (and perhaps unrealistic) earnings 
target or financial outcome. A perceived opportunity to commit fraud may exist when the trust violator is in 
a position of trust or has knowledge of specific deficiencies in internal control. ISA 240 also required audit 
team members to discuss the susceptibility of the entity to fraud and urged them to consider external and 
internal factors affecting the entity that may create an incentive or pressure for management or others to 
commit fraud, provide the opportunity for fraud to be perpetrated, and indicate a culture or environment that 
enables management or others to rationalise committing fraud (para.15, A11).  
 
Prior research also provided support for the existence of the fraud triangle factors within companies where 
fraud schemes have been perpetrated. For instance, Loebbecke and Willingham (1988, as cited by Loebbecke 
et al., 1989) developed a logical model that contains an underlying reasoning process designed to lead to an 
assessment of the likelihood of material management fraud. They considered the content of SAS No.53 in 
terms of assessing the likelihood of management fraud and proposed a re-organisation of the SAS factors in 
terms of a conceptual model for making the assessment. They also tested the model against the contents of 
management fraud cases reported in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs).  
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The model asserts that for fraud to occur there should be three important factors; motives to commit fraud, 
opportunity or weakness in the system that facilitates the fraud, and the fraud perpetrators must be of a 
character that would allow them to knowingly commit a dishonest, criminal act without regret. The model 
asserts that if any of these conditions/factors was missing, it would be highly unlikely that management fraud 
has occurred or will likely occur. However, a weakness in this model is that the effect of incomplete 
information available to or obtained by the auditor is to reduce the assessed likelihood of fraud which will 
be a serious error in judgment especially if the auditor follows the model blindly. Another limitation is that 
the model was developed from and tested against only populations of cases of fraud and defalcation and was 
not applied to cases where no material irregularities exist.  
Bell and Carcello (2000) estimated a logistic regression model predicting the incidence of fraud, and found 
support for the existence of fraud triangle conditions for a sample of financial fraud companies. Their results 
were consistent with Rezaee (2005) who analysed five alleged fraud cases and found support for the existence 
of all three of the fraud triangle conditions in fraud firms. Skousen and Wright (2006) examined an array of 
potential fraud risk factors using the examples cited in SAS No. 99 and relied on prior research in order to 
identify a comprehensive set of coexistent factors that are linked to the incidence of financial reporting fraud. 
They developed fraud proxy variables representing various measures of pressure, opportunity, and 
rationalisation and tested these variables using a sample of fraud firms and a matched sample of non-fraud 
firms. They constructed a fraud prediction model using the identified fraud risk factors and the model 
correctly classifies fraud and non-fraud firms approximately 69.77 percent of the time. Skousen et al. (2008) 
developed a model to empirically examine the effectiveness of the fraud risk factor framework adopted in 
SAS No.99 in detecting financial reporting fraud. They developed variables which serve as proxies for 
pressure, opportunity, and rationalisation. They tested these variables using a sample of fraud firms and a 
matched sample of firms with no fraud. The results showed that their model correctly classifies firms between 
70 and 73 percent of the time. However, a weakness in their model is their inability to identify significant 
variables to serve as proxies for rationalisation. 
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Chen and Elder (2007) empirically tested the relationship between a set of fraud risk factors identified by 
Taiwan SAS No.43 and the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. TSAS No.43 requires auditors to 
evaluate the presence of fraud by assessing the three factors of the fraud triangle: Pressure, opportunity, and 
rationalisation. They developed proxy variables to measure each of these risk factors. They select their 
sample from the Taiwan Economic Journal Financial Restatements database for the period 1996-2006, and 
by using a matched sample of fraud firms and non-fraud firms they empirically examined whether the proxy 
variables for the three fraud risk factors are associated with higher likelihood of fraudulent financial 
reporting. Their results showed that all pressure proxy variables (analyst forecast errors (external pressure), 
negative cash flow from operations (financial distress and firm’s performance), and percentage of directors’ 
shareholdings pledged for loans and credits (personal financial need)) are associated with a higher likelihood 
of fraudulent financial reporting. They also found that only one proxy for opportunity (related party 
transactions) is associated with higher likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. Also all proxy variables 
for rationalisation (higher frequency of earnings restatements, firms with external and internal auditors’ 
switches) were found associated with higher likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. Choo and Tan 
(2007) argued that a better understanding of corporate executive fraud is possible by relating three key 
features of the American Dream theory (Intense emphasis on monetary success, corporate executives 
exploit/disregard regulatory controls, and corporate executives justify/rationalise fraudulent behaviour) with 
the three variables of the Fraud Triangle concept (Pressure, Opportunity, and Rationalisation). 
Albrecht et al. (2008) discussed the basic nature of fraud, including the major accounting scandals of the last 
decade and also to discuss the role of auditors for detecting financial reporting fraud. They found that the 
main reasons behind the occurrence of large-scale frauds, applying the three fraud triangle factors, are: First, 
incentives include: misplaced executive incentives, unrealistic Wall Street expectations, large amounts of 
debt, and executives’ greed. Second, opportunities include; good economy was making many problems, 
selective interpretation of GAAP, and behaviour of CPA firms. Third, rationalisation, include: moral decay 
in society, and educators’ failures to teach students ethics and fraud. Emma et al (2009) conducted a survey 
study to determine the view of Nigerian accountants towards the impact of the fraud triangle on the audit 
process and its relationship with management’s integrity. They also examined how effective modified audit 
procedures must be to reduce audit risk to traditionally acceptable levels when audit evidence implies fraud 
risk factors for incentives and opportunities both are present. A total of 130 questionnaires were administered 
to accountants and academics in public and private enterprises, but only 84 questionnaires were returned.  
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Their results support the concept of the fraud triangle in that the three components and the relationships 
between these components are shown to have a substantial impact on audit risk. However, a major weakness 
in their study is that they did not mention what are the appropriate audit procedures to be used when fraud 
risk increases. In addition, the role and interaction of the fraud triangle in the audit process was not presented 
clearly. Albrecht et al. (2010) explored the susceptibility of the four largest companies in South Korea which 
are Hyundai, Samsung, SK, and Daewoo to fraud using the fraud triangle as a basis for their analysis. Their 
results showed the opportunities, pressure, and rationalisation factors that could make these four companies 
susceptible to fraud.  
However despite the significance of the fraud triangle model, reviewing prior literature revealed that it has 
limitations and might not fully explain the reason behind fraudulent behaviours nor could it be considered 
alone as an effective model for detecting financial reporting fraud. For instance, Dorminey, et al. (2011) 
argued that one limitation in the current fraud triangle model is that it cannot solve the fraud problem alone 
because two sides of the fraud triangle which are “pressure and rationalisation” cannot be easily observed. 
However, Cressey argued that motives can be observed and empirically tested. He noted that “motives are 
not inner, biological mainsprings of action but linguistic constructs which organise acts in particular 
situations, the use of which can be examined empirically” (1954, p. 33).  
Chen et al. (2009, p.4) mentioned that:  
“Rationalisations are cognitive and therefore internal by nature. They may be hidden in order to deceive, and the 
best the auditor can do is to make inferences as to the attitudes that managers may possess”.  
The Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No.99: “Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit” supported that by stating that: 
 “Observing that individuals have the requisite attitude to commit fraud, or identifying factors that indicate a 
likelihood that management or other employees will rationalise committing a fraud, is difficult at best” (Auditing 
Standards Board, 2002, para.35).  
 
A second limitation in the fraud triangle model is that although it points investigators to why people might 
commit fraud, the evidentiary trail might be weak or non-existent (Dorminey et al., 2012). The authors added 
that a third limitation in Cresseys’ fraud triangle hypothesis is that it helps the anti-fraud community 
understand the accidental fraud perpetrators who do not accept a job at a company to defraud it but as a result 
of non-shareable motives/pressures and the existence of an opportunity to commit fraud, they might commit 
fraud. This group of fraud perpetrators need to rationalise the illegal act in order not to feel guilty about it.  
53 
 
However, the actions of some fraud perpetrators are more closely aligned with the behaviour of a predator 
who would not care about pressure and rationalisation because the predator needs only opportunity to commit 
fraud. Ramamoorti (2008) added that Cressey’s model ignored other non-financial motives such as greed, 
revenge, and catch me if you can attitude that some white collar criminals have. Ramamoorti et al. (2009) 
examined executive white-collar crime and attempted to understand why wealthy, influential, and prominent 
members of society would risk becoming involved in white-collar crime. They consulted 1500 executives 
who were planning, involved, or committed a crime against their organisation and concluded that social 
status comparison was a motive for them to commit fraud. They concluded that motivation for fraud is under-
hypothesized by the fraud triangle because there are other motivations than greed and non-shareable financial 
problems that pressure executives to commit fraud, such as fraud perpetrators’ emotions (e.g. revenge, social 
status comparisons, and crimes of passion). 
Other researchers (Desai et al., 2010; Ramos, 2003; Wilks and Zimbelman, 2004; Favere-Marchesi, 2009) 
pointed out a fourth limitation in the current fraud triangle model as they argued that fraud is not necessarily 
the result of the three fraud factors and that the absence of one fraud factor does not mean fraud did not take 
place. They also believed it is important to decompose the three fraud risk factors because this will help 
external auditors focus more on cues that are normally overlooked when making an overall assessment of 
fraud risk and at the same time force them to revise audit plans and increase the extent of audit testing. This 
contradicts the findings of Cressey (1950) where his assumption was that all the three factors in the fraud 
triangle model have to be there for fraud to take place. For instance, Desai et al. (2010) found that not all of 
the three elements of the fraud triangle are necessary to induce opportunistic managerial behaviour. Ramos 
(2003) considered that failure to observe one of the elements of the fraud triangle does not guarantee an 
absence of fraud.  
 
Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) used an experiment with 52 practicing audit managers to examine whether 
separately assessing attitude, pressure, and opportunity risks prior to assessing overall fraud risk increases 
auditors’ sensitivity to opportunity and pressure cues when perceptions of management’s attitude suggest 
low fraud risk. Their findings indicate that auditors who decompose fraud-risk assessments are more 
sensitive to opportunity and pressure cues when making their overall assessments than auditors who simply 
make an overall fraud risk assessment. However, this increased sensitivity appears only when those cues 
suggest low fraud risk. This decomposition will help auditors focus on cues that are normally overlooked 
when simply making an overall assessment of fraud risk.  
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Favere-Marchesi (2009) conducted an experiment with 90 audit managers from two of the Big 4 audit firms 
in offices around Canada and U.S. to examine whether decomposing the assessment of fraud can lead to an 
increased sensitivity in incentive and opportunity risks given both low and high risk settings. Their results 
showed that auditors who decompose fraud assessments are significantly more sensitive to variations in 
incentive and opportunity cues than auditors who only categorize fraud risk factors. This increased sensitivity 
is observed in both low and high risk settings. The findings also showed that this decomposition leads to a 
higher need to revise audit plans and increase the extent of audit testing than do auditors who make 
categorisation judgments alone.  
 
Other researchers believed that not all fraud factors have the same significance and some factors are more 
important than others in assessing the risk financial reporting fraud. However, there was a lack of consensus 
in prior literature on which factor(s) are more significant in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. 
For instance, in support of motives behind fraud, Becker (1968) stated that a fraud perpetrator will weigh the 
benefits and costs of the criminal/fraudulent act and if the benefits exceed the cost, he (she) will most 
probably commit the crime. The benefits of committing the crime could be the pressure that the fraud 
perpetrator is facing and the cost could be the punishment that the fraud perpetrator might face if he was 
caught. Thus, Becker’s economic theory focused only on the pressure or motive side of the fraud triangle 
model. A stream of research argued that motives is the main cause of fraud and understanding it is a key to 
detecting fraud (Reinstein et al. (1998), Davies (2000), Coenen (2008), Hasnan et al. (2008), and Ramamoorti 
et al. (2009)).  This was supported by Wells (2001, p.1) who stated that “the most common reason employees 
committed fraud had little to do with opportunity, but more with motivation”. Understanding management’s 
motives also turned out to be one of the important factors in applying professional scepticism. A report by 
the Audit Inspection Unit of the Public Oversight Board in 2010/2011 cited that Hurtt et al. (2002) and Shaub 
and Lawrence (2004) both studied how scepticism was treated in early philosophical writings and in other 
relevant disciplines and found that a thorough understanding of people’s motivation/behaviour is one of the 
behaviours expected from sceptics. Higson (2011) believed that maintaining professional scepticism is not 
enough for auditors to detect fraud but critical thinking is also important. He argued that the only way to do 
this is by understanding management’s motives behind fraud and viewing external auditing in terms of the 
audit of management’s motivations.  
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Elayan and Meyer (2008) and Erickson et al. (2006) both argued that understanding the underlying 
circumstances and motives that give rise to accounting irregularities is important and a necessary precursor 
to effectively prevent future occurrences. Pedneault (2004b) suggested a three-part formula to include in any 
audit  plan focusing on fraud detection, that is to (1) identify motivations/incentives for executives to commit 
fraud, (2) determine how managers might commit financial reporting fraud if the motivation is there, (3) 
design audit procedures to actively detect fraud and respond to the risk factors. Thus his findings support 
that understanding management’s motives is the key in detecting financial reporting fraud.  
 
Grazioli, et al. (2006) developed an approach that integrates the reasons why auditors succeed at detecting 
financial reporting fraud with the reasons why they fail to do so. They tested the theory by using a computer 
model that applies the detection tactics to a set of real financial statements and they run the model on four 
real fraud cases. The results of their empirical studies revealed that successful auditors need to possess both 
deep knowledge of deception as well as technical knowledge of accounting and auditing, which requires 
deep thinking and understanding of management’s motives and possible malicious actions. Hogan et al 
(2008) found that the use of checklists identifying the existence or absence of pressures/motives and 
opportunities for clients to commit financial reporting fraud would be helpful to auditors. Suyanto (2009) 
found that the likelihood of fraudulent financial statements is easier to be observed using fraud risk factor 
proxies for pressure (net profit/total assets) and opportunity rather than rationalisation. In a study by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) (2010) to investigate the root causes of fraud and the way in which they 
affect organisations worldwide, and their findings revealed that 71% of respondents attributed greater risk of 
fraud to increased motives or pressures.  
 
Other studies found opportunity as a key factor in explaining fraudulent behaviour and a significant factor in 
assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. Opportunity for fraud comes about by a weakness in the 
internal control system as discussed in chapter two. For instance, Hasnan et al (2013) argued that opportunity 
to commit financial reporting fraud increases when the firm does not have strong corporate governance 
mechanisms. Dechow et al (1996 as cited in Dunn, 1999) found that weak governance structure provides the 
opportunity for firms to engage in financial reporting fraud. Beasley (1996, as cited in Dunn, 1999) studied 
the importance of governance structures in preventing fraudulent financial reporting and found that the 
likelihood of fraudulent reporting decreases when there are more non-management directors on the board, 
the longer the tenure of the outside directors on the board, and the larger their ownership interest in the firm.  
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Dunn (2004) explored how insiders exercise control over both the top management team and the board of 
directors, and how this concentration of power in the hands of insiders contributes to fraudulent financial 
reporting. He used two databases to collect study data: Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release 
(AAER) for the period from 1992 to 1996 and the Lexis/Nexis system. The 103 fraud firms were then 
matched with 103 non-fraud firms. The results showed that financial reporting fraud is more likely to occur 
when there is a concentration of power in the hands of insiders where they regulate the flow of information 
needed to make decisions and also control the board through ownership interest.  
Johnson et al. (2008) used a sample of 87 fraud firms extracted from the Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases (AAERs) for the period from 1991 to 2005. They compared the financial incentives 
from stock and option holdings and operating performance measures in fraud firms to similar incentives in 
non-fraud firms. The results suggested that fraud firms are high growth firms and have more insiders on their 
audit committees which imply a lower likelihood of fraud detection and thus lower expected costs of 
committing fraud.  
Rezaee (2005) found that lack of responsible corporate governance was one of the factors causing financial 
reporting fraud. Hasnan et al (2008) used a matched sample of 47 fraud firms convicted of issuing fraudulent 
financial reporting during the period from 1996 to 2006 to examine factors involved in fraudulent financial 
reporting, and found that firms involved in fraudulent financial reporting have significantly poorer corporate 
governance structures. Owens- Jackson et al. (2009) examined the association between audit committee 
characteristics and the quality of financial reporting. They examined the Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases (AAERs) on firms cited for accounting fraud, and then matched each company with 
a company that had no indicators of fraud or financial restatements. Their results revealed that the likelihood 
of fraudulent financial reporting is negatively related to audit committee independence and number of audit 
committee meetings. In contrast, Beasley et al (2010) conducted a study sponsored by the Committee of 
Sponsored Organisations of the Treadway Commission to provide a comprehensive analysis of fraudulent 
financial reporting occurrences investigated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission between 
January 1998 and December 2007 and found no statistical significant differences in the composition of 
boards between fraud and non-fraud firms. They also found no difference in audit committee characteristics 
between fraud and non-fraud firms and concluded that there is little evidence that these characteristics are 
associated with the occurrence of fraudulent financial reporting.  
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Dellaportas (2013) found that the fraud triangle is not an equally sided triangle but an irregular triangle with 
expanded opportunities arising from occupational status, thus creating a disproportionate emphasis on 
opportunity relative to pressure and rationalisation.  
 
While other studies found rationalisation more significant in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. 
For instance, Cohen et al. (2010) used evidence from the press articles covering 39 corporate fraud cases that 
went public during the period 1992-2005 to examine the role of managers’ behaviour in the commitment of 
the fraud. They integrated the fraud triangle and the theory of planned behaviour (TPB) to gain a better 
understanding of fraud cases. The results of their study revealed that personality traits appear to be a major 
fraud risk factor. Their analysis was further validated through a quantitative analysis of key words which 
confirmed that key words associated with the attitudes/rationalisation component of the integrated theory 
were predominately found in fraud firms as opposed to a sample of control firms. The results indicated that 
auditors should evaluate the ethics of management through the components of the theory of planned 
behaviour: the assessment of attitude, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control and moral obligation. 
Their results also confirmed that attitudes/rationalisation appear to be a key risk factor for corporate frauds 
and that the fraud triangle, integrated with the theory of planned behaviour, is a useful framework for 
analysing unethical behaviour by managers that are associated with corporate fraud. However, a major 
weakness in their study is that they depended on press articles which are known to be biased and unreliable.   
 
In contrast, Uddin (2000) examined the socio-cultural, cognitive and personality characteristics that influence 
a CFO’s intention to report fraudulently in the financial statements. A mail survey was used to collect data 
from CFOs of publicly traded US corporations and the model is tested using structural equation modelling. 
The results revealed that individual attitudes towards fraudulent reporting on financial statements, and the 
size of the company, affect intention to commit fraud. However, neither individual subjective norm for 
fraudulent reporting nor compensation structure affect intentions to report fraudulently on financial 
statements, which was inconsistent with the theory of planned behaviour developed by Ajzen (1991).  
Murphy (2008) conducted an experimental study to examine whether rationalisation is associated with 
fraudulent financial reporting in situations in which the opportunity and motivation to misreport exist and 
are held constant. The findings supported the validity of the third side of the fraud triangle (rationalisation) 
and indicated that interventions aimed at rationalisation can reduce the likelihood of misreporting.  
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Murphy and Dacin (2011) developed a framework that identifies three psychological pathways to fraud. 
They aimed at increasing the understanding of the psychology of committing fraud. Their framework 
depended on the fraud triangle and built on it by expanding the rationalisation side to include three 
psychological pathways: lack of awareness, intuition coupled with rationalisation, and reasoning. Hasnan et 
al (2013) argued that rationalisation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for firms to engage in 
financial reporting fraud.  
A fifth limitation in the current fraud triangle model is that it ignored some factors that could be significant 
in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud such as management integrity and fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities. For instance, Albrecht et al (1984) developed a model that is called “the fraud scale”. Their 
model suggested replacing the rationalisation side of the fraud triangle model by integrity. The fraud scale 
was developed through an analysis of 212 fraud cases. Their study was based on data obtained from internal 
auditors of companies that were victims of fraud. The findings revealed that integrity is more observable 
than rationalisation through observing both a person’s decisions as well as the decision making process. The 
authors explained that personal integrity affects the probability that an individual may rationalise 
inappropriate behaviour. They also added that this could give external auditors an idea about that person’s 
commitment to ethical decision making and in turn this can help in assessing integrity and thus the likelihood 
of that person committing fraud. For example, persons with greater integrity would be less likely to form 
rationalisations for justifying inappropriate behaviour. From that perspective, they suggested that integrity 
should replace the rationalisation side of the fraud triangle. Their model was supported by Carpenter and 
Reimers (2005) who applied the theory of planned behaviour to corporate managers’ propensity to commit 
fraud in financial reporting decisions. Their research suggested that an emphasis on ethical decision making 
from top managers could reduce fraudulent financial reporting decisions. Woefel and Woefel argued that: 
 Before the deterrence and detection of fraud, external auditors should understand that perpetrators could be 
motivated or forced into committing fraud, perpetrators would be encouraged to commit fraud when there is an 
opportunity to do so without being caught, and when perpetrators lacked the personality traits such as integrity 
and honesty (1987, p.7). 
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Emma et al (2009) found that audit risk decreases as the evidence for management’s integrity increases. 
Their results also revealed that managers with low integrity may seek to create or increase existing incentives 
and opportunities. Their findings indicate that the evaluation of management integrity is a critical part of 
developing an opinion as to the fairness of the presentation of financial statements. Fuller and Jensen (2002 
as cited in Chen et al., 2013) argued that executives who lack integrity tend to ignore policies and procedures 
and are more likely to commit fraudulent acts. Chen et al. (2013) found that firms in China with executives 
that have lower integrity, indicated by a greater degree of earnings manipulations, are associated with higher 
likelihood of regulatory enforcement actions against corporate fraud in the subsequent years.  
Rezaee and Riley (2010) developed a model called 3Cs model to explain the reasons behind financial 
reporting fraud. The model consists of: Conditions, corporate culture, and choice. Conditions refer to 
pressures and opportunities, corporate culture refer to corporate governance mechanisms and its 
effectiveness. As for choice they believed that financial reporting fraud is a matter of choice regardless of 
environmental pressure, need, or corporate culture. They believe this can be a result of management’s 
personal traits and lack of integrity or greed. This again supported the significance of considering 
management’s integrity in explaining fraudulent behaviours as suggested by Albrecht et al (1984) in the 
fraud scale model. The authors also suggested that financial reporting fraud may be perpetrated when the 
3Cs are present. They also mentioned that if any of the three factors is missing, then the probability of 
financial statement fraud is diminished.  
Albrecht (2016) argued that lack of integrity burdens society and opens portals to fraud. Managers who focus 
on building and maintaining integrity will support a healthy tone at the top and help block portals to fraud. 
Fuller and Jensen (2002) point out that executives who lack integrity tend to ignore policies and procedures 
to pursue self-interests to the cost of other investors and therefore unethical decisions and fraudulent 
behaviour are more likely to flourish among them. Chen et al (2013) found that firms with executives having 
lower integrity, indicated a greater degree of earnings manipulation and are associated with higher probability 
of regulatory enforcement actions against corporate fraud in the subsequent year. Sutherland (1983) argues 
that dishonest employees, especially those in positions of authority within the organisation, will infect a 
portion of honest ones. An environment in which ethics are valued will provide additional deterrence to the 
potential fraud perpetrator because such an environment will make concealment difficult and once caught 
punishment certain.  
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Cohen et al (2011) argue that both auditors and audit committees play an important role in assessing 
management integrity. Chen et al (2013) stated that external auditors can serve as external governance 
mechanism to discourage executives with lower integrity in committing fraud.  
Other researchers viewed fraud perpetrators’ capabilities a very important factor that was also missing in 
the current fraud triangle model. For instance, Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) developed a model called 
“Fraud Diamond” where they added fraud perpetrators’ capabilities to the fraud triangle model. They also 
suggested four observable traits for committing fraud; (1) authoritative position or function within the 
organisation, (2) capacity to understand and exploit accounting systems and internal control weaknesses, (3) 
confidence that she/he will not be detected or if caught she/he will get out of it easily, and (4) capability to 
deal with the stress created within an otherwise good person when he/she commits bad acts.  
The fraud diamond modifies the opportunity side of the fraud triangle by limiting opportunity to a small set 
of individuals thought to have the necessary capability. Thus, capability likely affects the probability that an 
individual will be able to exploit opportunities in the control environment of the organisation. The fraud 
diamond model was supported by Omar and Din (2010) who used the fraud diamond model to identify 
important fraud risk indicators and whether these indicators are used by companies to prevent or detect 
financial fraud. They used a mail survey that was distributed to 200 external auditors, 200 internal auditors, 
and 200 governmental auditors in Malaysia. The results revealed that both internal auditors and governmental 
auditors perceived the opportunity side of the diamond model to be the most important fraud risk indicator, 
while external auditors perceived the fraud perpetrators’ capability side to be the most important fraud risk 
indicator. The fraud diamond modifies the opportunity side of the fraud triangle, because without the 
capability to exploit control weaknesses for the purpose of committing and concealing the fraud act, no fraud 
can occur. They also mentioned that opportunity opens the door to fraud, incentive and rationalisation draw 
the fraud perpetrator closer to the door, but the fraud perpetrator must have the capability to recognise the 
opportunity to walk through that door to commit the fraudulent act and conceal it. Dorminey et al (2012) 
added that the capabilities of top management and directors must be explicitly considered as part of the risk 
assessment process. The authors added that a focus on capability requires that organisations and their auditors 
understand employees traits and abilities, especially for those in positions of authority and responsibility.  
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Kassem and Higson (2012b) suggested another model called the ‘New Fraud Triangle Model’.  Their model 
includes four factors or elements that might explain the reason behind fraud. The first element is the extended 
motivation that includes both financial and non-financial motives. The second element is opportunity. The 
third element is personal integrity which replaces rationalisation in Cressey’s model as suggested by the 
fraud scale model. The fourth element which is located at the centre of the fraud triangle is fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities in order to show how significant fraud perpetrators’ capabilities could be in explaining fraudulent 
behaviour. However, their model was not empirically tested. Reviewing prior literature also revealed that 
prior studies hardly ever examined the strength or influence of the relationship between the three factors of 
the fraud triangle, management integrity, and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities in assessing the risk of financial 
reporting fraud. Only one study examined the strength of the relationship between the three fraud triangle 
(Dellaportas, 2013) and the findings revealed that opportunity should be given more weight relative to the 
other fraud triangle factors (i.e. motives and rationalisation). However the sample was so small in number 
(i.e. only ten accountants), self-selected and restricted to offenders serving a custodial sentence.  
An examination of the audit standards revealed no guidance was provided to external auditors on the 
significance of the three fraud triangle factors and management integrity in assessing the risk of financial 
reporting fraud. This might make external auditors assume that all fraud factors have the same significance 
and thereby overlook the most significant ones. This might impact audit quality and the likelihood of 
detecting material financial reporting fraud. There was also no mention of fraud perpetrators’ capabilities in 
the audit standards despite its significance. This raises a question about whether external auditors should 
consider fraud perpetrators’ capabilities in their fraud risk assessments. Only two studies explored the traits 
that could enhance fraud perpetrators’ capabilities to commit fraud but no study has actually explored the 
traits that might enhance management’s capabilities to commit financial reporting fraud. This motivated the 
current study to seek an answer to the following research questions: 
 To what extent are the following fraud factors (management motives, management integrity, 
opportunity to commit fraud, rationalisation, and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities) significant in 
assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud? Why?  
 Should fraud perpetrators’ capabilities be considered by external auditors in assessing the risk of 
financial reporting fraud?  
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 What are the traits that could enhance management’s capabilities to commit financial reporting 
fraud? 
Reviewing prior literature and examining the audit standards also revealed that no guidance was provided to 
external auditors on how to assess the following fraud factors: management motives, opportunity, 
rationalization, management integrity, and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities. The lack of guidance in this area 
will lead to inconsistencies in external auditors’ assessment and response to the risk of financial reporting 
fraud. This might impact audit quality and the likelihood of detecting material financial reporting fraud. This 
motivated the current study to fill in these gaps in knowledge and practice by seeking an answer to the 
following research question: 
 How could external auditors assess the following fraud factors (management motives, management 
integrity, opportunity to commit fraud, rationalisation, and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities)? How 
difficult is it to assess these fraud factors, and why? 
3.6 The Audit of Management Motivations and Financial Reporting Fraud Detection 
Financial reporting fraud could be difficult to detect because it is often perpetrated by highly motivated and 
qualified teams of knowledgeable managers with the power to override controls and circumvent rules (Wang 
and Kleiner, 2005; Wells, 2011; Buckhoff, 2001; Coenen, 2008; Firth et al., 2011). This requires external 
auditors to think beyond the numbers in the financial statements. Ramamoorti (2008) stated that fraud is a 
human endeavour involving deception and intent and thus understanding behavioural factors influencing 
fraud perpetration is key for establishing responsive fraud detection mechanisms and proactively managing 
the risk of financial fraud. Ramamoorti (2008, p.522) added that “since crimes are committed by human 
beings, understanding the motivations as well as why and how the white collar crime was committed is 
crucial”. Kliegman (1994, p.3 cited in Reinstein et al., 1998) saw that “The essence of a successful auditor 
is to understand the motivations of the people involved in each function, from the highest to the lowest”. 
Woefel and Woefel added that “Understanding the psychology and motivation of the fraud perpetrator would 
enhance the methodology of fraud detection and deterrence” (1987, p.7).  
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Dellaportas (2013, p.3) believed that: 
 A better understanding of the causes of fraudulent behaviour in the profession will help members to recognise the 
signs that give rise to the potentiality for fraud and allows professional associations to incorporate into their 
professional development programs the skills required to alert members to the difficulties they may face in practice 
and articulate strategies to deal with such problems.  
 
Glover and Aono (1995) found that understanding corporate culture, including management motives, and 
industry traits are crucial for fraud detection because those two factors have significant influence on the 
likelihood for fraud to occur.  Wells (2011, p.328) added that: 
 “we can better prevent and detect fraud if we first understand the different pressures that senior managers and 
business owners can face that might drive them to commit fraud. This will increase the likelihood of detecting these 
crimes by knowing the most likely places to look for fraud on an organisation’s financials”  
 
Higson (2003) argued that the classification of an action as being fraudulent may depend on the motivation 
behind it. Thus, the auditor is not just auditing the accounting records but is also faced with the audit of 
management motivations because management motivations drive its actions. The author added that unless 
external auditors can actually understand why people are doing things, they will never really understand the 
accounts.  
Albrecht et al. (2006) mentioned that fraudulent financial reporting is rarely detected by analysing the 
financial statements alone, rather it is usually detected when the information in the financial statements is 
compared with the context in which management is operating and being motivated. They also suggested that 
three aspects should be investigated by external auditors: management’s background, management’s 
motivations, and management’s influence in making decisions for the organisation. Rezaee and Riley (2010) 
and Dorminey et al (2012) added that proactive fraud detection also includes an active search for collusion 
and management override. Young (2000) suggested that fraudulent financial reporting begins with 
management pressure or motive. 
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The above discussion indicates that external auditors should understand what motivates management to 
commit financial reporting fraud in a given context and learn how to deal with management impact on the 
financial statements. This is more likely to increase the likelihood of detecting financial reporting fraud. This 
motivated the current study to critically review prior studies into what motivates management to commit 
financial reporting fraud, how could management motivations impact the financial statements, and how 
external auditors could audit management motivations, or in other words, how could external auditors assess 
the impact of  management motivations on the financial statements. This is discussed in detail in the next 
chapter.  
3.7 Summary of Chapter Three 
Chapter three aims to present and critically review the techniques available for detecting financial reporting 
fraud. The chapter evaluates these techniques by providing evidence from prior literature. Reviewing prior 
literature showed that the techniques available for detecting financial reporting fraud include the use of 
analytical procedures, the use of red flags, the use of statistical and data mining techniques, and the use of 
the fraud triangle model. Evidence from prior literature showed that analytical procedures although widely 
supported by audit standards and prior literature in detecting financial reporting fraud has limitations and 
thus depending on it solely might not be an effective way for detecting financial reporting fraud. Prior 
literature showed mixed results as to the effectiveness of red flags and the use of checklist of red flags in 
detecting financial reporting fraud. This made the effectiveness of red flags as a tool for detecting financial 
reporting fraud still questionable. Statistical and data mining techniques also appeared to have limitations 
and thus using them in detecting financial reporting fraud was not recommended.  
Reviewing prior literature also showed that understanding the reasons behind fraudulent behaviours 
especially the motivations behind management fraud could be the best way to detect financial reporting fraud. 
The factors behind fraudulent behaviours include motives to commit fraud, opportunity to commit fraud, 
rationalisation of fraud act, management integrity, and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities. However, there was 
a lack of consensus in prior literature with regards to the significance of these factors in assessing the risk of 
financial reporting fraud, and no study has actually suggested a guidance for external auditors to assess these 
factors. The audit standards provided no guidance to external auditors on how to assess these factors either. 
This motivated the current study to fill in these gaps in the literature by exploring the significance of these 
factors in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud and how could external auditors assess these factors.   
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Reviewing prior literature also revealed that knowing what motivates management to commit financial 
reporting fraud could be an effective way for detecting financial reporting fraud. This motivated the current 
study to critically review prior literature into management motivations, its impact on the financial statements, 
and implications for external auditors. This is discussed in details in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Four: 
Management Motivations - Their Impact on the Financial Statements and Implications for 
External Auditors  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Understanding the motivations behind management fraud could be an effective technique for detecting 
financial reporting fraud as stated in chapter three. This requires external auditors to understand what might 
motivate management to commit financial reporting fraud in a given context, what impact could management 
motivations have on the financial statements, and how could external auditors assess the impact of 
management motivations. This is discussed in detail in this chapter. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 critically reviews prior research into the 
motivations behind management fraud. Section 4.3 critically reviews prior studies into the impact of 
management motivations on the financial statements. Section 4.4 discusses prior studies into the audit of 
management motivations. Section 4.5 is a summary of chapter four.  
4.2 Streams of Research into the Motivations behind Management Fraud 
Understanding management motivations is important for increasing the likelihood of detecting financial 
reporting fraud. Dorminey et al (2012) stated that a significant opportunity for future research might involve 
exploring the various pressure sources in addition to financial pressures that were specified in the fraud 
triangle. This motivated the current study to explore what might motivate management to commit financial 
reporting fraud by critically reviewing prior literature in this area. 
The findings from prior literature revealed various motivations for management to commit financial 
reporting fraud. For instance, management could be motivated to commit financial reporting fraud in order 
to obtain finance, get remuneration and bonuses, meet or beat analysts’ forecasts, or to avoid delisting from 
the stock exchange. Prior research also showed that non-financial factors could also motivate management 
to commit financial reporting fraud such as ownership structure especially in the case of state ownership and 
family ownership, ego, culture, or revenge. However results of prior research were mixed with regards to 
what motivates management to commit financial reporting fraud and very few research explored non-
financial management motives. This is discussed in detail in the sub-sections below.  
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4.2.1 The Desire for Remuneration 
Management or any employee can feel tremendous pressure when company success is directly linked to his 
or her compensation plan. This can lead managers to choose accounting principles that may result in 
fraudulent financial reporting (Jones, 2011). Rezaee and Riley (2010) argued that executives of failed 
financial firms such as AIG, Lehman Brothers, and Freddie Mac were generously compensated for making 
bad judgments and in some cases alleged fraudulent decisions. The Financial Services Authority (2009) 
mentioned that executive compensation policies in British banks have created incentives for some executives 
to take excessive risks which seemed to achieve high profit at first but later proved harmful to the institution 
and in some cases to the entire banking system.  Executive pay could also distort incentives because managers 
focus on their specific targets rather than on the overall promotion of shareholder value (Cheffins, 2009). 
Management compensation plans can be in the form of either stock options, cash compensation (bonuses), 
or stock ownership (equity-based compensation). Stock options enable options holders to buy the company 
stock at an option exercise price that is below a stock market price. This option provides incentives to Chief 
Executive Officers (CEO) whose compensation is dependent on options to engage in much greater risk-
taking than a genuine representative of stockholders likely would (Ryan and Wiggins, 2004). It could also 
make independent directors place too much emphasis on short-term profit growth and ignore excessive risk 
taking of CEOs as long as it increases short-term stock price and their stock-option value (Chowdhury and 
Wang, 2009; Cheffins, 2009). When legitimate business operational results can no longer justify the price of 
stock, these CEOs may turn to accounting manipulation and even fraudulent practices to continue the 
appearance of short-term profit growth, which affects an appreciation in stock and option values (Jones, 
2011). Excessive cash compensation of independent directors may also lead to an environment of cronyism 
where directors and management are not concerned with shareholder interests (Chowdhury and Wang, 2009). 
Agency theory argued that increased firm ownership should mitigate a manager’s propensity to fraudulently 
divert resources for unauthorised consumption. Thus, equity-based compensation has been an increasingly 
popular means by which to align the incentives of top management with those of the shareholders (Davis et 
al., 1997). By providing a share in the ownership of the firm, equity provides the manager with a greater 
incentive to maximise the value of the firm. However, most of the frauds in recent times have been committed 
by senior managers or CEOs who may own a significant portion of the firm (Mckee and Santore, 2008).  
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However, prior research showed mixed results as to whether compensation plans motivate management to 
commit financial reporting fraud. For instance, Dunn (1999) used a sample of 113 firms that issued fraudulent 
financial statements in the period from 1992-1996 and matched them with an equal number of non-fraud 
firms to determine the motives and opportunities behind the occurrence of fraudulent financial reporting. He 
found that the motivation for fraudulent financial reporting is positively related to ownership pressures from 
management. Anderson and Tirrell (2004) found that personal financial rewards can motivate management 
to commit financial reporting fraud. Chesney and Gibson-Asner (2005) used a numerical simulation model 
to study managers’ incentives to cheat in the presence of equity-based compensation policies and found that 
managers will always cheat sooner with stock options than with a cash equivalent remuneration consisting 
of stocks.  
In a study by Sen (2007), the results revealed that increased ownership may not necessarily reduce the 
propensity to commit fraud. He also argued that as the gain from fraud and the corresponding penalty 
increases, unless the gain from fraud is completely offset through the penalty, more and more managers may 
find it optimal to engage in a mixed strategy and behave fraudulently some of the time. Donoher et al (2007) 
explored CEO’s motivations for issuing misleading financial disclosures and why boards fail to exercise 
adequate monitoring and governance. They investigated the nature of incentive alignment and board control 
by comparing firms that filed restatements to previous years’ reported financial results in response to the 
threat of legal action or SEC enforcement actions, with matched firms with clean accounting records. They 
used the database Lexis/Nexus to search for reports with financial restatements during the period from 1994 
to 2003 and their findings revealed that equity ownership motivate CEOs to commit improper disclosure.  
Elayan and Meyer (2008) examined whether the empirical evidence supports the claim that an incentive-
based compensation structure is positively associated with the probability of accounting irregularities. They 
found that firms committing the irregularities have a motive as they exhibit poorer operating performance 
and have greater equity-based compensation. Cullinan et al. (2008) found that compensating outside directors 
with stock options may weaken their independent oversight and might motivate them to misstate financial 
results. Robison and Santore (2008) mentioned that equity compensation contracts may encourage managers 
to commit fraud to inflate a firm’s stock price. Albrecht et al. (2008) discussed the basic nature of fraud, 
including the major accounting scandals of the last decade and also to discuss the role of auditors for 
detecting financial reporting fraud. They found one of the main motives behind the occurrence of large-scale 
frauds is misplaced executive incentives. However, their research lacked empirical testing. 
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 Johnson et al. (2008) used a sample of 87 fraud firms extracted from the Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases (AAERs) for the period from 1991 to 2005. They compare the financial incentives 
from stock and option holdings and operating performance measures in fraud firms to similar incentives in 
non-fraud firms. They found that unrestricted stock is the largest incentive source at fraud firms, and that the 
likelihood of fraud is positively related to incentives from unrestricted stock and unrelated to restricted stock. 
A restricted stock plan may be either a stock purchase plan or a stock bonus plan and it usually carries a 
restriction as to transferability, requiring that during a specified period of time the shares not be pledged or 
sold, except that they may be sold to the issuing company at the original purchase price if the executive 
leaves the firm within the specified period (Jaenicke 2001).  
Mckee and Santore (2008) conducted an experimental study to examine the relationship between equity-
based compensation and fraud occurrence, and found that increasing the level of equity-based compensation 
causes both the level of effort and the amount of fraud to increase. In a study by the Centre for Audit Quality 
(2010), five roundtable discussions with more than 100 participants, followed by more than twenty in-depth 
interviews were conducted to discuss the detection of financial reporting fraud. Participants included audit 
committee, internal and external auditors, and top management. The results showed that the desire to 
maximise performance bonuses and stock-based compensation was identified as one of executives’ top 
motives behind financial reporting fraud. However, the results of this study depended on perceptions of 
participants rather than empirical testing. Beasley et al (2010) conducted a study that was sponsored by the 
Committee of sponsored Organisations of the Treadway Commission. The aim of their research was to 
identify instances of alleged fraudulent financial reporting by registrants of the U.S. SEC disclosed by the 
SEC in an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) issued during 1998-2007, examine 
certain key company and management characteristics for fraud firms, and provide insights related to 
preventing, deterring, and detecting fraudulent financial reporting. Their search identified 347 companies 
involved in fraudulent financial reporting and 322 non-fraud companies. Their results revealed that the desire 
to increase management compensation based on financial results is among the most commonly cited 
motivations for fraud. Troy et al. (2011) examined how stock options moderate the relationship between 
CEO demography and the likelihood of accounting fraud and found that CEO stock options are positively 
and significantly associated with accounting fraud. Boyle et al. (2012) found that CEO involvement in 
accounting manipulation appears to be driven by CEOs’ compensation incentives and facilitated by their 
power.  
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In contrast, Dechow et al. (1996) used a sample of 92 firms subject to accounting enforcement releases during 
the period 1982-1992, and found no evidence that managers are manipulating earnings to obtain a larger 
earnings-based bonus, nor do managers appear to be manipulating in order to sell their stockholdings at 
inflated prices. However they did not specify whether these manipulations were the result of earnings 
management or financial reporting fraud. Gerety and Lehn (1997) tested several hypotheses concerning why 
some firms, and not others, commit accounting fraud by examining a sample of 62 firms charged with 
disclosure violations by the SEC during the period 1981-1987. They found that the use of accounting based 
executive compensation schemes appear unimportant in affecting the decision to commit disclosure 
violation. Uddin (2000) examined the socio-environmental, cognitive and personality characteristics that 
influence a CFO’s intention to report fraudulently in the financial statements. A mail survey is used to collect 
data from CFOs of publicly traded US corporations and the model is tested using structural equation 
modelling. The results indicate that neither individual subjective norm for fraudulent reporting nor 
compensation structure affect intentions to report fraudulently on financial statements.  
Erickson et al. (2006) compared executive equity incentives of firms accused of accounting fraud by the SEC 
during the period 1996-2003 with two samples of firms not accused of fraud. They found no consistent 
evidence to support the conclusion that the probability of accounting fraud is increasing in the sensitivity of 
executives’ total equity or vested stock and stock option-based wealth to changes in stock prices. They also 
found that managerial exercises of stock options and managerial stock sales are not significantly higher for 
fraud firms than for non-fraud firms. Persons (2012) investigated whether there is an association between 
the likelihood of financial reporting fraud and independent directors’ stock option and cash compensation. 
Logistic regression analysis based upon a sample of 111 fraudulent companies and 111 matched non-
fraudulent companies indicated a significantly positive association between director stock-option 
compensation and the fraud likelihood. However, he found no association between the fraud likelihood, and 
independent directors’ cash compensation and stock ownership. 
4.2.2 The Need to Obtain Finance  
Another stream of research showed that the desire to obtain finance can be a motive for management to 
commit financial reporting fraud. For instance, management might be motivated to attract finance at low 
cost, avoid debt covenant restrictions, raise additional capital, get higher cash proceeds from new securities, 
issue equity capital more cheaply, and hence financial reporting fraud will be the only choice to achieve their 
goals in a short time. 
71 
 
Dechow et al. (1996) found that the desire to attract external financing at low cost and the desire to avoid 
debt covenants restrictions can motivate management to manipulate earnings. Beasley et al. (1999) found 
that the desire to obtain higher cash proceeds when issuing new securities can be an alleged motive for 
management to commit financial reporting fraud. Dunn (1999) used a sample of 113 firms that issued 
fraudulent financial statements in the period from 1992-1996 and matched them with an equal number of 
non-fraud firms to determine the motives and opportunities behind the occurrence of fraudulent financial 
reporting. He found that the motivation for fraudulent financial reporting is positively related to the need to 
raise additional capital. Anderson and Tirrell (2004) mentioned that CEOs will often feel extreme pressure 
to report acceptable results, or they will lose access to new capital, default on a bank loan covenant, or be 
unable to retain the confidence of customers and suppliers. Beasley et al. (2010) found that the need to bolster 
financial performance for pending equity or debt financing can be a motive for committing financial reporting 
fraud. Firth et al. (2011) found that the desire to issue equity capital more cheaply can motivate management 
to overstate revenue. 
In Egypt, Kamel and Elbanna (2010) conducted a study to assess respondents’ perceptions of the quality of 
reported earnings. They distributed 464 questionnaires to respondents and got 217 back and interviewed 16 
of their respondents. The respondents included external auditors, accounting and auditing academics, and 
financial managers. Their results revealed that one of the main incentives for manipulating earnings in Egypt 
is to enhance the chances of obtaining a bank loan. However, although their paper holds important 
implications about the quality of earnings in Egypt, it was not clear whether the management’s motives arise 
from earnings management or financial reporting fraud. They did not also specify the techniques used by 
management to manipulate earnings as intended by their study.  
4.2.3 Meeting or Beating Analysts’ Forecasts  
Prior studies found that meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts can motivate management to commit financial 
reporting fraud. For instance, management might seek to raise funds in an Initial Public Offering (IPO), meet 
company’s performance goals, increase demand for issuing new shares, sustain last years’ profit 
performance, report profit, or achieve high share valuation. Evidence from these studies are presented below.  
Executives know that the penalty for not meeting analysts’ forecasts can harm the company’s share price. 
This also can place significant pressure on management to manipulate earnings via financial reporting fraud 
(Albrecht et al., 2007).  
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Rezaee and Riley (2010) mentioned that publicly traded companies are pressured to report earnings that meet 
analysts’ forecasts and expectations rather than focusing their efforts on continuously improving quality and 
quantity of earnings because missing the earnings expectations can cost a significant amount of dollars in 
the market capitalisations as well as top management compensation. Rezaee (2003) found that financial 
reporting fraud can be explained and justified by understanding five factors, abbreviated as CRIME; Cook 
or who committed fraud, Recipes or how books are cooked, Incentives to commit fraud, Monitoring or 
available opportunity that facilitates fraud, End results or the consequences of the fraud act. He found some 
incentives for financial reporting fraud like; meet analysts’ forecasts by inflating the company’s financial 
results to raise funds in an IPO, meet the company’s performance goals, and inflate stock prices to increase 
demand for issuing new shares. However, one limitation in his study is that the cook was not only 
management, but was also auditors and owners. Another limitation was that his results were not empirically 
tested.  
Albrecht et al. (2008) found that unrealistic Wall Street expectations motivate executives to commit fraud. 
Beasley et al. (2010) found that the need to meet internal or external earnings expectations is a commonly 
cited motivation for fraud. Similarly, the Centre for Audit Quality (2010) found that the need to meet short-
term financial expectations motivate executives for committing financial reporting fraud. Perols and Lougee 
(2010) examined how previous earnings management impacts the likelihood that a firm will commit financial 
reporting fraud. They developed three new fraud predictors using a sample of 54 fraud and 54 non-fraud 
firms and found that fraud firms are more likely to meet or beat analyst forecasts and inflate revenue than 
non-fraud firms even when there is no evidence of prior earnings management.  
4.2.4 Concealing Firm’s Financial Distress  
Prior studies found that management might commit financial reporting fraud to conceal company’s 
deteriorating financial condition. For instance, Beasley et al. (1999) conducted a study that was sponsored 
by COSO to identify instances of alleged fraudulent financial reporting by registrants of the U.S. SEC during 
the period 1987-1997. They identified a sample of 200 companies involved in financial reporting fraud and 
found that companies committing the fraud were experiencing net losses or were in close to break-even 
positions before the fraud. This indicated that pressures of financial strain or distress may have provided 
incentives for fraudulent activities for some fraud companies.  
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Kapardis (2002) constructed two models to help external auditors in fraud detection. She called her first 
model “Eclectic Fraud Detection model” or “EFD”.  Her second model was part of her first model and was 
called ROP which stands for Rationalisation, Opportunity, and Crime-prone person model. Her first model 
was tested in Australia via a survey distributed to 125 external, internal, and public auditors, while her second 
model was tested in a study of 50 convicted serious fraud offenders in Victoria, Australia. Her model calls 
for the importance of considering both individuals and companies proneness to fraud.  One of her findings 
showed that companies with serious financial problems are prone to fraud and auditors should be alerted to 
this information. Rosner (2003) found that failing firms (bankrupt firms) may be motivated to engage in 
fraudulent financial reporting to conceal their financial distress. They also noted that they are mainly 
motivated to materially overstate earnings in pre-bankruptcy years. 
Albrecht et al. (2008) discussed the basic nature of fraud, including the major accounting scandals of the last 
decade and also discussed the role of auditors for detecting financial reporting fraud and found that one of 
the motives behind fraud is the need to cover large amounts of debts. Johnson et al. (2008) found that 
executives who commit fraud are likely motivated by a desire to avoid large share price declines.  
Hasnan et al. (2008) developed two logistic models to examine factors involved with fraudulent financial 
reporting practices and whether there is a relationship between earnings management and the occurrences of 
fraudulent financial reporting. Their study used a matched sample of 47 firms that were convicted of issuing 
fraudulent financial statements during the period from 1996 to 2006. Their results showed that firms with 
high financial distress are more likely to commit financial reporting fraud in Malaysia. Beasley et al. (2010) 
found that concealing the company’s deteriorating financial condition is one of the most commonly cited 
motivations for fraud. Firth et al. (2011) examined the causes and consequences of falsified financial 
statements in China and found management is motivated to overstate revenue to avoid reporting three years 
of losses.  
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4.2.5 Ownership Structure and Financial Reporting Fraud  
Ownership structure has an important influence on value creation and firm performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). Dunn (2004) argued that many family-owned and State-owned Enterprises might pose a risk by 
controlling owners and more generally discouraging shareholders from participating in the governance 
process where they regulate the flow of information needed to make decisions and also control the board 
through ownership interest and thereby increasing the likelihood of financial reporting fraud. Yet, reviewing 
prior literature showed scarcity of research in both areas as well as mixed results.   
Family ownership and financial reporting fraud 
Chen et al. defined a family firm as a “firm where members of the founding family continue to hold positions 
in top management, are on the board, or are block-holders of the company” (2008, p.500). Tong (2008) also 
defined them as firms in which founding families have a controlling interest which comes from ownership 
of the majority of shares which give them disproportionate voting and control rights. He added that family 
firms are a vital part of the global economy and can make an even more substantial contribution to growth 
and recovery if they are given the right support, at the right time. 
Family businesses are recognised for their role in driving entrepreneurship. The Institute for Family Business 
(2011) found that in 2010, there were almost 3 million family businesses in the UK or more than three in 
five of all private sector enterprises. The vast majority of these were Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
(SMEs), with approximately 900 large family firms. They also found that family businesses made 14.2% of 
total government revenues in 2010 and the UK family business sector is estimated to have employed 9.2 
million people which are about 41% of total private sector employment. Al Masah Capital Management 
(2011) mentioned that roughly 5000 medium to large family firms exist in the Middle East, with net assets 
totalling $600 billion. These companies constitute 75% of the private sector economy and employ 70% of 
the labour force in the region. The average family net worth in Saudi Arabia stood at $6 billion, followed by 
Egypt (average net worth is $4.5 billion). 
However, family businesses could have some disadvantages. For instance, PwC (2012) mentioned that there 
are many senior people in family firms whose actual role and responsibilities bear little relationship to the 
title they hold. Some family businesses solve the interpersonal issues that can arise at succession by allocating 
specific job titles by way of compensation. This means that the right persons with the required skills are not 
employed at the right places, which will make it difficult for those executives to do the job they were hired 
to do.  
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 PwC in the Middle East added that “family businesses do not place enough importance on proper procedures 
and governance” (2012, p.14). In addition, the high managerial stake so common in family firms, as argued 
by Sciascia and Mazzoia (2008), may provide managers with incentives to engage in earnings management 
to increase the value of the shares. Anderson and Tirrell (2004) mentioned that in family-dominated firms 
with public ownership, business success is a matter of family pride, and failure is commonly associated with 
family humiliation. As the CEO position is passed from founder to children, the new generation is under 
intense pressure to prove to everyone that they are worthy of inheriting the crown. When their decisions 
prove unwise or the environment refuses to cooperate, an overwhelming temptation exists to pretend the 
desired results actually happened. Albrecht et al (2007) also added that management can feel unsecured if 
they did not meet owners’ needs especially in family-owned businesses. The fear to lose their job might force 
them to commit financial reporting fraud.  
Kenyon (2009) argued that small, family owned and fast-growing businesses can be more vulnerable to 
fraud. These types of businesses are usually very cost-conscious and may not appreciate the necessity of an 
adequate system of internal controls especially if a business has grown dramatically from a small 
unsophisticated operation to a much larger, more complex, and more diverse business in a short amount of 
time. Plant et al. (2010) mentioned that family businesses may be criticised for unprofessional governance 
practices, or pay higher costs for insurance or accessing capital. They also mentioned that although 
significant percentages of family businesses are utilizing boards, their independence is still in question. 
Nekhili et al. (2012) argued that managers being aware of the need to provide regular information to the 
various external partners are often faced with a problem regarding the nature and the level of information to 
be disclosed. Families act as insiders and are thus likely to influence managers’ decisions about disclosing 
relevant information. 
According to PwC 2012 Global Family Firms Survey, family firms are facing major challenges in the current 
downturn. The three issues identified by most respondents were market conditions especially price pressures 
(54%), competition (27%), and government policy and regulation (27%). They also found that family 
businesses often face difficulties accessing significant levels of new capital to fund expansion. The Institute 
of Family Business (2011) found that the proportion of SME family businesses which applied for finance 
over the previous year rose from 18% in 2008 to 30% in 2010. The need for external finance is increasing in 
family firms especially after the credit crunch which significantly constrained access to internal finance. 
Thus, family firms might find it difficult to obtain loans until they boost their disclosure and transparency 
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levels. This might put more pressure on family firms to smooth income and may be manipulate income 
figures via financial reporting fraud to get finance.  
There are concerns about whether founding families exploit their powerful positions in the companies to get 
personal benefits and cover up their acts via financial reporting fraud such as improper disclosure of related 
party transactions, improper revenue recognition, or improper consumption of the firm’s resources. For 
instance, In March 2005, a federal jury in New York found former WorldCom Chief Executive Officer and 
co-founder Bernard Ebbers guilty of an $ 11 billion accounting fraud. Another example is Adelphia, a cable 
television company, which was founded in 1952 by John Rigas. The company went public in 1986, and by 
2000 became among the largest cable television and telecommunications providers in the U.S. another 
example is Adelphia company where its stock price declined from about $30 per share in January 2002 to 
$0.30 per share in June 2002, and the stock was delisted from the NASDAQ market. Alleged fraudulent 
conduct included co-borrowing by the Rigas family, omission of Adelphia liabilities, and false and 
misleading financial statements (Rezaee and Riley, 2010). Ahmed Ezz, a co-founder of Ezz Steal in Egypt, 
was also convicted of money laundering and sentenced to seven years in jail – plus a fine of 19.5bn Egyptian 
pounds on October 5, 2012.  
Anderson and Tirrell (2004) and Albrecht et al. (2010) found that family considerations to gain high profit 
motivate management to commit financial reporting fraud. Jara and Lopez (2011) examined how the 
distribution of ownership and the contest for control of the largest family shareholder impacts the earnings 
management of family-owned firms. The results showed that the distribution of control among several block 
holders reduces earnings management in family firms compared with non-family firms due to the higher 
incentives for opportunistic behaviour. Prabowo and Simpson (2011) found that family ownership is more 
detrimental to firm performance whenever the family is highly involved in control decisions. Connelly et al. 
(2012) provided empirical evidence on the relationship between control, ownership structure and firm value 
for all industrial companies that were publicly traded on the Thai Stock Exchange in 2005. The findings 
showed that Thai families are able to manipulate governance measures when they have high voting control 
over their firms. Chen et al. (2008) studied the impact of founding family ownership on voluntary disclosure 
practices and found that family owners on average prefer less voluntary disclosure whether the disclosure 
reveals good or bad news. Ali et al. (2007) and Salvato and Moores (2010) both found that family firms make 
fewer disclosures about their corporate governance practices.  
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Albrecht et al. (2010) wrote a conceptual paper on the relationship between South Korean Chaebols and 
fraud. Chaebols refer to the four largest companies in South Korea which are Hyundai, Samsung, SK, and 
Daewoo. They were exploring the susceptibility of these companies to fraud using the fraud triangle as a 
basis for their analysis. They concluded that among the motives that might lead to fraud in these companies 
were foreign demands and family pressures to gain high profit. Hasnan et al. (2008) empirically tested the 
effect of family owned business and found that family owned businesses sometimes put pressure on 
management to commit financial reporting fraud.  
In contrast, Ahmad et al. (2008) examined the relationship between fraudulent financial reporting and firms’ 
characteristics that are size, type of ownership and types of auditor in companies audited by Inland Revenue 
Board of Malaysia. They found that a company’s form of control, whether it is a controlled or non-controlled 
company by families or a sole proprietor, has no significant effect on misstatements of financial reports. 
Ibrahim and Samad (2011) found that family firms experience lower family agency costs compared to non-
family firms, but they also have lower firm value.  Prencipe et al. (2008) found that family firms are less 
sensitive to income-smoothing motivations than are nonfamily firms, whereas they are similarly motivated 
to manage earnings to avoid debt-covenant violations. Klein et al. (2005) found that ownership type does not 
affect performance in Canada. They found no evidence that family ownership affects firm’s performance. 
Tong (2008) conducted a research to investigate whether the financial reporting practices of family firms 
differ from non-family firms. The results indicate family firms have lower absolute discretionary accruals, 
report fewer small positive earnings surprises compared to non-family firms, have more informative earnings 
and have less earnings restatements relative to non-family firms which indicates less opportunistic behaviour.  
State-owned firms and financial reporting fraud 
Governments and institutional investors are similar in many ways because of their significant resources and 
power. However, governments and institutions can often have very different objectives, which can lead to 
disparate outcomes when it comes to their effect on corporate governance. Governments can leverage 
themselves almost infinitely, using implicit guarantees to secure debt financing for state-controlled firms. 
The relative ease with which these firms secure financing could discourage monitoring, allowing agency 
problems to develop. Governments have the ability to create regulations that can positively or negatively 
affect a company, even to the point of forcing it to shut down. The state might want profitable investments 
as well, but their motivation can also include the reduction of unemployment, increase in tax collection, and 
overall stability of the financial system (Borisova and Megginson, 2011). 
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Borisova et al. (2012) examined the impact of government ownership on corporate governance using a 
sample of firms from the European Union. They found that government ownership is associated with lower 
governance quality and generally harmful to the corporate governance of the firm. Their results also 
suggested that national government ownership reduces the number of board committees while increasing the 
power of CEOs, signalling the state’s intention to consolidate power within a firm and facilitate the transfer 
of control. In contrast, Hasnan et al. (2008) empirically tested the effect of politically connected firms or 
state-owned firms on financial reporting fraud occurrence. However, they found no relationship between 
politically connected firms and financial reporting fraud. Kamel and Elbanna (2012) found that state-owned 
enterprises are less eager to maximise their offering proceeds than privately owned companies. 
4.2.6 Other Management Motivations  
Management might also be motivated to commit financial reporting fraud in order to cover assets 
misappropriated for personal use, bolster other financial results, avoid de-listing from stock exchanges, or 
because of a sudden personal financial need. For instance, In Egypt, Kamel and El Banna (2010) found that 
the desire to sustain previous year’s profit performance, report profits, and achieve high-share valuation can 
motivate management to manipulate earnings. Beasley et al. (1999) found that the following were alleged 
motivations for the financial reporting fraud: to bolster other financial results, increase the stock price to 
cover up assets misappropriated for personal gain, and avoid de-listing from stock exchanges.  Beasley et al. 
(2010) found that the need to cover up assets misappropriated for personal gain is one of the most commonly 
cited motivations for fraud. Firth et al. (2011) examined the causes and consequences of falsified financial 
statements in China by taking a thorough examination of corporate and stock exchange announcements in 
the years 2000 to 2005 using a Bivariate Probit regression analysis, and found management is motivated to 
overstate revenue to avoid being de-listed from the stock exchange. Drew (2012) mentioned that the AICPA 
Fraud Task Force interviewed six perpetrators of significant accounting fraud and found they were all 
motivated to commit fraud by a personal sudden need for money. 
Anderson and Tirrell (2004) analysed a series of fraud case studies and found that Corporate Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs) have a number of personal and professional motivations to influence the financial results 
reported by their organisations. These motivations include; over-identification with the business, ego, family 
pressures, growth strategies, and survival concerns. However, a limitation in their study is that it was not 
empirically tested and they did not mention the implications of these motives for external auditors. 
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 Zahra et al. (2005) analysed fraud by senior executives in terms of its nature, scope, antecedents, and 
consequences. They depended on the fields of psychology, sociology, economics, and criminology to 
identify societal, industry, and firm level antecedents of management fraud and the individual differences 
that enhance the likelihood and degree of such fraud. They mentioned that there are three factors explaining 
the reasons behind management fraud and provided examples and explanation of each of the three factors. 
These factors are society-level factors such as differential association and strain; industry-level factors such 
as culture and norms, investment horizons, concentration/competition, environmental hostility, 
environmental dynamism, and environmental heterogeneity, and firm-level factors such as board 
composition, leadership, and organisational structure. However, their research lacked empirical testing. 
Besides, they did not link management motives to financial reporting fraud types, or even mentioned the 
implications of their findings for external auditors.  
Albrecht et al. (2008) found that executives’ greed is a motive to commit fraud. Omar and Din (2010) found 
that “high degree of competition or market saturation accompanied by declining margins” where perceived 
by auditors in Malaysia as the least important and used fraud risk indicator. Ball (2009) explained that for 
individuals who have built their sense of self-esteem around the business, the possibility of a publicly 
announced failure represents a direct threat that necessitates protective actions that might lead to financial 
reporting fraud. Rezaee and Riley (2010) argued that self-esteem can motivate management to commit 
financial reporting fraud. Dorminey et al. (2011) developed a model that expanded the pressure side of the 
fraud triangle as it provides an expanded set of motivations beyond a non-shareable financial pressure. They 
also identified it with the acronym: MICE that stands for: Money, Ideology, Coercion, and Ego. Ideology 
makes motivators justify the means where they can steal money or participate in a fraud act to achieve some 
perceived greater good that is consistent with their beliefs. Coercion occurs when individuals may be 
unwillingly pulled into a fraud scheme. Ego is the case where sometimes people do not like to lose their 
reputation or position of power in front of their society or families because their success in running the 
business is a matter of pride (Kassem and Higson, 2012b). Similarly, Boyel et al. (2012) found that CFOs 
accused of manipulating their results do not appear to be participating in accounting schemes for direct 
personal gain through equity pay but rather they were pressured to do so by their CEOs (Coercion).  
Prior studies that explored the motivations behind management fraud were summarised in table 4.1. This 
includes details about management motives, the type of financial reporting fraud committed, the research 
methods used, and the limitations of the studies.  
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Table 4.1 Prior studies into the motivations behind management fraud 
Authors Year Research 
method 
List of motives Types of 
financial 
reporting 
fraud 
Limitations 
Dechow et al. 1996 Experiment &  
model 
 Desire to attract 
external 
financing at low 
cost 
 Avoid debt 
covenants 
restrictions 
 Obtain larger 
earnings-based 
bonus 
 
Manipulate 
earnings 
Did not specify 
whether these 
manipulations were the 
result of earnings 
management or 
financial reporting 
fraud. Did not mention 
the implications of 
these motives for 
external auditors 
Gerety and 
Lehn 
1997 Experiment & 
model 
 Cost of valuing 
assets 
 Accounting 
based executive 
compensation 
Improper 
Disclosure  
Did not mention the 
implications of these 
motives for external 
auditors 
Beasley et al. 1999 Experiment & 
model 
 Conceal 
financial strain 
or distress 
 Avoid reporting 
a pre-tax loss 
 Increase the 
benefits of 
insider trading 
 Obtain higher 
cash proceeds 
when issuing 
new securities 
 Cover up assets 
misappropriated 
for personal 
gain 
 Avoid de-listing 
in stock 
exchange 
Not specified Did not mention the 
implications of these 
motives for external 
auditors. Did not 
specify the type of 
financial reporting 
fraud that is more 
likely to be committed 
with these motives in 
mind. 
Dunn 1999 Experiment  The need to 
raise additional 
capital 
 Management’s 
ownership 
pressure 
 
Not specified Did not mention the 
implications of these 
motives for external 
auditors. Did not 
mention which types of 
financial reporting 
fraud can management 
be motivated to commit 
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Kapardis 2002 Models   Financial 
distress 
Not specified Did not mention the 
implications of this 
motive for external 
auditors. Did not 
mention which types of 
financial reporting 
fraud can management 
be motivated to commit 
 
 
Rosner 
 
 
2003 
 
 
survey 
o  
 
 Conceal 
financial 
distress 
 
 
Overstate 
revenues 
 
 
Did not mention the 
implications of this 
motive for external 
auditors 
Rezaee 2003 Analysing case 
studies using 
content 
analysis 
 Raise funds 
 Meet analysts’ 
forecast 
 Meet the 
company’s 
performance 
goals 
 Increase 
demand for 
issuing new 
shares 
 Cover up 
financial 
difficulties 
Not specified Their research did not 
focus on management’s 
motives but also 
motives of owners and 
auditors. Did not 
mention the 
implications of these 
motives for external 
auditors. Did not 
specify the type of 
financial reporting 
fraud that is more 
likely to be committed 
by management with 
these motives in mind. 
Abdel Shahid 2003 Content 
analysis and 
model 
 Ownership type Not specified Focused only on one 
motive. Did not 
mention the 
implications of this 
motive for external 
auditors. Did not 
mention how this 
motive may affect the 
preparation of financial 
statements 
Anderson and 
Tirrell 
2004 Analysing real 
fraud cases 
 Ego  
 Self esteem 
 Personal 
financial 
rewards 
 Worries about 
firms’ survival 
 Family 
considerations 
(type of 
ownership) 
Not specified Did not mention how 
the fraud cases were 
chosen. Did not 
mention which type of 
financial reporting 
fraud can be committed 
given the underlying 
motives and their 
article lacks practical 
and theoretical basis. 
Their results were not 
empirically tested. Did 
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not mention the 
implications of these 
motives for external 
auditors 
Chesney and 
Gibson-Asner 
2005 Numerical 
simulation 
model 
 Equity based 
compensations 
Not specified Did not mention the 
implications of this 
motive for external 
auditors. Did not 
mention which type of 
financial reporting 
fraud is more likely to 
be committed with this 
motive. Their results 
were not empirically 
tested. 
Skousen and 
wright 
2006 Experiment  Increase in 
ownership 
interest 
Not specified Did not mention the 
implications of this 
motive for external 
auditors. Did not 
mention which type of 
financial reporting 
fraud is more likely to 
be committed with this 
motive 
Donoher et al. 2007 Experiment  Equity 
ownership 
Improper 
disclosure 
Did not mention the 
implications of this 
motive for external 
auditors. 
Omran  2007 Questionnaire  Ownership 
structure 
Not specified Studied only one 
motive. Did not explain 
the effect of this 
motive on the 
preparation of financial 
statements. Did not 
mention the 
implications of this 
motive for external 
auditors 
Johnson et al. 2008 Experiment  Avoid large 
share price 
declines 
 Management’s 
incentives 
Not specified Did not mention the 
implications of these 
motives for external 
auditors. Did not 
mention which type of 
financial reporting 
fraud is more likely to 
be committed with 
these motive 
Cullinan et al. 2008 Experiment  Stock options 
compensation 
Revenue 
misstatements 
Did not mention the 
implications of this 
motive for external 
auditors.  
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Skousen et al. 2008 Model  Rapid asset 
growth 
 Increased cash 
needs 
 External 
financing 
Not specified Inability to identify 
significant variables to 
serve as proxies for 
rationalisation. Did not 
mention the 
implications of these 
motives for external 
auditors. Did not 
mention which type of 
financial reporting 
fraud is more likely to 
be committed with 
these motives. Did not 
mention which factor 
of the three fraud 
factors have significant 
effect on financial 
reporting fraud 
Albrecht et al.  2008 Content 
analysis: 
Analysing 
articles 
 Executive 
incentives 
 Wall street 
expectations 
 Large amounts 
of debt 
 Executive’s 
greed 
Not specified Lacked empirical 
testing, motives were 
not linked to the 
different types of 
financial reporting 
fraud, did not mention 
the implications of 
these motives for 
external auditors 
Hasnan et al. 2008 Two Models  Conceal high 
financial 
distress 
 Type of 
ownership 
(family or 
foreigner) 
  Politically 
connected firms 
Not specified Did not test whether 
there is a link between 
financial reporting 
fraud and other 
incentives that were 
mentioned in the 
literature. Did not 
mention the 
implications of these 
motives for external 
auditors. Did not 
mention which type of 
financial reporting 
fraud is more likely to 
be committed with 
these motives. 
Robison and 
Santore 
2008 survey  Equity 
compensation 
contracts  
Inflate stock 
price 
Did not mention the 
implications of this 
motive for external 
auditors. 
Dey et al. 2008 Content 
analysis of 
listed 
companies, a 
 To get more 
bonuses 
 Avoid debt 
covenants 
Overstatement 
of revenues  
Mentioned only three 
motive or reasons for 
manipulating earnings. 
Did not mention the 
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model, and 
semi-
structured 
interview 
 Pay less tax implications for these 
motives for external 
auditors. The very low 
response hinders 
generalization of their 
results to the Egyptian 
context 
Ramamoorti  
et al. 
2009 Interview and 
a model 
 Social status 
comparisons 
 Revenge  
 Crimes of 
passion 
Not specified Did not mention the 
implications of these 
motives for external 
auditors. Did not 
mention which type of 
financial reporting 
fraud is more likely to 
be committed with 
each motive. 
Kamel and  
El Banna 
2010 Questionnaire  Chances of 
obtaining a bank 
loan 
 Sustain previous 
year’s profit 
performance 
 Report profits 
 Avoid reporting 
losses 
 Achieve high-
share valuation 
Earning 
manipulation 
Did not specify 
whether these are 
motives behind 
financial reporting 
fraud or earnings 
management. Did not 
mention the 
implications of these 
motives for external 
auditors. 
Albrecht et al 2010 Case 
studies/analysi
ng four firms 
 Foreign 
demands 
 Heavy 
borrowing 
 Family 
pressures to 
gain high profit 
Not specified Did not mention which 
of the three factors of 
the fraud triangle has 
the most significant 
impact on fraud within 
these companies. Did 
not mention the 
implications of these 
motives for external 
auditors. Did not 
mention which type of 
financial reporting 
fraud is more likely to 
be committed with 
these motives. Their 
research lacked 
empirical testing 
Perols and 
Lougee 
2010 Experiment  Meet or beat 
analysts’ 
forecasts 
Overstating 
revenues 
They examined only 
one incentive related to 
fraud, and did not 
mention the 
implications of this 
motive for external 
auditors 
85 
 
Beasley et al 2010 Experiment  Meet internal 
and external 
earnings 
expectations 
 Conceal the 
company’s 
deteriorating 
financial 
condition 
 
 To increase the 
stock price 
 The need to 
bolster financial 
performance for 
pending equity 
or debt 
financing 
 The desire to 
increase 
management 
compensation 
based on 
financial results 
 Cover up assets 
misappropriated 
for personal 
gain 
Not specified Did not mention the 
implications of these 
motives for external 
auditors. Did not 
mention which type of 
financial reporting 
fraud is more likely to 
be committed with 
these motives 
Dorminey et 
al. 
2010 Model  Ego  
 Financial need 
 Coercion 
  Ideology  
Not specified Did not mention the 
implications of these 
motives for external 
auditors. Did not 
mention which type of 
financial reporting 
fraud is more likely to 
be committed with 
each motive. Their 
model was not 
empirically tested 
The Centre for 
Audit Quality 
2010 Round table 
discussions & 
in-depth 
interviews 
 The desire to 
maximise 
performance 
bonuses and 
stock-based 
compensation 
  The need to 
meet short-term 
financial 
expectations 
  A desire to hide 
bad news.  
Not specified The results of this study 
depend on perceptions 
of participants rather 
than empirical testing. 
Did not mention the 
types of financial 
reporting fraud that are 
more likely to be 
derived by these 
motives. Did not 
mention the implication 
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of these motives for 
external auditors 
Omar and Din 2010 Mail survey  Degree of 
competition 
 Market 
saturation 
Not specified Did not mention the 
implication of these 
motives for external 
auditors. Did not 
mention the types of 
financial reporting 
fraud that are more 
likely to be derived by 
these motives. 
Firth et al 2011 Experiment   To avoid 
reporting three 
years of losses 
as a fear of 
being des-listed 
from the stock 
exchange 
  Issue equity 
capital more 
cheaply  
  Give 
confidence to 
the investors 
and creditors of 
highly leveraged 
companies. 
Overstatement 
of revenues 
Studied only three 
motives. Did not 
mention the 
implications of these 
motives for external 
auditors  
Kamel 2012 Content 
analysis of 
listed 
companies and 
model 
 State-owned 
firms 
 Keep their job 
 Maximise their 
capital gain 
Manipulate 
IPO earnings 
Studied only three 
motives. Did not 
explain the effect of 
these motives on the 
preparation of financial 
statements. Did not 
mention the 
implications of these 
motives for external 
auditors 
Kamel and El- 
banna 
2012 Content 
analysis and 
model 
 State-owned 
firms 
 To affect 
the offering 
proceeds of 
their firms 
Not specified Studied only two 
motives. Did not 
explain the effect of 
these motives on the 
preparation of financial 
statements. Did not 
mention the 
implications of these 
motives for external 
auditors 
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In summary, reviewing prior literature showed various motivations behind management fraud. However the 
results were mixed leading to an inconclusive evidence in this area. These motives were summarised in table 
4.2 along with the number of times each motive was cited in prior literature. It is clear from table 4.2 that the 
most commonly cited motives behind management fraud were “Desire for remuneration” followed by 
“Ownership structure in case of family-owned business and state-owned business”, “The need to conceal the 
company’s financial distress”, “The need to get finance for the company”, and “The desire to meet or beat 
analysts’ forecasts”. Table 4.2 also showed that very few studies explored non-financial management 
motives such as Ego, self-esteem, coercion, competition in the market, greed, social status comparisons, 
revenge, ideology, crimes of passion, and culture. Hence the mixed results in prior literature with regards to 
management motives behind fraud and the scarcity of research into the impact of non-financial management 
motives on the likelihood of committing financial reporting fraud motivated the current study to explore this 
area in the Egyptian context. Egypt was chosen because of the scarcity of fraud research in this context. This 
allowed the current research to expand knowledge of fraud in a context that has hardly been examined before 
in prior literature. The list of management motives summarised in table 4.2 was used by the current study as 
one of the questionnaire questions “what motivates management in Egypt to commit financial reporting 
fraud”.  
Egypt has been developing rapidly from a socialist to a fully developed market-based economy. This 
economic transition towards a more capitalist orientation will influence the country’s cultural and socio-
economic environment, and consequently the behaviour of its corporate managers. The increasing separation 
of ownership and control of capital could be expected to increase agency problems associated with 
managerial decisions (Dahawy et al., 2010). Thus, given the socio-economic environment in Egypt, it is 
expected that management might be more motivated to commit financial reporting fraud than before. It was 
further argued by (Dahawy et al., 2010; Hassan and Power, 2009) that Egypt is characterised by the secrecy 
culture and management tend to view information as a private asset owned by the firm, hence, the voluntary 
disclosure of information is rare and compliance with mandatory disclosure is often problematic. This raises 
the question of whether improper disclosure might be a common way of committing financial reporting fraud 
in the Egyptian context by management in Egypt. This was also supported by Kassem and Higson (2015) 
who argued that Egypt might be facing high risk of improper disclosure because of the secrecy culture. This 
motivated the current study to address the following research question: 
 What motivates management in Egypt to commit financial reporting fraud? 
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  Table 4.2 List of Management Motivations behind Financial Reporting Fraud 
List of Motivations behind Management Fraud   Number of Times 
Cited in Prior 
Literature 
1. Desire for remuneration 22 
2. Need to get finance 7 
3. Meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts 6 
4. Conceal the company’s financial distress 8 
5. Cover up assets misappropriated for personal use 2 
6. Avoid de-listing from stock exchanges 2 
7. Personal sudden need for money 1 
8. Ownership Structure (Family-owned &State-owned firms) 19 
9. Ego 2 
10. Self esteem 2 
11. Coercion 2 
12. Level of competition in the market 2 
13. Greed 1 
14. Social status comparisons 1 
15. Revenge 1 
16. Ideology  1 
17. Crimes of passion  1 
18. Culture and norms 1 
 
4.3 Streams of Research into the Impact of Management Motivations on the Financial Statements  
The techniques available to management to commit financial reporting fraud to satisfy their motives are only 
limited by their imagination. However, certain techniques might recur with great frequency. For example, 
change in revenue recognition methods, inflating stock prices, or improper disclosure, are common 
techniques used (Jones, 2011).  
Reviewing prior literature showed very little empirical evidence in this area as well as inconsistent results. 
For instance, Rosner (2003) found that management overstate revenues to conceal financial distress. Donoher 
et al. (2007) found that management commit improper disclosure to get equity ownership. In contrast, Gretey 
and Lehn (1997) did not find support that management commits improper disclosure to decrease the cost of 
valuing assets and get higher management remuneration. Cullinan et al. (2008) and Robison and Santore 
(2008) found evidence of revenue misstatement when management want to get stock options compensation. 
Dey et al. (2008) found support that management in Egypt are motivated to overstate revenues through using 
income-increasing accounting techniques to increase their bonuses and pay less tax, but they found little 
evidence that management will manipulate revenues to avoid debt covenants. However, the very low 
response rate in their study indicates that their findings cannot be generalised to the Egyptian context. 
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Perols and Lougee (2010) conducted an experimental study and their results revealed that management 
overstate revenues to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. Firth et al. (2011) found that management overstate 
revenues to avoid being delisted from the stock exchange, issue equity capital more cheaply, and give 
confidence to investors and creditors of highly leveraged companies. Kamel (2012) did not find support that 
state owned firms put pressure on management to manipulate IPO earnings. Table 4.3 summarises prior 
studies in this area. The above discussion showed that only few studies explored the impact of management 
motivations on the financial statements and their results were even inconsistent. This motivated the current 
study to seek an answer to the following research question: 
 How could management motivations impact the financial statements? 
     Table 4.3 the Impact of Management Motivations on the Financial Statements 
Motive Technique used Cited by 
1. Conceal 
company’s 
financial distress 
Overstate earnings in pre-
bankruptcy years or simply 
overstate revenue 
Rosner (2003) & Firth et al. 
(2011) 
2. Avoid de-listing 
from stock 
exchanges 
Overstate revenues or inflate 
stock prices 
Firth et al. (2011) & Beasley et 
al. (1999) 
3. Get equity 
ownership 
Improper disclosure, inflate 
firm’s stock price, or overstate 
revenue via improper inventory 
valuation or change of 
depreciation policies 
Donoher et al. (2007); Robison 
and Santore (2008); & Dey et 
al. (2008) 
4.  Need to get 
finance – issue 
capital more 
cheaply or get   
high cash proceeds 
from issuing 
securities 
Overstate revenue or inflate 
stock prices 
Firth et al. (2011) & Beasley et 
al. (1999) 
5. Meeting analysts’ 
forecasts – raise 
funds in an IPO, 
increase demand 
for issuing new 
shares 
Overstate revenue, inflate 
stock prices, or inflate revenue 
Rezaee (2003); Rezaee (2003); 
& Perols and Lougee (2010) 
6. Cover up assets 
misappropriated 
for personal use 
Inflate stock prices Beasley et al (1999) 
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4.4 The Audit of Management Motivations  
As mentioned in chapter three some researchers believed that it is important for external auditors to know 
how to deal with the motivations behind management’s fraud and its impact on the financial statement. This 
is more likely to help them properly assess and respond to risks of financial reporting fraud. This can be 
referred to as “the audit of management motivation”. This term was first introduced by Higson (2003) who 
argued that the classification of an action as being fraudulent may depend on the motivation behind it. Thus, 
the auditor is not just auditing the accounting records but is also faced with the audit of management’s 
motivations because management motivations drive its actions. Thus, unless external auditors can actually 
understand why people are doing things, they will never really understand the accounts. This was also 
supported by Albrecht et al. (2006) who mentioned that fraudulent financial reporting is rarely detected by 
analysing the financial statements alone, rather it is usually detected when the information in the financial 
statements is compared with the context in which management is operating and being motivated. They also 
suggested that three aspects should be investigated by external auditors: management’s background, 
management’s motivations, and management’s influence in making decisions for the organisation. Higson 
(2011) added that maintaining professional scepticism is not enough for auditors to detect fraud. He 
recommended auditors to apply critical thinking to external auditing rather than scepticism and saw the only 
way to do this is by understanding management’s motives behind fraud and viewing external auditing in 
terms of the audit of management’s motivations.  
However no study has actually suggested how external auditors could audit management motivations or in 
other words, how external auditors could assess the impact of management motivations. This motivated the 
current study to fill in this gap by seeking an answer to the following research question: 
 How could external auditors assess the impact of management motivations on the financial 
statements? 
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4.5 Summary of Chapter Four  
This chapter aims to discuss and critically review prior research into what motivates management to commit 
fraud, the impact that management motivations might have on the financial statements, and how could 
external auditors audit management motivations. Reviewing prior literature revealed various motivations for 
management to commit financial reporting fraud. For instance, management could be motivated to commit 
financial reporting fraud in order to obtain finance, get management’s compensation, meet or beat analysts’ 
forecasts, or to avoid delisting from the stock exchange. Prior research also showed that non-financial factors 
could also motivate management to commit financial reporting fraud such as ownership structure especially 
in the case of state ownership and family ownership, ego, culture, or revenge. The most commonly cited 
management motives in prior literature include “the desire to get management’s compensation” followed by 
“Ownership structure in case of family-owned business and state-owned business”, “The need to conceal the 
company’s financial distress”, “The need to get finance for the company”, and “The desire to meet or beat 
analysts’ forecasts”. However the results were mixed leading to an inconclusive evidence with regards to 
what motivates management to commit financial reporting fraud.  
Few studies have explored non-financial management motives such as Ego, self-esteem, coercion, 
competition in the market, greed, social status comparisons, revenge, ideology, crimes of passion, and 
culture. Very few studies also explored the impact of management motivations on the financial statements 
and the results were also mixed. No study has actually suggested how external auditors could audit 
management motivations. This motivated the current study to fill in these gaps in the literature by exploring 
what motivates management in Egypt to commit financial reporting fraud, a context that has hardly been 
explored in prior literature. The current study also sought to explore the impact of management motivations 
on the financial statements and how could external auditors assess the impact of management motivations. 
Egypt was chosen because of the scarcity of fraud research in this context which gave the current research 
an opportunity to expand fraud research in a context that has hardly been explored before. The next provides 
an overview of the Egyptian context.  
 
 
 
 
92 
 
Chapter Five: 
An Overview of the Egyptian Context 
5.1 Introduction 
The current study was conducted in the Egyptian context and data was thus collected from external auditors 
working at audit firms in Egypt.  This required a thorough understanding of the development and nature of 
the accounting and audit profession in Egypt. This chapter therefore provides an overview of the Egyptian 
context. This includes Egypt’s profile and economy, the development of the accounting and audit profession 
in Egypt, the nature of the audit profession in Egypt, and the main audit regulatory and supervisory 
professional bodies in Egypt. This chapter also sheds light on the accounting and audit standards used in 
Egypt, fraud research, financial reporting fraud in Egypt, and some of the governance issues that might have 
an impact on audit quality in Egypt.  
Egypt was an attractive context for the current study for various reasons. First, there is a scarcity of fraud 
research in the Egyptian context. This motivated the current study to explore a controversial area that has 
hardly been explored before. Second, the secrecy culture, the existence of family businesses, the degree of 
government intervention, and the weak legal system in Egypt (World Bank, 2009) might make the country 
more prone to the risk of financial reporting fraud. Third, the existence of personal contacts who work as 
audit professional in Egypt and their willingness to participate in the current study made Egypt an attractive 
context for the current study.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 provides an overview of Egypt’s profile and 
economy. Section 5.3 describes and explains the development of the accounting and audit profession in 
Egypt. Section 5.4 explains the nature of the audit profession in Egypt and sheds light on some of the 
governance issues in Egypt that might have an impact on audit quality in the country. Section 5.5 explains 
the role of the main regulatory and supervisory audit professional bodies in Egypt. Section 5.6 discusses the 
risk of financial reporting fraud in Egypt. Section 5.7 presents fraud research in Egypt. Section 5.8 is a 
summary of chapter five.  
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5.2 Overview of Egypt’s Profile and Economy 
Egypt is located in North Africa but it is also considered a Mediterranean country as it is bordered by the 
Mediterranean Sea. Egypt’s population is about 87 million with most of the population concentrated in Cairo 
and Alexandria which are the main cities of Egypt. The official language in Egypt is Arabic, however, 
English and French is widely understood and spoken by educated classes. There are 41 Universities in Egypt, 
where 23 are public Universities and 18 are private Universities (General Authority for Investment and Free 
Zone www.gafinet.org). 
 Egypt is a Republic, with the elected President as Head of State and Commander of the Armed Forces, and 
elected by universal suffrage. The government is led by the Prime Minister. The Peoples’ Assembly is the 
legislative body. Egypt has a unitary government based in the capital, Cairo. Administratively, the country 
consists of 28 governorates and Luxor City (Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, 
2009). The annual population growth rate is 1.68%, and reducing this growth rate is a challenge to the 
government, given a youthful population (about half is between the ages of 14-45 years old). Only 6% of the 
population is more than 60 years old, while 30% are under the age of 14 years (the World Bank, 2009). 
The Egyptian economy is among the largest in the Middle East. The stock market in Egypt traces its roots to 
1882 (Smith et al., 2009). However, since the outbreak of the 25th January, 2011 revolution, the Egyptian 
economy showed lower growth rates compared to the pre-revolution average (The Egyptian Centre for 
Economic Studies, 2013). On the other hand, after the 25th of January revolution, Egypt has just started its 
transformation to a stable, democratic, and modern economy. Egypt has access to large key markets through 
various multilateral and bilateral trade agreements with the USA, European, Middle Eastern and African 
countries; which secures benefits to Egyptian-based producers supplying these markets (General Authority 
for Investment and Free Zone www.gafinet.org). 
Egypt is a low middle income country with the most diversified economy in the Middle East and the North 
Africa region. Sources of economic growth are broad-based across manufacturing, tourism, agriculture, 
wholesale and retail trade, construction, irrigation and Suez Canal. The main sources of foreign exchange 
income are tourism, remittances from foreign workers abroad, revenues from the Suez Canal, and from oil. 
As for Egypt’s financial sector, the Egyptian financial institutions include banks, insurance companies, 
mortgage financing companies, and leasing companies. The banking system is characterised by a strong 
presence of state-owned banks and, increasingly, of banks controlled by other Arab and European financial 
institutions (World Bank, 2009).  
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Like many emerging markets, banks in Egypt are the dominant financial institutions, as they control most of 
the financial flows and possess most of the financial assets. But economic reform has directed more of bank 
ownership and activity towards the private sector, and has activated a long-dormant securities market (Bolbol 
et al., 2005).  
Investment in Egypt, whether for foreign investors or Egyptian investors, is governed and regulated by 
Companies Law No. 159 for 1981 (“Companies Law”), Investment Law No. 8 for 1997 (“Investment Law”), 
and Capital Market Law No. 95 for 1992 (“Capital Market Law”).  In general, foreign investors can invest 
in Egypt without any restrictions after obtaining security clearances from the national security agencies. In 
addition, certain regulatory approvals are required for foreign and local investments in Egyptian banks and 
insurance companies exceeding 10% of the issued shares. Banking and financial services activities require a 
license from the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE).  Investment banking services require a license or the approval 
from the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA) (Lex Mundi Legal Firm, 2012) 
In response to the 25th January, 2011 revolution, firms in Egypt were compelled to reduce wages and 
employment to avoid a business crisis (The Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies, 2014). However, women 
seem disadvantaged compared to men in Egypt in terms of employment. This was supported by Krafft and 
Assaad (2014) who argued that 11% of all young women in Egypt are unemployed which is higher than the 
percentage of unemployed men. Almost 90% of uneducated and basic educated young women are out of the 
labour force. Even women with higher education participate at only moderate rates, as 49% remain out of 
the labour force and only 32% are actually employed. This was also supported by figures reported in the 
statistical year book published by the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMAS) in 
Egypt, where the unemployment rate in Egypt reached 9.8% for males and 42.2% for female in 2013. In 
addition, the labour market exhibits some favouritism towards men vis-à-vis women. This was supported by 
Burke and El-Kot (2011) who found that females in Egypt were younger, worked at lower organisational 
levels, were less likely to supervise others, worked in smaller organisations, and earned less income than 
males in Egypt. El Hamidi and Said (2014) found that professional women earned 75% of median male 
wages in 2000 and 78% in 2004. The authors added that professional jobs are becoming harder for women 
to get in, but once entered, they face a second wave of discrimination that is practised within the occupation. 
This might explain why the percentage of male respondents in the current study were higher than female 
respondents.  
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The Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX)  
The Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX) is the only registered Stock Exchange in Egypt and it is a governmental 
body under the supervision of the Capital Market Authority (CMA) which is now replaced by the Egyptian 
Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA). The EGX, has the authority to enforce the Listing Requirements. 
The Egyptian Stock Exchange is responsible for monitoring compliance with listing rules and may impose 
penalties (including monetary payments, trading suspension, and delisting) on companies that do not meet 
disclosure requirements (www.egx.com.eg) 
The EGX also aims at educating the public and increasing its awareness of the basics of investment in the 
stock market. This exposure reduces the probability of making uninformed investment decisions and serves 
to provide knowledge-based protection for investors against fraud that may be committed by intermediaries. 
EGX public awareness campaign consists of (1) stock riders simulation game which is a website designed to 
enable participants to experience the real investment atmosphere without a real financial loss and through a 
user friendly interface, (2) Borsa step x step forum and exhibition where educational investments seminars 
are provided to the public for free by experts in the finance field, (3) students tours to EGX, (4) educational 
brochures, and (5) research papers. EGX is currently a member of the International Forum for Investor 
Education (IFIE) which is a non-commercial, private sector organisation whose primary objective is to 
improve investor education on a worldwide basis so that consumers in all jurisdictions are able to make 
informed choices about financial products and investments (www.egx.com.eg) 
EGX is an entity with two locations: Cairo and Alexandria that use the same software, databases and servers. 
Both locations are also managed by the same Chairman and Board of Directors. The Egyptian Exchange has 
four important committees: listing committee, membership committee, trading committee, and EGX index 
committee. The Listing Committee is established by a Decree from the board of directors of EGX to list and 
De-list companies on EGX. It aims at ensuring that the listing of securities and the issuers adhere to the 
financial and legal requirements according to EGX listing rules and capital market laws, and ensuring that 
those not following the listing requirements are delisted from the EGX. The Membership Committee reviews 
membership applications and verifies that all conditions and documents are complete, and reviews member’s 
recommendations and complaints. The Trading Committee is responsible for studying and executing special 
term deals and trades if they fulfil certain specific conditions in order to achieve fairness and integrity in the 
capital market. The EGX Index Committee ensures that global standards are applied in the index rules, and 
advise on the construction and methodology of new indices (www.egx.com.eg). 
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5.3 The Development of the Accounting and Audit Profession in Egypt 
The audit profession in Egypt has passed through several development stages, from a pure public audit 
market to a more liberalised audit market including both private and public audit firms. The history of the 
audit profession in Egypt goes back to 1952 when the government nationalised more than 50 per cent of 
private investments, and passed Act 161 in 1957 to regulate the Egyptian Capital Market. At that time, the 
public sector became the dominant sector, and accordingly the government laws adjusted all major systems, 
including accounting, to correspond to the state central planning philosophy. In 1964 the Central Audit 
Organisation (CAO) was established and was known at that time as “the Auditing bureau”. The government 
assigned the CAO the responsibility to audit all governmental bodies and authorities, in addition to all public 
sector companies. As a result, audit firms and individual auditors were obliged to engage the Central Audit 
Organisation in auditing their accounts. Thus the market available for auditors shrank substantially and 
became limited to some banks, international hotel chains and airline companies. Accordingly, most auditors 
were forced to quit the profession and to work for either the public sector companies or for the CAO, which 
became almost the only and largest audit firm in Egypt (Hassan, 2008; KPMG Hazem Hassan, 2010). The 
Central Audit Organisation is now called the “Accountability State Authority (ASA)” and still continues to 
audit public sector companies.  
In 1973 the open door policy was introduced and the rebuilding began with the enactment of “Law No. 43 of 
1974 Arab and Foreign Capital Investment and Free Zones” to encourage foreign investment and economic 
development and to liberalize Egypt’s trade and investment policy. Egyptian policy involved dismantling 
import controls, relaxing restrictions on the possession and use of foreign currency, and, most important for 
this paper, developing the private sector. This began the transformation of Egypt to a market-based economy 
(Hassab El Naby and Mosebach, 2005). This law permitted the private sector companies in Egypt to start 
operating in a more competitive environment. In 1981, the government passed the Company Act No. 159 
that required private sector companies to prepare their financial statements to meet certain requirements that 
differed from those of the Accountability State Authority (Hassan 2008; Dahawy et al 2010).  
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During the period 1974-1985 there were two frameworks of Accounting and Auditing in Egypt: the Unified 
Accounting System (UAS) that was used by the Accountability State Authority and the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles and Generally Accepted Auditing Standards that were used by the private sector. As 
of 1985, there were representatives of the Big 8 audit firms in Egypt which required the implementation of 
the International Accounting Standards and International Standards on Auditing. However, the public sector 
companies continued using the UAS and the ASA kept auditing the financial statements of these companies 
(KPMG Hazem Hassan, 2010). 
In 1986, Egypt initiated extensive economic reforms that included the privatization of state-owned 
corporations, beginning a more rapid phase of economic development. In 1991, the Egyptian government 
reached an agreement with the World Bank leading to even more accelerated economic reforms through 
increased privatization and the organisation of a stock market. As a member of the World Trade Organisation 
Egypt appeared well on its way to completing its transformation to a market-based economy since 2005. It 
has a preferential trade accord with the European Union and a Bilateral Investment Treaty with the U.S. 
(Hassab El Naby and Mosebach, 2005). 
 In 1992, the capital market law No.95 was issued in Egypt requiring all public listed companies to prepare 
their financial statements using the International Accounting Standards and their audits to comply with the 
International Standards on Auditing (KPMG Hazem Hassan, 2010). Egypt thus, decided to harmonize its 
national accounting standards with IAS, while ensuring that specific characteristics of the Egyptian 
environment were taken into account. As a result of Ministerial Decision No. 503 in October 1997, Egypt 
established the Permanent Committee for Accounting and Auditing Standards to issue the Egyptian 
Accounting Standards (EAS) that were to be based on IAS, though adapted for local conditions. The 
Permanent Committee is chaired by the chairman of the Capital Market Authority (i.e. now called the 
Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority) and composed of nine members representing the major audit 
professional bodies such as, the Accountability State Authority, the Egyptian Financial Supervisory 
Authority, the Central Bank of Egypt, and the General Authority of Free Trade and Investment (Ragab and 
Omran, 2006; KPMG, 2010).  
Although official responsibility for setting accounting and auditing standards rests with the permanent 
committee, the Egyptian Society of Accountants and Auditors (ESAA) has, in practice, the main 
responsibility for drafting accounting and auditing standards. The society’s standard-setting committee 
selects international accounting and auditing standards that are applicable to the Egyptian situation.  
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Once the committee selects an international standard, it is translated into Arabic and becomes the basis for 
drafting an Egyptian standard that reflects specific requirements under Egyptian laws and regulations. The 
draft standard is then submitted to the permanent committee for discussion, finalisation and adoption. The 
final version of the standard is transmitted to the Ministry of Foreign Trade for issuance by a ministerial 
decree (Trade and Development Board, 2008). 
By the end of May 2002, twenty two Egyptian Accounting Standards and six Egyptian Standards on Auditing 
had been issued by ministerial decrees. The six Egyptian Standards on Auditing focused only on reporting 
issues and did not cover other areas of International Standards on Auditing (ISA). However, preface to the 
Egyptian Auditing Standards prescribed that ISA should be followed in the absence of Egyptian Auditing 
Standards (Dahawy et al, 2010).  
In 2006, The Minister of Investment has issued the Ministerial Decree No. 243 of 2006 incorporating the 
new Egyptian Accounting Standards replacing the ones issued by Ministerial Decrees Nos 503/1997 and 
345/2002. This complete set of the new Egyptian Accounting Standards comprises thirty-five standards 
which are based on the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (Afify, 2009). Preparers of 
financial reports refer to IFRS in cases where EAS does not address specific issues. The main departures and 
adaptations from IAS/IFRS are: (a) EAS 1 “Presentation of financial statements” (corresponding to IAS 1): 
(i) Profit distribution to employees and members of the Board of Directors (employee benefits) are not 
recorded as expenses in the income statement, rather they are recorded as dividends distribution in 
accordance with the requirements of local law; (ii) This departure also affects other two standards, namely, 
EAS 22 “Earnings per share” and EAS 38 “Employee benefits”; (b) EAS 10 “Fixed assets and their 
depreciation” (corresponding to IAS 16): Paragraphs 31–42 of this standard on the revaluation model have 
been modified, as this model cannot be used except in certain cases, and when it does not contradict the laws 
and bylaws. Otherwise, the entity should use the cost model as provided in paragraph 30 of IAS 16;  (c) EAS 
19 “Disclosure in financial statements of banks and similar financial institutions” (corresponding to IAS 30 
which has been superseded by IFRS 7): Paragraphs 44, 51 and 52 of this standard have been omitted, as they 
prohibit forming a general provision for loans and borrowings as a deduction from profits and losses (expense 
item), instead stipulating that this provision be formed as a deduction from the owners’ equity (reserve).  
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According to the regulations of the Central Bank of Egypt and generally accepted Egyptian banking 
practices, however, this provision may be treated as an expense and therefore is deducted from revenue 
before calculating profits and losses. (d) EAS 20 “Accounting rules and standards for financial leasing 
operations” (corresponding to IAS 17) This standard is different from IAS 17 for leasing, as the Egyptian 
Financial Leasing Act No. 95/1995 issued by the Minister for Economics and Foreign Trade stipulates a 
completely different accounting treatment to that widely used internationally (arts. 24 and 25), under which 
the lessor records the leased asset in his books and depreciates it, while the lessee records the value of the 
payments of the leasing contracts in the profits and losses as expenses in the period in which they are paid. 
(Trade and Development Board, 2008). 
 
As of July, 2007, the Egyptian Standardised accounting system came to an end. The current Egyptian 
Accounting Standards (EASs) and Egyptian Standards on Auditing (ESAs) are just a translation of the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the International Standards on Auditing (ISAs). The 
EFSA monitors compliance with the EASs by listed public companies on the stock exchange (Farag, 2009). 
Deloitte (2012) argued that the current version of full EASs, issued in 2006 and effective for financial years 
beginning 1st January 2007, applies on all Egyptian entities regardless of whether or not they are listed in 
the Egyptian Stock Market. As for the Audit Standards, the Minister of Investment has issued the Ministerial 
Decree No. 166 of 2008 incorporating the new Egyptian audit and limited inspection standards replacing the 
ones issued in September 2000. The Egyptian audit and limited inspection standards includes ten sets of 
criteria which cover 38 standards including all tasks performed by auditors and legal accountants. The new 
audit standards are consistent with the international audit standards and come within the set of procedures 
taken to enforce Egyptian joint stock companies to prepare their financial statements according to the IFRS 
(Afify, 2009).  
Currently Egypt still complies with the Egyptian Accounting Standards and Egyptian Standards on Auditing 
which are just a translation of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and International 
Standards on Auditing (ISAs). This was supported by Zehri and Chouaibi (2013) who listed Egypt among 
other developing countries that adopt the International Financial Reporting Standards.  
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Compliance with IFRS and ISAs in the Egyptian Context 
Although the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the International Standards on Auditing 
(ISAs) are complied with in the Egyptian context, prior research showed inconsistencies in complying with 
both IFRS and IAS among different companies, and in some cases partial compliance with the standards in 
the Egyptian context.  For instance, it was argued that the degree of compliance with applicable auditing 
standards varies among large and small firms. Although large auditing firms generally have greater capability 
to provide quality services, compliance with the standards is not always ensured (Rahman, 2002; Ministry 
of Foreign Trade, 2003; Wahdan et al, 2005). Hassan and Power (2009) mentioned that although Egypt 
applies the Egyptian Accounting Standards which is not significantly different from the International 
Financial Reporting Standards, divergence from full compliance with mandatory disclosure is the norm and 
voluntary disclosure is limited because of unfamiliarity with IAS, language barriers, tendency towards 
secrecy in the Egyptian culture, and lack of an effective enforcement policy for companies who do not 
comply. They also added that in Egypt companies tend to view information as a private asset owned by the 
firm, hence, the voluntary disclosure of information is rare and compliance with mandatory disclosure is 
often problematic. 
A study by Rahman (2002) reviewed the financial statements of 30 top-listed companies in 2001 and 
interviewed 50 experienced corporate accountants, practising auditors, finance executives, investment 
analysts, academics, and regulators in Egypt. His findings revealed that some companies in Egypt avoid full 
disclosure of information in the published financial statements, ignoring the disclosure requirements set by 
the applicable accounting standards. He also found that the financial statements of many companies that 
seem to have related parties do not disclose information on either the existence of related parties or related-
party transactions, and companies usually do not disclose information on events after the balance-sheet date. 
Besides, non-compliance with the relevant Egyptian Accounting Standard appeared even in the case of many 
companies that present financial statements three to four months after the balance sheet date. In another study 
about financial statements disclosure in Egypt by Abdel Shahid (2003) the findings revealed that the level of 
compliance with familiar aspects of IASs disclosure requirements was significantly higher than the level of 
compliance with relatively unfamiliar aspects of IASs disclosures, where both sets of requirements were 
available in Arabic.  
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Abd El Salam and Weetman (2003) noticed in Egypt that in many cases, international auditing firms referred 
to compliance with IAS, but not the ISA. They have also examined the language effect on the first 
introduction of IFRS in Egypt. Through a sample of 72 locally listed companies, the authors have shown that 
Egyptian companies continue to encounter difficulties in implementing IFRS, given the disparities between 
the IFRS spirit and philosophy in respect of the local accounting traditions and cultures. Wahdan et al (2005) 
in their study on auditing in Egypt have concluded that there is compliance gap between auditing 
requirements and actual practices in Egypt. The authors explained that noncompliance with auditing 
standards in Egypt was mainly caused by the lack of experience and expertise in the profession, the lack of 
accounting and auditing education, and the lack of competitiveness of the profession in terms of salaries and 
incentives. However, the authors added that now apart from very few deviations, due to law and regulation 
constraints, EAS comply with IFRS in substance and in form.  
The World Bank conducted a project in 2009 aimed at assessing corporate governance practices in Egypt. 
The results of the study showed that in practice, the quality of financial disclosure in Egypt is thought to 
have improved greatly compared to previous years, however non-financial disclosure remains inadequate 
and public disclosure is generally lacking, especially when it comes to disclosure about conflicts of interest 
or approving related party transactions. This was supported by Abd El Salam and Weetman (2007) who 
mentioned that Egypt is characterised by the secrecy culture that makes Egyptian companies reluctant to 
disclose important information such as the market value of investments. Wahdan et al (2005) also noted that 
the company decisions to implement IAS are strongly affected by the Egyptian culture and Socio-economic 
factors. All companies comply with IAS when they do not conflict with local culture factors, but they have 
deviated where conflict exists. For example, the disclosure level in the company financial statements is 
considerably lower than the IAS requirements, especially when the disclosure conflicts with the Egyptian 
tendency for secrecy. Dahawy and Conover (2007) stated that secrecy was found to be high in the Egyptian 
market and its effect on the actual disclosures as applied by companies that are listed in the Egyptian Stock 
market. The findings of their research indicate that companies disclosed 61% of the required level of 
disclosure by the Egyptian Capital Market Authority (CMA) and IASs and that companies were selective in 
their choice of what to comply with and what not to.  
 
 
102 
 
Examples of the disclosure of the items that companies failed to comply with were policies related to 
consolidation, leasing, and treatment of intangible assets, policies and values of commitments for capital 
expenditures, market values of investments, disclosure of liabilities to members of the board and the effects 
of transactions with related parties. Ahmed and Hussainey (2010) found that Egyptian listed firms neither 
measure nor report intellectual capital indicators in their annual reports. In addition, they found that auditors’ 
responsibilities on intellectual capital reporting are ambiguous. 
Samaha and Abdallah (2012) explored disclosure of electronic versions of financial statements in Egypt. The 
results indicated that Egyptian listed firms are still in the early stages to disclose electronic versions of its 
print-based financial statements as very limited voluntary financial, corporate governance and investor- 
related information is available online, which are displayed using the very static basic Internet technologies. 
They also found that firms which are audited by the big four audit firms comply more with the International 
Accounting Standards (IASs) required disclosures. They concluded that international audit firms operating 
in Egypt are more familiar with IASs, and thus firms audited by one of the international firms comply more 
closely with the IASs disclosure. Samaha et al (2012) investigated the extent of corporate governance 
voluntary disclosure and the impact of a comprehensive set of corporate governance attributes (board 
composition, CEO duality, director ownership, and the existence of audit committee) on the extent of 
corporate governance voluntary disclosure in Egypt. They measured the degree of disclosure by examining 
annual reports and websites of the most active 100 Egyptian companies on the Egyptian Stock Exchange as 
measured by the EGX 100 index at the financial year ends on 2009. The findings of their study revealed that 
the levels of corporate governance disclosure are minimal. However, disclosure was found high for items 
that are mandatory (41 items out of 53) under the Egyptian Accounting Standards (EASs) because of EGX 
listings’ requirements. The findings also showed that the extent of corporate disclosure is lower for 
companies with duality in position and higher ownership concentration, and increases with the proportion of 
independent directors on the board and firm size. 
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In another study by Samaha and Hegazy (2012) to explore whether external auditors in Egypt follow the 
requirements of ISA No. 520 related to analytical procedures. The results of the study showed relatively low 
use of analytical procedures by Egyptian auditors with wide variations in its use by Big 4 and other audit 
firms. The findings also revealed that auditors from Big 4 firms are found to use analytical procedures to a 
greater extent compared to auditors from non-Big 4 audit firms. The study also found that ISA 520 was not 
that effective in stimulating significant change for the use of analytical procedures in Egypt audit 
engagements. The researchers explained the reason behind that could be due to lack of adequate training and 
awareness of auditing standards, less qualified auditors and more reliance on experienced ones, insufficient 
materials about auditing standards taught at various universities and finally inability of some auditors to read 
and interpret ISA on its original English language. 
However, no empirical evidence was found on the degree of external auditors’ compliance with and 
awareness of ISA 240/ESA 240 with regards to financial reporting fraud in Egypt. The Egyptian Standard 
on Auditing (ESA) No 240 is just a translation of ISA 240.  No study has also explored the usefulness and 
limitations of both in helping external auditors assess and respond to the risk of financial reporting fraud.  
This motivated the current study to seek an answer to the following research questions: 
 To what extent external auditors in Egypt are aware of and are complying with the requirements of 
ISA 240/ESA240 with regards to financial reporting fraud?  
 How useful is ISA 240/ESA240 in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud? Why? 
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5.4 External Audit and Governance Issues in Egypt 
The Nature of the Audit Profession in Egypt 
All registered companies in Egypt are required to keep proper accounting records and prepare audited 
financial statements annually. In the case of state-owned firms, the Accountability State Authority is 
responsible for auditing the state-owned firms (Accountability State Authority, 2012).  
According to the Company law, the annual general meeting of shareholders should monitor auditor 
performance, and appoint a new auditor or renew the appointment of the existing auditor. In the case of bank 
audits, the Central Bank of Egypt monitors the performance of auditors and reviews auditor’s report and 
annual financial statements prior to their presentation at the shareholders’ general meeting (Wahdan et al, 
2005; Ebaid, 2011; Wahdan and Herik, 2012). This requires two auditors (can be from the same firm) to 
audit bank financial statements, and an individual auditor cannot formulate reports for more than two banks 
annually (Dahawy et al, 2010).  
The audit profession in Egypt is generally divided into two groups of practising auditors. One represents 
members of the Egyptian Society of Accountants and Auditors (ESAA) who are qualified and some are 
members of international professional bodies such as the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA), Association of Certified Chartered Accountants (ACCA), and Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in England and Wales (ICAEW). Auditors in this group are normally partners, managers, and audit seniors 
in the Big 4 audit firms or audit firms with international affiliations. The other group is composed of many 
practitioners in small- and medium-size audit firms who do not necessarily possess sufficient knowledge and 
formal qualification of both accounting and auditing standards and perform audit examination for tax 
purposes only (Wahdan et al, 2005).  
The Big 4 audit firms as well as some international audit firms other than the Big 4 such as BDO, Horwath 
International, and Grant Thornton have a presence in Egypt. There is also well-established local audit firms 
whose clients included listed companies. However, the degree of compliance with applicable auditing 
standards varies among large and small firms. Although large auditing firms generally have greater capability 
to provide quality services, compliance with the standards is not always ensured (Deloitte, 2012; Soliman 
and Ragab, 2014). Most of the non-Big 4 international audit firms are small firms which have one or more 
auditors, one of whom is usually the owner, with a trivial market share of the industry’s clients (Anis, 2014).  
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The audit market in Egypt is relatively saturated with weak demand for professional auditing services, in 
particular the non-Big 4 auditing firms, because the big auditing firms have almost 60% of the market share 
(EFSA, 2012). 
According to Egypt’s current legislative framework, the audit profession is permitted to be practised only by 
Egyptian nationals and only licensed individuals can act as auditors. In practice, companies appoint 
individual partners of audit firms so that in the case of an audit failure, the audit firm cannot be held liable. 
Previously, there was no audit firms in Egypt and all the partners have been appointed to audit the financial 
statements of their clients as individuals not on behalf of their firms. However, currently, audit partners can 
be appointed to audit the financial statements of their clients on behalf of their firms (Rahman, 2002; Wahdan 
et al, 2005; El Daly and Abdel Kader, 2011).  
There is a general register kept at the Ministry of Finance where the authorised auditors are to be recorded 
as follows: schedule (A) the auditors under training are registered in this schedule for three years at an 
accredited audit firm before they can be transferred to schedule (B) where they become public accountants 
after five years. There are about 25000 auditors registered at the general register of the Ministry of Finance. 
Members of the Egyptian Society of Accountants and Auditors are automatically registered at the general 
register. Some supervisory authorities have made special registers for the auditors who shall carry out the 
auditing of the entities that fall under their supervision and they do require their auditors to be highly qualified 
such as the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority, the Central Bank of Egypt, the Egyptian Insurance 
Supervisory Authority, and the Egyptian Mortgage Finance Authority (KPMG Hazem Hassan, 2010). 
Governance Issues in Egypt 
There are some governance issues in Egypt that might have an impact on audit quality in the country. The 
Egyptian Code of Corporate Governance (ECCG) was formally established in October 2005 and was largely 
derived from the recommendations of the Cadbury Report (1992), the Hampel Report (1998) and the 
Combined Code (2000) in the UK. However, the code is not mandatory nor legally binding (World Bank 
2009).   
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Reviewing prior studies into corporate governance in Egypt indicates a large gap between the good practices 
suggested by the Egyptian code of corporate governance and what is actually happening in practice. For 
instance, the Egyptian code of corporate governance (2005) stated that the external auditor’s experience, 
competence and capabilities should be relevant to the size and nature of the company’s objectives. However, 
in a study by Wahdan et al (2005) results indicated that there is a scarcity of experienced auditors in Egypt, 
along with variations of the auditor’s judgements. During the interviews, auditors stressed the facts that laws 
do not include rules that state their rights and obligations, there is no strong independent professional 
organisation to guarantee their rights with the auditees, there are no standardised measures for audit quality, 
and there is no separation between the auditing service and other services provided to the auditees by the 
auditors. The Egyptian code of corporate governance states that the board should nominate an external 
auditor based on the audit committee’s recommendation who meets the conditions stipulated in the law of 
practicing the accounting and auditing profession, including competence, reputation and adequate 
experience. However, in 2009, the World Bank assessed the application of Corporate Governance in Egypt 
as part of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme on Reports on the Observance 
of Standards and Codes (ROSC). The findings revealed that in practice, the board without input from an 
independent audit committee and a formalised nomination process nominates the external auditor for 
shareholder approval, and that the Annual General Meeting formally elects the auditor and approves the 
auditor's compensation in 84.8% of companies. They also found that auditor independence is addressed in 
the legal and regulatory framework, however, not consistently complied with in practice. Moreover, auditors 
often remain with their clients for extensive periods, often exceeding ten years, which may influence 
auditor’s independence. Boards are not required or encouraged to ensure the integrity of the financial 
reporting process. Many boards in Egypt are constituted with family members, government officials, and 
related parties and are often chosen for their loyalty to the majority owner rather than their skills and 
objectivity. They also found that although in practice, the quality of financial disclosure is thought to have 
improved greatly, non -financial disclosure remains inadequate. There is also considerable state ownership 
of privatised companies, board independence is weak and disclosure is not a common practice. Few 
companies publicly disclose their ownership and governance structures, remuneration policies, or 
foreseeable risk factors online or in their annual reports. In addition, key policies on risk management, 
internal control and audit processes, and succession planning are often absent.  
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Ebaid (2011) explored the nature and characteristics of the internal audit function in Egyptian listed firms 
and assessed its ability to fulfil its role in corporate governance. The findings revealed that there is a weak 
level of interaction between internal and external auditors in Egypt. In a study by Samaha et al (2012) the 
findings revealed that audit committees’ role in Egypt does not comply with the fundamentals of agency 
theory and that this Corporate Governance supervisory tool has little role in improved financial disclosure. 
They explained that the phenomenon of non-compliance may also be attributed to the socio-economic factors 
in Egypt. Given the present unbalanced political situation, prevalent corruption, deteriorating law and order 
situation and the influence of the social elite, non-compliance with the legal requirements often go 
unpunished encouraging more non-compliance. Anis (2014) argued that there is no mandatory auditor 
rotation in Egypt; however, some international companies and medium size national companies have a 
specific condition to change the auditor every three to five years and some big audit firms have internal 
policies to change the audit partner every seven years. The author added that auditors have indicated many 
challenges that might affect the application of mandatory auditor rotation in Egypt such as the significant 
gap between the audit quality of big auditing firms and that of other auditing firms; the lack of a wide pool 
of qualified auditors to choose from when changing auditors; the significant variation in audit fees between 
big auditing firms and other auditing firms in Egypt; and that almost no lawsuits have ever been brought 
against audit firms in the past. Thus, the auditor liability structure and the strength of law enforcement may 
affect the auditors’ incentives to maintain audit quality.  
 
5.5 The Main Supervisory and Regulatory Audit Professional Bodies in Egypt 
In Egypt, the main regulatory and supervisory professional bodies are the Egyptian Financial Supervisory 
Authority, the Central Bank of Egypt, the Accountability State Authority, and the Egyptian Society of 
Accountants and Auditors. 
The Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA) 
The Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA) is a public Authority, having a legal status, 
established in accordance to Law 10 of the year 2009. The Authority is responsible for supervising and 
regulating non-banking financial markets and instruments, including the Capital Market, the Exchange, and 
all activities related to Insurance Services, Mortgage Finance, Financial Leasing, Factoring and 
Securitization. EFSA's role is to regulate the market and ensure its stability and competitiveness to attract 
more local and foreign investments.  
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The mandate of the Authority also includes limiting inconsistency risks and addressing problems arising 
from applying different supervisory rules. The EFSA staff is required to comply with the “EFSA Code of 
Conduct”, which is prepared with the aim of raising EFSA’s performance level and maintaining EFSA’s 
reputation as a distinguished entity providing high quality services to both dealers and staff 
(www.efsa.gov.eg). The EFSA is a member of the International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators 
(IFIAR). The International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators was established on 15 September 2006 
which aim to share knowledge of the audit market environment and practical experience of independent audit 
regulatory activity, promote collaboration in regulatory activity; and provide a focus for contacts with other 
international organisations which have an interest in audit quality (www.ifiar.org). 
The EFSA established the “Quality Control Unit”. The Quality Control Unit aims at monitoring the 
performance of registered auditors on the authority’s registers and to verify their compliance with 
professional quality standards, auditing and ethical standards.  Its role include: Enhancing the level of 
professional adequacy for auditors through increasing the number of members of the technical team entrusted 
with auditing tasks and developing them professionally on a constant basis, preventing auditors in violation 
from accepting tasks from new clients for a specific period of time, appointing a quality observer/ supervisor 
for current engagements of the auditor in violation, preventing an auditor from engaging in audit tasks for a 
specific period of time and grant him the right to re-practice after expiry of such period of time, and deleting 
an auditor in violation from the Authority register for entering auditors as stated on the EFSA website 
(http://www.efsa.gov.eg/jtags/efsa_en/index_en.jsp). 
 
The Quality Control Unit (QCU) depends on experts from the Accountability State Authority. According to 
the QCU rules, the auditor can only accept new clients if he/she hires a reasonable number of new staff in 
case he/she wants to increase his/her professional capacity. This will prevent auditors from being overloaded 
with audit work which in turn will affect audit quality. The inspection team uses a checklist to check two 
aspects: (1) Reviewing the structure and control system within audit firms. For example, whether there is a 
quality assurance system, continued professional development, clients’ acceptance policies, and commitment 
to ethical requirements. (2) Review the efficiency and effectiveness of the audit process, and to what extent 
audit firms follow the audit standards and keep proper audit documentation. The results of the inspection are 
sent to individual auditors as well as being publicly available in the form of an anonymous general report on 
the webpage of the QCU (www.efsa.gov.eg).  
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To help increase the number of qualified auditors, the QCU make it mandatory for listed auditors to hold 
either a PhD in Accounting/Auditing or to be a member in the Egyptian Society of Accountants and Auditors. 
The QCU also do periodic reviews of listed auditors depending on the potential risks related to their audit 
work. The listed auditors are classified annually according to the number of their listed clients. Auditors who 
audit five listed companies or more are considered as high risk auditors and have to be reviewed annually, 
while auditors who audit fewer than five listed companies are considered as low risk auditors and have to be 
reviewed every three years (www.efsa.gov.eg).  
 
The Accountability State Authority (ASA) 
The Accountability State Authority (ASA) is an independent organisation attached to the People’s Assembly 
(Parliament). It helps the People’s Assembly achieve control over state funds, and funds of public entities. 
The ASA governs the audit of government departments and agencies, public sector enterprises, and 
companies in which public investment constitutes at least 25 percent of total ownership. The ASA also audits 
and examines the work and accounts of any other entity assigned to it by the President of the Republic, the 
People’s Assembly, or the Prime Minister (Wahdan et al, 2005). 
The president of the ASA is appointed by the President of the Republic and the approval of the People’s 
Assembly. He/she can be relieved from his position by a presidential decree requiring the approval of the 
majority of members in the People’s Assembly. ASA auditors are not allowed to assume a job that conflicts 
with their audit work to maintain an independent perspective. The ASA has complete discretion in deciding 
what subjects to look at and how to examine them within a predetermined plan, and it also has complete 
access to the registers in public entities, accounts and documents pertaining to them, and all other documents, 
registers, or papers which the ASA deems necessary to perform its work. The ASA’s audit reports are 
submitted to the People’s Assembly. These reports are given to specialised committees to study, scrutinise, 
and make recommendations for action to be taken. Meetings of such committees are usually attended by 
representatives of the auditee and the relevant ASA department. The specialised committees’ 
recommendations are discussed in plenary sessions. (www.asa.gov.eg). 
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The ASA consists of thirteen departments for financial audit, three for performance audit, and two for legal 
audit. Financial audits include the examination of the integrity and propriety of accounts and records and the 
legality of transactions for governmental agencies and departments in both central and local administrations. 
For publicly owned companies, the financial audits include an audit opinion on the financial statements. 
Performance audits include following up on implementation of the national plan as well as evaluation of the 
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of audited entities. Performance audits also include examining 
resources, information systems, performance measures, and monitoring systems. Legal audits completed by 
the ASA include an examination of the actions taken by the entities under its jurisdiction with regard to 
financial violations committed by their members. This ensures that suitable measures have been taken, 
responsibility has been determined, and disciplinary action has been taken against responsible officials. 
(www.asa.gov.eg). 
 
ASA auditors are rotated at suitable intervals among different assignments to provide them with varied 
experiences. Auditors also participate in training sponsored by the International Organisation of Supreme 
Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), United States General Accounting Office, German Foundation for 
International Development, and the Canadian Comprehensive Auditing Foundation. ASA has always had a 
duty to provide a reasonable level of care while performing audits. This responsibility necessitated the 
establishment of a department, attached directly to the president of the ASA, to review the technical quality 
of auditors’ work. In these examinations, reviewers ascertain that the auditors have exercised due 
professional care and that audits were performed in accordance with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
(GAAS) and the applicable rules of professional ethics (www.asa.gov.eg). 
 
The Egyptian Society of Accountants and Auditors (ESAA) 
The ESAA was established in 1946 by a Royal Charter. The Egyptian Society of Accountants and Auditors 
is an association of chartered accountants that develops educational and professional standards for its 
members. The ESAA is a member of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). However, the 
Society does not function as a self-regulating body in line with the recommendations of IFAC, as it does not 
have the power to ensure its members comply with rules of professional conduct. However there is a code 
of ethics that was developed for Egyptian accountants in 1958, in addition to the Syndicate’s Law 40/1972 
that discusses ethics violation criteria (such as negligence or fraud) (Ebaid, 2011 and Akle, 2011; 
http://esaaegypt.com).  
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The ESAA plays a major role in the development of the accountancy profession in Egypt. Most of its 
members are actively involved in the practice of auditing. The ESAA is governed by a board of directors. To 
gain admission, members are required to meet one of the following requirements: 1) membership in the 
ICAEW or any other acceptable international professional body, provided they pass the ESAA’s 
examinations on Egyptian tax and company law, 2) a doctoral degree in accounting with three years of 
experience in practice, or 3) at least three years of experience in the office of a practicing ESAA member 
and successful completion of the ESAA’s two-part examination. The ESAA is committed to developing 
strong ethical standards to guide Egyptian accountants and auditors. Key aspects of the ESAA’s code of 
ethics include integrity, objectivity, professional competence, confidentiality, and professional behaviour. 
(Smith et al, 2009). However, many practising auditors, who are not members of the Egyptian Society of 
Accountants and Auditors, lack the necessary professional competence for providing high-quality auditing 
services (Wahdan et al, 2005; Smith et al., 2009). 
Training programmes in international accounting and auditing standards are being conducted by ESAA for 
its members and non-members. In an effort to increase the supply of qualified accountants, ESAA and ACCA 
have agreed to facilitate the process for ESAA members to become members of the ACCA after passing the 
required exams. There are about 25000 accountants who have registered at the Ministry of Finance. No 
exams are required for registration but it is necessary to have a relevant academic degree. (Farag, 2009). 
The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) 
The Central Bank of Egypt is the oldest of the Egyptian financial regulators. The bank is an independent 
legal entity, not under the direct administrative supervision of any government body. The Central Bank is 
authorised to undertake a number of steps against banks that violate the provisions of the law. These include 
the cancellation of the bank’s registration, deduction of sums from the bank’s account with the Central Bank 
if it does not maintain the required liquidity ratio, conveyance of a notice to the bank stating the violation, 
reduction of the credit facilities accorded to the bank, prevention of the bank from undertaking certain 
activities, the requirement that it deposits with the central bank additional funds, convening of a meeting for 
the bank’s board of directors in order to discuss the violations, appointment of a supervising member to the 
bank’s board and the dissolution of the bank (Trade and Development Board, 2008).  
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The Central Bank of Egypt has its own registry for banks. Auditors are liable for misrepresentation and 
errors, and are required to compensate the company and/or shareholders, if found guilty. The Banking Act 
No. 88/2003 requires all banks to follow accounting and auditing requirements and guidelines set by the 
Central Bank of Egypt. The Central Bank issues guidelines to banks on financial reporting and requires them 
to follow EAS. Regulations which aim at ensuring audit quality state that two licensed auditors must audit 
bank financial statements and that individual auditors cannot sign audit reports for more than two banks per 
year. The two signatories may not be partners of the same audit firm. It is also worth mentioning that the 
Banking Act and its executive regulation require banks to have an internal audit department that reports to 
the bank’s audit committees (Trade and Development Board, 2008). 
5.6 Financial Reporting Fraud in Egypt 
There was no evidence of published financial reporting fraud cases in the Egyptian context. May be that 
pertains to the secrecy culture in Egypt (Dahawy et al, 2010).  According to the Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners (ACFE) global fraud study in 2016, the number of fraud cases reported from the Middle 
East was 79 cases out of which only 5 cases were reported from Egypt. The number of financial reporting 
fraud cases reported from the Middle East was 5 cases. However, it was not clear how many cases were 
reported from Egypt.  
Evidence from prior studies indicate that there is a high risk of financial reporting fraud in the country due 
to improper disclosure. For instance, Dahawy et al. (2010) argued that the Egyptian accounting system is 
characterised by secrecy. They also added that this secrecy preference in the accounting subculture would 
influence the extent of information disclosed in the accounting reports. Puddephatt (2012) stated that there 
is a lack of proper government accounting systems. Egypt has the Accountability State Authority, but 
generally it does not publish its reports - they are sent directly to the president, head of parliament and prime 
minister who decide what to do with the information.  The author added that the Accountability State 
Authority sometimes fail to get the data they request from government either because the ministry does not 
want to collaborate or the government does not have the data. The Accountability State Authority (ASA) is 
an independent organisation attached to the People’s Assembly (Parliament). It helps the People’s Assembly 
achieve control over state funds, and funds of public entities. The ASA governs the audit of government 
departments and agencies, public sector enterprises, and companies in which public investment constitutes 
at least 25 percent of total ownership.  
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The ASA also audits and examines the work and accounts of any other entity assigned to it by the President 
of the Republic, the People’s Assembly, or the Prime Minister (Wahdan et al, 2005). A study by Rahman 
(2002) found that some companies in Egypt avoid full disclosure of information in the published financial 
statements, ignoring the disclosure requirements set by the applicable accounting standards. He also found 
that the financial statements of many companies that seem to have related parties do not disclose information 
on either the existence of related parties or related-party transactions, and companies usually do not disclose 
information on events after the balance-sheet date. Hassan and Power (2009) argued that although Egypt 
applies the Egyptian Accounting Standards which is not significantly different from the International 
Financial Reporting Standards, divergence from full compliance with mandatory disclosure is the norm and 
voluntary disclosure is limited because of unfamiliarity with IAS, language barriers, tendency towards 
secrecy in the Egyptian culture, and lack of an effective enforcement policy for companies who do not 
comply. They also added that in Egypt companies tend to view information as a private asset owned by the 
firm, hence, the voluntary disclosure of information is rare and compliance with mandatory disclosure is 
often problematic.  
The World Bank conducted a project in 2009 aimed at assessing corporate governance practices in Egypt. 
The results of the study showed that in practice, non -financial disclosure remains inadequate and public 
disclosure is generally lacking, especially when it comes to disclosure about conflicts of interest or approving 
related party transactions. Dahawy and Conover (2007) found that companies disclosed 61% of the required 
level of disclosure by the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority and IASs and that companies were 
selective in their choice of what to comply with and what not to. Examples of the disclosure of the items that 
companies failed to comply with were policies related to consolidation, leasing, and treatment of intangible 
assets, policies and values of commitments for capital expenditures, market values of investments, disclosure 
of liabilities to members of the board and the effects of transactions with related parties.  
Samaha et al (2012) investigated the extent of corporate governance voluntary disclosure and the impact of 
a comprehensive set of corporate governance attributes (board composition, CEO duality, director 
ownership, and the existence of audit committee) on the extent of corporate governance voluntary disclosure 
in Egypt. They measured the degree of disclosure by examining annual reports and websites of the most 
active 100 Egyptian companies on the Egyptian Stock Exchange as measured by the EGX 100 index at the 
financial year ends on 2009. The findings of their study revealed that the levels of corporate governance 
disclosure are minimal.  
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However, disclosure was found high for items that are mandatory (41 items out of 53) under the Egyptian 
Accounting Standards (EASs) because of EGX listings’ requirements. The findings also showed that the 
extent of corporate disclosure is lower for companies with duality in position and higher ownership 
concentration, and increases with the proportion of independent directors on the board and firm size. 
There is very little evidence that management in Egypt are overstating revenues. For instance Dey et al. 
(2008) found support that management in Egypt are motivated to overstate revenues through using income-
increasing accounting techniques to increase their bonuses and pay less tax, but they found little evidence 
that management will manipulate revenues to avoid debt covenants. Kamel and Elbanna (2010) found that 
management manipulates earnings in Egypt to enhance the chances of obtaining a bank loan, the desire to 
sustain previous year’s profit performance, report profits, and achieve high-share valuation. 
In Egypt, several mechanisms were adopted in the last decade, which aims to increase levels of transparency 
and confidence in the content of financial reporting, such as the compliance with the International Financial 
Reporting Standards, the code of corporate governance, and the creation of the Egyptian Financial 
Supervisory Authority (EFSA) which is responsible for supervising and regulating non-banking financial 
markets and instruments, including the Capital Market, the Exchange, and all activities related to Insurance 
Services, Mortgage Finance, Financial Leasing, Factoring and Securitization (www.efsa.gov.eg). However, 
in spite of all these mechanisms, the ability of companies to manipulate financial reports through the earnings 
management still exists (Metawee, 2013). 
However, all prior studies are just an indication that the risk of financial reporting fraud might be high in the 
Egyptian context with no empirical evidence. This indicates there is a need for empirical research to explore 
the nature of financial reporting fraud in the Egyptian context which motivated the current research to seek 
an answer to the following research questions: 
 How common is financial reporting fraud in Egypt?  
 What are the most common types of financial reporting fraud in Egypt?  
 How often do external auditors in Egypt discover financial reporting fraud cases where 
management is involved?  
 How do external auditors detect financial reporting fraud in each case and what are the actions 
taken by external auditors in these cases?  
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5.7 Fraud Research in Egypt 
Reviewing prior literature showed a huge gap in the literature with regards to fraud research in Egypt. For 
instance, only three studies were found on financial reporting fraud in Egypt. Hegazy and Kassem (2010) 
conducted a study to explore external auditors’ perceptions of the importance of red flags in detecting 
financial statements fraud and the effect of demographic factors on auditors’ perception. Their findings 
revealed that external auditors in Egypt perceived red flags as an important tool in detecting financial 
statement fraud. However, they did not explore if external auditors in Egypt actually use red flags to assess 
risks of financial statement fraud and how they actually respond to these risks.   
Kamel and Elbanna (2010) conducted a study to assess respondents’ perceptions of the quality of reported 
earnings in Egypt. The respondents included external auditors, accounting and auditing academics, and 
financial managers. Their results revealed that one of the main incentives for manipulating earnings in Egypt 
is to enhance the chances of obtaining a bank loan, the desire to sustain previous year’s profit performance, 
report profits, and achieve high-share valuation. However, although their paper holds important implications 
about the quality of earnings in Egypt, it was not clear whether the management’s motives arise from earnings 
management or financial reporting fraud. They did not also mention the implications of their results for 
external auditors, however they only provided general recommendations or actions required for improving 
the quality of information. Besides, they did not specify the techniques used by management to manipulate 
earnings as was intended by their study. Kassem and Higson (2015) argued that there might be a high risk of 
financial reporting fraud in Egypt. However, their study was based on the findings from prior literature and 
lacks empirical evidence.  
Only one study, by Kassem (2014), was found in assets misappropriation. The author explored Egyptian 
auditors’ perceptions of the most effective red flags in detecting asset misappropriation, and how would they 
respond to each risk. The findings revealed that external auditors perceived analytical procedures as the most 
effective tool to assess risks of asset misappropriation. The findings also indicates that external auditors still 
need guidance on how to respond to risks of asset misappropriation. The scarcity of fraud research in Egypt 
motivated the current study to use Egypt as a context. It also further motivated the current study to explore 
financial reporting fraud in Egypt.  
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5.8 Summary of Chapter Five  
The current study was conducted in the Egyptian context and data was thus collected from external auditors 
working at audit firms in Egypt.  This required a thorough understanding of the development and nature of 
the accounting and audit profession in Egypt. This chapter therefore provides an overview of the Egyptian 
context. This includes Egypt’s profile and economy, the development of the accounting and audit profession 
in Egypt, the nature of the audit profession in Egypt, and the main audit regulatory and supervisory 
professional bodies in Egypt. This chapter also shed light on the accounting and audit standards used in Egypt 
including the degree of compliance with International Accounting and Auditing Standards, fraud research 
and financial reporting fraud in Egypt, and some of the governance issues that might audit quality in Egypt.  
Banks in Egypt are the dominant financial institutions, as they control most of the financial flows and possess 
most of the financial assets. The banking system is characterised by a strong presence of state-owned banks 
and, increasingly, of banks controlled by other Arab and European financial institutions. In response to the 
25th January, 2011 revolution, firms in Egypt were compelled to reduce wages and employment to avoid a 
business crisis. Unemployment rate is still high in Egypt but the percentage of unemployed of females are 
higher than that of males. Women are also less likely to have managerial or professional jobs.  
The audit profession in Egypt has passed through several development stages, from a pure public audit 
market to a more liberalised audit market including both private and public audit firms. The current Egyptian 
Accounting Standards (EASs) and Egyptian Standards on Auditing (ESAs) are just a translation of the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the International Standards on Auditing (ISAs). 
However, prior research showed inconsistencies in complying with both IFRS and IAS among different 
companies, and in some cases partial compliance with the standards in the Egyptian context. No empirical 
evidence was found in prior literature into the usefulness/limitations of the International Standard on 
Auditing No. 240 in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud either in the Egyptian context or elsewhere. 
No evidence was also found as to the degree of compliance of audit firms in Egypt with the requirements of 
ISA No. 240. Because ISA No.240 was related to the subject of the current research, it was important to 
explore whether external auditors in Egypt are familiar with the requirements of ISA 240 and are actually 
complying with it in the audit of financial statements. Thus, one of the research questions the current study 
sought to explore this area.  
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The audit profession in Egypt is generally divided into two groups of practising auditors. One represents 
members of the Egyptian Society of Accountants and Auditors (ESAA) who are qualified and some who are 
members of international professional bodies such as the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA), Association of Certified Chartered Accountants (ACCA), and Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in England and Wales (ICAEW). Auditors in this group are normally partners, managers, and audit seniors 
in the Big 4 audit firms or audit firms with international affiliations. The other group is composed of many 
practitioners in small- and medium-size audit firms who do not necessarily possess sufficient knowledge and 
formal qualification of both accounting and auditing standards and perform audit examination for tax 
purposes only. The Big 4 audit firms as well as other international audit firms have a presence in Egypt. 
There is also well-established local audit firms whose clients included listed companies. However, the degree 
of compliance with applicable auditing standards varies among large and small firms.  
The audit market is dominated by the Big4 audit firms. There are some governance issues in Egypt that might 
have an impact on the quality of the audit profession in the country. This includes issues in audit rotation, 
audit fees, audit independence, weak legal system, weak governance mechanisms, and lack of a professional 
body that monitors audit quality across all audit firms in Egypt. This raised concerns regarding the degree of 
compliance of audit firms in Egypt with the requirements of ISA 240. This further motivated the current 
study to explore to what extent external auditors in Egypt are familiar with and are actually complying with 
the requirements of ISA 240 and the challenges they might face in discharging their responsibilities for fraud 
as required by the standard. In Egypt, the main regulatory and supervisory professional bodies are the 
Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority, the Central Bank of Egypt, the Accountability State Authority, 
and the Egyptian Society of Accountants and Auditors. 
There was no evidence of published financial reporting fraud cases in the Egyptian context. However, 
evidence from prior studies indicate that there is a high risk of financial reporting fraud in the country due to 
improper disclosure and improper revenue recognition. Reviewing prior literature showed a huge gap in the 
literature when it comes to fraud research in Egypt. This further motivated the current study to choose Egypt 
as the research context and to explore financial reporting fraud in the country. The next chapter describes the 
philosophy underpinning the current research, the methods used for data collection and analysis.  
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Chapter Six  
Research Methodology, Design, and Methods 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Research methodology refers to “the study of methods that raises all sorts of philosophical questions about 
what is possible for researchers to know” (Fisher, 2004, p.40). It also means the process of research (Creswell 
and Clark, 2011) or the theory of how research should be undertaken (Saunders et al., 2009). Research 
methodology was defined by Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009) as a broad approach to scientific inquiry that 
specifies how research questions should be asked and answered. This includes considerations for designs, 
sampling logic, data collection and analysis, guidelines for making inferences, and the criteria for assessing 
and improving quality. Research design refers to the general plan of how research questions will be answered. 
This requires a decision on the research purpose, research strategy, research choice, and time horizons 
(Saunders et al 2009). Research methods refers to the techniques and procedures used to collect and analyse 
the research data (Saunders et al., 2009; Bryman, 2012; Kumar, 2014). Research methods include specific 
strategies and procedures for implementing research design, including sampling, data collection, data 
analysis, and interpretation of the findings (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009).  
This chapter, therefore, describes and explains the way the current research was conducted including the 
choice and rationale for the research philosophy, approach, and design, the techniques used for data 
collection and analysis. The chapter also explains how various ethical issues were addressed by the current 
study.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2 presents and explains the current research aims 
and the main research questions. Section 6.3 explains the different research paradigms and philosophies in 
the social science research along with the rationale behind the philosophy underpinning the current research. 
Section 6.4 describes and explains the approach undertaken by the current research and how the current 
research was designed. Section 6.5 describes and explains the techniques used for data collection. This also 
includes a description of the current study’s population, sample, sampling techniques, type of data collected, 
strategies used for gaining access to data, and how the issues of reliability and validity were taken into 
consideration by the current study. Section 6.6 explains how the current research data were analysed. Section 
6.7 explains how various ethical issues were addressed by the current study. 
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6.2 Research Aims and Questions 
 Research Aims 
The current study aims to help external auditors properly assess and respond to the risks of financial reporting 
fraud. That is in an effort to increase the likelihood of detecting it. In order to achieve this, the current study 
sought to explore the significance of the various fraud factors in assessing the risk of financial reporting 
fraud, and how external auditors could assess these fraud factors. It examines what motivates management 
to commit financial reporting fraud, the impact of management motivations on the financial statements, and 
how external auditors could assess the impact of management motivations. The current study was conducted 
in the Egyptian context and thus it was also important to explore the nature of financial reporting fraud in 
Egypt and whether external auditors in Egypt are aware of and are actually complying with the requirements 
of the international standard on auditing (ISA 240) and the Egyptian Auditing Standards (ESA 240) with 
regards to financial reporting fraud. That is due to the scarcity of fraud research in the Egyptian context and 
the lack of empirical evidence with regards to the degree of compliance of external auditors in Egypt with 
ISA 240 and ESA 240 as mentioned in chapter five.  
 
Research Questions 
In order to achieve the study aims, the current study sought to address the following research questions: 
 Q1: To what extent external auditors in Egypt are aware of and are complying with the requirements 
of ISA 240/ESA240 with regards to financial reporting fraud? How useful is ISA 240/ESA240 in 
assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud and why? 
 Q2: How common is financial reporting fraud in Egypt? What are the most common types of financial 
reporting fraud in Egypt? How often do external auditors in Egypt discover financial reporting fraud 
cases where management is involved? How do external auditors detect financial reporting fraud in 
each case and what are the actions taken by external auditors in these cases?  
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 Q3: To what extent are the following fraud factors (management motives, management integrity, 
opportunity to commit fraud, rationalisation, and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities) significant in 
assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud? Why? How could external auditors assess these 
factors?  
 Q4: What motivates management in Egypt to commit financial reporting fraud? How could 
management motivations impact the financial statements? How could external auditors assess the 
impact of management motivations on the financial statements? 
In order to answer the above research questions, data in the current study was collected by means of mixed 
research methods, namely an online mixed research questionnaire and semi-structured interviews. The 
interviews helped to confirm and complement the questionnaire results. The interviews helped to confirm 
the questionnaire results in areas such as the extent by which external auditors are complying with ISA 240, 
the significance of the fraud factors, and the motivation behind management fraud. The interviews helped in 
investigating some areas in more depth such as the reasons behind the significance of the fraud factors, the 
alleged financial reporting fraud cases in Egypt, auditors compliance with ISA 240, how could external 
auditors assess the various fraud factors, and the impact of management motivations on the financial 
statements and how external auditors could deal with it. The interviews also helped in exploring areas that 
were not explored by the questionnaire such as the usefulness and limitations of ISA/ESA 240, and the 
nature, likelihood, and types of financial reporting fraud in Egypt. Table 6.1 shows how both research 
methods helped in answering the current research questions.  
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  Table 6.1 Summary of research questions and methods of data collection  
Research Questions Role of research methods  
Q1a: To what extent external auditors in Egypt are 
aware of and are complying with the requirements of 
ISA 240/ESA240 with regards to financial reporting 
fraud?  
The questionnaire helped in exploring the extent by 
which external auditors in Egypt are aware of and 
are complying with ISA/ESA 240. The interviews 
helped to explore the degree of compliance with the 
standards in more depth.  
Q1b: How useful is ISA/ESA 240 in assessing the 
risk of financial reporting fraud and why? 
This question was only explored by the interviews  
Q2a: How common is financial reporting fraud in 
Egypt?  
This question was only explored by the interviews 
Q2b: What are the most common types of financial 
reporting fraud in Egypt?  
This question was only explored by the interviews 
Q2c: How often do external auditors in Egypt 
discover financial reporting fraud cases where 
management is involved?  
This question was only explored by the 
questionnaire  
Q2d: How do external auditors detect financial 
reporting fraud in each case and what were the 
actions taken by external auditors?  
Both the questionnaire and interviews helped in 
answering this question. However the interviews 
helped in exploring this area in more depth through 
using probe questions 
Q3a: To what extent are the following fraud factors 
(management motives, management integrity, 
opportunity to commit fraud, rationalisation, and 
fraud perpetrators’ capabilities) significant in 
assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud? Why? 
Both the questionnaire and interviews helped in 
answering this question. However the interviews 
alone helped in understanding the reasons behind 
this significance.  
Q3b: How could external auditors assess the 
following fraud factors (management motives, 
management integrity, opportunity to commit fraud, 
rationalisation, and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities)? 
How difficult is it to assess these fraud factors, and 
why? 
Both the questionnaire and interviews helped in 
answering these questions. However the interviews 
alone helped in understanding the rationale behind 
the difficulty of assessing these factors and whether 
external auditors actually consider all these factors 
in their fraud risk assessment. The interviews thus 
helped in exploring this area in more depth which 
helped in the preparation of the detailed guides for 
assessing these factors.  
Q3c: Should fraud perpetrators’ capabilities be 
considered by external auditors in assessing the risk 
of financial reporting fraud?  
Only the questionnaire helped in answering this 
question  
Q3d: What are the traits that could enhance 
management’s capabilities to commit financial 
reporting fraud? 
Only the questionnaire helped in answering this 
question  
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Research Questions Role of research methods  
Q4a: What motivates management in Egypt to 
commit financial reporting fraud?  
Both the questionnaire and interviews helped in 
answering this question. However the interviews 
helped in exploring management motivations in 
more depth. For instance, why could some 
motivations be more likely and in which companies  
Q4b: How could management motivations impact the 
financial statements?  
Both the questionnaire and interviews helped in 
answering this question. However the interviews 
helped in confirming the questionnaire results and 
in exploring this area in more depth through the use 
of probe questions during the interviews. The 
respondents were willing to share more details 
about this issue during the interview more than they 
did in the questionnaire. This helped in developing 
detailed guidance for auditors in this area.  
Q4c: How could external auditors assess the impact 
of management motivations on the financial 
statements? 
Both the questionnaire and interviews helped in 
answering this question. However the interviews 
helped in confirming the questionnaire results and 
in exploring this area in more depth through the use 
of probe questions during the interviews. The 
respondents were willing to share more details 
about this issue during the interview more than they 
did in the questionnaire. This helped in developing 
detailed guidance for auditors in this area. 
 
6.3 Research Paradigm and Philosophy 
In scientific research, the actions of researchers are guided by the systems of belief by which they generate 
and interpret knowledge claims about reality. These systems of belief are called paradigms and can be defined 
through two ways of thinking about philosophy: ontology and epistemology (Bryman, 2012; Kumar, 2014). 
Research philosophy relates to “the development of knowledge and the nature of that knowledge” (Saunders 
et al., 2009, p.107). It includes important assumptions about the way the world is viewed. These assumptions 
affect the choice of the research strategy and methods used for data collection (Saunders et al, 2009). Hence, 
this section will explain the research paradigm, the various research philosophies in the literature, and the 
rationale behind the choice of the current research philosophy. 
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Research Paradigm 
Research paradigm refers to the way of thinking about research philosophy (Saunders et al, 2009). A 
paradigm may be defined as “a worldview, complete with the assumptions that are associated with that view” 
(Mertens, 2003, p.139 as cited in Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009) or systems of beliefs and practices that 
influence how researchers select both the questions they study and the methods they use to study them 
(Morgan, 2007 as cited in Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009).  
There are two ways of thinking about philosophy: Ontology and Epistemology.  
Epistemology is the relationship of the knower to the known; the nature of knowledge and its justification 
(Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). Epistemology refers to the evidentiary assessment and justification of 
knowledge claims (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991 as cited in Wynn and Williams 2012). It refers to what 
constitutes acceptable knowledge in a field of study (Bryman 2012; Saunders et al., 2009). A particularly 
central issue in epistemology is the question of whether the social world can and should be studied according 
to the same principles, procedures, and ethos as the natural sciences (Byrman, 2012). Epistemology is also 
concerned with the relationship between the researcher and that being researched (Creswell and Clark 2011; 
Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009).  
On the other hand, ontology refers to the nature of reality, being, and truth (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009; 
Saunders et al. 2009; Creswell and Clark 2011). Ontology is concerned with whether social entities can and 
should be considered objective entities that have a reality external to social actors or whether they can and 
should be considered social constructions built up from the perceptions and actions of social actors. These 
positions are referred to as objectivism and constructionism (Bryman 2012). Objectivism believes that social 
entities exist in reality independent of social actors, while subjectivism calls for the importance of 
understanding the meanings that individuals attach to social phenomenon because social phenomenon are 
created from the perceptions and consequent actions of those social actors (Bryman 2012; Saunders et al., 
2009). Bryman added that subjectivism or what he calls constructionism is “an ontological position that 
implies that social phenomena and categories are not only produced through social interaction but that they 
are in a constant state of revision” (Bryman, 2012, p.33).  
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Research Philosophy 
Research philosophy relates to the development of knowledge and the nature of that knowledge (Saunders 
et al 2009). There are four research philosophies that will be explained in this section: Pragmatism, 
Positivism, Realism, and Interpretivism.  
In the pragmatism philosophy, the pragmatists argue that the most important determinant of the philosophy 
we adopt is the research question. They also believe that it is possible to use variations in epistemology and 
ontology, and the use of mixed methods (qualitative and quantitative) is highly appropriate (Saunders et al, 
2009). Pragmatism draws on many ideas, including employing “what works”, using diverse approaches, and 
valuing both objective and subjective knowledge (Creswell and Clark 2011). Pragmatists believe that 
epistemological issues exist on a continuum rather than on two opposing poles. At some points during the 
research process, the researcher and the participants may require a highly interactive relationship to answer 
complex questions. At other points, the researcher may not need interaction with the participants such as 
with testing hypotheses using quantitative data that have already been collected (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 
2009). 
On the other hand, the positivism philosophy advocates the application of the methods of the natural sciences 
to the study of social reality and beyond. It believes that only phenomena and hence knowledge confirmed 
by the senses can genuinely be warranted as knowledge and that the purpose of theory is to generate 
hypotheses that can be tested and that will thereby allow explanations of laws to be assessed, and that 
knowledge is arrived at through the gathering of facts that provide the basis for laws (Bryman, 2012). The 
positivists follow the tradition of the natural scientists. They only work with an observable social reality and 
are concerned with facts rather than impressions. They believe that the researcher is independent of social 
entities and neither affects nor is affected by the subject of the research. Thus they are more into objectivism. 
They use existing theory to develop hypotheses and test it. These hypotheses can then either be confirmed 
or refuted, and the results will be generalised like a law. Positivist researchers are more likely to use 
structured methods and quantifiable observations that can be statistically analysed (Saunders et al., 2009).  
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Positivism is not relevant to business research because it is a statement about the power of science and 
rational thought to comprehend and manipulate the world. It rejected the subjective ideas and is interested 
only in the tangible aspects of human beings like behaviours and speech, but not in the intangible aspects 
like internal thoughts or motivations. It believes that the tangible aspects of human beings and their actions 
and institutions can be studied as objectively as the natural world. It aims at producing general laws that can 
be used to predict behaviour (Fisher, 2004). In epistemology, positivists believe that the knower (researcher) 
and the known (participant) are independent, whereas constructivists believe that the knower and the known 
are inseparable (working together to construct social realities). In ontology, positivists believe that there is a 
single reality, whereas constructivists believe that there are multiple, constructed realities (Teddlie and 
Tashakkori, 2009). 
The third philosophy, which is realism, is concerned with whether objects exist independently of our 
knowledge of their existence. It is similar to positivism as it assumes a scientific approach to the development 
of knowledge. Realism aims to be scientific but makes fewer claims to knowledge and considers the 
intangible aspects of human beings. However they recognised that intangibles cannot be studied in the same 
way as chemistry and physics. It puts things into categories and labels them although it is possible to argue 
about whether the right categories have been chosen. Realists are concerned that their theories should be 
verifiable and they offer generalisations but not predictions. They will try to measure and quantify the things 
they are studying. They believe that the knowledge we gain through research can accurately mirror reality 
itself, although they think the mirror image may be distorted by the intrusion of subjectivity into the process 
of knowing. They believe knowledge we acquire can give good indications of what should be done (Fisher 
2004; Saunders et al, 2009; Bryman, 2012; Kumar; 2014). 
Most realist research includes statistics, although some can include comparison of qualitative case studies. 
Realist seek to test the cause and effect relationship. It takes complex things such as the experience of stress 
and simplifies it to an index number that can be measured statistically. It also uses questionnaires to measure 
people’s attitudes towards things. They form and test hypotheses about patterns of association between 
selected data. Hypotheses are treated as possible explanations rather than fixed laws as in the case of 
positivists and scientific law. Realist research proceeds by choosing the best option by elimination (rejecting 
hypotheses). It can also be used in choosing recommendations, where each possible recommendation 
becomes a hypothesis that can be checked out (Fisher 2004; Saunders et al, 2009; Bryman, 2012; Kumar; 
2014).  
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Realism shares two features with positivism: a belief that the natural and the social sciences can and should 
apply the same kinds of approach to the collection of data and to explanation, and, a commitment to the view 
that there is an external reality to which scientists direct their attention (Bryman, 2012).  
There are two forms of realism: direct or empirical realism and critical realism. 
Direct realism argues that what we see is reality or in other words, what we experience portrays the world 
accurately. Direct realism asserts that through the use of appropriate methods, reality can be understood. It 
fails to recognise that there are enduring structures and generative mechanisms underlying and producing 
observable phenomena and events and is therefore superficial. While critical realism believes that what we 
experience are just images of the things in the real world and not the things directly. They believe that our 
knowledge of reality is the result of social conditioning and cannot be understood independently of the social 
actors involved in the knowledge derivation process (Dobson, 2002, as cited by Saunders et al, 2009).  
Critical realism believes that as researchers, we will only be able to understand what is going on in the social 
world if we understand the social structures that have given rise to the phenomena that we are trying to 
understand. Critical realism thus calls for understanding the reason for a phenomenon (Saunders et al 2009). 
Critical realists however argue that there is a level of reality that is not easily accessible because it is hidden 
from common view. They believe that to discover this level of reality requires honest and intelligent people 
to work hard at the problems or bad things and have corrective actions taken. (Fisher, 2004). Critical realism 
recognises that there is a distinction between the objects that are the focus of their enquiries and the terms 
they use to describe, account for, and understand them. Critical realists unlike positivists are perfectly content 
to admit into their explanations theoretical terms that are not directly amenable to observation. Critical 
realism is an integration of a realist ontology (there is a real world that exists independently of our 
perceptions, theories, and constructions) with a constructivist epistemology (our understanding of this world 
is inevitably a construction from our own perspectives and standpoint). It is a potential contribution to mixed 
methods research because it validates and supports hey aspects of both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches (Creswell and Clark, 2011). Thus, critical realism was the most suitable philosophy for the 
current research.  
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The fourth philosophy is the interpretivism, which calls for the importance of understanding the differences 
between humans as social actors. They believe that we interpret the actions of others with whom we interact 
and this interpretation leads to adjustment of our own meanings and actions. Interpretivism can also be called 
phenomenology or constructionism or naturalistic research. Researchers believe that reality is socially 
constructed based on people’s interpretation of reality which is influenced by their values and how they see 
the world. They are interested in the particularities or what people will do in specific situations. A feature of 
their research is that you cannot understand how others may make sense of things unless you have an 
insightful knowledge of your own values and thinking processes (Saunders et al., 2009).  
Interpretivists believe that researchers individually and collectively construct the meaning of the 
phenomenon under investigation (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). They see the link between understanding 
and action as indirect because the world is complex and options for action are not always clear. They believe 
improving understanding and knowledge does not reveal the best actions to take. The link between 
understanding and action can be mediated through people’s thinking, values, and relationships with each 
other. It is used to explore how people’s sense of their world both influences and is influenced by that of 
others. They believe understanding a situation should help us to use our judgment to arrive at a better choice 
of action, but not necessarily to be the best. It attempts to generalise about how meaning is developed through 
human interactions.  
Interpretative researchers are often participants in the processes they are studying. Sometimes they try to let 
theories emerge from their research material rather than begin the study with a ready prepared set of theories. 
This is known as grounded approach to research (Fisher 2004; Saunders et al, 2009; Bryman, 2012; Kumar; 
2014). Interpretivists believe that social reality has a meaning for human beings and thus human action is 
meaningful, and thus for them, it is the job of the social scientist to gain access to people’s common-sense 
thinking and hence to interpret their actions and their social world from their point of view (Bryman, 2012) 
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The Current Research Philosophy - Critical Realism  
The current study followed the critical realism philosophy because critical realism is much more in line with 
the purpose of business and management research which is in most cases aims at understanding the reason 
for a phenomenon (Saunders et al, 2009) as a way to recommend change. This requires an understanding of 
the social world. This is applicable to the current research that aims at exploring the reasons or motivations 
behind management fraud in order to offer recommendations to external auditors on how to properly assess 
and respond to risks of financial reporting fraud.  
 
Critical realism also seeks to understand the reason for a phenomenon which is interpreted through 
understanding the acts of social actors involved in this phenomenon as explained earlier in this chapter. This 
suits the current research that seeks to understand how financial reporting fraud can be committed through 
understanding the motivations behind management fraud, its impact on the financial statements, and 
implications for external auditors.  The “Critical realist philosophy offers the potential to investigate not only 
the economic consequences of accounting, but also the perceptions and perceptual biases of accountants, 
managers, decision makers and other stakeholders in their use of and reactions to accounting information” 
(Bisman2010, p.15). This suits the aims of the current study that seek the perception of external auditors on 
the motivations behind management fraud, the impact of management motivations on the financial 
statements and the implications for external auditors.  
Critical realism provides a way of bridging the gap between quantitative and qualitative approaches and their 
philosophical underpinning (positivism which relates to the material world and interpretivism which relates 
to the personal subjective world) (Brown and Brignall, 2007; Creswell and Clark, 2011).  The current study 
collected the data using mixed research methods and the critical realist philosophy validates and supports 
key aspects of both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Hence, it was the most suitable philosophy for 
the current study.  
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6.4 Research Approach and Design 
Research Approach 
The choice of the research approach depends on when and how theory was used in the research. Based on 
this, there are two research approaches; deductive approach and inductive approach (Saunders et al, 2009; 
Bryman, 2012). 
In the deductive approach, theory is developed along with the hypothesis followed by the design of a research 
strategy to test the hypothesis (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2010; Saunders et al., 2009; Bryman, 2012). On the 
other hand, the inductive approach starts with the data collection and then the development of theory as a 
result of data analysis (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2010; Saunders et al., 2009; Bryman, 2012). Quantitative 
research is often confirmatory in nature and driven by theory and thus confirmatory research employs the 
deductive approach which involves arguing from the general (theory) to the particular (data). Qualitative 
research, on the other hand, employ the inductive approach which involves arguing from the particular (e.g., 
data) to the general (e.g., theory) (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009).  
The current research used a combined research approach or in other words, a mix of the deductive and 
inductive approach to make the best use of each approach’s advantages. Bryman (2012, p.26) said: 
 As deduction entails an element of induction, the induction process is likely to entail a modicum of deduction. To 
a large extent, deductive and inductive strategies are possibly better thought of as tendencies rather than a hard-
and-fast distinction 
Research in the social sciences sometimes requires moving back and forth between data and theory. The 
deductive approach for instance, helped to review the available literature in the field and gain proper 
knowledge of the gaps in the literature and what was achieved so far. This was important in designing the 
research questions and the methods used in data collection for the current study. In the meantime, the 
inductive approach helped in developing theory (e.g. extending knowledge in an area that has hardly been 
explored before in prior literature) after analysing the research data. Thus, the current research started by 
theory, development of research questions, data collection, data analysis, and then back to theory 
development.  
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Research Design 
Research design provides a plan or a framework for data collection and analysis. It also reveals the type of 
the research and the priorities of the researcher (Kumar 2014; Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2010; Saunders et al 
2009). In order to design a research, researchers have to decide on the research purpose, research strategy, 
research choice, and time horizons (Saunders et al 2009).  
Research Purpose 
The purpose of research can be either exploratory, explanatory, descriptive, or a combination of these. The 
purpose of the current research is exploratory as it is looking for a way to help external auditors properly 
assess and respond to the risk of financial reporting fraud. Most of the areas explored by the current study 
have hardly been explored before as discussed in chapters three, four, and five. Exploratory research is a 
valuable means of finding out what is happening to seek new insights, ask questions, and/or to assess 
phenomena in a new light (Saunders et al 2009).  
Research Strategy 
There are various research strategies including experiment, survey, case study, action research, grounded 
theory, ethnography, and archival research. The choice of a research strategy will depend on the research 
questions and objectives, the extent of existing knowledge, the amount of time and other resources available, 
as well as the philosophical underpinnings (Saunders et al., 2009).   
The current research chose to apply the survey strategy for various reasons. First, the survey strategy allows 
the collection of a large amount of data from a sizeable population in a highly economical way (Kumar, 
2014; Saunders et al., 2009). Second, it is a popular and common strategy in business and management 
research and is most frequently used to answer who, what, where, how much, and how many questions 
(Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2010). This is more likely to suit the current research aims and questions. The survey 
strategy includes data collection techniques like questionnaires, interviews, and observation. However, the 
current research chose to collect data using mixed research methods, namely an online mixed research 
questionnaire and semi-structured interviews. This helped in depicting a complete picture of the current 
research issues.  
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Research Choice – The Use of Mixed Methods 
Mixed methods can be defined as a type of research design in which qualitative and quantitative approaches 
are used in types of questions, research methods, data collection and analysis procedures (Creswell and Clark, 
2011; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). 
In mixed methods research, the purpose of the research is both confirmatory and exploratory, both inductive 
and deductive logic (inductive-deductive research cycle) are used, a mix of probability and purposive 
sampling is used. There is an integration between thematic and statistical data. Mixed methods lead to the 
enrichment of data and provide more support to the research arguments by collecting additional research 
evidence (Kumar 2014).  The use of mixed research methods will help to reduce the biases associated with 
each method and thus improve our understanding of the research issue (Bryman, 2006; Creswell and Clark, 
2011). The use of mixed methods in the current study was useful because mixed methods provide better 
opportunities to answer the research questions through taking the advantage of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods. Qualitative research offers understanding and depth in knowledge as well as new 
insights while quantitative research achieves reliability and rigour of the results because of the generalisation 
they offer. Quantitative methodology, on the other hand, produce more broadly based conclusions (Teddlie 
and Tashakkori, 2009). 
The current research used the sequential mixed methods research design where the first phase of data 
collection started by distributing an online questionnaire to the study sample followed by semi-structured 
interviews.  
The interviews were meant to complement and enrich the data collected via the questionnaire. That is because 
participants did not provide enough details in some of the questions in the questionnaire, and also the nature 
of some questions required the use of interviews rather than the questionnaire. For instance, open-ended 
questions that required participants to provide detailed answers. Generally, participants are reluctant to 
provide much detail in the questionnaire while they might be happy to share enough details via personal 
interviews. The results from the interviews helped in adding insights into the quantitative results collected 
via the questionnaire. This helped in depicting a complete picture of the current research issue. The results 
from the questionnaire were used to decide on the sample of the interview as well as the interview questions.  
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The questionnaire included a question to seek respondents’ desire to take part in an interview for the purpose 
of the current study later. The quantitative and qualitative results were mixed during the interpretation stage 
(i.e. the findings chapter) where conclusions were drawn reflecting what was learned from the combination 
of the results from both methods in the current study. The contribution of the interview is discussed in detail 
in chapters eight and nine.  
6.5 Research Methods and Data Collection Techniques  
Research methods refer to the techniques and procedures or tactics used to collect and analyse the research 
data (Saunders et al. 2009; Bryman, 2012; Kumar, 2014). Primary data was collected to answer the current 
research questions through the use of mixed research methods. A mixed methods online questionnaires was 
used to collect both quantitative and qualitative data, followed by semi-structured interviews to collect 
qualitative data that helped in providing rich information. This helped in depicting a complete picture of the 
current research issue. 
This section describes how each data collection technique was designed and administered for data collection. 
It also explains the study sample, the sampling technique used in each case, and the strategies used in gaining 
access to respondents.  
6.5.1 Mixed Methods Questionnaire  
Population, Sample, and Sampling Technique 
The current study was conducted in the Egyptian context. The population of the current study constituted of 
external auditors working at audit firms in Egypt. Stratified purposive sampling was used to select the sample 
of the current study. Stratified purposive sampling is a mixed method sampling technique that requires the 
researcher to first stratifies the potential participants based on certain dimensions using procedures consistent 
with probabilistic sampling and then purposefully selects a small number of cases from each stratum 
(Creswell and Clark, 2011). The stratified nature of this sampling technique is similar to probability sampling 
and the small number of cases it generates is characteristic of purposive sampling (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 
2009). Thus, the study sample included 150 external auditors working at different audit firms in Egypt such 
as the Big 4 international audit firms, international audit firms other than the Big 4, and small/medium size 
national audit firms. 
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The use of stratified purposive sampling suited the current study because it helped in choosing only 
respondents that can provide valuable information to help answer the current research questions from a large 
population. Because the current study included technical questions that required respondents with enough 
years of experience in the audit field, only respondents with two years of experience or more were included 
in the sample. Respondents who have insufficient knowledge or experience may deliberately guess at the 
answer, a tendency known as “uninformed response” which reduces the reliability of data (Saunders et al, 
2009). In addition to the need for experienced audit professionals to answer the current study’s questions, it 
was difficult to use probability sampling because there was a difficulty in specifying the sampling frame. 
The Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority in Egypt keeps a register of individual external auditors 
licensed to audit listed companies, but this list does not represent the total number of external auditors 
working in the Egyptian context. In addition, these licensed auditors are audit partners or owners of audit 
firms in Egypt who are allowed to sign audited financial statements for listed companies. Hence, the list does 
not represent the population of external auditors in Egypt as it does not include other external auditors with 
different years of audit experience and different ranks or titles or even the total number of external auditors 
working in these audit firms/offices.  
The sample of the current study started with twenty personal contacts that are experienced audit professionals 
in Egypt. Then by the use of the snowballing technique, Linkedin, and facebook, the final sample was 150 
external auditors. This is explained in detail in the sub-section below.  
Gaining Access to Respondents 
A three-stage strategy was used to gain access to data. First, existing personal contacts were contacted via 
email or through their LinkedIn accounts and asked to fill in the questionnaire. Then they were asked to 
identify other possible contacts who might be interested to take part in the current study. Second, new 
contacts were developed through LinkedIn, Facebook, and Twitter. Then they were asked to fill in the 
questionnaire. Third, existing and new contacts were asked in the questionnaire if they would like to take 
part in an interview later for the purpose of the current study. 
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In the current study, twenty existing personal contacts were contacted via email and also through their 
LinkedIn accounts to seek their desire to participate in the current study. The personal contacts were all 
experienced external auditors working at the Big 4 international audit firms in Egypt.  
Existing personal contacts were first contacted by email and through LinkedIn – a professional network – to 
seek their permission to take part in the current study. LinkedIn is the world's largest professional network 
with 300 million members in over 200 countries and territories around the globe. Their mission is to connect 
the world's professionals to make them more productive and successful and help them to access to people, 
jobs, news, and updates. It allows access to their professional profiles that includes their professions, 
information about their companies, years of experience, and their qualifications. It also shows their contacts 
and their details with an option to send them messages and invitations to connect. 
The snowballing technique was then used to gain access to other respondents. First, existing personal contacts 
were asked to identify other external auditors who have more or at least the same years of audit experience 
and who might be interested to take part in the current study. These new contacts were then asked to identify 
further cases, and so the sample snowballs. This helped in gaining access to twenty two more external 
auditors. All personal contacts at that point had LinkedIn accounts which also helped in gaining access to 
their personal contacts. A request was sent to new contacts – only external auditors working in Egypt – to 
connect via LinkedIn.  
Then, a message was sent to these new contacts seeking their permission to take part in the current study. 
This helped in gaining access to more 105 external auditors working in Egypt. The message included the 
research purpose, why they have been chosen, what type of data access is required from them, and a link to 
the online questionnaire. They were also thanked for their time and advised to contact me either via LinkedIn 
or email in case they have any questions or concerns regarding my research. Hence, LinkedIn was an 
excellent way not only to gain access to more external auditors in Egypt but also to understand more about 
the sample and to choose only respondents who are suitable for the current study. The LinkedIn message was 
sent to respondents on 29th October, 2013, followed by a reminder one month later and a final one three 
weeks later to increase the response rate. Social networks such as Facebook and Twitter were also used to 
gain access to more respondents for the current study.  
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A link to the online questionnaire was also posted on Facebook and Twitter and addressed only to external 
auditors in Egypt or personal contacts who know external auditors in Egypt. Facebook helped in gaining 
access to three more external auditors who were willing to take part in the current study. However, Twitter 
did not help in gaining access to any respondents. This led to a total sample of 150 external auditors working 
in audit firms in Egypt. Figure 6.1 illustrates how data access was gained through personal contacts and the 
development of new contacts.  
Figure 6.1 Strategy for gaining access to participants 
 
 
In order to gain access to the 150 respondents in the current study, other various strategies were also used. 
This includes a good understanding of the audit firms where respondents of the current study work, sufficient 
time was allowed for the design of the current research and for data collection, a clear research purpose was 
provided to all respondents, and their organisational concerns were addressed in an appropriate manner.  
Possible benefits to the audit firms and external auditors who took part in the current study were also 
highlighted. The respondents were also given the choice of both an Arabic and English Version of the 
questionnaire/interview schedule to ensure they are comfortable to answer the questions. Each of these 
strategies is discussed in detail below.  
 
 
 
 
 
Total Number of Respondents - 150
Personal contacts 
-20 contacts
Snowballing via 
personal 
contacts -22 
contacts
Snowballing via 
LinkedIn -105 
contacts
Facebook - 3 
contacts 
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Understanding the nature of audit firms in Egypt 
The nature and type of audit firms in Egypt was thoroughly understood before designing the methods for 
data collection and approaching respondents. This required browsing audit firms’ websites and reviewing 
prior literature. The Big 4 audit firms as well as other international audit firms had a presence in Egypt. There 
are also well-established local audit firms whose clients included listed companies. However, the degree of 
compliance with applicable auditing standards varies among large and small firms. Although large auditing 
firms generally have greater capability to provide quality services, compliance with the standards is not 
always ensured (Deloitte, 2012). The audit profession in Egypt is divided into two groups of practising 
auditors as explained in chapter five. One represents members of Egyptian Society of Accountants and 
Auditors (ESAA) who are qualified and some who are members of international professional bodies such as 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), Association of Certified Chartered 
Accountants (ACCA), and Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW).  
Auditors in this group are normally partners, managers, and audit seniors in the Big 4 audit firms or 
international audit firms other than the Big 4. The other group is composed of many practitioners in small- 
and medium-size audit firms who do not necessarily possess sufficient knowledge and formal qualification 
of both accounting and auditing standards and perform audit examination for tax purposes only (Wahdan et 
al, 2005). In addition, there are auditors working for the “Accountability State Authority (ASA)” which was 
known before as the “Central Audit Organisation”. The Accountability State Authority is responsible for 
auditing all governmental bodies and authorities, in addition to all public sector companies. 
Access to audit firms in Egypt - regardless of the size - was very difficult without having personal contacts 
to facilitate physical access to these firms.  
Sufficient time to design and collect data  
Sufficient time- almost a year- was given to design the current research and decide on the data collection 
methods. Sufficient time was allowed to contact intended participants and gain their acceptance. 
Research design and data collection methods were reviewed and approved by two academics having 
considerable years of experience in accounting and audit research. All the required modifications were taken 
into consideration before data collection. Pilot testing was also used to make sure the questionnaire was 
clearly designed and that respondents could clearly understand the questions so as to encourage respondents’ 
participation in the current study.  
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The questionnaire was open for more than a year – from 29th October, 2013 to 12th January, 2015- to allow 
participants enough time to respond as well as to increase the response rate. Reminders were sent to 
participants a month after first submission but with no pressure to take part in the current study.  
Providing a clear research purpose and type of data access needed 
A message was sent to respondents via email, LinkedIn, Facebook, or Twitter to seek their consent to 
participate in the current study. This message included a clear explanation of the purpose of the current study. 
The questionnaire also included a participants’ information sheet that further explained the research purpose, 
why respondents were chosen, and what is expected from them.  
Overcoming organisational concerns 
All organisational concerns were addressed including the amount of time or resources that would be involved 
on the part of the organisation, the sensitivity of the current research topic, and concerns about data 
protection. A participants’ information sheet was attached to the online questionnaire that was sent to all 
participants. In the participants’ information sheet all participants were assured that their personal data would 
not be shared with any other party without their consent. It was also explained that to maintain confidentiality, 
all personal data collected during the current research will be anonymised and participants will be assigned 
a reference number or code where their data will be stored against this number/code rather than against the 
names of participants.  
Participants were informed that data will be kept in a lockable room with controlled access and all 
computerised data will be password protected and kept on flash memories that will be kept in a secured 
locked place with controlled access. Data backups will also be kept securely in case the original data set was 
lost or damaged. They were also assured that numerical/statistical data will be stored in raw data format for 
six years from completion of the research project, interview notes and questionnaire responses will be stored 
in their original form for ten years from completion of the project. All electronic data will be securely 
electronically deleted. They were also informed that they have the right to request their data be removed 
from the research project before publishing the final results. However, once the final results are published, 
participants will not be able to withdraw their data. In the meantime, they were assured that published results 
of the current research will be anonymised and no information is published that would allow participants to 
be identified.  
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Participants were also informed that their participation in the current study is completely voluntary and that 
they have a right to withdraw their data from the current study before the publication of the results. They 
were also assured that their identities will remain confidential and anonymised during the research process 
and after publication of the results.  
One audit partner was concerned about confidentiality and the use of data but he was assured that all data 
will remain confidential and anonymised throughout the research process and even after publishing the 
results. He requested the firm’s risk assessment department to have a look at the questionnaire prior to filling 
in the questionnaire so as to make sure the questionnaire does not include any sensitive questions that might 
harm the organisation or breach its confidentiality agreement with its audit clients.  
The risk assessment department took three days to check the questionnaire and then approval to take part in 
the current study was granted.  He then passed the questionnaire link to other audit partners and audit seniors 
working at the same firm.  
Highlighting possible benefits to the organisation or participants  
The participant’s information sheet included a statement explaining the potential benefit of the current study 
to participants and their organisations. For instance, the current study aims at helping external auditors 
properly assess and respond to the risks of financial reporting fraud which is a controversial topic in today’s 
business as well as a concern for audit professionals. This might in turn increase the likelihood of detecting 
material financial reporting fraud which might give the audit firm a competitive advantage.  
Hence, the participants saw the benefit of taking part in the current study and many of them requested a 
summary of the findings while others offered to pass the questionnaire to other audit professionals.  
Using suitable language 
The official language in Egypt is Arabic but English is well spoken and understood by the educated classes. 
External auditors in Egypt are normally either graduates of a University where English was the first language 
of instruction or hold professional qualifications from internationally recognised audit professional bodies 
such as the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), Association of Certified 
Chartered Accountants (ACCA), or American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 
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To ensure that respondents were feeling comfortable with the questions and could clearly understand them, 
they were all asked if they prefer to fill in the questionnaire in English or Arabic. All of them preferred to 
fill in the questionnaire in English. All the technical terms were properly defined to help participants clearly 
understand the questions. The questionnaire was also pilot tested by experienced audit professionals and 
academics prior to data collection.  
Questionnaire Design 
An online mixed methods questionnaire was designed using Bristol Online Surveys (BOS).  “Bristol Online 
Surveys” is an easy-to-use service that allows you to develop, deploy, and analyse surveys via the Web. 
Bristol Online Surveys is used by over 300 organisations - approximately 130 universities plus by other 
public bodies and companies (http://www.survey.bris.ac.uk/support/about). Access to Bristol Online Survey 
(BOS) was granted through Loughborough University as part of the support given to research students.  
Internet-mediated questionnaires offer greater control because most users read and respond to their own mail 
at their personal computer. It also improves the reliability of the data because the researcher can record non-
respondents, this will help in assessing the impact of bias caused by refusals (Saunders et al, 2009; Bryman, 
2012). BOS provides a link to the questionnaire that respondents can click on to access the questionnaire and 
then submit back to BOS where all the online questionnaires are stored in one place and are accessible to 
their owners. Online surveys are extremely useful in case of large and geographically diverse sample. They 
are quicker and cheaper than other forms of the survey (Kumar, 2014) 
The questionnaire was designed by 20th September, 2013, launched on 29th October, 2013 and was closed on 
12th January, 2015 to allow more time for gaining access to data and to enhance the response rate. The 
questionnaire was four pages long. The first page included the participants’ information sheet which included 
the purpose of the current study, why participants were selected, information about the data protection act, 
and an assurance that their data will remain confidential and will only be used for the current research 
purpose. Respondents were advised to submit their responses no later than two weeks and were also thanked 
for taking part in the study. The information sheet also included some instructions to respondents to guide 
them through the questionnaire.  
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The questionnaire included four sections and twenty questions. The first three sections included questions 
from 1 to 13 which aimed at answering all of the current research questions. While the last section included 
questions from 14 to 20 that sought respondents’ demographic details which was required for data analysis 
purposes. This included questions about participants’ years of audit experience, type of audit office, 
professional qualifications, and alleged financial reporting fraud cases in Egypt. The last question (Q 20) in 
this section were seeking respondents’ consent to take part in an interview for the purpose of the current 
study. Respondents were also asked to leave their contact details, if they wish to be contacted later for the 
interview. 
The questionnaire included a mix of closed-ended questions with predetermined response categories and 
open-ended questions that required narrative responses. In a questionnaire, open-ended questions can provide 
a wealth of information provided and also provide respondents with the opportunity to express themselves 
freely, resulting in a greater variety of information and will in turn eliminate the possibility of investigator 
bias (Kumar, 2014). To avoid investigator bias in the questionnaire that comes from the use of closed-ended 
questions that list only the response patterns that the investigator is interested in, the category of “others” 
was included in the questionnaire in some of the questions such as questions number 8, 9, 16, and 18. 
Response formats associated with closed-ended questions included the choice of either yes or no (e.g. 
questions number 1, 2, 3, part of 4, 17, and 20), Likert scales (e.g. questions 6 and 9), and checklists (e.g. 
questions 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, and 18). Closed questions facilitate the processing of data because they 
are normally pre-coded, thus reducing coding errors and time (Bryman, 2012).  
Closed questions also enhance the comparability of answers, and reduce the possibility of variability in the 
recording of answers (Saunders et al., 2009). Open-ended questions, on the other hand, allow unusual 
responses to be derived, allowing respondents to use their knowledge and experience to answer questions 
that need to be further explored by the current study (Kumar 2014). The questionnaire included only few 
open-ended questions to get as much responses as possible from a large number of respondents in a highly 
economical way. For instance, part of question number 4, and questions number 12, 13, and 19. These 
questions were clearly designed to encourage respondents to answer them. They were also included among 
the interview questions as check questions to ensure reliability and at the same time to complement the 
findings of the questionnaire.  
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At the end of the questionnaire, respondents were thanked for their time and participation in the current 
study. The contact details of the researcher was provided in case respondents had any questions or concerns 
about the questionnaire or the current study. A copy of the questionnaire is available in Appendix A1. 
Pilot Testing 
Prior to pilot testing, two accounting and auditing academics - with considerable experience in audit 
education and research- were asked to comment on the representativeness and suitability of the research 
questions. This helped in establishing content validity and reliability of data and enabled necessary 
amendments prior to pilot testing. The reviewers’ feedback has led to the removal of one research question 
to avoid repetition. They recommended adding some definitions to the following fraud risk factors (e.g. 
motives, opportunity, and rationalisation, integrity, and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities) and changing the 
term “fraudsters” to the term “Fraud perpetrators” which they found more suitable in academic writing.  
The questionnaire was then pilot tested before being sent to respondents by six external auditors having more 
than 5 years of audit experience to make sure the wordings, structure, and questions of the questionnaire 
were clear enough and easy to understand. The pilot testing included questions to participants such as: “how 
long the questionnaire took to complete”, “whether the instructions were clear enough”, “which, if any 
questions were unclear or ambiguous”, “which if any questions the respondents felt uneasy about answering”, 
“whether in their opinion there were any major topic omissions”, “whether the layout was clear and 
attractive”, and any other comments. Positive feedback was received from the six external auditors with no 
change required. 
Questionnaire Administration and Response Rate  
Bristol Online Survey (BOS) provides a link to the questionnaire that respondents can click on to access the 
questionnaire and then submit back to BOS where all the online questionnaires are stored in one place and 
are accessible to their owners. This link was then included in the message sent to respondents either via 
email, LinkedIn, Facebook, or Twitter. Sending the online questionnaire to respondents directly to their 
personal emails, LinkedIn accounts, or social network accounts allowed checking who has taken part in the 
questionnaire which improves reliability of data. It also helps to record non-respondents allowing for some 
assessment of the impact of bias caused by refusals (Saunders et al, 2009). Respondents were advised to 
email back if they had difficulty in answering any of the questions in the questionnaire or in case they have 
any concerns about the current study.  
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One hundred and fifty questionnaire requests were sent to respondents and 82 responses were received as of 
12/01/2015. This yields a response rate of approximately 55% (questionnaires received/total questionnaires 
sent). This response rate compares favourably with other studies in the same setting, which have indicated 
that the average response rate to questionnaire surveys in Egypt tends to be low, ranging between 30% and 
50% (Elbanna, 2007; Dixon and Woodhead, 2006; Anis, 2014). Saunders et al (2009) added that the likely 
response rate from internet-mediated questionnaires is variable with 11% or lower and that low response rate 
is one of the disadvantages of a questionnaire. Kumar (2014) mentioned that the common response rate in 
questionnaires is between 20 -50 %  
Validity and Reliability 
There are two criteria for good measurement: reliability and validity. Reliability is an indicator of a measure’s 
internal consistency. Validity is the accuracy of a measure or the extent to which a score truthfully represents 
a concept. The four basic approaches for establishing validity are: face validity, content validity, criterion 
validity, and construct validity. Face validity means a scale’s content logically appears to reflect what was 
intended to be measured. It refers to the subjective agreement among professionals that a scale logically 
reflects the concept being measured (Zikmund et al., 2013). Face validity tells us to what extent the measure 
used seems to be a reasonable measure for what it purports to measure. This can be tested by asking the 
opinion of others acquainted with the actual topic (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2010).  
The questionnaire was pilot tested to ensure face validity. Content validity refers to the degree that a measure 
covers the domain of interest. Criterion validity refers to the ability of a measure to correlate with other 
standard measures of similar constructs of established criteria. Construct validity exists when a measure 
reliably measures and truthfully represents a unique concept (Zikmund et al., 2013). Construct validity can 
also be defined as the extent to which an operationalisation measures the concept which it purports to 
measure. It can be assessed by considering face validity, convergent validity, and divergent validity (Ghauri 
and Gronhaug, 2010). Ghauri and Gronhaug (2010) referred to three other different types of validity which 
are convergent validity, divergent validity, and external validity.  They stated that convergent validity tells 
to what extent multiple measures of or multiple methods for measuring the same construct yield similar 
results. Divergent validity tells us to what extent a construct is distinguishable from another construct. 
External validity relates to what extent the findings can be generalised to particular persons, settings and 
times, as well as across types of persons, settings and times. 
 
143 
 
In order to ensure that the research questions are valid and reliable, the questions were designed carefully 
from the start, reviewed by two academic members of staff with considerable years of experience in 
accounting and audit research, and then pilot tested by six external auditors who have more than two years 
of audit experience to ensure face validity. To ensure content validity, the research questions and 
questionnaire questions were designed after careful review of related literature and the questions were also 
assessed by a panel of experts from Loughborough University (PhD supervisor and an internal observer). 
Pilot testing was used to refine the questionnaire so that respondents will have no problems in answering the 
questions and there will be no problems in recording the data. It also facilitated the assessment of the 
questions’ validity and the likely reliability of the data that collected. This helped to establish content validity.  
The use of online questionnaires also improved the reliability of the data because it allowed for recording 
the non-respondents which allowed some assessment of the impact of bias caused by refusals as stated by 
Saunders et al (2009) and Bryman (2012). Sending the online questionnaire to respondents directly to their 
personal emails, LinkedIn accounts, or social network accounts allowed checking who has taken part in the 
questionnaire which also improved reliability of data. To ensure reliability even more, Cronbach’s alpha was 
calculated to measure internal consistency. Crohnbach’s alpha is a measure of the intercorrelations between 
the various indicators used to capture the underlying construct. The assumption is that the various indicators 
should correlate positively, but they should not be perfectly correlated (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2010). 
6.5.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
Semi-structured interview is a type of a non-standardised interview that can be either conducted one to one 
as face-to-face, by telephone, or electronically. In the semi-structured interviews, the researcher will have a 
list of predetermined questions without predetermined answers to allow interviewees more freedom in 
answering the questions. Data collected by semi-structured interviews can be used to reveal and understand 
the “what” and the “how” questions but with more emphasis on exploring the “why” questions that is difficult 
to be explored using a questionnaire (Saunders et al, 2009; Kumar, 2014).  
Semi-structured interviews allow interviewees to provide their views through free-flowing discussions which 
in turn helped in getting as much details as possible.  It also allows the interviewer to make clarification, and 
add or delete probes to interview between subsequent subjects.  This gives interviewers the chance to draw 
out more complete stories or answers from subjects through asking them to elaborate on what they have 
already answered in response to a given question (Bryman, 2012; Saunders et al, 2009). 
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Semi-structured interviews provide the researchers with the opportunity to “probe” answers, where they want 
the interviewees to explain, or build on their responses. This is important for research following the critical 
realism philosophy as it is concerned with understanding the meanings that participants attach to various 
phenomena. This will also help in collecting a rich and detailed set of data. The value of using semi-structured 
interviews is derived from the flexibility that you may use to explore the complexity of the topic (Berg, 2009; 
Bryman, 2012). Hence the use of semi-structured interviews has helped in collecting as much details as 
possible about the current research issues.  
Population, Sample, and Sampling Technique 
The population of the current study is external auditors working at various audit firms in Egypt. To determine 
whom to interview, the study was attracted by the idea of theoretical sampling. This approach to sampling 
and selection was first introduced by Glaser and Strauss (1967). It is an approach to selecting people which 
gives greater priority to including people on a theoretical basis than a statistical one. Thus, rather than 
specifying in advance that “n” number of people should be interviewed in order to achieve the aims of the 
research, the approach of theoretical sampling requires only enough people for a certain question and then 
moves on to related issues. The number of selected respondents was also limited by the ability to gain access 
to these audit professionals and convince them to take part in the interview. Saunders et al (2009) mentioned 
that in business studies, it is acceptable to have a sample size ranging between 25 and 30 interviews. 
There are no rules for sample size in qualitative inquiry because the size depends on a number of factors such 
as what you want to know and what will have credibility. Saturation is a term used to describe the point when 
you have heard the range of ideas and are not getting new information. Saturation in purposive sampling 
occurs when the addition of more units does not result in new information that can be used in theme 
development. (Patton 2002 as cited in Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). Thus in order to find interviewees for 
the current study, the questionnaire included a question to seek participants’ consent to take part in the 
interview. 82 participants filled in the questionnaire and 36 participants agreed to take part in the interview. 
Participants were also asked to leave their contact details if they wish to be contacted for the interview. Out 
of the 36 participants, 6 did not engage even after sending two reminders and were thus removed from the 
sample. This made a final sample of 30 interviewees.  
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Other strategies were also used to convince the 30 interviewees to take part in the interviews. This includes 
the use of sufficient time to design the interview schedule and collect data, providing a clear research purpose 
to all interviewees, overcoming organisational concerns, highlighting possible benefits to participants or 
organisation, and using suitable language. These strategies are discussed below in more detail.  
Sufficient time to design and collect data  
The design of the interview schedule including the interview questions started in August, 2014. The design 
of the interview schedule was completed and reviewed by 15th August, 2014, the interview schedule was 
then pilot tested and participants were contacted starting 20th August, 2014. The first interview started 12th 
December, 2014 and data collection was complete by 30th August, 2015.  
Reminders were sent to participants two weeks after first submission but with no pressure to take part in the 
current study. Interviewees were asked about the most suitable time for them to conduct the interview.  
Research design and data collection methods were reviewed and approved by two academics having 
considerable years of experience in accounting and audit research. All the required modifications were taken 
into consideration before data collection. Pilot testing was also used to make sure the interview schedule was 
clearly designed and that respondents could clearly understand the questions so as to encourage respondents’ 
participation in the interview. The interview schedule was sent to four external auditors having more than 
five years of audit experience for pilot testing.  The interview schedule was also sent to participants via email 
prior to the interview to give them more time to read the interview questions and prepare the answers or any 
supporting documents if needed. 
Interviewees were asked about the right time for them to be interviewed. This helped in getting a high 
response rate where 30 participants out of the 36 participants that were originally interested to take part in 
the interview showed their interest and willingness to help. Giving them the choice of time helped in gaining 
as much details as possible because they chose the most suitable time for them so that they could talk freely 
without worrying much about their time or the work they need to do. 
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Providing a clear research purpose  
The purpose of the current research was explained to participants as well as the importance of their 
participation in the current study. The interview schedule included an information sheet that further explained 
the research purpose, why respondents were chosen, and what is expected from them. Participants were also 
encouraged to contact the researcher if they have any queries or concerns about the interview questions.  
Overcoming organisational concerns 
All respondents were assured that their personal data would not be shared with any other party without their 
consent. It was also explained that to maintain confidentiality, all personal data collected during the interview 
will be anonymised and participants will be assigned a reference number or code and that data will be stored 
against this number/code rather than against the names of participants. Participants were also assured that 
data will be kept in a lockable room with controlled access and all computerised data will be password 
protected and kept on flash memories that will be kept in a secured locked place with controlled access.  
Respondents were also assured that data backups will be kept securely in case the original data set was lost 
or damaged and that numerical/statistical data will be stored in raw data format for six years from completion 
of the research project, and interview notes will be stored in their original form for ten years from completion 
of the project. All electronic data will be securely electronically deleted. They were also informed that their 
participation in the current research is completely voluntary and that they have the right to request their data 
be removed from the research project before publishing the final results. However, once the final results are 
published, participants will not be able to withdraw their data. In the meantime, they were assured that the 
published results of the current research will be anonymised and no information published would allow 
participants to be identified.  
An interview schedule was sent to all interviewees prior to the interview. The schedule included the purpose 
of the current research, what is expected from interviewees, information about data protection act and their 
right to withdraw their data from the interview as well as the timing, duration, and location of the interview. 
Interviewees were informed that the interview will be digitally recorded using a digital device for the purpose 
of the current study and were advised to inform the researcher if they do not wish for this to happen. They 
were assured though that the digital recorder will remain confidential and is necessary just for the purpose 
of the current study. Out of the 30 participants, only one did not agree to have the interview digitally recorded 
using a digital device. However in all cases, notes were taken regardless whether the interview was digitally-
recorded or not.  
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Highlighting possible benefits to the organisation or participants 
The participant’s information sheet as well as the interview schedule and the questionnaire included a 
statement explaining the potential benefit of the current study to the participants and their organisations. 
Hence, participants saw the benefit of taking part in the current study and many of them requested a summary 
of the findings. 
Using suitable language 
The official language in Egypt is Arabic but English is well spoken and understood by the educated classes. 
External auditors in Egypt are either graduates of a University where English was the first language of 
instruction or hold professional qualifications from international recognised bodies such as the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), Association of Certified Chartered Accountants 
(ACCA), or American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). They also audit multinational 
companies where knowledge of English is a requirement. Hence, all participants were aware of the technical 
terms used in the interview schedule and showed good understanding of the questions asked. In addition their 
answers ensured that language was not an issue. Besides, to ensure that respondents were feeling comfortable 
with the questions and could clearly understand it, they were all asked if they would prefer to have the 
interview conducted in English or Arabic and they all preferred the use of English because they could then 
refer to the audit terminologies they know in English without having to translate in Arabic. All the technical 
terms were properly defined to help participants clearly understand the questions.  
Interview Mode 
Participants were asked if they would like to have a Skype, or Viber interview. Out of the 30 participants 
who agreed to take part in the interview, 14 preferred Skype interview, and 16 preferred to have the interview 
via Viber. The researcher lives in England and thus conducting the interviews face-to-face was not practical 
and would have been so expensive since the current study was conducted in the Egyptian context. Skype 
interviews offer an advantage of automatically recording the interview as they are typed in thereby removing 
problems associated with audio-recording and transcription such as cost, accuracy, and participants’ 
apprehension. On the other hand, attempting to conduct non-standardised interviews by telephone offer 
potential advantages associated with access, speed of data collection, and lower cost especially if the 
interviewee is distant from the interviewer (Saunders et al, 2009).  
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The quality of the data obtained by telephone interview is potentially comparable to the quality of data 
collected face-to-face. Respondents are more willing to provide detailed and reliable information on a variety 
of personal topics over the phone while in the privacy of their own homes than when answering questions 
face-to-face. Respondents may answer embarrassing or confidential questions more willingly in a telephone 
interview than in a personal interview (Zikmund et al., 2013) 
Interview Schedule 
The interview schedule was four pages long including the participants’ information sheet (See Appendix 
A1). The information sheet included an explanation of the research purpose, why interviewees were chosen 
to take part in the interview, an assurance that their data and responses to the interview questions will remain 
confidential and anonymous throughout the research process and after publishing the results of the current 
study. It also assured participants that their data will be stored and disposed in a confidential and secured 
manner. Participants were also informed that their participation in the interview is completely voluntary and 
that they have the right to withdraw their data from the current study before the results are published.  
Participants were informed that the interview will be recorded and that they need to contact the researcher in 
case they do not agree with that. Out of the 30 participants, only one participant requested not to digitally-
record his interview. The schedule included a statement to thank interviewees for agreeing to take part in the 
interview. Important instructions were also included in the interview schedule to guide interviewees through 
the interview. Interviewees were advised to email back in case they have any questions or concerns regarding 
the interview. 
The interview schedule included 22 questions, 15 questions were aiming to answer the current research 
questions (questions from 7 to 21) and 6 questions were seeking respondents’ demographic details for data 
analysis purposes. This included, participants’ job title, professional qualifications, audit experience, type of 
audit firm, their age, professional qualifications, and the place of their professional audit training.  
Long questions or those that are made up of two or more questions were avoided in order to obtain a response 
to each aspect of the current research questions. Questions did not include too many theoretical concepts to 
ensure that both the interviewees and researcher have the same understanding.  
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All questions were open-ended questions to encourage the interviewees to provide an extensive and 
developmental answer that might be used to reveal attitudes or obtain facts except for questions 5 and 6 about 
the participants’ age and type of audit firm respectively. Participants in these two questions were given a 
checklist to choose from. In case of question 5, interviewees were asked to choose from an age range of (20-
30), (31-40), (41-50), or above 50 years old. As for question 6, interviewees were asked to choose whether 
they are working at a Big 4 audit firm, international audit firm other than Big 4, small national audit firm, or 
medium size national audit firms.  
Pilot Testing  
The interview schedule was reviewed by two academics having considerable years of experience in 
Accounting and Audit research prior to pilot testing. This led to the addition of three more questions to the 
interview schedule (questions number 7, 8, 17, and 22). It also led to changes in the wording of question 
number 15 from “How do you think external auditors deal with the impact of management’s motivations on 
the financial statements?” to “Do you think external auditors in Egypt appreciate the impact of management’s 
motivations on the financial statements?” This change was needed to avoid repetition of questions. The order 
of questions number 1 to 6, related to interviewees’ demographic details, was also changed from the end of 
the schedule to the beginning. That is because the nature of the interview is different from the questionnaire 
as it requires breaking the ice with participants by knowing more about them before asking the main interview 
questions. This is more likely to encourage them to share as much details as possible. The interview schedule 
was then pilot tested by sending it to four external auditors working at audit firms in Egypt and having more 
than five years of audit experience. No changes were suggested. A copy of the interview schedule is available 
in Appendix A1.  
Interviews Administration  
The interview started by thanking interviewees for agreeing to take part in the interview and for their time. 
A brief introduction about the current study aims was given. Confidentiality and anonymity of personal 
information and responses of interviewees were assured and interviewees were briefed about their right to 
withdraw from the study and how data will be stored and kept securely. Interviewees were also reminded 
that the interview would be digitally recorded using a digital device unless they prefer otherwise. It was 
ensured that the level of language used during the interview is compatible with the respondent’s knowledge 
and usage of the same language. That is by giving interviewees the choice to answer the interview questions 
either in English or Arabic.  
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All of the 30 interviewees preferred speaking in English during the interview. Their answers to the interview 
questions also indicated that they properly understood the questions and that they have no language issues.  
Comments or non-verbal behaviour such as gestures which indicate any bias in thinking was avoided to give 
interviewees the freedom to answer the interview questions without any influence from the interviewer. A 
neutral response was also used in relation to the interviewees’ answers in order not to provide any lead that 
may result in bias.  
The understanding of the interviewees’ answers was tested by summarising what the interviewees said to 
evaluate the adequacy of the interpretation and amend the answers if necessary. This helped in avoiding a 
biased or incomplete interpretation. Probing questions were used to explore responses that are of significance 
to the research topic especially question number 10 “Which of the following fraud risk factors you think is 
the most significant in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud (motives, opportunities, rationalisation, 
integrity, and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities)? Why? ” question number 11 “Which of the following fraud 
risk factors is the most difficult to assess? Why?” question number 12 “How do you assess each of the 
following fraud risk factors (motives, opportunities, rationalisation, integrity, and fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities)? Question number 14 “How could management motivations impact on the financial 
statements?” and question number 17 “What audit techniques do external auditors use to assess the impact 
of management motivations on the financial statements?” Probing questions were also used to seek an 
explanation of an unclear answer or where a response does not reveal the reasoning involved. 
Notes were taken during the interview regardless of whether the interview was digitally recorded or not. 
Notes were summarised immediately after the interview to avoid errors and loss of important details and also 
to control bias and to produce reliable data for analysis. Notes were then saved against interviewees’ codes 
rather than their names.  
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Validity and Reliability 
Denzin and Lincoln (1994 as cited in Kumar, 2014) have suggested a framework of four criteria to assess 
the validity and reliability in qualitative research. That is credibility (similar to internal validity), 
transferability (similar to external validity), dependability (similar to reliability), and confirmability (similar 
to objectivity). Credibility, a substitute for internal validity, could be defined as whether or not a research 
report is credible to the participants whom the researchers studied (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009).  
Credibility involves establishing that the results of qualitative research are credible or believable from the 
perspective of the participant in the research (Kumar, 2014). Respondents in the current study were promised 
a summary of the research findings. Also to ensure credibility participants was given relevant information 
before the interview as the interview schedule including the participants’ information sheet and the interview 
questions was sent to them via email. This enabled interviewees to consider the information being requested 
and allowed them the opportunity to assemble supporting organisational documentation from their files. One 
of the interviewees actually shared important checklists and guides designed by his audit firm for use during 
fraud risk assessments. However, a promise was given not to share these checklists and guides with anyone 
without the consent of the interviewee. The interviewee was happy though for me to refer to them in the 
current research.  
The interviews were digitally recorded using a digital device to allow more thorough examination of what 
interviewees said, permit repeated examinations of the interviewees’ answers, and open up data to public 
scrutiny by other researchers who can evaluate the analysis that was carried out by the current study. 
Dependability can be ensured by keeping an extensive and detailed record of the process for others to 
replicate the study to ascertain the level of dependability (Kumar, 2014). To establish and improve the 
validity of the current study, thorough documentation of data collection and analysis methods was maintained 
to promote both reliability and replicability, as well as to enable full auditability to promote validity and 
reliability. Notes were taken during the interview regardless of whether the interviews were digitally recorded 
or not to avoid any missing details or any sudden technical difficulties in the digital recorder. Comments or 
non-verbal behaviour such as gestures which indicate any bias in thinking was avoided.  
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A neutral response was used in relation to the interviewee’s answers in order not to provide any lead that 
may result in bias. The understanding of the interviewees’ answers was tested by summarising what the 
interviewees have said to evaluate the adequacy of the interpretation and amend if necessary. This helped in 
avoiding a biased or incomplete interpretation. Probing questions were also used to explore responses that 
are of significance to the research topic. It was also used to seek an explanation of an unclear answer or 
where the response does not reveal the reasoning involved and avoid bias as suggested by Saunders et al 
(2009). The interview was also piloted to identify questions that make respondents feel uncomfortable and 
questions that seem not to be understood or that are often not answered. This helped to increase the validity 
and reliability of the data collected. 
6.6 Data Analysis  
The current study collected data using a mixed methods questionnaire and semi-structured interviews. Both 
the questionnaire and interviews included both quantitative and qualitative data and thus different methods 
of data analysis were used. For instance, quantitative data were analysed using SPSS while qualitative data 
were analysed using content analysis and Nvivo.  
Quantitative data analysis 
Quantitative data were coded and fed into SPSS for analysis. Various measures were used to measure 
variables in the questionnaire and interviews. For instance, the nominal scale (yes or no questions) was used 
which facilitated the coding of  respondents’ answers to “1” in case of “yes” and “0” in case of “no”. The 5-
point Likert scale was used to rate some research questions on a scale of 1 (i.e. strongly disagree or least 
significant) to 5 (i.e. strongly agree or most significant). Descriptive statistics such as frequencies and cross 
tabulations. Phi-test and Spearman’s correlation were also used to test the relationship between some 
variables. The analysis of the quantitative data is discussed in detail in chapters seven and eight.  
Qualitative data analysis 
Qualitative data in the questionnaire and interviews were analysed using content analysis and Nvivo. Content 
analysis Content analysis has a long history in social research (Vourvachis and Woodward, 2014) and can 
be defined as a research method that is used to analyse text data such as interviews or open-ended questions 
in a questionnaire. It involves the use of subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the 
systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005; 
Kumar, 2014).  
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Content analysis was also defined by Berg (2009, p.338) as “a careful, detailed, systematic examination and 
interpretation of a particular body of material in an effort to identify patterns, themes, biases, and meanings”. 
Content analysis enables the breakdown and organisation of large amounts of data into categories or codes 
which can be words, themes, phrases, concepts or sentences. Such categorization or coding of data makes 
content analysis a useful tool for data analysis as it facilitates arrival at a manageable and meaningful set of 
data (Kulatunga et al., 2007). 
Content analysis can range from simple word counts to thematic analysis. The underlying assumption behind 
word counting is that the words mentioned most often indicate the important concerns. Thematic analysis, 
however, attempts to find similar cognitions under the same concept (Kulatunga et al., 2007). Hsieh and 
Shannon (2005) added that there are three types of content analysis: “conventional content analysis”, 
“directed content analysis”, and “summative content analysis”. In summative content analysis, data analysis 
begins with searches for occurrences of the identified words by hand or by computer. Word frequency counts 
for each identified term are calculated. Directed content analysis requires the use of predetermined categories 
or codes that are derived from prior literature. Conventional content analysis allows researchers to avoid 
using predetermined categories but instead allow the categories and names for categories to flow from the 
data. Thus codes are derived during data analysis. In the conventional approach to content analysis, 
researchers immerse themselves in the data to allow new insights to emerge. This type of content analysis is 
used when there is little or no data in prior literature about the research issues under study. This approach 
helps researchers to gain a richer understanding of a research issue. Conventional content analysis, as stated 
by (Mayring 2000; Bernard, 2000), could also be called “inductive coding” which allows categories and 
codes to emerge from the text itself. This approach is more suitable for exploratory research like the case of 
the current study.  
 
The current study used a mix of the conventional and summative approach to content analysis. These two 
approaches were more suitable due to the lack of data in prior literature related to some of the current research 
issues such as the assessment of the fraud factors and the audit of management motivations. Qualitative data 
from the questionnaire and the interviews were thus analysed as follows. The researcher read through the 
data given by respondents to get a general understanding of the different responses and their meanings. From 
these responses broad themes that reflect these meanings were developed. A code was assigned to the main 
themes such as theme # 1, theme # 2, etc. All responses were then classified under the main themes that each 
is related to.  
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Thus, a combination of the following two methods was used to communicate the findings. First, the responses 
of each respondent were examined to develop a narrative to describe the answer to a particular question and 
then integrated into the discussion of the research findings. Second, the main themes that emerged from 
respondents’ answers to some of the questions were identified, a code was assigned to each theme and the 
frequency of occurrence of each theme was counted to provide their prevalence. The responses to each 
question by respondents were examined to determine the similarities and differences among them.  The 
themes identified were related to some of the current research questions such as those related to the 
assessment of the various fraud factors and the techniques used by external auditors to detect financial 
reporting fraud in Egypt. This approach was supported by Berg (2009) who stated that the themes or 
categories emerging from content analysis should have some relationship with the research question and 
should not just be random words that seem to occur with some regular frequency.   
 
Nvivo helped in obtaining the frequency of occurrence of some themes such as the techniques used by 
external auditors to detect financial reporting fraud, and the techniques/audit procedures used to assess the 
various fraud factors. NVivo is a qualitative data analysis computer software package produced by QSR 
International and is designed for qualitative researchers working with very rich text-based, such as in the 
case of open-ended questions in the questionnaire and semi-structured interviews, where deep levels of 
analysis on small or large volumes of data are required. NVivo also helps users to classify, sort and arrange 
information, examine relationships in the data, and combine analysis (Johnston, 2006; Smyth, 2006). Free 
access to NVivo was granted by Loughborough University as part of students’ support.  The analysis of the 
qualitative data is discussed in detail in chapters seven and eight. 
 
6.7 Addressing Ethical Issues 
Research ethics refers to questions about how we formulate and clarify the research topic, design research 
and gain access, collect data, process and store data, analyse data and write up the research findings in a 
moral and responsible way (Saunders et al. 2009). Ethical issues include; preserving participants’ anonymity, 
exposing participant to mental stress, asking participants questions that are detrimental to their self -interest, 
involving participants in research without their consent, use of deception, depriving participants of their right 
to withdraw from the study anytime (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2010; Saunders et al., 2009). 
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The current research overcome the above mentioned ethical issues by various means. For instance, no 
pressure was placed on individuals to participate in the current study. Existing personal and new contacts’ 
informed consent was taken prior physical and cognitive access to data. Participants were happy and willing 
to participate in the current study. Credibility was established through providing a detailed information sheet 
to all participants. This included a clear explanation of the purpose of the current research and what is 
expected from participants, why they were chosen, and how their data will be protected and stored. Their 
right to withdraw their data from the study was also explained. An assurance of maintaining confidentiality 
and anonymity of data was also included in the information sheet. A promise was made to send participants 
a summary of the research findings to maintain more credibility. Participants were also informed that their 
participation in the current study is completely voluntary.  
Confidentiality and anonymity were taken into consideration where all personal data collected during the 
current study was anonymised and participants were assigned a reference code. Data was stored against this 
code rather than against the names of participants. Data was kept in a lockable room with controlled access 
and all computerised data was password protected and kept on flash memories that was kept in a secured 
locked place with controlled access. Data backups was also kept securely in case the original data set was 
lost or damaged. Numerical/statistical data will be stored in raw data format for six years from completion 
of the research project, interview notes and questionnaire responses will be stored in their original form for 
ten years from completion of the project. All electronic data will be securely electronically deleted after this. 
The questionnaire and the interviews did not include any sensitive questions that might cause harm, 
embarrassment, stress, or discomfort to participants. Besides, all questions were pilot tested prior to data 
collection to identify questions that might make respondents feel uncomfortable. In addition, enough time 
was given to participants to answer the research questions in both the questionnaire and during the interview. 
Objectivity was maintained during data analysis stage where no misrepresentation or omission of data was 
made. During the interview interest was shown on what was said through avoiding any impression of anxiety, 
disbelief, astonishment, or any other negative signal.  
Besides, according to Loughborough University’s regulation, all academic staff and research students have 
to fill in an ethics clearance form for research that involves human participants. This form was submitted to 
the University’s Ethical Advisory Committee for approval before carrying out the current study. This is to 
ensure that the current study is free from any ethical violation or harm that might be caused to participants. 
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6.8 Summary of Chapter Six  
Chapter six has described and explained the aims and motivation of the current study, the philosophy 
underpinning the current research, the methods used to collect and analyse the current research data and how 
research ethics was taken into consideration.  The current study was conducted in the Egyptian context and 
data was collected from external auditors working at audit firms in Egypt. The current study followed the 
critical realism philosophy because critical realism is much more in line with the purpose of business and 
management research which is in most cases aims at understanding the reason for a phenomenon as a way 
to recommend change. This suits the aims of the current study that seek the perception of external auditors 
on management motivations behind financial reporting fraud, and how these motives could have an impact 
on the financial statements and the audit process, which are highly subjective.  
Data of the current study was collected by using mixed research methods, namely an online questionnaire 
and semi-structured interviews. The use of mixed methods helped in depicting a complete picture of the 
current research issues. A mixed methods online questionnaire was designed using Bristol Online Surveys. 
The questionnaire included a mix of quantitative and qualitative data. Stratified purposive sampling was used 
to select respondents for the current study. The sample of the questionnaire included 150 participants while 
82 questionnaires were received making a response rate of 55% which lies within the common range of 
response rates in questionnaires which is normally 20-50%. The questionnaire included a question at the end 
seeking participants desire to take part in an interview for the purpose of the current study.  
Out of the 82 respondents, 30 showed interest in taking part in an interview for the purpose of the current 
study. Interviews were conducted using either Skype or Viber. All interviews were digitally recorded except 
for one but notes were taken in all cases and were then summarised immediately after each interview to avoid 
errors or bias. Ethical issues across the stages and duration of the current research has been taken into 
consideration. This includes privacy of participants, voluntary nature of participation and participants’ right 
to withdraw completely from the process before publishing the results, informed consent of participants, 
confidentiality and anonymity of data, and any harm that might be caused to participants in reaction to the 
way in which the data was sought like embarrassment, stress, discomfort, pain and harm.  
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All questions either in the questionnaire or the semi-structured interview was pilot tested prior to data 
collection to identify questions that might make respondents feel uncomfortable as well as to ensure validity 
and reliability of data. Data from the questionnaire was analysed using both SPSS for quantitative data and 
thematic analysis for qualitative data. Data from the semi-structured interviews was analysed using thematic 
analysis and NVivo. The next chapter explains and describes how the data collected via the questionnaire 
was analysed.  
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Chapter Seven: 
Analysis of Questionnaire Data and Discussion of the Results 
7.1 Introduction  
In order to achieve the aim of the current study and to address the current research questions, data was 
collected by means of mixed methods, namely an online questionnaire and semi-structured interviews as 
explained in chapter Six. This chapter explains how the data collected via the online questionnaire was 
analysed and interpreted. This also includes a discussion of the questionnaire results.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 describes the type of questionnaire data, variables, 
and measurement scales used including how the reliability of scales was measured. Section 7.3 describes and 
presents the type of statistics used to analyse the questionnaire data. Section 7.4 explains how the 
questionnaire data was edited and coded prior to the analysis. Section 7.5 presents and discusses the 
demographic details of the questionnaire respondents. Section 7.6 shows how the questionnaire data was 
analysed and interpreted to address each of the current research questions. This section also includes a 
discussion of the results. Section 7.7 is a summary of chapter seven.  
7.2 Type of Questionnaire Data, Variables, and Measurement Scales  
The questionnaire included both quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative data can be divided into 
numerical data and categorical data. Numerical data have values that are measured or counted numerically 
as quantities such as the case of interval and ratio data. Categorical data have values that cannot be measured 
numerically but can be either classified into categories or placed in rank order. Categorical data can be further 
sub-divided into nominal data (i.e. descriptive) and ordinal data (i.e. ranked). Categorical data can be 
measured using the nominal scales and ordinal scales (Saunders et al., 2009; Zikmund et al., 2013).  
The questionnaire data in the current study was all categorical in nature and included both nominal data and 
ordinal data. For instance, closed ended questions such as questions number 1, 2, 3, part of 4, 17 and 20 
required respondents to choose one from either two options “yes” or “No”. Other closed-ended questions 
required respondents to choose only one answer from a number of choices such as questions number 5, 7, 
10, 11, 14, and 15 or to choose all answers that apply like in the case of questions number 8, 16, and 18. 
Thus, the nominal scale was used as the measurement scale for these questions. Other set of questions 
required the use of ordinal scales such as questions number 6 and 9 that required respondents to rate their 
answers using a 5-point Likert style rating scale. Quantitative data was coded and then analysed using SPSS.  
159 
 
The questionnaire also included open-ended questions such as part of question number 4, and questions 
number 12, 13, and 19. Open-ended questions are qualitative in nature and thus required a different type of 
analysis called “content analysis” which requires the identification of the main themes that emerge from the 
responses given by respondents (Kumar, 2014).  
Reliability of Measurement Scales  
Reliability of scales refers to the degree to which the items that make up the scale are all measuring the same 
underlying attribute. This is known as internal consistency (Pallant, 2010). Reliability can be measured by 
“Cronbach’s Alpha”. Cronbach’s alpha provides an indication of the average correlation among all of the 
items that makeup the scale (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2010). Cronbach’s alpha for the scales used in the current 
study was 0.767 which suggests good internal consistency. This was supported by Pallant (2010) and 
Saunders et al (2009) where they mentioned that Cronbach’s alpha values from and above 0.7 indicate that 
a scale is reliable.  
7.3 Statistical Analysis Techniques  
Quantitative questionnaire data was analysed using SPSS after coding to facilitate analysis. Normality testing 
was first undertaken to see the distribution of data so that proper statistics can be chosen for the analysis of 
data. There are two types of statistics: parametric and non-parametric statistics. Parametric statistics use data 
obtained from interval and ratio scales whereas non-parametric statistics use data obtained from nominal and 
ordinal scales. Parametric statistics requires data to be normally distributed while this is not the case with 
non-parametric statistics (Teddlie and Tashakori, 2009; Saunders et al., 2009; Zikmund et al., 2013).  
Given that quantitative questionnaire data in the current study were measured using both the nominal and 
ordinal scales, non-parametric statistics was the most suitable choice for the analysis of quantitative 
questionnaire data. A test of normality was also carried out to ensure that the data is not normally distributed 
and that non-parametric statistic is the right choice for quantitative questionnaire data. The normality test 
was carried out for some variables listed in table 7.1. the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic showed 
a significance value of .000 suggesting the data are not normally distributed and thus the use of non-
parametric statistics was more suitable for the current research. This is supported by Pallant (2010) who 
stated that a non-significant result (Sig. value of more than .05) indicates normality while the sig. value .000 
indicates data are not normally distributed. The author also added that this is quite common in larger samples. 
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 Table 7.1 Test of Normality  
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova 
Statistic df Sig. 
Knowledge of ISA requirements .540 82 .000 
Frequency of Impact of Management 
motivation on financial figures 
.268 82 .000 
Frequency of Impact of Management 
motivation on disclosure 
.245 82 .000 
Difficulty of assessing fraud risk factors .188 82 .000 
 
Quantitative data was thus analysed using non-parametric statistics such as frequencies, cross tabulations, 
phi test and Spearman’s rank correlation. Qualitative data analysis required the use of conventional and 
summative content analysis, as explained in chapter six, where the main themes that emerged from the 
description given by respondents in answer to the research questions were identified. The themes were then 
explored to combine similar themes together and to identify frequencies of occurrences as will be shown in 
this chapter. Nvivo was used for word counting especially in the case of the techniques used to assess the 
various fraud factors and the techniques used by external auditors to detect financial reporting fraud.  
7.4 Editing and Coding of Questionnaire Data  
Data collected via the questionnaire was checked and inspected thoroughly in order to identify any errors or 
missing responses and to ensure that data is ready for analysis. The online questionnaire was designed using 
“Bristol Online Survey (BOS)” as mentioned in chapter six. BOS prevented respondents from being directed 
to the wrong set of questions by providing them with clear instructions. BOS did not also allow respondents 
to miss a question to avoid missing responses. Inspection of data showed that there were no missing values 
or errors in quantitative data. Qualitative data was reviewed, checked, and few were edited to make sure they 
are clear and understandable.  
The coding of all closed-ended questions was straightforward and easy to quantify. For instance, yes or no 
questions were coded using “1” for Yes and “0” for No. In checklist questions, each choice given to 
respondents was given a number. Questions that used a 5-point Likert style rating scale was coded as follows; 
“1” denoted either strongly disagree or least significant, and “5” denoted either “strongly agree” or “most 
significant” depending on the research question. A copy of the questionnaire coding book for quantitative 
data is available in Appendix A2 (quantitative data codebook).  
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Open-ended questions were coded using manual content analysis or thematic analysis where the main themes 
that emerged from the answers given by respondents were identified and then a combination of the following 
two methods was used to communicate the findings. First, the responses of each respondent were examined 
to develop a narrative to describe the answer to a particular question and then integrated into the discussion 
of the research findings. Second, the main themes that emerged from respondents’ answers to some of the 
questions were identified, a code was assigned to each theme and the frequency of occurrence of each theme 
was counted to provide their prevalence (i.e. number of times each was cited). The responses to each question 
by respondents were also examined to determine the similarities and differences among them.  
7.5 Respondents’ Demographic Details 
Respondents’ Gender 
Out of the 82 questionnaire respondents, only two were females. This is because it was difficult to find other 
females working in the audit profession in Egypt. This might pertain to the fact that the majority of females 
in Egypt are unemployed or face high competition in the market compared to men. This is supported by 
Krafft and Assaad (2014) who found that 11% of all young women in Egypt are unemployed, 75% of young 
women are inactive, and almost 90% of uneducated and basic educated young women are out of the labour 
force. They also found that even women with higher education participate at only moderate rates, as 49% 
remain out of the labour force and only 32% are actually employed. Barsoum et al (2014) found that the 
unemployment rate of young females in Egypt is more than five times that of young males (38.1 per cent 
versus 6.8 per cent). They also found that young men had a larger presence in industrial activities like 
construction (18.7 per cent) and manufacturing (17.3 per cent), and in service activities like transport (9.4 
per cent), while young women were more concentrated in activities associated with the public sector – for 
example, education (14.6 per cent), and health and social work (10.7 percent) as well as in agriculture. Burke 
and El-Kot (2011) found that females in Egypt were younger, worked at lower organisational levels, were 
less likely to supervise others, worked in smaller organisations, and earned less income than males in Egypt. 
El Hamidi and Said (2014) found that professional jobs are becoming harder for women in Egypt to get in, 
but once entered, they face a second wave of discrimination that is practised within the occupation. This 
might explain why the percentage of male respondents in the current study were higher than female 
respondents.  
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Respondents’ Audit Experience 
The experience of respondents in the audit profession varied from 0-2 years of audit experience to more than 
8 years of audit experience. However, the majority of respondents in the current study have more than eight 
years of audit experience (42.7%, 35 respondents), 28% (23 respondents) have 3-5 years of audit experience, 
24% (20 respondents) have 6-8 years of audit experience, and only 4.9% (4 respondents) falls in the category 
of (0-2) years of audit experience. An examination of all contacts LinkedIn accounts revealed that no one 
has less than two years of audit experience. It was important for the purpose of the current study to include 
only respondents having not less than two years of audit experience in order to be able to answer some of 
the highly technical questions in the current study. Table 7.2 summarises the results related to respondents’ 
audit experience.  
Table 7.2 Questionnaire Respondents’ Audit Experience  
 
 Frequency Percent Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 0-2 years 4 4.9 4.9 4.9 
3-5 years 23 28.0 28.0 32.9 
6-8 years 20 24.4 24.4 57.3 
More than 8 years 35 42.7 42.7 100.0 
Total 82 100.0 100.0  
 
Respondents’ Type of Audit Firms 
There are different types of audit firms in Egypt including the Big4 international audit firms, international 
audit firms other than the Big 4 audit firms, small national audit firms, and medium size national audit firms. 
Table 7.3 shows that 85.4% of respondents (70 respondents) in the current study work for the Big 4 
international audit firms, 11% of respondents (9 respondents) work for international audit firms other than 
the Big 4, and only 2.4% (2 respondents) and 1.2% (1 respondent) of respondents work for medium size 
national audit firms and small national audit firms respectively. There are various explanations as to why the 
majority of respondents in the current study were selected from the Big 4 international audit firms and other 
international audit firms in Egypt. First, the Big 4 audit firms are well known in Egypt because of their 
reputation when it comes to audit quality.  
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External auditors working at the Big 4 international audit firms are also more knowledgeable, qualified, and 
experienced in the external audit profession (Deloitte, 2012; Wahdan et al, 2005; Samaha and Abdallah, 
2012). Thus, it was important for the current study to choose participants that have enough experience and 
knowledge to be able to answer the research questions in the current study. Second, most of the other audit 
firms in Egypt are small firms which have one or more auditors, one of whom is usually the owner, with a 
trivial market share of the industry’s clients (Anis, 2014). The audit market in Egypt is relatively saturated 
with the Big 4 audit firms have almost 60% of the market share (EFSA, 2012). Third, it was very difficult to 
gain access to external auditors working in either medium size national audit firms or small audit firms 
because they either did not have a LinkedIn account or they were reluctant to take part in the current study. 
All the initial existing personal contacts were external auditors working at Big 4 audit firms and thus most 
of their contacts via LinkedIn were also colleagues working at the same type of audit firms.  
Table 7.3 Respondents’ type of audit office 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Big 4 audit firm 70 85.4 85.4 
International other than Big 4 9 11.0 96.3 
Medium size national audit firm 2 2.4 98.8 
Small national audit firm 1 1.2 100.0 
Total 82 100.0  
 
Respondents’ Professional Qualifications  
Respondents were also asked if they have any audit professional qualifications from international audit 
professional bodies like the “Association of Certified Chartered Accountants (ACCA)”, “American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)”, “Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE)”, or “the 
Egyptian Society of Accountants and Auditors (ESSA)”. Respondents were also instructed to choose all that 
apply in case they have more than one professional qualification. Table 7.4 shows that the majority of 
respondents (67%) have CPA, 29% have audit qualifications from the ESAA, 9.8% of respondents have 
audit qualifications from the ACCA, and 8.5% have CFE. This indicates that CPA is the most popular 
professional audit qualification in Egypt. This was an interesting result given that Egypt tends to comply 
with the International Standards on Auditing and the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), as 
mentioned in Chapter Five.  
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 These are somehow different from the American Standards and thus one would expect external auditors in 
Egypt to be more interested in the ACCA qualification that covers International Accounting and Audit 
Standards. The results from table 7.4 also show that only a small percentage of respondents (8.5%) have the 
Certified Fraud Examiners (CFE) qualification from the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE). 
This indicates that fraud education and the need for a fraud examination qualification might not be that 
common in Egypt.  
Table 7.4 Questionnaire Respondents’ Professional Qualifications  
 ACCA 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
No 74 90.2 90.2 
Yes 8 9.8 100 
Total 82 100   
 CPA 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
No 27 32.9 32.9 
Yes 55 67.1 100 
Total 82 100   
CFE  
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
No 75 91.5 91.5 
Yes 7 8.5 100 
Total 82 100   
 ESAA 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
No 58 70.7 70.7 
Yes 24 29.3 100 
Total 82 100   
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7.6 Data Analysis and Discussion of the results  
The questionnaire helped in answering questions related to the compliance and awareness of external auditors 
in Egypt with ISA/ESA 240 and financial reporting fraud cases in Egypt. It also helped in exploring issues 
related to the significance and assessment of the various fraud factors, the motivations behind management 
fraud in Egypt, its impact on the financial statements, and how external auditors could deal with this. Details 
about the findings of the questionnaire in each of these areas are discussed in this section.  
7.6.1 External Auditors’ Knowledge of and Compliance with ISA/ESA 240 in Egypt 
External auditors’ knowledge of ISA 240 and ESA 240 in Egypt 
External auditors in Egypt are expected to be aware of the requirements of ISA/ESA 240 with regards to 
financial reporting fraud given that they are required to comply with ISA/ESA 240. ESA 240 is just a 
translation of ISA 240 as explained in chapter five. The results from the questionnaire showed that the 
majority of questionnaire respondents (89%, 73 respondents) said they are aware of and are considering the 
requirements of ISA 240 in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud, while 82.9% of participants agreed 
that they are aware of and are complying with the requirements of the Egyptian Standard on Auditing (ESA) 
240. This slight difference indicates that ISA 240 might be more commonly used and referred to by external 
auditors in Egypt than ESA 240. The results are summarised in tables 7.5 and 7.6.  
It can also be noticed that only few percentage of respondents (11%-17%) indicated that they do not consider 
the requirements of either ISA 240 or ESA 240. It was not clear whether this pertains to limitations in the 
audit standards or negligence from the part of external auditors and/or the audit firms that do not monitor the 
performance of these few auditors. To determine whether there are any limitations in ISA/ESA240 or 
whether they actually help external auditors to assess and respond to the risks of financial reporting fraud, 
this area was further explored during the interviews. This is discussed in detail in Chapter Eight. 
Table 7.5 The Use of ISA 240 by External Auditors in Egypt 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
No 9 11 11 
Yes 73 89 100 
Total 82 100   
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Table 7.6 The Use of ESA 240 by External Auditors in Egypt 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
No 14 17.1 17.1 
Yes 68 82.9 100 
Total 82 100   
 
Compliance of external auditors in Egypt with ISA/ESA 240? 
ISA 240 and ESA 240 require external auditors to assess and respond to the risks of financial reporting fraud. 
Both standards require external auditors to classify the risk of financial reporting fraud into risk arising from 
the following three fraud factors: (1) risks of motivation to commit fraud, (2) risk of opportunity to commit 
fraud, and (3) risk of rationalisation of fraud. The standards also require external auditors to consider 
management’s integrity and the risk of management override of internal control. Hence respondents were 
first asked if they are aware of the following fraud risk factors: “motives to commit fraud”, “opportunity to 
commit fraud”, “rationalisation to fraud”, and “management integrity”. The results from table 7.7 showed 
that the majority of respondents (96.3%, 79 respondents) were familiar with these fraud risk factors. 
Table 7.7 Familiarity of questionnaire respondents with fraud factors 
   
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
No 3 3.7 3.7 
Yes 79 96.3 100 
Total 82 100   
 
Respondents were then asked to state which of these factors are actually considered during the assessment 
of the risk of financial reporting fraud. The results from table 7.8 showed that the majority of external auditors 
(98%, 81 respondents) consider both management motives and opportunity to commit fraud in assessing the 
risk of financial reporting fraud. This is followed by management’s integrity (93.9%, 77 respondents), and 
then rationalisation (80.5%, 66 respondents). These results support the results of Higson (2003) and Albrecht 
et al. (2008) who stated that external auditors and audit regulators spend much time looking at opportunity 
through the assessment of internal controls, increasingly recognising the importance of management 
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motivations through the business risk approach, and probably do not spend much time on rationale of 
management or management integrity.  
Table 7.8 Consideration of the fraud factors  
Considering motives 
  Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
  
No 1 1.2 1.2 
Yes 81 98.8 100 
Total 82 100  
Considering integrity 
  Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
  
No 5 6.1 6.1 
Yes 77 93.9 100 
Total 82 100   
Considering rationalisation 
  Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
  
No 16 19.5 19.5 
Yes 66 80.5 100 
Total 82 100   
Considering opportunity 
  Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
  
No 1 1.2 1.2 
Yes 81 98.8 100 
Total 82 100   
 
Audit Experience and Compliance with the Standards 
In order to know if audit experience has an impact on the extent by which external auditors are complying 
with ISA 240 and ESA 240, cross tabulation was used. Cross tabulation shows the relationship among 
variables and allows the inspection and comparison of differences among groups based on nominal and 
ordinal categories (Zikmund et al, 2013). The results from tables 7.9 and 7.10 showed that auditors’ 
compliance with ISA 240 and ESA 240 seem to increase with more audit experience.  
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Table 7.9 Crosstab – Compliance with ISA 240 and audit experience  
  
Years of audit experience 
Total 0-2 
years 
3-5 years 6-8 years 
More than 8 
years 
Use of 
ISA 240 
No 1 4 2 2 9 
Yes 3 19 18 33 73 
Total 4 23 20 35 82 
 
 
Table 7.10 Crosstab – Compliance with ESA 240 and audit experience 
  
Years of audit experience Total 
0-2 years 3-5 years 6-8 years 
More than 8 
years 
 
Use of 
ESA 240 
No 0 4 4 6 14 
Yes 4 19 16 29 68 
Total 4 23 20 35 82 
 
Type of Audit Firm and Compliance with the Standards 
In order to know if the type of audit firm has an impact on the extent by which external auditors are complying 
with the requirements of ISA 240 and ESA 240, cross tabulation was used. The results from tables 7.11 and 
7.12 revealed that the type of audit office does not seem to have an impact on external auditors’ awareness 
and compliance with ISA 240 and ESA 240.  
Table 7.11 Crosstab – Compliance with ISA 240  and type of audit firm  
 
 
Type of audit firm 
Total 
Big 4 audit 
firm 
International 
other than Big 
4 
Medium size 
national audit 
firm 
Small national 
audit firm 
Use of ISA 240 No 5 3 0 1 9 
Yes 65 6 2 0 73 
Total 70 9 2 1 82 
 
Table 7.12 Crosstab – Compliance with ESA 240 and the type of audit firm 
 
Type of audit firm 
Total 
Big 4 audit 
firm 
International 
other than Big 4 
Medium size 
national audit 
firm 
Small national 
audit firm 
Use of ESA 240 No 14 0 0 0 14 
Yes 56 9 2 1 68 
Total 70 9 2 1 82 
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7.6.2 Financial Reporting Fraud Cases in Egypt 
The current study sought to explore the nature and likelihood of financial reporting fraud in Egypt. The 
questionnaire helped in exploring whether external auditors discovered financial reporting fraud cases in 
Egypt were management was involved, how they discovered these cases, and what actions have been taken 
in these cases.  
Management involvement in alleged financial reporting fraud cases in Egypt 
Respondents were asked if they have encountered any financial reporting fraud cases in Egypt where 
management was involved. The results from table 7.13 showed that 67% of respondents (55 respondents out 
of 82) have encountered financial reporting fraud cases in Egypt where management was involved. This 
indicates that financial reporting fraud seems to be common in Egypt and that management are more likely 
to commit financial reporting fraud. This supports the results of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
(ACFE) in 2014 that found that managers were involved in 46.2% of the fraud cases that were reported from 
the Middle East and North Africa. However out of the 52 cases reported in the ACFE study only two cases 
were found in Egypt. The report did not also mention if the reported fraud cases were cases of financial 
reporting fraud.  
 
Table 7.13 Management Fraud Cases in Egypt 
 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 No 27 32.9 32.9 
Yes 55 67.1 100.0 
Total 82 100.0  
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Audit Experience and Likelihood of Detecting Management Fraud 
The current study sought to explore whether there is any relationship between auditor’s experience and the 
likelihood of detecting management fraud. Hence cross tabulations was used and the results from table 7.14 
showed that the likelihood of detecting fraud seemed to increase with the increase in audit experience. Phi 
coefficient was also used to determine the strength of the relationship between audit experience and the 
likelihood of detecting financial reporting fraud. The results from table 7.15 showed that although there is a 
direct relationship between the two variables, the relationship seems to be weak since Phi test showed a 
significance of only 0.133. This indicates that audit experience might not have much impact on the likelihood 
of detecting financial reporting fraud.  
 
Table 7.14 Likelihood of detecting Financial reporting fraud and audit experience - 
Cross tabulation 
  
Years of audit experience 
Total 
0-2 years 
3-5 
years 
6-8 
years 
More 
than 8 
years 
Likelihood of detecting 
financial reporting 
fraud 
No 1 11 8 7 27 
Yes 3 12 12 28 55 
Total 4 23 20 35 82 
 
 
Table 7.15 Relationship between likelihood of financial reporting fraud and audit experience – Phi test 
Symmetric Measures 
  Value 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Exact Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal 
Phi 0.26 0.137 0.133 
Cramer's V 0.26 0.137 0.133 
N of Valid Cases 82   
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Type of Audit Firm and Likelihood of Detecting Management Fraud 
In order to explore whether the likelihood of detecting financial reporting fraud differs with the type of 
audit firm, cross tabulation was used. Table 7.16 showed that the type of audit firm seems to have no 
impact on the likelihood of external auditors detecting financial reporting fraud.  
 
Table 7.16 Likelihood of detecting financial reporting fraud and type of audit firm Cross 
tabulation 
  
Type of audit firm 
Total Big 4 audit 
firm 
International 
other than 
Big 4 
Medium 
size 
national 
audit 
firm 
Small 
audit 
firm 
Likelihood of detecting 
FRF 
No 26 1 0 0 27 
Yes 44 8 2 1 55 
Total 70 9 2 1 82 
 
Type(s) of Financial Reporting Fraud Detected  
Respondents were then asked about the type(s) of financial reporting fraud that were discovered in each case. 
Types of financial reporting fraud include “improper revenue recognition and timing difference”, “improper 
assets valuation”, “concealed liabilities”, “concealed expenses”, and “improper disclosure” as explained in 
chapter two. The results revealed that 32.2% of respondents found “improper revenue recognition and timing 
differences” cases, 17.3% found “improper assets valuation” cases, 14.4% found cases of “concealed 
expenses”, 13.5% found “improper disclosure” cases, and 12.5% found cases of “concealed liabilities”.  This 
indicates that “improper revenue recognition” seems to be the most common type of financial reporting fraud 
in Egypt followed by improper assets valuation. This supports the findings of a study released in March 1999 
by the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) that found improper 
revenue recognition and improper assets valuation as the most common types of financial reporting fraud in 
other contexts. While, expense and liability understatements were less frequent (Beasley, et al. 2000). The 
results of the current study also supports the findings of prior studies that argued that fictitious revenues 
always draw more attention from auditors and regulators than the other types of financial reporting fraud 
(Rezaee, 2005; Albrecht, 2006; Coenen, 2009). 
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How Did External Auditors Detect Financial Reporting Fraud? 
The questionnaire respondents were asked to note down how financial reporting fraud was detected in each 
case. This is an open-ended question and thus content analysis was used to analyse data. Respondents’ 
answers were carefully analysed and classified into the following themes: “Theme I: Techniques for 
detecting improper revenue recognition and timing differences”, “Theme II: Techniques for detecting 
concealed liabilities and expenses”, “Theme III: Techniques for detecting improper assets valuation”, and 
“Theme IV: Techniques for detecting improper disclosure”. Common responses were then put together and 
the number of their occurrences was counted using Nvivo. The techniques related to each financial reporting 
fraud type were then summarised in tables along with their number of occurrence. Techniques that were 
mentioned three times or more were then regarded as a pattern or most commonly used techniques. This 
approach was supported by Berg (2009, p.364) who stated that “in content analysis, a common rule of thumb 
is that a minimum of three occurrences of something can be considered a pattern”. 
 
Theme I: Techniques for detecting improper revenue recognition and timing differences 
The results from the questionnaire in this area revealed a number of techniques that were used by external 
auditors to detect improper revenue recognition and timing differences schemes. Some of these techniques 
were more common than other techniques given that they were mentioned more than three times by 
respondents. For instance, the most common techniques mentioned were “understanding the client’s business 
and industry (mentioned 7 times)”, “using normal audit procedures suggested by the standards such as 
inspection of documents, re-performance, or recalculation (mentioned 6 times)”, “performing the cut-off and 
reasonableness tests (mentioned 5 times)”, “fraud risk assessment during the planning stage (mentioned 5 times)”, and 
“using substantive tests or test of details of balances and transactions (mentioned 4 times)”.  
Investigating tip offs from customers, employees, and whistle blowers were mentioned three times. One 
respondent stated that: 
 
“Tip offs from whistle blowers helped in detecting cases of improper revenue recognition in one case. A whistleblower 
submitted a report about a suspected fraud in a company. The board of directors then investigated the matter more and 
fraud was detected.” 
The findings from the ACFE study in 2014 showed that 35.3% of fraud cases were detected via tips in the 
Middle East and North Africa. The ACFE study also reported that tips were the most common detection 
method for most organisations and that the presence of a fraud reporting hotline had a substantial impact on 
the initial fraud detection method in the cases analysed in their study. This shows the importance of both tips 
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and whistle blowers’ reporting lines as anti-fraud controls which was also confirmed by the results of the 
current study.  
 
The findings also revealed that analytical procedures is an important tool in detecting financial reporting 
fraud, especially improper revenue recognition cases. Three respondents mentioned analytical procedure and 
one of them said: 
 
“Sometimes fraud cases could be detected by chance while applying the normal audit procedures as required by the 
ISA. However, analytical procedures could be an important tool to detect fraud such as comparing sales to cost of 
goods sold. Analysing the data in more depth is always helpful and sometimes the use of an expert such as an 
actuarial in insurance companies could help”.  
Another respondent stated that the restrictions imposed on the scope of auditor’s work could sometimes be 
a sign of management motivation to commit fraud. This should alert external auditors to use analytical tools 
and substantive tests to assess the likelihood of fraud. He added that: 
 “Management used to impose restrictions on the scope of the audit by setting tight deadlines, this made me feel 
there might be an intention to commit fraud so I performed more analytical procedures and substantive tests that 
helped in the discovery of overstatement of revenues”.  
All the other techniques that were mentioned by respondents are listed in table 7.17 below.  
Table 7.17 Techniques for detecting improper revenue recognition and timing difference schemes 
Techniques Frequency of 
Occurrence 
Performing test of controls and identifying weaknesses in the internal control system such as 
lack of commitment to competence, lack of proper financial records, and high risk of 
management override of internal controls 
2 
Auditing the revenue cycle which revealed fake sales 1 
Inquiry and discussion of/with management 1 
Deeper analysis of fraud related controls that failed internal control testing by the audit firm 1 
Review of budgeted income and provisions 1 
Comparing bank reconciliation with the customer account 1 
Looking for problems with accounts receivable confirmations and missing sales invoices 1 
Using variance analysis 1 
Discussion with the accountant about revenue recognition and cut-off test used 1 
Management imposing limitations on the scope of audit was a red flag 1 
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Observing some red flags for fraud during the engagement 1 
Designing anti-fraud audit procedures 1 
Using IT audit 1 
Examination of unusual transactions 1 
Third party confirmations 1 
Checking the adequacy of the company provisions and reserves 1 
The use of an expert such as an actuarial in insurance companies could help 1 
Understanding the flow of transactions  1 
 
Theme II: Techniques for detecting Concealed Liabilities and Concealed Expenses 
Going through the questionnaire results in this area identified few techniques that were used by external 
auditors in the current study to detect concealed liabilities and expenses. None of these techniques were 
mentioned more than once. However, two of these techniques were also mentioned as common techniques 
used for detecting improper revenue recognition which is “understanding the client’s business and industry” and 
“using substantive tests”. Other techniques include “asking for positive confirmation”, “reviewing a complete list of 
all liabilities and expenses”, “using variance analysis”, “tracking unusual items in expenses, liabilities, and new 
accounts”, and “increasing the audit sample”.  
 
One respondent added that it is also important to consider management disclosure and to compare it to existing 
evidence to determine any discrepancies. He said that this helped him to detect concealed liabilities that management 
was trying to hide. He stated that: 
 
“In one of the cases comparing management disclosure to information in contracts provided by the legal department 
revealed unrecorded liabilities by management. The case was later investigated and turned out to be a case of 
financial reporting fraud”.  
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Theme III: Techniques for detecting improper assets valuation 
 
The questionnaire results in this area revealed only few techniques that respondents used to detect improper 
assets valuation. However none of these techniques were mentioned more than once by respondents. 
Examples of these techniques include “re-performance”, “physical examination”, and “recalculation”. Three 
respondents added that: 
 
“In one of the cases re-performance helped in discovering that the company did not comply with the entity global 
fixed assets policy”.  
 
“Physical examination and inspection of ownership contracts revealed that assets were bought for personal use in 
one of the cases”.  
 
 “Re-calculation revealed that the wrong depreciation method was used on assets. Management was inquired 
about this but because he refused to correct it, this made us feel there might be an intent to commit fraud so we 
increased the substantive tests and raised the matter to the board of directors.”  
 
One respondent said that observing management attitude such as refusing to correct misstatements could 
indicate an intent to commit financial reporting fraud. Other techniques that were mentioned by respondents 
to detect improper assets valuation include “examining assets valuation”, “using IT audit”, “inventory 
count”, and “the use of analytical procedures”.  
 
 Theme IV: Techniques for detecting improper disclosure 
Respondents only mentioned very few techniques that were used to detect cases of improper disclosure. This 
includes “bank confirmations”, “comparing reports from the operational department with the report from the 
finance department”, and “management refusal to disclose information about related party transactions”.  
 
Actions Taken by External Auditors in the Alleged Financial Reporting Fraud Cases 
Respondents were asked about the actions taken in each of these alleged financial reporting fraud cases. The 
results revealed that in most of the cases external auditors required adjusting entries rather than reporting the 
matter to those charged with governance and shareholders. In only two cases, the fraud was reported to 
shareholders and a qualified opinion was issued while the auditors withdrew from the engagement in only 
one case. No legal actions were taken in all cases.  
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These findings indicate the existence of poor corporate governance mechanisms in Egypt. For instance, the 
fact that auditors did not report the suspected fraud to those charged with governance in most cases as 
required by ISA 240 indicates lack of compliance with ISA 240 requirements with regards to reporting fraud. 
The standard requires auditors to report the matter to a third party outside the organisation in case 
management and those charged with governance were suspected of fraud. However this did not happen in 
the cases reported by external auditors in the current study. This also raises concerns about the effectiveness 
of audit committees in Egypt as a monitoring mechanism. This confirms the results of a study conducted by 
Samaha et al (2012) who found that audit committees in Egypt are weak and hardly considered as an effective 
corporate governance supervisory mechanism. The authors explained that the phenomenon of non-
compliance may also be attributed to the present unbalanced political situation, prevalent corruption, and 
deteriorating law where non-compliance with the legal requirements often go unpunished encouraging more 
non-compliance. The weakness of the legal system in Egypt was also evident in the work of the World Bank 
(2009), Wahdan et al, 2009, and Anis 2014 who found that there is lack of rules that state auditors’ rights 
and obligations, lack of a strong independent professional organisation to guarantee auditors’ rights with the 
auditees, lack of standardised measures for audit quality, and that almost no lawsuits have ever been brought 
against audit firms in Egypt in the past. This might impact the auditors’ incentives to maintain audit quality 
in Egypt and in particular report suspected fraud.  
 
The findings of the current study also explain the results of the ACFE in 2014 where they reported that 
external audit was the least effective technique for detecting fraud given that only 5.4% of the fraud cases 
reported in their study were detected by external audit. If external auditors are not reporting alleged fraud 
cases, their efforts in combating fraud will not be recognised. The results from the ACFE also revealed that 
no fraud cases in their study was reported by external auditors in the Middle East and North Africa which is 
consistent with the findings of the current study.  
 
Table 7.18 summarises the actions taken by external auditors in the alleged financial reporting fraud cases 
they have detected. 
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Table 7.18 Actions taken by external auditors in the financial reporting fraud cases  
Actions taken Frequency of 
Occurrence 
Adjusting entries were required to reflect the true balances of the affected 
accounts or disclosure 
35 
The matters were referred to either the audit committee, a higher level of 
management, the board of directors, or the audit partner 
17 
The fraud was reported to shareholders and a qualified opinion was issued 2 
Withdrawing from the engagement 1 
 
7.6.3 The Significance of Fraud Factors  
The current study sought to explore the significance of various fraud factors in the assessment of financial 
reporting fraud. These factors include “management motives to commit fraud”, “existing opportunity to 
commit fraud”, “management integrity”, “rationalisation of fraud”, and “fraud perpetrators’ capabilities”.  
The questionnaire respondents were thus given a list of these factors and were asked to identify the most 
significant fraud factor(s) in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. The results from table 7.19 
revealed that management motives (35.4%, 29 respondents) and management integrity ((34.1%, 28 
respondents) were perceived as the most significant fraud factors in assessing the risk of financial reporting 
fraud. This was followed by opportunity to commit fraud (28%, 23 respondents). Only one respondent 
viewed rationalisation the most significant factor and another one perceived fraud perpetrators’ capabilities 
as the most significant fraud factor. This supports the results of Higson (2003) and Albrecht et al. (2008) 
who argued that external auditors and audit regulators do not spend much time on rationale of management. 
Table 7.19 Most significant fraud risk factor(s) 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Management motives 29 35.4 35.4 
Management integrity 28 34.1 69.5 
Rationalisation 1 1.2 70.7 
Opportunity 23 28.0 98.8 
Fraud perpetrator's capabilities 1 1.2 100.0 
Total 82 100.0  
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Respondents were then asked to rate these fraud factors according to their significance using a 5 likert scale 
from 1 to 5 where “1” indicated the least significant fraud factor and “5” indicated the most significant fraud 
factor. The results from table 7.20 revealed that the majority of respondents (92.7%) rated management 
motives as either “most significant” (43.9%) or “significant” (48.8%). It can also be noticed that no 
respondents rated management motives as “not significant”. This supports the results of prior studies that 
found management motivation behind fraud a key factor for assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud 
(Grazioli, et al., 2006; Elayan and Meyer, 2008; Erickson et al., 2006; Higson, 2011; Gary Becker, 1968; 
Reinstein et al., 1998; Davies, 2000; Coenen, 2008; Hasnan et al., 2008; Ramamoorti et al., 2009; Wells, 
2001; Higson, 2011; Pedneault, 2004a; Grazioli et al., 2006; Hogan et al, 2008).  
This was followed by management integrity where 84.2% of respondents perceived management integrity 
as either the most significant factor (47.6%) or significant factor (36.6%) and only one respondent believed 
management integrity is not significant. This supports the findings of Emma et al (2009) who found that 
audit risk decreases as the evidence for management’s integrity increases and that the evaluation of 
management integrity is a critical part of developing an audit opinion as to the fairness of the presentation of 
financial statements. The results also support the body of knowledge that found management’s integrity a 
significant factor in explaining the reasons behind fraudulent behaviours in general and financial reporting 
fraud in particular (Albrecht et al., 1984; Woefel and Woefel, 1987; Loebbecke and Willingham, 1988; 
Carpenter and Reimers, 2005; Rezaee and Riley, 2010; Chen et al., 2013).  
The results from table 7.20 also revealed that 84.1% of respondents rated rationalisation as either most 
significant or significant. This was a very similar percentage to those who rated management integrity as 
either most significant or significant (84.2%). This might indicate a link between rationalisation and integrity 
where external auditors seems to consider them somehow equally significant. This might be because people 
with low integrity tend to rationalise fraudulent acts more. This was supported by Albrecht et al (1984) who 
suggested that integrity should replace rationalisation because personal integrity affects the probability that 
an individual may rationalise inappropriate behaviour. Rae and Subramaniam (2008) defined rationalisation 
as a justification of fraudulent behaviour due to an employee’s lack of personal integrity. Hence the results 
of the current study supports the idea of replacing rationalisation of fraud by management integrity. However 
external auditors need to keep in mind that rationalisation of fraud and unethical behaviour could be a red 
flag or sign for low management integrity.  
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It can also be noticed from table 7.20 that the percentage of respondents that rated opportunity for fraud and 
fraud perpetrators’ capabilities as either most significant or significant tend to be similar (57.3% for 
opportunity, 56.1% for fraud perpetrators’ capabilities). This shows how important fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities might be in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. This supports the current body of 
knowledge that found fraud perpetrators’ capabilities a significant factor in assessing the risk of financial 
reporting fraud (Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004; Vona, 2008, Omar and Din, 2010; Kassem and Higson, 2012). 
The results also indicate that there might be a link between opportunities to commit fraud and some of the 
traits or capabilities that fraud perpetrators might possess. For instance, “capacity to exploit internal control 
weaknesses”, “authoritative position within the organisation”, and “confidence that fraud perpetrators will 
not be detected or if caught will get out of it” could all be the result of weaknesses in the internal control 
system that could create a high risk of opportunity to commit fraud. This supports Vona (2008) who argued 
that a person’s position in the organisation contributes to the opportunity to commit fraud and there is a direct 
correlation between opportunity to commit fraud and the ability to conceal the fraud. Wells (2005) stated 
that too much power in the hand of one person could increase the risk of that person abusing his/her power 
which might also create an opportunity to commit fraud as well as increase the risk of management override 
of internal control. The findings of the current study also support the results of Omar and Din (2010) who 
found that without the capability to exploit control weaknesses for the purpose of committing and concealing 
the fraud act, no fraud can occur.  
The results of the current study thus indicates that people with certain capabilities could be more able to 
exploit weaknesses in the internal control system and thus the opportunity to commit fraud. This suggest that 
external auditors should consider the opportunity of fraud together with the capability of management to 
commit financial reporting fraud. The audit standards do not require external auditors to consider fraud 
perpetrators’ capabilities in their fraud risk assessments. However the results of the current study provided 
evidence that fraud perpetrators’ capabilities are equally significant to the opportunity to commit fraud which 
external auditors are required to consider in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. This indicates that 
audit standards should consider incorporating fraud perpetrators’ capabilities especially management 
capabilities in the assessment of financial reporting fraud. To explore this area further the current study 
sought external auditors’ opinion on this matter. The questionnaire respondents were thus asked whether 
they think fraud perpetrators’ capabilities should be considered in the assessment of financial reporting fraud.  
180 
 
The results from table 7.21 showed that 82.9% (68 respondents) of external auditors in the current study 
believe that fraud perpetrators’ capabilities should be considered in assessing the risk of financial reporting 
fraud.  
Respondents were then asked about the traits that could enhance management’s capability to commit 
financial reporting fraud making use of the traits suggested by Wolfe and Hermanson (2004).  These traits 
include: (1) Authoritative position or function within the organisation, (2) capacity to understand and exploit 
accounting systems and internal control weaknesses, (3) confidence that she/he will not be detected or if 
caught she/he will get out of it easily, and (4) capability to deal with the stress created within an otherwise 
good person when he/she commits bad acts.  
The results from table 7.22 showed that the majority of respondents (84.1%, 69 respondents) agreed that “the 
capacity to exploit internal control weaknesses” is a significant trait in assessing management’s capabilities 
to commit financial reporting fraud. This was followed by “Authoritative position within the organisation” 
(63%, 56 respondents), “Capacity to understand accounting systems” (58.5%, 48 respondents), and 
“Confidence that the fraud perpetrator will not be detected and if caught will get out of it easily” (56.1%, 46 
respondents). Not many respondents (28%, 23 respondents) agreed that the ability to deal with stress is 
significant in assessing management’s capability to commit financial reporting fraud.  
Table 7.20 Significance of Fraud Factors 
Management Motives 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Least Significant 1 1.2 1.2 
Rarely Significant 5 6.1 7.3 
Significant 40 48.8 56.1 
Most Significant 36 43.9 100 
Total 82 100   
Management Integrity  
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Least Significant 1 1.2 1.2 
Not Significant 1 1.2 2.4 
Rarely Significant 11 13.4 15.9 
Significant 30 36.6 52.4 
Most Significant 39 47.6 100 
Total 82 100   
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Rationalisation  
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Not Significant 1 1.2 1.2 
Rarely Significant 12 14.6 15.9 
Significant 36 43.9 59.8 
Most Significant 33 40.2 100 
Total 82 100   
Opportunity 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Least Significant 5 6.1 6.1 
Not Significant 2 2.4 8.5 
Rarely Significant 28 34.1 42.7 
Significant 38 46.3 89 
Most Significant 9 11 100 
Total 82 100   
Fraud Perpetrators’ capabilities 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Least Significant 1 1.2 1.2 
Not Significant 13 15.9 17.1 
Rarely Significant 22 26.8 43.9 
Significant 37 45.1 89 
Most Significant 9 11 100 
Total 82 100   
 
Table 7.21 Consideration of fraud perpetrator's capabilities 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 
No 14 17.1 17.1 
Yes 68 82.9 100 
Total 82 100  
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Table 7.22 Traits for Assessing management’ capabilities to commit fraud 
Capacity to understand accounting systems 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
No 34 41.5 41.5 
Yes 48 58.5 100 
Total 82 100   
Capacity to exploit internal control weaknesses 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
No 13 15.9 15.9 
Yes 69 84.1 100 
Total 82 100   
Ability to deal with stress 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
No 59 72 72 
Yes 23 28 100 
Total 82 100   
Authoritative position within the organisation 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
No 26 31.7 31.7 
Yes 56 68.3 100 
Total 82 100   
Confidence that the fraud perpetrator will not be detected or if caught, will get out of it 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
No 36 43.9 43.9 
Yes 46 56.1 100 
Total 82 100   
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Audit Experience and External Auditors’ Appreciation of Management Motives 
The current study sought to explore if more experienced auditors tend to appreciate management motives in 
assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud more than less experienced auditors. The results from cross 
tabulation as shown in table 7.23 indicate that more experienced auditors rated management motives as either 
most significant or significant factor in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. 
Table 7.23 Crosstab – Appreciation of management motives and audit experience 
  
Years of audit experience 
Total 
                                   0-2 years 3-5 years 6-8 years 
More than 
8 years 
Significance 
of motives 
Least Significant 0 0 1 0 1 
Rarely Significant 2 1 0 2 5 
Significant 2 11 8 19 40 
Most Significant 0 11 11 14 36 
Total                                       4 23 20 35 82 
 
Spearman’s rank correlation was then calculated to determine the strength of this relationship. The results 
from table 7.24 showed that Spearman’s rho significance is 0.255 which indicates a direct but a weak 
relationship between audit experience and the appreciation of external auditors to management motives. This 
means that audit experience might not have a strong impact on external auditors’ consideration of 
management’s motives in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud.  
Table 7.24 Correlations – Appreciation of management motives and audit experience  
 
Considering 
motives 
Years of 
audit 
experience 
Spearman's rho Considering motives Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .127 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .255 
N 82 82 
Years of audit 
experience 
Correlation Coefficient .127 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .255 . 
N 82 82 
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Type of Audit Firm and External Auditors’ Appreciation of Management Motives  
The current study sought to explore whether the ratings given by respondents to the significance of 
management motives differs according to the type of their audit firms. Cross tabulation and Spearman’s rank 
correlation were used. The results from table 7.25 showed that Big 4 audit firms and international audit firms 
other than the Big 4 tend to regard management motives as a key factor in assessing financial reporting fraud 
more than the other types of audit firms. The results from table 7.26 indicate that there is a direct and a strong 
relationship (Spearman’s rho sig 0.682) between the type of audit office and the rankings given to the 
significance of management motives. This indicates that the type of audit firm has a strong impact on external 
auditors’ appreciation of management motives.  
Table 7.25 Appreciation of management motives and type of audit office Cross tabulation 
  
Type of audit office 
Total 
Big 4 audit firm 
International 
other than Big 
4 
Medium 
size 
national 
audit firm 
Small 
audit 
firm 
Significance 
of motives 
Least Significant 1 0 0 0 1 
Rarely 
Significant 
4 1 0 0 5 
Significant 34 5 1 0 40 
Most Significant 31 3 1 1 36 
Total                                      70 9 2 1 82 
 
Table 7.26 Correlations – Appreciation of management motives and type of audit office 
  
Considering 
motives 
Type of audit 
office 
Spearman's rho 
Considering motives 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
1 0.046 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.682 
N 82 82 
Type of audit office 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
0.046 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.682 . 
N 82 82 
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7.6.4 The Assessment of Fraud Factors  
The current study sought to explore how external auditors could assess the various fraud factors. This 
includes “management motives to commit fraud”, “opportunity to commit fraud”, “rationalisation of fraud”, 
fraud perpetrators’ capabilities, and “management integrity”. This is an open-ended question which required 
the use of both conventional and summative content analysis. Conventional content analysis was used to 
identify common themes while summative content analysis was used to calculate the frequency of occurrence 
of some of these techniques via the use of Nvivo. Thus, different themes were identified, similar 
themes/responses were combined together, and the frequency of occurrence of these themes were also 
obtained. The questionnaire helped in answering questions related to how external auditors could assess the 
above mentioned fraud factors and how difficult they perceive the assessment of each of these factors.  
Theme I: Assessing Management Motives to Commit Financial Reporting Fraud  
Going through the questionnaire data helped in identifying common techniques for assessing management 
motives. All these techniques were summarised in table 7.27. Some of these techniques were mentioned 
thirteen and twelve times such as “inquiry of management and those charged with governance about their 
process for identifying and responding to the risks of fraud in the entity including any risks of fraud that have 
been identified by management or brought to management's attention as well as their relationship with related 
parties (mentioned 13 times)” and “assessing the effectiveness of the client’s internal control system 
especially fraud-related controls (mentioned 12 times)”. One respondent stated that: 
“The assessment of the client’s internal control system would help in the assessment of management motives to 
commit financial reporting fraud and that management override of controls is a very important red flag” 
Other techniques were mentioned three times such as “taking into consideration red flags that might increase 
management’s motivation to commit fraud”, “understanding client’s business, industry, and regulatory 
environment”, “using audit software that includes a checklist of management motives”, “observing 
management’s compensation system and bonuses”, and “reviewing and inspecting board of director’s 
minutes of meetings”. One respondent said: 
 “Incorporating motives in fraud risk assessment depends on the type of industry and client’s business as well as 
on how effective the client’s internal control is” 
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Another respondent added that: 
“Assessing motives requires understanding the kind of business and the organisational structure and the relationship 
between management and employees and to understand who has the most power in the company or is authorised 
to put pressure on employees that might force them to commit fraud”. 
Three respondents mentioned that the assessment of motives requires the understanding of management 
motivations in the first place. They also mentioned some examples of management motives and how would 
they deal with it. Their comments were: 
“To consider motives, first an overall assessment of the company business must take place to identify whether there 
is a pressure or incentive that could drive the management to commit fraud such as bonuses, incentives that are 
linked to the revenue or the financial performance of the Company , whether the company is a public listed company 
and need to show a better results to increase its share value, salesmen bonuses or commissions are based on targeted 
budget sales as in the case of pharmaceutical companies in Egypt, or company is in need of finance and thus need 
to improve its financial ratios to get finance from banks”. 
“During the risk assessment process we usually evaluate whether managers have motives or incentives that might 
affect the company’s financial performance. We also consider management’s power and ability to alter financial 
results”.  
“Generally management might be motivated to either increase the revenues and assets to show unreal financial 
position, or to increase the expenses and liabilities to reduce taxes. We can assess this risk by reviewing board of 
director’s minutes of meetings, discussions with company personnel, and reviewing company’s financial history”.  
 
Another respondent mentioned that in fraud risk assessment it is important to consider the three fraud triangle 
factors: pressure to commit fraud, opportunity to commit fraud, and rationalisation. He then added that: 
“Fraud risk assessment should at least be undertaken by an audit manager and should be used in combination with 
other procedures such as: “1- Questionnaire to the management. 2- History of the client. 3- Considering the tone at 
the top and how they cooperate with the audit team. 4- Considering the possible susceptible fraud areas, especially 
revenue recognition, unusual transactions, unusual sales and profits”. 
Three other respondents said they use an audit software that incorporates the assessment of management 
motives into fraud risk assessment. One of them stated that the concentration of power in the hand of one 
person is a red flag for high fraud risk. He added that:  
“We have sophisticated electronic questionnaire that we apply. The questionnaire includes a list of motives that we 
need to check like: the need for money, concentration of power which is always a big motive for fraud”.  
Another respondent believed that assessing non-financial motives could be easier than financial motives. He 
said: 
 “It is very difficult to consider the financial pressures, since that can be very personal. But we do consider non-
financial aspects, where there are indicators for that”.   
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Table 7.27 Assessment of Management Motives to Commit Financial Reporting Fraud 
Techniques to assess management motives  Frequency of 
occurrence  
Inquiry of management and those charged with governance about:  
 Their process for identifying and responding to the risks of fraud in the entity 
including any risks of fraud that have been identified by management or brought 
to management's attention.   
 Their relationship with related parties 
13 
Assessing the effectiveness of the company’s internal control system including the design and 
implementation of controls, in particular: 
 Controls designed to identify fraud or to prevent frauds from occurring. Assess 
what controls management maintains in relation to Fraud and whether they do 
regular assessment and maintain a fraud register (Cited 3 times) 
 Weaknesses in the internal control system that could induce a pressure/motive to 
commit fraud such as unrealistic targets, management being risk averse 
 Reviewing tone at the top and the extent by which management cooperates with 
the audit team 
 Management’s philosophy and operating style  
 The control environment 
 The existence of proper authorisation  
 The risk of management override of controls 
 The existence of adequate segregation of duties especially between CEO and 
chairman of the board 
 Consider management’s power and ability to alter financial results (cited 2 times) 
12 
Taking into consideration red flags that might increase management’s motivation to commit fraud 
such as high sales targets, or bonuses that are linked to financial performance, weak company 
performance, management’s integrity history, high pressure to achieve unrealistic targets, high 
pressure to meet budget    
3 
Understanding client’s business, industry, and regulatory environment including: 
 Organisation structure  
 Management philosophy and operating style  
 Delegation of power and authority  
 Relationship of management with employees  
 Review company’s performance and financial results  
 whether the company is a public listed company and need to show a better 
results to increase its share value 
 Company’s financial needs 
 Understanding management’s objectives 
 Reviewing company’s financial history 
3 
Using audit software that includes a checklist of motives 3 
Observing management’s compensation system and bonuses 3 
Reviewing and inspecting board of director’s minutes of meetings 3 
Using analytical procedures to determine if there is a link between operational results and 
management’s compensation, do industry comparisons, and review company’s financial results 
2 
Paying more attention to high risk accounts such as revenue recognition, assets, unusual 
transactions, unusual sales, and profits 
2 
Making appropriate communications about fraud risk, and evaluate audit evidence related to fraud 
risk 
1 
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Discussing fraud risk with engagement personnel 1 
Considering prior fraud incidents 1 
Considering tip offs from whistle blowers 1 
Applying professional scepticism 1 
Inquiries of internal audit 1 
 
Theme II: Assessing Management’s Integrity 
Respondents were asked how they could assess management integrity. The results revealed that some of 
these techniques were mentioned twelve times such as “Inquires of management, employees, and those 
charged with governance about fraud controls and how they respond to fraud risk”, “communication with 
employees regarding their views on business practices and ethical behaviour”, “assessing the company’s 
code of ethics”, and “understanding the nature, timing and extent of transactions with related parties”.  
Other techniques were mentioned ten times such as “assessing management’s integrity history by using 
google search to check management’s integrity history and reputation in the market or following the news 
and different Egyptian publications especially in case of listed companies”, “conducting management’s 
background check to know more about management’s qualifications and years of experience”, “checking if 
management had any financial statements restatements history”.  
Six respondents mentioned that management commitment to ethical values would help in assessing their 
integrity. They mentioned examples of how management could be committed to ethical values and promoting 
integrity in their organisation. For instance, whether management provides staff with ethics training and/or 
handouts about acceptable ethical behaviour, whether the company has an ethical code of conduct on their 
website, and whether management lead by example and adheres to Company's policies and procedures. 
Understanding and assessing the client’s internal control system especially segregation of duties and the 
existence of proper authorisation was mentioned five times by respondents as a technique for assessing 
management’s integrity. Three other respondents added that the assessment of management integrity is a key 
in assessing the effectiveness of the client’s control environment. They also believed that understanding and 
testing the client’s internal control could help in assessing management integrity. Their comments were: 
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 “We pay more attention to segregation of duties and the existence of proper authorisation. The key in assessing 
integrity is to have a questioning mind”.  
 “Integrity is a key factor in our assessment of the control environment using COSO framework. It can be assessed 
by asking employees at all levels about management’s integrity and whether they come across any risk factors 
that indicate management’s lack of integrity. We also browse global portals knowledge links to get an idea about 
the company history and whether management was involved in a fraud case before as part of our client’s 
acceptance and continuance procedures. We may also modify our audit extent and nature if we identify some 
integrity related issues after accepting an audit client”.  
“Examining human resources policies and procedures is quite important for assessing management’s integrity 
and that the existence of a code of ethics and whistle blowing hotlines could encourage ethical behaviour and thus 
could help in their assessment of management integrity” 
“During the entity level risk assessment process a lot of procedures are performed to ensure that the company has 
a human resource process to select candidates that have gone through reference checks and that have complied 
with the selection process that pertain to the law. We also make sure that there is a proper code of conduct 
circulated to all employees at all levels, and that there is a whistle blowing hotline”. 
“Management override of controls and management motives are always classified as high risk areas and that my 
audit firm expects clients to have some controls in place to reduce management override of controls and the 
incentive to commit fraud” 
 
Three respondents mentioned that management integrity is very difficult to be assessed given the lack of 
professional guidance. Another respondent argued that management integrity and rationalisation are 
normally assessed together and not as separate elements. Another respondent said: 
 “The prudent auditor should make links between substantive tests, analytical tests, board of directors’ decisions 
and the discussion with management” 
 
One respondent stated that the procedures used to assess management integrity will depend on whether the 
client is an existing client or a new client. He argued that: 
“In recurring audits we have accumulated sufficient data and knowledge of management that can help us make 
such judgement about management’s integrity. As for new clients, we perform a number of exercises like those 
incorporated in a KYC programme plus interviews of the client and market information gathering”. 
While another respondent added that critical thinking is important in fraud risk assessments. This supports 
Higson (2003) who argued that professional scepticism is not enough and that critical thinking will help 
external auditors do proper fraud risk assessments. The respondent said that: 
“The auditor should be critical about the audit evidence, have a questioning mind, and apply professional 
scepticism. The auditor should also consider that fraud can occur regardless of any past experience with the entity 
or any belief about management's honesty and integrity. The auditor should not rationalise or dismiss information 
that may be indicative of fraud”. 
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Table 7.28 Assessing Management Integrity 
Techniques Frequency of 
Citation 
Inquires of management, employees, and those charged with governance about fraud controls and 
how they respond to fraud risk, as well as, communication with employees regarding their views 
on business practices and ethical behaviour, assessing the company’s code of ethics, and 
understanding the nature, timing and extent of transactions with related parties 
12 
Assessing management’s integrity history by collecting information from the market and news 
about management’s reputation and integrity, conducting management’s background check to 
know more about management’s qualifications and years of experience, or using google search to 
check management’s integrity history and reputation in the market or following the news and 
different Egyptian publications especially if it is listed company, checking if management had any 
financial statements restatements history 
10 
Assessing management’s and company’s commitment to ethical behaviours and values e.g. 
providing staff with ethics training or handouts about acceptable ethical behaviour or having an 
ethical code of conduct on their website, assessing whether management is committed to company's 
values, do management lead by example, and assess their adherence to Company's policies and 
procedures 
6 
Understanding and assessing the client’s internal control system could help though especially 
segregation of duties and the existence of proper authorisation 
5 
Being aware of some of the red flags like lack of an internal audit department, management’s ability 
to override the internal control system, high turnover of senior management, lack of a code of 
conduct, and whistleblowing hotline, the existence of improper disclosure and/or improper 
authorisation,  lack of adequate segregation of duties 
3 
Applying professional scepticism and having a questioning mind 2 
Reviewing actions taken by management regarding deficiencies in internal control shown in the 
internal audit report or management report by the external auditor 
2 
Assessing management’s attitude and reaction towards identified control deficiencies and audit 
adjustments and willingness to improve processes and reporting quality 
2 
Review human resource policies and procedures especially the process of conducting background 
checks on new recruits and employees    
2 
History of management involvement in previous fraud cases or the existence of prior fraud incidents 
and evaluating how management dealt with it 
2 
Investigating the Whistle blower system Considering whistle blowing hotline for tips about 
management’s integrity 
2 
Assess conflict of interest policy and related party transactions, also we can assess disclosure policy 
and whether management conceal important information 
1 
Review previous year audit reports to determine if management had any issues with previous 
auditors to determine the degree of previous auditors’ reliance on management’s integrity 
1 
Understanding the management control environment including the HR policies and procedures, 
management philosophy and operating style and other communication tools such as whistle 
blowing systems. 
1 
Inspecting management’s disclosure in the financial statements to determine management’s 
tendency to hide important information 
1 
The existence of consistent misrepresentations of the financial statements 1 
Inspection of board of director’s minutes of meetings 1 
Communication with the previous external auditor 1 
Reviewing whistle blowers policy to determine how the complaints or tips are dealt with 1 
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Direct communications with key management personnel, interviewing different level in the 
organisation and ask the same question by different ways to determine if any of them has a tendency 
to hide important information or to falsify facts. 
1 
Reviewing actions taken by management in response to fraud 1 
Checking if there are any previous issues with predecessor auditors 1 
Discussion with the audit engagement team 1 
Evaluating management’s philosophy and operating style: the existence of unreasonable acts by 
management, assessing management’s commitment to "do the right thing, assessing management’s 
willingness to cooperate with the auditors 
1 
Discussion with employees at all levels about management’s integrity and whether they come 
across any risk factors that indicate management’s lack of integrity 
1 
Observation of management’s behaviour 1 
The existence of consistent management’s misrepresentation of the financial statements history 1 
The existence of litigations against management or the company 1 
Determine whether corrective actions were taken by management in response to internal control 
deficiencies 
1 
Understanding the nature, timing and extent of transactions with related parties 1 
 
Theme III: Assessing Opportunity to Commit Fraud  
Respondents were asked how they could assess the opportunity to commit financial reporting fraud. The 
results showed that almost all respondents (80 respondents) believed that “understanding and evaluating the 
client’s internal control system to identify weaknesses in internal controls” is the main way for assessing the 
risk of opportunity. Some of them gave examples of control weaknesses that are highly taken into 
consideration such as “lack of segregation of duties”, “concentration of power in the hand of one person”, 
“lack of proper authorisation”, and “weaknesses in the control environment”. They also emphasised on how 
important understanding and evaluating the control environment is including the organisation structure. This 
supports prior research that found weaknesses in internal control system increase the risk of opportunity to 
commit financial reporting fraud Albrecht et al., 2008, 2010; Vona, 2008; Dorminey et al., 2012; Dunn, 
1999; Dunn, 2004; Rezaee, 2005; Hasnan et al., 2008).  
Three respondents said that: 
“A major part in deciding on our audit approach is considering the company’s internal control system and whether 
it’s effectively implemented to detect and avoid fraud. This will affect our audit approach and scope significantly”.  
“Testing the operating effectiveness of anti-fraud controls” and “evaluating the entity level control environment”, 
as well as “making use of whistle blowers” to identify hidden weaknesses in the client’s internal control system 
could help in assessing existing opportunity for fraud”.  
“Opportunity for fraud mainly arises from two factors. The first and the most important factor is the lack of 
segregation of duties. For example: sales officer is the same person who also prepares purchase order and has the 
control on the credit limit of customers. The second factor is collusion between employees based on mutual 
benefits and it is normally the result of lack of segregation of duties”.  
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Other mentioned techniques for assessing the opportunity to commit financial reporting fraud include “the 
use of audit software and checklist to identify the weaknesses in a client’s internal control system”, and “the 
use of professional scepticism and observation of management and employees”. 
Theme IV: Assessing Rationalisation of Fraud 
Respondents were asked how they could assess rationalisation of fraud. The results showed some commonly 
used techniques that were mentioned seven or six times such as “understanding the business and its 
regulatory environment (mentioned 7 times)”, “discussion with the audit engagement team (mentioned 6 
times)”. Four respondents mentioned that the “existence of previous fraud incidences” and the “existence of 
unusual behaviours” could be a sign of high risk of rationalisation of fraud.  They added that in both cases, 
details about previous fraud incidents should be obtained and carefully examined, and that any unusual 
behaviour should be questioned.  
The results also showed that eight respondents said they do not assess rationalisation. This supports prior 
studies that found external auditors are giving less attention to rationalisation in fraud risk assessments 
(Higson, 2003; Albrecht et al., 2008). Two respondents stated that rationalisation is hardly assessed on its 
own but as part of management integrity and management motives. This again provides support that there 
might be a link between management integrity and rationalisation of fraud and that rationalisation should be 
assessed as part of management integrity rather than as a separate fraud factor. One of them said that:  
“Rationalisation is not specifically considered on its own as it is a part of management motives, so if motives 
exist, we would immediately increase the risk of rationalisation. Should the risk assessment process relating to 
management integrity indicate strong controls eventually this will reduce the risk of rationalisation”.  
Another respondent mentioned that consideration of rationalisation will depend on the culture in a particular 
context. He added that:  
“We generally believe that in Egypt rationalisation for fraud is embedded in the culture and this is what usually leads 
to increased corruption and fraud”.  
 
Table 7.29 summarises the techniques mentioned by respondents for assessing rationalisation of fraud along with their 
frequency of occurrence. 
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Table 7.29 Assessing Rationalisation of Fraud  
Techniques Frequency of citation 
Understanding the business and its regulatory environment 7 
Discussion with the audit engagement team   6 
The existence of unusual behaviours have to be questioned 4 
Existence of previous fraud incidences 4 
Investigating whistle blowers 3 
Observation of management and other staff’s behaviours 3 
Inquire management about previous fraud cases and how it took place, 
how it was discovered,  and what was the action taken 
3 
Understanding and testing client’s internal control system especially 
ensure segregation of duties 
2 
The use of an audit software 2 
Apply professional scepticism 1 
Having a look at the payroll expense and compare to other companies 
in the same industry 
1 
The use of analytical procedures followed by discussion of 
management in case there is an unusual transaction/account 
1 
 
Theme V: Assessing Fraud Perpetrators’ Capabilities  
The audit standards (ISA/ESA 240) do not require external auditors to assess fraud perpetrators’ capabilities 
as part assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. However the results of the current study revealed that 
fraud perpetrators’ capability have similar significance to the opportunity to commit fraud factor. External 
auditors in the current study also agreed that fraud perpetrators’ capabilities should be considered in assessing 
the risk of financial reporting fraud. Hence, the current study sought to explore how fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities could be assessed. The results revealed some that the most commonly mentioned techniques 
were “understanding and testing the client’s internal control system”, and “lack of segregation of duties or 
inadequate authorisation of transactions could be a red flags for high risk of fraud perpetrators’ capabilities 
to commit financial reporting fraud”. These two techniques were mentioned eight times by respondnets in 
the current study. 
Six respondents mentioned that “performing management inquiries” could actually help in assessing fraud 
perpetrators’ capabilities to commit financial reporting fraud. Other techniques include “assessing 
management’s integrity (mentioned 5 times)”, and “observation of capabilities of the client’s personnel 
(mentioned 4 times)”.  
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One respondent stated that the existence of a strong control environment will limit fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities to commit fraud. He then added that an assessment of a client’s internal control environment 
could help in assessing fraud perpetrators’ capabilities to commit fraud.  
Two respondents said that fraud perpetrators’ capabilities could be assessed as part of the risk of opportunity 
to commit fraud. This provides support to the previous discussion about the link between fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities and opportunity to commit fraud.  
All the techniques mentioned by external auditors in the current study were summarised in table 7.30 along 
with how many times each was mentioned.  
Table 7.30 Assessment of fraud perpetrators’ capabilities  
Techniques  Frequency of 
Citation 
Understanding and testing the client’s internal control system, lack of segregation of 
duties or inadequate authorisation of transactions could be a red flag 
8 
Performing management inquiries 6 
Assessing management’s integrity 5 
Inquiries and observation of capabilities of the client’s personnel 4 
Assessing the risk of rationalisation of fraud 3 
Observing changes in employees’ and managements’ behaviours and life style 2 
Applying professional scepticism 2 
Conducting management’s background checks 1 
Understanding the top finance management's experience and qualifications which will 
give an indication of how technically strong they are and what sort of capabilities and 
skills they have 
1 
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The Difficulty in Assessing the Fraud Factors  
The current study sought to explore respondents’ perception of the difficulty in assessing the following fraud 
factors: management motives, opportunity, rationalisation, integrity, and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities. 
Thus respondents were asked to choose the most difficult fraud factor(s) to assess. The results showed that 
58.6% of respondents (48 respondents) believed that management’s integrity and opportunity to commit 
fraud are the most difficult fraud factors to assess. This was followed by rationalisation (26.8%) and 
management motives (11%). Respondents believed that fraud perpetrators’ capabilities is the least difficult 
fraud factor to assess. To explore the reasons behind this, interviewees were asked about the difficulty in 
assessing these fraud factors and the rationale behind their answers. This is discussed in detail in chapter 
eight.  
7.6.5 The Motivations behind Management Fraud in Egypt 
The current study sought to explore external auditors’ perception of the likely motivations behind 
management fraud in Egypt. Management motives that were cited in prior literature were all compiled in a 
list of 17 management motives as mentioned in chapter four and then this list was used in the questionnaire 
for the purpose of the current study. Respondents were asked to use a 5-likert scale to indicate their degree 
of agreement/disagreement with the proposed list of motives behind management fraud. “1” on the scale 
denotes “strongly agree” that the motive is more likely in Egypt and “5” denotes “strongly disagree” that the 
motive is likely in Egypt.  
The results from table 7.31 revealed that the majority of the questionnaire respondents (63.4%, 52 
respondents) strongly agreed that the “desire for remuneration or to get a bonus” is more likely to motivate 
management in Egypt to commit financial reporting fraud. This finding supports the findings of other 
research studies that found the desire for remuneration a common motivation to commit financial reporting 
fraud in other contexts (Jones, 2011; Rezaee and Riley, 2010; Cheffins, 2009; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004; 
Chowdhury and Wang, 2009; Cheffins, 2009; Jones, 2011; Mckee and Santore, 2008; Dunn, 1999; Anderson 
and Tirrell, 2004; Chesney and Gibson-Asner, 2005; Sen, 2007; Donoher et al., 2007; Elayan and Meyer, 
2008; Cullinan et al., 2008; Robison and Santore, 2008; Albrecht et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2008; Jaenicke 
2001; Mckee and Santore, 2008;  Beasley et al., 2010; Troy et al., 2011). 
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This was followed by “the need to get or maintain finance for the business” where 36.6% of respondents (30 
respondents) strongly agreed that this is a more likely motives for management to commit financial reporting 
fraud in Egypt. The results of the current study supports the results of prior studies that found the desire to 
obtain finance could motivate management to commit financial reporting fraud (Dechow et al., 1996; Beasley 
et al., 1999; Dunn, 1999; Anderson and Tirrell, 2004; Beasley et al., 2010; Firth et al., 2011). In Egypt, 
Kamel and Elbanna (2010) found that one of the main incentives for manipulating earnings in Egypt is to 
enhance the chances of obtaining a bank loan. However, it was not clear in their paper whether management 
in Egypt was motivated to commit earnings management or financial reporting fraud. They did not also 
specify the techniques used by management to manipulate earnings as intended by their study.  
The results of the current study also support the results of prior studies that found management might commit 
financial reporting fraud to conceal company’s deteriorating financial condition (Beasley et al., 1999; 
Kapardis, 2002; Rosner, 2003; Albrecht et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2008; Hasnan et al., 2008; Beasley et al., 
2010; Firth et al., 2011). However the current study was the first study to explore what motivates 
management in Egypt to commit financial reporting fraud. The majority of prior research were conducted in 
developed countries with less evidence on the developing world 
Table 7.31 The motivations behind management fraud in Egypt 
Desire for remuneration/bonus 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
Strongly disagree 1 1.2 1.2 
Disagree 3 3.7 4.9 
Agree 26 31.7 36.6 
Strongly agree 52 63.4 100 
Total 82 100   
Need to get/maintain finance for the business 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
Strongly disagree 1 1.2 1.2 
Disagree 5 6.1 7.3 
Do not know 9 11 18.3 
Agree 37 45.1 63.4 
Strongly agree 30 36.6 100 
Total 82 100   
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Meeting or beating analysts' forecasts 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
Strongly disagree 2 2.4 2.4 
Disagree 9 11 13.4 
Do not know 12 14.6 28 
Agree 39 47.6 75.6 
Strongly agree 18 22 97.6 
  2 2.4 100 
Total 82 100   
Conceal the company's financial distress 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
Strongly disagree 1 1.2 1.2 
Disagree 5 6.1 7.3 
Do not know 10 12.2 19.5 
Agree 43 52.4 72 
Strongly agree 23 28 100 
Total 82 100  
Cover up assets misappropriated for personal use 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
Strongly disagree 1 1.2 1.2 
Disagree 15 18.3 19.5 
Do not know 15 18.3 37.8 
Agree 32 39 76.8 
Strongly agree 19 23.2 100 
Total 82 100  
Avoid de-listing from stock exchanges 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
Strongly disagree 1 1.2 1.2 
Disagree 15 18.3 19.5 
Do not know 16 19.5 39 
Agree 29 35.4 74.4 
Strongly agree 21 25.6 100 
Total 82 100  
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Personal sudden need for money 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
Strongly disagree 2 2.4 2.4 
Disagree 20 24.4 26.8 
Do not know 18 22 48.8 
Agree 32 39 87.8 
Strongly agree 10 12.2 100 
Total 82 100  
Pressure from government in state-owned firms 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
Strongly disagree 4 4.9 4.9 
Disagree 15 18.3 23.2 
Do not know 24 29.3 52.4 
Agree 28 34.1 86.6 
Strongly agree 11 13.4 100 
Total 82 100  
Pressure from owners in family businesses 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
Strongly disagree 3 3.7 3.7 
Disagree 7 8.5 12.2 
Do not know 10 12.2 24.4 
Agree 41 50 74.4 
Strongly agree 21 25.6 100 
Total 82 100  
Ego and self-esteem 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
Strongly disagree 3 3.7 3.7 
Disagree 16 19.5 23.2 
Do not know 34 41.5 64.6 
Agree 21 25.6 90.2 
Strongly agree 8 9.8 100 
Total 82 100  
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Pressure from Coercion 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
Strongly disagree 1 1.2 1.2 
Disagree 8 9.8 11 
Do not know 45 54.9 65.9 
Agree 20 24.4 90.2 
Strongly agree 7 8.5 98.8 
Total 82 100  
High level of competition in the market 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
Strongly disagree 2 2.4 2.4 
Disagree 14 17.1 19.5 
Do not know 18 22 41.5 
Agree 36 43.9 85.4 
Strongly agree 12 14.6 100 
Total 82 100  
Greed 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
Strongly disagree 1 1.2 1.2 
Disagree 10 12.2 13.4 
Do not know 32 39 52.4 
Agree 28 34.1 86.6 
Strongly agree 11 13.4 100 
Total 82 100  
Social status comparison 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
Strongly disagree 3 3.7 3.7 
Disagree 23 28 31.7 
Do not know 20 24.4 56.1 
Agree 26 31.7 87.8 
Strongly agree 10 12.2 100 
Total 82 100  
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Taking revenge 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
Strongly disagree 4 4.9 4.9 
Disagree 29 35.4 40.2 
Do not know 28 34.1 74.4 
Agree 13 15.9 90.2 
Strongly agree 8 9.8 100 
Total 82 100  
Ideology 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
Strongly disagree 4 4.9 4.9 
Disagree 25 30.5 35.4 
Do not know 31 37.8 73.2 
Agree 17 20.7 93.9 
Strongly agree 5 6.1 100 
Total 82 100  
Culture and norms 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  
Strongly disagree 5 6.1 6.1 
Disagree 24 29.3 35.4 
Do not know 21 25.6 61 
Agree 25 30.5 91.5 
Strongly agree 7 8.5 100 
Total 82 100  
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Respondents were then asked to note down any other management motives that were not mentioned in the 
list. Two respondents mentioned that “tax avoidance or tax evasion” could motivate management in Egypt 
to commit financial reporting fraud. Another participant mentioned that “a branch or subsidiary could 
manipulate the financial statements results to show high performance or the ability of the branch to continue 
in the future in case of reporting to an international holding company”.  
Other motivations include: “high expectations from press releases, board of directors, or third parties about 
the performance of the company”, “difficulty in meeting legal or contractual requirements”, “personal 
guarantee of entity debts”, “excessive pressure on management to meet financial targets”, “desire to meet 
debt covenants”, “to avoid going concern risk”, “to meet budgets”, and “to show high earnings per share”.  
Two respondents provided examples of motives that could encourage management in Egypt to manipulate 
the financial statements such as “pleasing management at headquarters to get bonuses”, “to please investors 
or owners”, or “to avoid bankruptcy”. The results of the current study supports the results of Dey et al. (2008) 
who found support that management in Egypt are motivated to overstate revenues through using income-
increasing accounting techniques to increase their bonuses and pay less tax. 
Based on the findings of the current study, the list of management motives was then reordered to show the 
most likely motivations behind management fraud in the Egyptian context. This is shown in table 32. This 
yields a list of 27 motivations behind management fraud in Egypt.  
Table 7.32 The most likely motivations behind management fraud in Egypt  
Rank 
Management’s motives 
1 
Desire to increase/get management’s remuneration 
2 Need to get/maintain finance for the business 
3 
Conceal company’s financial distress 
4 
Pressure from owner in family-owned businesses 
5 Meeting/beating analysts’ forecasts 
6 Cover up assets misappropriated for personal use 
7 Avoid delisting from stock exchanges 
8 High level of competition in the market 
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9 Personal sudden need for money 
10 Greed 
11 Pressure from government in state-owned companies 
12 Social status comparisons  
13 Culture and norms  
14 Ego and self-esteem 
15 Pressure from coercion  
16 Ideology 
17 Taking revenge  
18 Tax avoidance or tax evasion 
19 Desire to show favourable results to international holding company 
20 To meet the expectations of press releases, board of directors, or other third parties about the 
performance of the company 
21 To overcome difficulty in meeting legal or contractual requirements  
22 To cover personal guarantee of entity debts  
23 Excessive pressure from management to meet financial targets  
24 Desire to meet debt covenants 
25 To avoid going concern risk 
26 To meet budgets  
27 To show high earnings per share  
 
7.6.6 The Impact of Management Motivations on the Financial Statements  
The current study sought to explore the impact of management motivations on the financial statements. The 
questionnaire helped in exploring whether management motivations could impact the figures and disclosures 
in the financial statements. It also helped in understanding the impact of management motivations on the 
financial statements.  
The results from the questionnaire revealed that the majority of respondents (46.3%, 38 respondents) 
believed management motivations could often impact the figures in the financial statements, and 32.9% of 
respondents (27 respondents) stated that management motivations could occasionally impact the figures in 
the financial statements. 11% (9 respondents) believed that management motivations will impact the 
financial statements’ figures all the time and only 8 respondents believed it could rarely impact the financial 
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statements figures. This indicates that management motivations are more likely to impact the figures in the 
financial statements. The results are summarised in table 7.33 below.  
Table 7.33 The Extent of Impact of management motivation on financial figures 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Rarely 8 9.8 9.8 
Occasionally 27 32.9 42.7 
Often 38 46.3 89.0 
All the time 9 11.0 100.0 
Total 82 100.0  
 
As for the impact of management motivations on the disclosure in the financial statements, results from table 
7.34 show that the majority of respondents (46.3%, 38 respondents) believed that management motivations 
will often impact disclosures on the financial statements. 29.3% of respondents (24 respondents) believed 
that management motivations will occasionally impact disclosures in the financial statements, and 13.4% (11 
respondents) stated that it will impact disclosures all the time. Only 7 respondents believed that management 
motivations will rarely have an impact on disclosures in the financial statements. This indicates that 
management motivations is more likely to impact disclosures in the financial statements. 
Table 7.34 Frequency of Impact of management motivation on disclosure 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Rarely 7 8.5 8.5 
Occasionally 24 29.3 37.8 
Often 38 46.3 84.1 
All the time 11 13.4 97.6 
Do not know 2 2.4 100.0 
Total 82 100.0  
 
Respondents were then asked about how management motivations could actually impact the financial 
statements. A close examination of their responses revealed that a number of themes are common. For 
instance, the majority of respondents (80%) believed that management motivations could lead to “improper 
revenue recognition”, “concealment of liabilities and expenses”, “improper assets valuation”, and “improper 
disclosure”. Responses were then classified under each of these common themes as follows: 
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Theme I: Management motivations and improper revenue recognition: 
The results of the questionnaire in this area showed that management motivations could lead to improper 
revenue recognition. This fraud scheme is more likely to be committed through “recording fictitious 
revenues”, “overstating revenues to get finance for the business or to meet budget”, “understating revenues 
to avoid paying taxes”, “manipulations in accounting estimates such as provisions and other areas that require 
management’s judgment”, “showing unusual profits from sale of assets or investments”, “omission of 
important journal entries and transactions”, “understating the cost of goods sold”, and “harming the business 
by deliberately losing customers which will lead to losses”. 
Theme II: Management motivations and concealed liabilities and expenses: 
The results revealed that management motivations could also lead to concealed liabilities and expenses. 
These fraud schemes are more likely to be committed through “not recognising liabilities or provisions”, 
“manipulations in accrued expenses”, “overstating expenses to avoid paying taxes”, “having more than one 
book of accounts to avoid paying taxes”, “understatement of liabilities”, and “misclassification of liabilities”. 
Theme III: Management motivations and improper assets valuation: 
The results revealed that management motivations could lead to improper assets valuation through the use 
of various techniques. This includes: “improper valuation of non-current assets”, “manipulations in 
goodwill”, “capitalisation of expenses and operating losses”, “overstatement of assets”, “Misclassification 
of assets”, and “Transferring cash from business to their personal accounts”.  
Theme IV: Management motivations and improper disclosure: 
The results revealed that management motivations could also lead to improper disclosure. However 
respondents provided very few examples of the techniques that could be used to commit improper disclosure. 
This includes “hiding important information about the company’s ability to continue in the future”, “non-
disclosure of related parties transactions”, and “omission of important information and the disclosure of only 
favourable information”.  
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Two respondents stated that: 
“In Egypt we have several corporations that are reporting to head offices in Europe or US, and their senior 
management will always have the motive to overstate sales and operating results to make sure the branch in Egypt 
remains operational and at the same time to get bonuses” 
“Management might be motivated to falsify the financial statements figures and disclosure to achieve required 
targets whether required by owners, investors, or third parties or to get bonuses, and the end result would be an 
increase in the threat of bankruptcy and foreclosure” 
 
7.6.7 The Audit of Management Motivations  
The current study sought to explore how external auditors could assess the impact of management on the 
financial statements. In other words, how external auditors could audit management motivations. The results 
revealed some techniques that were mentioned three times by respondents of the current study. These 
techniques include: “the audit of significant risk accounts such as revenues, cash, and estimates and assigning 
more experienced audit staff to audit them”, “requiring management to do the necessary adjustments. If 
management refused to do the required adjustments, this needs to be mentioned in the management letter under the 
uncorrected misstatements section, or a qualified/disclaimer opinion will be issued based on materiality”, 
“understanding the entity’s control environment and risk during the planning stage”, and “increasing the 
nature and extent of audit work”.  
Three respondents mentioned that what matters is materiality or how significant is the risk of management 
motives. Two of them said that: 
 “Based on fraud assessment, if fraud risk is considered as significant risk, we assess the controls in place to 
mitigate such risk, we design detailed audit procedures to cover this risk. Based on what have been mentioned, 
we determine the nature, timing, and extent of our audit procedures for the relevant areas”. 
“It all depends on materiality. If the issue will not affect users’ decisions, we will note it down in the management 
letter, but if it is material then we might choose to either qualify the opinion or issue a disclaimer depending on 
the degree of materiality” 
Another respondent stated that the audit of management motivations will depend on the type of motive and 
the related significant risk. She mentioned that: 
“This will depend on the motive and the related significant risk, so if the risk is revenue recognition then the action 
would be a cut off test at year end and inspecting subsequent period sales returns as well as inspecting sales 
transactions made to related parties” 
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One respondent added that the use of professional scepticism requires external auditors to develop their own 
expectations/assumptions and to compare it to management expectations/assumptions. He argued that:  
 “Auditors need to apply professional scepticism, develop their own expectations and compare it to management’s 
expectations, review the assumptions used by management, and assess whether the assessment of the previous 
years’ estimates agree with the actual figures or not” 
Another respondent argued that the assessment of material misstatement whether due to error or fraud is an 
ongoing process and that it should be considered in every phase of the audit. He mentioned that: 
“The auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the 
financial statements are free from material misstatements whether caused by error or fraud. As part of audit 
planning, the auditor must specifically assess the risk of material misstatement of the financial statements due 
to fraud and should consider this assessment in designing the audit procedures to be performed. This fraud risk 
assessment is an ongoing process and should be considered in every phase of the audit” 
 Two more respondents stated that it is important to use unpredictable audit procedures to deal with 
management motives. One of them comment that: 
 “We usually set unpredictable procedures as part of audit planning that should then be followed throughout the 
audit. This might include: testing areas that are not usually tested, physical counts of locations that are not 
normally taken into account, increasing the sample taken from a certain period, and changing the extent of tests 
to be performed” 
 
Table 7.35 The Audit of Management Motivations  
Techniques Frequency of 
Citation 
The audit of significant accounts such as revenues, cash, and estimates, and assigning more 
experienced audit staff to audit such significant accounts 
3 
Requiring management to do the necessary adjustments. If management refused to do the required 
adjustments, this needs to be mentioned in the management letter under the uncorrected 
misstatements section, or a qualified/disclaimer opinion will be issued based on materiality 
3 
Understand the entity’s control environment and risks during the planning stage 3 
Increase the nature and extent of audit work 3 
Paying more attention to capitalised assets 2 
Performing analytical procedures 2 
Applying professional scepticism 2 
Inquiries of the board of directors and those charged with governance 2 
Assessment of fraud controls and clients internal control system especially the risk of 
management’s override of internal control 
2 
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Give more attention to fraud risk factors 2 
Discussion with management and requiring adjusting entries if needed 2 
It all depends on materiality. If the issue will not affect users’ decisions, note it down in the 
management letter, but if it is material then choose to either qualify the opinion or issue a disclaimer 
depending on the degree of materiality 
2 
Set unpredictable procedures as part of audit planning that should then be followed throughout the 
audit. This might include: testing areas that are not usually tested, physical counts of locations that 
are not normally taken into account, increasing the sample taken from a certain period, and 
changing the extent of tests to be performed 
2 
More attention should be given to the risk of management’s override of internal controls and 
revenue recognition. This could be done through understanding of the business, using analytical 
procedures and paying more attention to the fraud risk factors mentioned in ISA 240. 
2 
This will depend on the motive and the related significant risk. E.g. if the risk is revenue recognition 
then the action would be a cut off test at year end and inspecting subsequent period sales returns as 
well as inspecting sales transactions made to related parties 
1 
Auditors need to apply professional scepticism, develop their own expectations and compare it to 
management’s expectations, review the assumptions used by management, and assess whether the 
assessment of the previous years’ estimates agree with the actual figures or not 
1 
Based on fraud assessment, if fraud risk is considered as significant risk, assess the controls in place 
to mitigate such risk, design detailed audit procedures to cover this risk, and then determine the 
nature, timing, and extent of our audit procedures for the relevant areas 
1 
In case fraud risk is high, rely heavily on substantive tests instead of control tests and usually 
increase the sample size. 
1 
Pay more attention to the classifications of the assets and liabilities accounts as well as disclosures 1 
Based on risk assessment, the audit plan is tailored to focus on high risk areas that could 
significantly affect the financial statements 
1 
Report the issue to the  audit committee 1 
Consider the entity’s position in the market 1 
Understand management’s compensation system to understand the extent of pressure on 
management to achieve targets 
1 
Perform journal entry testing  1 
Inquiries of related parties 1 
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7.7 Summary of Chapter Seven 
This chapter has shown how the data collected via the questionnaire was analysed and interpreted to answer 
some of the research questions in the current study. All the questionnaire data was categorical in nature and 
both the nominal and ordinal scales were used. The results showed the measurement scales used are reliable. 
The questionnaire included both quantitative and qualitative data that required different statistical analysis 
techniques.  Numerical data was analysed using SPSS. Non-parametric statistics were used including the use 
of frequencies, cross tabs, Fisher’s exact test, Phi test, and Spearman’s correlation. The Questionnaire also 
included open-ended questions that was analysed using manual content analysis.  
The results of the current study revealed that external auditors perceive management motivations and 
management integrity as the most significant fraud factors in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud.  
This is followed by opportunity to commit fraud. Findings also revealed that fraud perpetrators’ capabilities 
are equally significant to the opportunity to commit fraud and that rationalisation of fraud should be assessed 
as part of management integrity rather than a separate factor. The questionnaire results showed there is a 
relationship between audit experience and external auditors’ appreciation of the significance of management 
motivations in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. However the relationship seems weak. The type 
of audit office was found to have a strong impact on external auditors’ perception of the significance of 
management motives in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. Big 4 audit firms and international 
audit firms other than the Big 4 tend to regard management motives as a key factor in assessing financial 
reporting fraud more than the other types of audit firms. 
The current study sought to explore how external auditors could assess the different fraud factors. Thus, the 
current study proposed guides to help external auditors assess management motives, opportunity to commit 
fraud, management integrity, rationalisation of fraud, and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities. The guides are 
based on insights from the audit profession in Egypt. The results showed that rationalisation tend to be 
ignored by external auditors in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. Respondents also viewed the 
assessment of management integrity and opportunity to commit fraud the most difficult factors to assess 
while management motives and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities are the least difficult factors to assess.  
The questionnaire results revealed that external auditors in Egypt are aware of and are complying with the 
requirements of ISA240/ESA240 with regards to financial reporting fraud. However more attention is given 
to management motives and opportunity more than management integrity and rationalisation. The results 
also showed that financial reporting fraud is more likely to be committed by management in Egypt and seems 
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to be common. The examples of the alleged fraud cases shared by respondents in the current study showed 
that improper revenue recognition and improper assets valuation are the most common types of financial 
reporting fraud in Egypt. The questionnaire results revealed that management in Egypt are more likely to be 
motivated to commit financial reporting fraud to get remuneration/bonuses, to get finance for the business, 
to conceal Company’s financial distress, to please owners in family-owned businesses, and/or to meet/beat 
analysts’ forecasts. This is not different from management motivations in other contexts including developed 
countries. A list of 27 motives behind management fraud in Egypt was compiled by the current study. The 
list was based on findings from prior literature and the findings of the questionnaire in the current study.  
The majority of questionnaire respondents believed that management motivations could either often impact 
or occasionally impact both the figures and disclosures in the financial statements. The majority of 
respondents also believed that management motivations could lead to “improper revenue recognition”, 
“concealment of liabilities and expenses”, “improper assets valuation”, and “improper disclosure. The 
current study provides a guide for external auditors on how to audit management motivations and its impact 
on the financial statements.  
Chapter Eight shows how the data from the interviews were analysed and interpreted to address the current 
research issues.   
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Chapter Eight: 
Interview Data Analysis and Discussion of the Results  
 
8.1 Introduction 
In order to address all the research questions in the current study, data was collected by means of an online 
questionnaire and semi-structured interviews as mentioned in chapters six and seven. Data collected via the 
interviews were meant to complement and confirm the questionnaire results. The interviews confirmed the 
questionnaire results in areas such as external auditors’ compliance with the audit standards, financial 
reporting fraud in Egypt, the significance of the various fraud factors, and the impact of management 
motivations on the financial statements. The interviews helped to investigate some areas in more depth such 
as the assessment of the various fraud factors, the techniques used by external auditors in the current study 
to detect financial reporting fraud in Egypt, the motivations behind management fraud, and the audit of 
management motivations. The interviews helped in exploring areas that were not explored by the 
questionnaire such as the use and limitations of ISA/ESA 240, the likelihood, and types of financial reporting 
fraud committed in Egypt, and the challenges faced by external auditors in Egypt including some of the 
governance issues that might impact audit quality and the likelihood of detecting financial reporting fraud in 
the country. This chapter thus aims at explaining and describing how the data from the interviews were 
analysed and interpreted and how the results were discussed.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 8.2 describes interviewees’ demographic details. 
Section 8.3 explains and describes the interview mode, duration, and how the data from the interviews were 
analysed. Section 8.4 explains and describes how the interview data helped in complementing and confirming 
the results of the results of the questionnaire in order to depict a complete picture of the current research 
issues. Section 8.5 is a summary of chapter eight. 
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8.2 Demographic Details of Interviewees  
The interviewees in the current study were asked about their job title, age, audit experience, type of audit 
office, professional qualifications, and the place of their professional audit training. The results are discussed 
in detail in this section.  
Interviewees’ Gender and Job Titles  
Out of the 30 interviewees, 28 were males and 2 were females. 36.7% (11 interviewees) were senior auditors, 
20% (6 interviewees) were audit supervisors, 16.7% (5 interviewees) were audit managers, 13.3% (4 
interviewees) were auditors, 10% (3 interviewees) were audit partners, and only one was a senior audit 
partner as shown in table 8.1.  
Table 8.1 Interviewees’ job title 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Auditor 4 13.3 13.3 
Senior auditor 11 36.7 50.0 
Audit supervisor 6 20.0 70.0 
Audit manager 5 16.7 86.7 
Audit Partner 3 10.0 96.7 
Senior audit partner 1 3.3 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
 
Interviewees’ Ages 
The majority of interviewees (63.3%, 19 interviewees) were 20-30 years old, 20% (6 interviewees) were 31-
40 years old, 14.4% (4 interviewees) were 41-50 years old, and only one was above 50 years old as shown 
in table 8.2. 
Table 8.2 Interviewees’ Age 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 20-30 years old 19 63.3 63.3 
31-40 years old 6 20.0 83.3 
41-50 years old 4 13.3 96.7 
Above 50 years old 1 3.3 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
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Type of Audit Firm 
 
Interviewees were asked about the type of their audit firms. The results showed that 80% of interviewees (24 
interviewees) work for Big 4 audit firms, 10% (3 interviewees) work for other international audit firms, two 
interviewees work for medium size national audit firms in Egypt, and only one works for a small national 
audit firm. The results were summarised in table 8.3. 
 
Table 8.3 Interviewees’ type of audit firm 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Big 4 24 80.0 80.0 
Other International audit 
firms 
3 10.0 90.0 
Small national audit firm 1 3.3 93.3 
Medium size national 
audit firm 
2 6.7 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
 
Interviewees’ Audit Experience and Qualifications  
The audit experience of interviewees ranged from 2 years to above 10 years. However the majority of 
interviewees (33.3%, 10 interviewees) have either 2-4 years of audit experience, or 5-7 years of audit 
experience (30%, 9 interviewees) as shown in table 8.4 below. The majority of interviewees (20 
interviewees) have CPA, followed by qualifications from the ESAA (10 interviewees), and ACCA (6 
interviewees). Three interviewees each have other professional qualifications like Certified International 
Management Accountant (CIMA), Certified Internal Auditor (CIA), and Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE). 
Two interviewees were asked why CPA seems to be the most common audit professional qualification in 
Egypt and they stated that: 
“CPA is more famous in Egypt and it is easier to pass given it does not require a lot of writing and takes much less 
time. ACCA takes almost 5 years while CPA could take 2 to 3 years. CPA offices and representatives are more 
accessible in Egypt than ACCA representatives” 
“ACCA is very time consuming and then at the end there are no big difference in the audit standards of 
US and the International Auditing Standards”.  
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Table 8.4 Interviewees’ audit experience 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 2-4 years 10 33.3 6.7 
5-7 years 9 30.0 40.0 
8-10 years 6 20.0 70.0 
above 10 years 5 16.6 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
 
Place of Professional Audit Training  
Interviewees were asked about the place of their professional audit training. Table 
8.5 below showed that all interviewees initially received their professional audit 
training in Egypt but some of them also received their training in different 
countries in the Middle East as well as in the USA, UK, Gulf Areas, Europe, and 
Asia. 
 
Table 8.5 Interviewee place of professional audit training 
 
Place of Professional Audit Training Number of Interviewees 
Egypt 30 
Dubai 8 
USA 3 
Saudi Arabia 2 
Qatar 2 
Thailand 1 
UK 1 
Germany 1 
Portugal 1 
Bahrain 1 
Kuwait 1 
Lebanon 1 
Doha 1 
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8.3 Interview Mode, Duration, and Data Analysis  
Interview Mode and Duration 
The semi-structured interviews were conducted either via Skype or Viber. The results from table 8.6 showed 
that 53.4% of the interviews (16 interviews) were conducted via Viber and 46.6% of interviews (14 
interviews) were conducted via Skype. All interviewees agreed to have the interview tape-recorded except 
for one interviewee who did not feel comfortable with that. However in all cases notes were taken during the 
interviewees and were then sent back to interviewees via email to ensure reliability and to build credibility. 
Table 8.6 Interview Mode  
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Skype interview 14 46.6 46.6 
Viber interview 16 53.4 53.4 
   100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
 
Some interviews took more than an hour (23 interviews), six took an hour, and one lasted for about two hours 
as shown in the pie chart below.  
Figure 8.1 – Pie chart for interview duration 
 
 
 
215 
 
Analysis of Interview Data  
Qualitative data from the interviews are descriptive in nature but some of it was generated through discrete 
qualitative categories such as questions related to interviewees’ audit experience, job title, professional 
qualifications and the location of their professional audit training. The interviews included both open-ended 
and two closed-ended questions such as questions 5 and 6 related to the demographic details of interviews. 
Open-ended questions related to interviewees’ demographic details were first analysed through content 
analysis (i.e. common themes were placed in categories), were then coded, and inputted into SPSS for 
analysis.  
 
All the other open-ended questions were analysed using conventional content analysis and/or summative 
content analysis via NVivo. The use of NVivo helped in word counts such as in the case of the techniques 
suggested by interviewees to assess the various fraud factors. NVivo in this case helped in counting the 
number of times similar techniques were mentioned by different interviewees. In order to use NVivo, all 
responses were first saved in a word document on the computer, a project was created in NVivo to save the 
data on, and the word document was transferred to a rich text file which was then imported on NVivo to use 
in the analysis. Word documents have to be transferred into rick text computer files before use on NVivo as 
stated by Richards (1999). Different parts of the document were then coded at nodes to facilitate the word 
counts. A node is a place in an NVivo project where ideas and coding could be kept but coding ideas is not 
necessary for ideas to be saved (Richards 1999). Different nodes were created on NVivo for instance nodes 
for “assessment of motives to commit fraud”, “assessment of opportunity to commit fraud”, “assessment of 
rationalisation of fraud”, “assessment of management integrity”, “assessment of fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities”, and “the audit of management motivations”. Coding nodes was not a requirement for running 
the word counts to identify the number of times similar techniques were mentioned by different interviewees. 
Nodes were created on NVivo by dragging and dropping selected text to a node that was then given a name 
in-vivo.  
 
Some themes were identified and then each was given a code and was inputted into SPSS for analysis. For 
instance questions related to “whether financial reporting fraud is common in Egypt”, “the types of financial 
reporting fraud committed in Egypt”, “the usefulness of ISA 240”, “the significance of the various fraud 
factors”, and “the difficulty in assessing the various fraud factors”. The code book for these themes is 
available in appendix A2.  
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8.4 Data Analysis and Discussion of the Results 
 
The data collected via the interviews helped in complementing and confirming the results of the 
questionnaire. In particular, the interviews confirmed the questionnaire results in areas such as external 
auditors’ compliance with the audit standards, financial reporting fraud in Egypt, the significance of the 
various fraud factors, and the impact of management motivations on the financial statements. The interviews 
helped to investigate some areas in more depth such as the assessment of the various fraud factors, the 
techniques used by external auditors in the current study to detect financial reporting fraud in Egypt, the 
motivations behind management fraud, and the audit of management motivations. The interviews helped in 
exploring areas that were not explored by the questionnaire such as the use and limitations of ISA/ESA 240, 
the likelihood, and types of financial reporting fraud committed in Egypt, and the challenges faced by 
external auditors in Egypt including some of the governance issues that might impact audit quality and the 
likelihood of detecting financial reporting fraud in the country. This is discussed in detail in this section.  
8.4.1 Compliance of External Auditors with ISA/ESA 240 
ISA/ESA 240 require external auditors to consider the three fraud triangle factors and management integrity 
in their fraud risk assessments as mentioned in chapter seven. The interviewees in the current study were 
thus asked to state which fraud factors are actually considered in their assessment of financial reporting fraud. 
The results revealed that 63% of interviewees (19 interviewees) mentioned that rationalisation is not 
assessed. This indicates that rationalisation is less likely to be assessed by external auditors as part of 
assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. This finding confirms the results of the questionnaire that 
revealed rationalisation of fraud is the least factor to be considered by external auditors in assessing the risk 
of financial reporting fraud. 
 
The results from the interviews also revealed that management integrity seems less likely to be considered 
by external auditors in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud where 36% of interviewees (11 
interviewees) mentioned that management integrity is not assessed. Two interviewees mentioned that 
management integrity is only assessed at the planning stage and not during the audit. One interviewee added 
that in Egypt it is difficult to report about management integrity because of the lack of an effective audit 
regulatory body. He added that:  
 
“Lack of a regulatory body that deals with ethical issues in Egypt. Also auditors’ integrity in some small audit 
firms in Egypt is questionable. All this makes reporting about management integrity very difficult given the 
high competition in the audit market”.  
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The results revealed that 23% of interviewees (7 interviewees) said they do not assess management motives 
and 10% (3 interviewees) said opportunity is not assessed. This again confirms the results of the 
questionnaire that revealed there is a lack of consistency among external auditors in complying with the 
requirements of the audit standards with regards to fraud risk assessments. The results of the questionnaire 
also revealed that external auditors in the current study seem to give more attention to management motives 
and opportunity to commit fraud rather than management integrity and the rationale for fraud. This was clear 
from the findings of the interviews that showed not all external auditors consider the fraud factors in assessing 
the risk of financial reporting fraud as required by the standards. Some external auditors are also being 
selective in their consideration of the three fraud triangle factors and management integrity in the assessment 
of the risk of financial reporting fraud.  However, management integrity and rationalisation of fraud are more 
likely to be overlooked in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. This finding also confirms the results 
of Hassink et al. (2010) who found that there are great differences among audit firms regarding compliance 
with the relevant auditing standards in relation to fraud risk assessments.  
 
8.4.2 The Usefulness and Limitations of ISA/ESA 240 
The current study sought to explore whether external auditors in the current study believe ISA/ESA 240 have 
actually helped them to assess and respond to the risk of financial reporting fraud. The current study also 
explored the limitations in the audit standards. This research issue was only explored via the interviews in 
the current study.  
 
The results from table 8.7 showed that 60% of interviewees (18 interviewees) believed that ISA/ESA 240 
are useful in helping external auditors assess the risk of financial reporting fraud, 20% of interviewees (6 
interviewees) believed ISA/ESA 240 are very useful and another 20% of interviewees (6 interviewees) said 
ISA/ESA 240 are not useful.  
 
Table 8.7 Usefulness of ISA240 
 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Not useful 6 20.0 20.0 
Useful 18 60.0 80.0 
Very Useful 6 20.0 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
 
 
218 
 
Interviewees stated that ISA/ESA 240 have helped them to understand their responsibility for fraud detection 
which in turn protects the external auditors from being liable in case fraud was undetected in an audited 
client’s company. They also said the standards helped them to understand the nature of clients industry, 
planning for the audit, and discussion with the audit team about fraud related matters and the susceptibility 
of clients to fraud. They added that the standard explained the meaning and nature of fraud, the meaning of 
fraud risk factors, the importance of considering the fraud triangle factors and management’s override of 
internal controls, and the meaning and importance of professional scepticism. However they all believed that 
ISA/ESA 240 alone cannot be used as a tool for assessing or detecting financial reporting fraud and that audit 
firms normally prepare their own practical guidance and checklists to assess fraud risks.  
 
Interviewees believed that the limitations of ISA/ESA 240 are that they lack important details such as how 
the different types of fraud are committed and what audit procedures the external auditors need to follow in 
each case, lack practical examples that might help in properly assessing and responding to fraud risks 
including the three fraud triangle factors and management integrity, lack examples of management’s inquiry 
about fraud related matters that could help external auditors to be more sceptical, lack of fraud-related audit 
procedures, lack guidance on how to assess motivations and how to collect evidence about the intent of 
management to commit fraud, and lack guidance on collusion which is very common in most fraud cases. 
Other interviewees argued that the audit standards are very limited because they are  sometimes very vague 
or complicated to follow because of lack of audit procedures in certain areas such as how could external 
auditors assess management’s override of internal controls and how to document the discussion with the 
team about client’s susceptibility to fraud. Other said the standards are generic and offer very general 
guidelines, are not tailored to specific industry or client’s business, show what the auditors should do to 
assess fraud risks but does not show how they could do this, and are rather theoretical guides than practical 
guides. Some of their comments are: 
 “ISA 240 is useful however, the standard alone cannot be used for fraud risk assessment because it lacks practical 
guidance and audit procedures that would help auditors comply with the requirements of the standards in practice. 
Detailed explanation of the requirements of the standards is also required” 
 
 “ISA 240 is useful in understanding the different risks associated with the financial statements and in knowing 
about management override of controls and the importance of management’s integrity but it is just a guideline 
that lacks practical applications and examples. It shows what the auditors should do to assess fraud risks but does 
not show how” 
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Four interviewees stated that audit firms should provide audit staff with guidance that offers practical 
interpretation of ISA 240 and its requirements. They also added that understanding and applying the standard 
requires enough years of audit experience, proper fraud training and skills, and the existence of an effective 
audit regulatory body that ensures consistency in complying with the standard. Two of them said: 
“ISA 240 is very useful in helping external auditors assess the risk of financial reporting fraud however it is 
quite important for every audit companies to provide its audit staff with a guide that offers practical interpretation 
of the standard and its requirements. Understanding and applying the requirements of the standard requires 
enough years of audit experience because what matters in assessing fraud risks is how sceptical the auditor is or 
in other words the quality of questions asked in case of management inquiry” 
 
“The application of the standard requires the existence of an effective audit regulatory body to ensure 
consistency in complying with the standards which is currently lacking in Egypt. Understanding the 
requirements of the standards requires proper training, skills, and experience. Sometimes due to time and cost 
constraints, auditors might not be able to fully comply with the requirements of the standards” 
 
Three interviewees mentioned that they depend on the guidelines prepared by their companies to assess the 
risk of fraud rather than depending on the standard and that fraud risk assessment is not really a priority for 
the audit in Egypt. They stated that:  
“Yes ISA 240 is useful but it is not quite applied in Egypt. We are still distant from proper fraud risk assessment 
and detection. We only refer to the requirements of the international standards in our documentation”    
 “The standard is very useful in explaining the meaning and importance of professional scepticism which is an 
important skill for any auditors. However, because fraud detection and fraud risk assessment is not the main 
concern of the audit profession in Egypt, the existence of such standard does not have an impact on the quality 
of the audit performed by his company. There is no audit manual that helps or requires fraud risk assessment as 
part of the audit in my company. However, the focus is more onto control risks”         
 “ISA 240 is very useful but not fully complied with in Egypt because compliance with ISA 240 requires also 
companies in Egypt with strong and effective internal control systems. Ineffective or weak internal control 
systems are very common in companies in Egypt”          
 
Two other interviewees stated that the requirements of the ISA 240 is embedded in a software that they use 
to assess and respond to fraud risks but they have never actually referred to the standard. Another interviewee 
stated that fraud risk assessment is the responsibility of more senior audit staff such as the senior audit 
manager and in some cases the audit partner. Two more interviewees added that the quality of fraud risk 
assessment will depend on the skills that an auditor has and the amount of time and resources allocated for 
the audit.  
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They argued that: 
 “In my opinion, ISA 240 represents merely guidelines, useful but in the right hands. Because the quality of risk 
assessment process depends on how professional the auditor is” 
“ISA 240 is useful in explaining the responsibility of external auditors for fraud which protects external auditors 
in terms of legal liability.   It also includes examples of the different fraud risk factors and high risk accounts such 
as revenue. However generally full compliance with ISAs in Egypt is not guaranteed because of work load, and 
shortage of staff sometimes” 
 
8.4.3 Financial Reporting Fraud in Egypt  
The current study sought to explore the nature and likelihood of financial reporting fraud in Egypt. The 
interviews complemented and confirmed the results of the questionnaire in this area. The interviews helped 
in exploring alleged financial reporting fraud cases in Egypt in more depth. The interview data thus provided 
rich details about this area. The interviews also helped in exploring new areas that were not explored by the 
questionnaire such as the nature, likelihood, and types of financial reporting fraud committed in Egypt. This 
is discussed in detail in this section.  
 
How Common Is Financial Reporting Fraud in Egypt? 
Interviewees were asked about their perception of how common is financial reporting fraud in Egypt. This 
is a new area that has not been explored by the questionnaire in the current study. The results from table 8.8 
showed that the majority of interviewees believed financial reporting fraud is either common (36.7%, 11 
interviewees) or very common (33.3%, 10 interviewees) in Egypt. Only 30% of interviewees (10 
interviewees) believed financial reporting fraud is not common in Egypt.  
Table 8.8 Likelihood of financial reporting fraud in Egypt 
 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Common 11 36.7 36.7 
Very Common 10 33.3 70.0 
Not Common 9 30.0 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
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Four interviewees stated that financial reporting fraud is common but unlikely to be reported by external 
auditors in Egypt. Another interviewee said that financial reporting fraud is common in Egypt because of the 
fear to lose the job, high competition in the market place, and the unemployment problem in Egypt that 
makes it very difficult to get another job easily. Three interviewees mentioned that financial reporting fraud 
is more common in small companies and relatively rare in joint stock and large companies or in companies 
audited by any of the Big 4 audit firms. Their comments were: 
 
 “Sometimes external auditors offer recommendations to management assuming fraud is an error rather than 
reporting it to those charged with governance or withdrawing from the engagement”.  
 
“Financial reporting fraud is somehow common in companies where management motivation to commit 
financial reporting fraud is high such as in companies where pressure is high from shareholders to achieve high 
profits”.  
 
 “Financial reporting fraud is very common in non-listed companies more than listed companies that are subject 
to the supervision of the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority”.  
 
 
More Likely Types of Financial Reporting Fraud in Egypt 
 
Interviewees were asked about the most common types of financial reporting fraud in Egypt. This is an open-
ended question and thus content analysis was used to analyse the responses of the interviewees. Nvivo was 
used to conduct summative content analysis or word counting. Conventional content analysis was used to 
identify common themes related to how financial reporting fraud is committed.  
 
The results interviews indicate that “improper revenue recognition and timing differences” is the most 
common type of financial reporting fraud in Egypt where this was mentioned 27 times by interviewees in 
the current study. This was followed by “improper assets valuation” where this was mentioned 19 times by 
interviewees. “Concealed expenses” was mentioned 9 times, “improper disclosure” was mentioned 8 times 
and “concealed liabilities” was mentioned 6 times.  
Going through the data, four common themes were identified. These themes are related to how financial 
reporting fraud was committed. For instance in theme I,  interviewees stated that “improper assets valuation” 
is more likely to be committed through manipulations in the investment account especially through 
investment available for sale, interest capitalisation, capitalising other expenses, overstatement of inventory 
(mentioned 4 times), and misclassifications of assets.  
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In theme II, interviewees mentioned that “improper revenue recognition” is more likely to be committed 
through deferred revenues, recording premature revenues, overstating revenues to get remuneration or 
bonuses , understating revenues to avoid paying taxes (mentioned 9 times), manipulations in commission 
revenue, estimates, accruals, allowances for doubtful accounts (mentioned 3 times), recording fictitious 
revenues, and manipulations in accounts receivable or equity to get loans from banks (mentioned 4 times).  
 
Theme III was about improper disclosure. Interviewees believed that “improper disclosure” is more likely to 
be committed by not disclosing related party transactions, sources of funds, and directors’ remuneration. 
Theme IV was related to concealed expenses and liabilities. The results revealed that“concealed expenses” 
are more likely to be committed by not recording expenses while “concealed liabilities” are committed by 
manipulating tax provisions or tax liabilities, not recording liabilities, and misclassification of loans.  
 
Three interviewees mentioned that financial reporting fraud is more likely to take place in construction 
companies, family-owned businesses, and companies preparing consolidated financial statements. One 
interviewee added that: 
 “In listed companies it is more likely to find cases of overstated revenues, inflated stock prices, improper assets 
valuation, concealed liabilities and expenses. While in small companies and limited liability companies 
understatement of revenues is common to avoid taxes”.  
 
Alleged Financial Reporting Fraud Cases in Egypt 
The interviews helped in exploring alleged financial reporting fraud cases in more depth, especially with 
regards to the techniques used by external auditors in the current study to detect financial reporting fraud. 
The interviewees were thus asked whether they discovered financial reporting fraud cases where 
management was involved. The results revealed that 73.3% of interviewees (22 respondents) found financial 
reporting fraud cases where management was involved. This confirms the results of the questionnaire that 
also indicated that financial reporting fraud committed by management in Egypt seems to be common.  
 
Interviewees were then asked to report some details about these fraud cases such as the type(s) of financial 
reporting fraud committed in each case, how each was discovered by external auditors, and what actions 
were taken in each case. The responses of interviewees were summarised in table 8.9. 
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Table 8.9 Examples of Alleged Financial Reporting Fraud Cases in Egypt 
Type of 
Financial 
Reporting Fraud 
Technique or 
methods used 
Detection methods Actions taken by external auditors 
Improper assets 
valuation 
Inventory 
overstatement 
(mentioned 4 times) 
 Inventory count 
 Recalculating 
cost of raw 
materials used in 
production 
 Analytical 
procedures 
(comparison of 
gross margin in 
the current year 
with that of 
previous years),  
 Checking prices 
of inventory 
with suppliers 
  Inquiry of CEO 
 Management disagreed to do 
the required adjustments and 
auditor withdrew from the 
engagement  
 The issue was reported to the 
board of directors and they 
were advised to contact a legal 
advisor because of the 
suspected fraud case. A 
lawsuit was filed against the 
colluding parties and they 
were fired and prosecuted. 
This was also reported to 
shareholders in the audit report  
 
 In another case management 
was required to prepare an 
adjusting entry and 
management was cooperative 
so no further actions were 
taken  
 
  Overstatement 
of fixed assets 
 unrecorded 
investments 
 Inquiry of 
operations 
manager 
 Confirmation 
with banks 
 Case was reported to the board 
of directors and audit partner 
but no further actions were 
taken because the amount was 
immaterial  
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 Tips from an 
employee of the 
company 
  Capitalising 
borrowing 
costs for a 
work-in-
process 
project 
 Reviewing the 
work-in-
progress account 
 Inquiry of 
management  
 The matter was raised to the 
audit partner and top 
management. All required 
modifications were made so no 
further actions were taken  
  Using low 
depreciation 
rates to record 
less 
depreciation 
expenses  
 Reviewing the 
company’s 
accounting 
policy for 
depreciation 
 The matter was raised to the 
audit partner because the 
company refused to do the 
required modifications. The 
auditor who discovered the 
fraud was removed from the 
engagement and a clean report 
was issued  
  Capitalising 
expenses and 
manipulations 
in some 
adjusting 
entries  
 Inquiry of 
management  
 A qualified opinion was issued 
and then the audit firm 
withdrew from the 
engagement  
  Overstatement 
of fixed assets  
 Inquiry of 
management and 
physical 
examination  
Management was challenged, an 
adjusting entry was recommended but 
the case was classified as lack of 
knowledge rather than fraud. an 
unqualified report with an explanatory 
paragraph was issued and no further 
actions were taken  
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Improper revenue 
recognition  
 Overstatement 
of revenues  
 Paying attention 
to red flags like 
low moving 
accounts 
receivable  
 inquiry of 
management  
 The matter was raised to the 
board of directors who agreed 
to do the required adjustments 
and both the CEO and CFO of 
the company were dismissed  
  Manipulate 
estimates  
 Documentation 
 analytical 
procedures  
 Auditor withdrew from the 
engagement because 
management and board of 
directors refused to do the 
required modifications  
 
 In another case, the issue was 
raised with audit partner and 
no action was taken apart from 
recommending management to 
set the right reserve for 
doubtful accounts  
  Understateme
nt of revenues 
 Understanding 
the business and 
its industry  
  Auditing the 
revenue cycle  
 Matter was raised to the board 
of directors and adjustments 
were made but no further 
actions were taken  
  Recording 
revenues from 
last year 
 Cut off tests   An adjusting entry was 
required and management was 
cooperative so no further 
actions were taken   
  Recording 
fictitious 
discounts on 
purchases  
 Reviewing 
journal entries 
related to 
purchases. 
 Issue was raised with audit 
partner, an adjusting entry was 
required and management 
agreed to do the required 
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 Documentation 
revealed 
important details 
were missing 
such as the date 
of the 
transaction  
adjustment so no further 
actions were taken  
  Overstatement 
of 
commission 
revenue  
 Understanding 
the business and 
the nature of its 
industry 
revealed that the 
company was 
overstating 
commission 
revenue. 
 Contracts were 
reviewed to 
reveal the 
overstatement of 
revenues.  
 Matter was raised with board 
of directors and required 
adjustments were made  
  Creating 
fictitious sales  
 Understanding 
the business and 
its industry 
 Reviewing sales 
contracts. 
 Missing proof of 
actual sale  
 The use of 
analytical 
procedures 
(mainly 
 A qualifying report was issued 
and the matter was raised to 
the minister of petroleum at 
this time but no actions were 
taken 
 The external auditor could not 
collect enough evidence to 
support the case and no action 
was taken  
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comparing 
profits in the 
current year with 
that of previous 
years) 
 Auditing the 
revenue cycle. 
 
 Discussion with 
the company’s 
sales 
representatives 
 
 Inquiry of 
management  
  Overstating 
accounts 
receivable  
 Using 
professional 
scepticism 
  External 
confirmation 
 Inquiry of 
accounts 
receivable 
accountant 
 The matter was raised to the 
board of directors and an 
adjusting entry was required. 
The auditor could not collect 
enough evidence to support the 
case and thus a disclaimer was 
issued 
  Not recording 
expenses to 
overstate 
revenues  
 Analytical 
procedures  
  Management 
inquiry  
 The auditor required adjusting 
entries to reflect the true 
amount of expenses. It was 
difficult for the auditor to 
prove intent in this case  
Concealed 
liabilities  
 Misclassific-
ation of 
liabilities 
from short 
 Reviewing loans 
and bank debt 
covenant 
 A reclassification entry was 
required and management was 
cooperative so no further 
actions were taken 
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term to long 
term to meet 
bank debt 
covenants  
agreements and 
terms of contract 
  Manipulations 
in contingent 
liabilities and 
its allowance 
by colluding 
with the 
company’s 
lawyer and 
management 
mentioned 
there are no 
lawsuits 
against the 
company  
 Auditor found 
paid lawyer’s 
fees in the 
company’s 
records that 
indicated the 
existence of 
lawsuits against 
the company 
 Auditor required confirmation 
from the lawyer who refused 
to write a confirmation that the 
company has no contingent 
liability because of a lawsuit. 
The matter was raised to the 
audit partner and a qualified 
opinion was issued 
  Misclassificati
ons of loans 
from short 
term to long 
term and 
loans 
instalments 
were 
underpaid  
 Reviewing loan 
contract terms 
and the liability 
account  
 Inquiry of management and 
adjusting entries were 
required. Management refused 
to do the required 
modifications and the matter 
was raised to the audit partner. 
A qualified opinion was issued  
  Not recording 
tax liability 
and tax 
expenses  
 Reviewing tax 
regulations  
 Comparing the 
recorded amount 
of tax liability 
 Matter was raised to the audit 
manager who then referred the 
matter to board of directors 
and an adjusting entry was 
required. The board of 
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on the balance 
sheet and the tax 
expense account 
on the income 
statement  
directors refused to prepare the 
adjusting entry and the audit 
manager was forced to 
increase the materiality 
threshold and a clean report 
was issued  
Concealed 
expenses  
 Overstating 
expenses to 
avoid paying 
taxes by 
creating a 
shell company 
scheme to 
overcharge 
the company  
 Documentation 
 Confirmation  
 Looking for the 
company’s 
location and 
ownership  
 The matter was raised to the 
board of directors who fired 
the finance manager and 
agreed to do all the necessary 
adjustments required by the 
external auditor 
Improper 
disclosure  
 Not disclosing 
related party 
 Tips from an 
employee of the 
company  
 Matter was raised to the board 
of directors and the audit 
partner. Management refused 
to do the required adjustments 
and unqualified audit report 
with explanatory paragraph 
was issued 
 
It can be noticed from table 8.9 that the actions taken by external auditors and the audit partners in these 
alleged financial reporting fraud cases were inconsistent. In some cases external auditors and their partners 
either withdrew from the engagement or issued a qualified audit report while in other cases audit partners 
just required adjustment entries or even took no action. This lack of consistency in reacting to fraud risk 
assessment indicates that external auditors still need guidance on how to respond to fraud risks. The results 
were not different from the results of the questionnaire in this area. 
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8.4.4 The Significance of Fraud Factors  
The current study sought to explore the significant of the various fraud factors in assessing the risk of 
financial reporting fraud. The interviews helped in confirming and complementing the questionnaire results 
in this area. The interviews helped in confirming the results of the questionnaire with regards to the 
significance of the various fraud factors and in complementing the results of the questionnaire by exploring 
the reasons behind this significance or in other words why external auditors in the current study view saome 
factor(s) more significant than others.  
 
The results from table 8.10 revealed that management motives were perceived as the most significant fraud 
factor (56.7%, 17 interviewees). This confirms the result of the questionnaire that found management 
motives the most significant factor in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. Interviewees believed 
management motive is a key factor in committing financial reporting fraud because it could have a direct 
impact on the financial statements. Four interviewees believed that management motives are more significant 
than opportunity for fraud because with the lack of motive an existing opportunity for fraud will not matter 
and will not be enough for a fraud perpetrator to take the risk of committing fraud.  Their comments were: 
 
“Management motives could have a direct impact on the financial statements such as in the case of management’s 
override of internal control to achieve his/her motives. In this case it does not matter how strong the internal 
control system is” 
 
“Management could manipulate the financial statements figures to achieve their goals. Thus, understanding 
management motives would indicate the accounts that might be manipulated by management to achieve their 
goals”.  
 
“There has to be a reason for management to commit fraud such as the desire to get bonuses. Otherwise, why 
would they commit fraud and bear its risk?”  
 
“Financial reporting fraud is more likely to be committed by management who will not take this risk unless they 
have a strong motive to do so. This is more likely to happen when performance is linked to financial targets or 
management wants to meet the budget”. 
 
“Unless somebody has a motive to commit fraud, he or she will not take that risk. Integrity goes hand in hand 
with motives. If someone has a strong motive to commit fraud and is lacking integrity, committing fraud will be 
much easier and more likely to happen”.  
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Others added that management motives are particularly important in the Egyptian context because of the 
poor economic conditions that might force companies to go bankrupt as well as the weak internal control 
systems in most companies in Egypt which makes opportunity for fraud common anyway. Their comments 
were: 
“Motive is a key for committing fraud and the main driver for committing any fraudulent act not just in Egypt. 
However in Egypt it is more likely to be the key driver for committing financial reporting fraud because running 
companies and saving them from bankruptcy in the current weak economy and political unrest is very difficult”.  
 
“In Egypt opportunities for fraud will always be found either because of weaknesses in the internal control systems 
of companies or loopholes in accounting and tax regulations. Thus, without a motive to commit fraud, there will 
be no reason for management to commit financial reporting fraud and to bear its risks”.  
 
“Motives could have a direct impact on the financial statements especially in the Egyptian context and when it 
comes to the choice of accounting policies and decisions related to estimates. Rationalisation is also important 
but always directly related to motives. That is if someone has the motive to commit fraud, he/she will always 
rationalise it” 
 
The results also revealed that 16.7% of interviewees (5 interviewees) viewed management motives and 
opportunity to commit fraud equally important. Some of them stated that: 
“It is common in Egypt that management might be motivated to commit financial reporting fraud especially 
through overstating revenues or share prices in case of listed companies and understating revenues to avoid paying 
taxes in small and medium-size companies. Weak internal controls are also very common in Egypt which 
increases the opportunity to commit fraud. That is why external auditors like to take both management motives 
and opportunity into consideration in every fraud risk assessment”.  
 
 “Management motives could have an impact on the financial statements and the opportunity to commit fraud could 
make the fraud act easier to commit” 
 
“Motive is the main drive for committing financial reporting fraud but achieving one’s goals will not be possible 
without an existing opportunity to commit fraud especially in case of concentration of power in the hand of one 
person or the ability to abuse that power without being caught. Thus motive goes hand in hand with opportunity”.  
 
Only one interviewee perceived management integrity as the most important fraud factor and stated that:  
“Integrity is the key to committing fraud because without integrity committing fraud will not be possible even if 
the other fraud factors exist”.  
 
The results also showed that rationalisation was not mentioned at all as the most significant factor. This 
finding confirms the results of the questionnaire that showed external auditors give more attention to 
management motives and opportunity to commit fraud while less attention if not any to management 
rationale.  
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Table 8.10 Significance of Fraud Factors 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Management Motives 17 56.7 56.7 
opportunities 5 16.7 73.3 
Management integrity 1 3.3 76.7 
Motives and integrity 2 6.7 83.3 
Motives and opportunities 5 16.7 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
 
Five interviewees (16.7%) perceived opportunity to commit fraud as the most significant fraud factor. They 
justified this by stating that weaknesses in internal control sometimes encourages people to commit fraud, 
committing fraud is easier when the consequences are not severe, committing fraud will be difficult without 
an existing opportunity to commit fraud. Three of them stated that: 
 
“Although weaknesses in internal control is a red flag for an existing opportunity to commit fraud, even in a 
strong control system management override of internal control could make fraud perpetration more likely”.  
 
“Opportunity to commit fraud is always related to existing weaknesses in the company’s controls which is very 
common in Egypt. Even if a person has a motive to commit fraud, without an opportunity to commit fraud, fraud 
will be difficult to commit or at least will be less likely to happen”.  
 
 “Opportunity is a key because it could happen as a result of weaknesses in internal control system which can be 
easily observed and is always the main concern for any audit” 
 
8.4.5 The Assessment of Fraud Factors  
The current study sought to explore how external auditors could assess management motives, management 
integrity, rationalisation of fraud, fraud perpetrators’ capabilities, and opportunity for fraud. Data from the 
questionnaire and the interviews helped in collecting as much details as possible about this issue.  However 
the interviews helped in exploring this area in more depth. This helped in developing the proposed guides by 
the current study to help external auditors assess the above mentioned fraud factors. These guides are 
available in appendix A3. 
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Difficulty of assessing the fraud factors 
The current study also sought to explore how difficult it is for external auditors to assess the above mentioned 
factors. The questionnaire helped in answering this question however the interviews helped in confirming 
the results of the questionnaire and providing a rationale behind respondents’ answers.  
 
The results from table 8.11 showed that management integrity appears to be the most difficult fraud factor 
to assess (36.7%, 11 interviewees), followed by rationalisation (26.7%, 8 interviewees). 13% (4 
interviewees) believed that rationalisation and integrity are equally difficult to assess. Management motives, 
opportunity to commit fraud, and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities were viewed as relatively less difficult to 
assess. This indicates that the difficulty in assessing management integrity and rationalisation might explain 
why external auditors do not assess them in most of the cases. The results also confirms the results of the 
questionnaire in this area.  
 
Table 8.11 Difficulty of assessing the fraud factors 
 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Management motives 3 10.0 10.0 
Opportunity 2 6.7 16.7 
Management integrity 11 36.7 53.3 
Rationalisation 8 26.7 80.0 
Fraud perpetrators’ capability 2 6.7 83.3 
Rationalisation & integrity 4 13.0 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
 
The current study thus sought to explore further evidence as to why external auditors view some of the fraud 
factors difficult to assess. The results revealed that management integrity was perceived as difficult to assess 
because there is no guidance in the audit standards on how to assess management integrity, external auditors 
are not trained on assessing management integrity, management integrity is intangible, unobservable, and 
could be highly subjective, and the difficulty in assessing management integrity arise with the lack of 
evidence about management integrity. Some comments included: 
 
“Although management integrity is more important than rationalisation in fraud risk assessments, it is very 
difficult to assess because auditors still need guidance on how to assess integrity in the first place. Guidance is 
lacking in this area in the audit standards”.  
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“Integrity is unobservable and sometimes if managers are smart enough and have the ability to overcome stress 
or to deceive, they could pretend they have high integrity when in fact they do not”.  
 
“Integrity is not observable and could be highly subjective unless the client has a history of bad integrity that is 
well known to the auditor. Clients in most cases deny any fraudulent act and refer to it as error or an unintentional 
mistake”.  
 
 “Integrity is very hard to be assessed but still we can assess conflict of interest policy and related party 
transactions, also we can assess disclosure policy and whether management conceal important information”. 
Interviewees viewed rationalisation a very difficult factor to assess because it cannot be seen and is 
intangible, very difficult to observe, can be easily hidden by clever management, is very hard to assess alone 
without considering the motives and opportunity to commit fraud, requires a lot of experience and personal 
judgment, is difficult to create a benchmark or standards to help auditors assess rationalisation because it 
differs from one person to another, and is very difficult to proof especially with the lack of guidance.  
 
Two interviewees viewed opportunity as the most difficult fraud factor to assess because it requires a lot of 
observation to discover weaknesses in a client’s internal control system which could be very time consuming, 
and it requires a lot of effort from auditors to understand and assess the client’s internal control system which 
is something that is currently overlooked in some audit firms. Two interviewees mentioned that assessing 
fraud perpetrators’ capabilities could be difficult because the audit standards did not require external auditors 
to consider it. They said:  
 
“Given the time and cost constraints and the high competition in the audit market in Egypt, it might not be practical 
for external auditors to assess fraud perpetrators’ capabilities especially with the lack of guidance in this area”.  
 
“Sometimes the power of management can lead to collusion which is very difficult to detect and also there is 
generally lack of awareness of fraud, integrity, and ethical behaviour in companies operating in Egypt. This makes 
employees vulnerable to management’s abuse and manipulation and thus understanding fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities in this case will not make a difference in assessing fraud risks”. 
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Assessment of the fraud factors 
The interviews helped in exploring how external auditors in the current study could assess the various fraud 
factors in more depth. The questionnaire results did not provide much in this area especially with regards to 
the assessment of opportunity to commit fraud and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities. This is an open-ended 
question and thus data was analysed using content analysis. Five common themes were identified and each 
was related to the assessment of a fraud factor. The frequency of occurrence of some the techniques 
mentioned by respondents in the current study was calculated using Nvivo.  
 
Theme I: Assessing management’s motives  
Interviewees were asked how they could assess management motives. The analysis of their responses 
including how many times each was mentioned was determined through the use of Nvivo that facilitated 
word counts. The results revealed that “understanding the nature of client’s business and industry and the 
nature of business activities and the financial performance of the company in the current year and previous 
years”, and “understanding and assessing the internal control system to be able to identify weaknesses that 
might motivate management to commit fraud” were the most commonly mentioned techniques. This 
confirms the results of the questionnaire in this area. The interviews, however, added various new techniques 
that were used by external auditors in the current study to assess management motives. All these techniques 
were compiled together with the results of the questionnaire in this area to develop a detailed guide for 
assessing management motives. The guide is available in appendix A3.  
 
Theme II: Assessing management’s integrity  
Interviewees were asked how they could assess management’s integrity. The results revealed that 
“background checks of management including their qualifications and work experience”, “investigating 
management’s integrity history”, and “discussion with management about fraud controls, past fraud cases 
and how they dealt with it” were the most commonly cited techniques for assessing management’s integrity. 
This confirms the findings of the questionnaire in this area. However, the interviews added new other 
techniques that external auditors in the current study used for assessing management’s integrity. These 
techniques were compiled with the results of the questionnaire in this area to develop detailed guidance to 
external auditors in this area. The guide is available in appendix A3.  
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Theme III: Assessing the opportunity to commit fraud  
Interviewees were asked how they could assess existing opportunities to commit fraud. The analysis of their 
responses including how many times each was cited was determined through the use of Nvivo that facilitated 
word counts. The results revealed that understanding and testing the client’s internal control system to 
identify weaknesses that might increase the risk of opportunity was the most commonly cited technique. This 
again confirms the results of the questionnaire in this area. However, the interviews added new other 
techniques that external auditors in the current study used for assessing opportunity to commit fraud. These 
techniques were compiled with the results of the questionnaire in this area to develop detailed guidance to 
external auditors in this area. The guide is available in appendix A3.  
 
Theme IV: Assessing rationalisation of fraud  
Interviewees were asked how they could assess rationalisation. The interviews helped in exploring new 
techniques that were not mentioned in the questionnaire. These techniques include “paying attention to some 
red flags such as the existence of unrealistic forecasts, bad relationship with prior auditor, history of violation 
of laws and regulations”, “knowing the people you are dealing with is the key. Understand people’s 
psychology and mind-set to assess their rationalisation and motives”, “observing management responses 
during the auditors inquiry about fraud related matters”, “interviewing key people or employees of the 
company”, “discussion with management and key employees”, “looking for any signs of employees 
dissatisfaction like unfair treatment by management or inappropriate compensation, are employees or 
management complaining about their pay or promotion”, “using professional scepticism”, and “paying more 
attention to payroll expenses and whether employees are satisfied with their pay and the way they are being 
treated in the company”. All these techniques were added to the list of techniques used to assess 
rationalistaion of fraud to develop a detailed guidance in this area. This guide is available in appendix A3.  
 
Comments from some interviews included: 
 
“Looking at the organisation chart will help in understanding the power in hand of management and whether there 
is any concentration of power in the hand of one person. This is more likely to increase the risk of committing 
financial reporting fraud as the person with too much power might be tempted to abuse this power” 
 
“Rationalisation could be assessed as part of assessing management integrity”  
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“Rationalisation is common in Egypt but is rarely assessed because it is very difficult to be assessed or measured. 
Mainly past experience with client will help in assessing it. It is somehow linked to integrity because if a person 
lacks integrity, rationalisation will be more likely to help them get out of the fraud act without penalty”.  
 
Theme V: Assessing fraud perpetrators’ capabilities: 
Few responses regarding the assessment of fraud perpetrators’ capabilities were collected via the 
questionnaire, and thus the interview data helped in collecting more details about this area. The results of the 
interviews revealed common techniques that could be used to assess fraud perpetrators’ capabilities. These 
techniques include “considering management position and power in the company (mentioned 15 times)”, 
“understanding the weaknesses in the company’s internal control system (cited by 10)”, and “observing 
management philosophy and operating style (cited by 5)”. 
 
Four interviewees stated that fraud perpetrators’ capabilities should be assessed while assessing opportunity 
to commit fraud, especially the risk of management override of internal controls. This confirms the results 
of the questionnaire in this area. Another interviewee argued that the assessment of fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities requires understanding people and their capabilities. This includes their knowledge and power 
in the organisation. He added that:  
 
“Fraud perpetrators’ capabilities might be assessed by understanding people and their role in the company. If they 
are knowledgeable about the system and its weaknesses and at the same time they are powerful, they might be 
more capable of committing fraud than others who do not possess the same capabilities or skills”.  
 
Another interviewee said fraud perpetrators’ capabilities could be avoided by proper segregation of duties 
and thus if this weakness in internal control was noticed, the risk of committing fraud might be high. He 
stated that: 
“Fraud perpetrators’ capabilities could be avoided by proper segregation of duties. It could be quite obvious in 
family businesses where the power is concentrated in the hand of one or two persons that could exploit or abuse 
this power”  
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8.4.6 The Motivations behind Management Fraud in Egypt 
The current study sought to explore what might motivate management in Egypt to commit financial reporting 
fraud. Both the questionnaire and interviews conducted by the current study helped to address this research 
issue. However, the interviews helped in exploring this issue in more depth and at the same time confirmed 
the questionnaire results in this area. In the questionnaire, respondents of the current study were given a list 
of motives behind management fraud and were asked to rank these motives according to their likelihood of 
occurrence in Egypt. However, in the interview, respondents were given an open-ended question about the 
motivations behind management fraud. This helped in collecting as much details as possible from 
respondents as they were not restricted or biased by a list of management motives.  
 
The results of the interviews revealed that management in Egypt are more likely to commit financial 
reporting fraud to get bonuses especially if it is linked to financial performance or to achieving certain targets. 
This motive was mentioned fifteen times by interviewees. This confirms the results of the questionnaire in 
this area where the desire to get or increase bonuses was the most commonly stated motives for management 
to commit financial reporting fraud in Egypt. One respondent said: 
“Management is more likely to overstate revenues in this case. This is more common in large and listed 
companies”  
 The need to get loans from banks was mentioned twelve times by interviewees as a motive for management 
to commit financial reporting fraud. This again confirms the results of the questionnaire in this area. The 
desire to avoid paying taxes was mentioned ten times by interviewees. This indicates that avoiding taxes is 
also a common motive for management to commit financial reporting fraud in Egypt. One interviewee added 
that: 
“Management could commit financial reporting fraud in order to avoid paying taxes especially in small 
companies and family owned businesses”  
 
Other interviewees said that management could commit financial reporting fraud in Egypt to keep their job 
(mentioned 6 times), for personal financial gain or need (mentioned 5 times), to meet budgets (mentioned 5 
times), to survive in the market (mentioned 5 times), or to meet bank’s debt covenant agreements (mentioned 
4 times). Their comments were: 
 
“Management could commit financial reporting fraud to meet or to reduce budget variances especially when 
budget is unrealistic or targets are very difficult to achieve”   
 
“Management could commit financial reporting fraud to survive in the market especially when there is monopoly 
or high competition in the market” 
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“Management could commit financial reporting fraud to meet bank’s debt covenant agreements which could 
lead to manipulations in equity and ratios such as liquidity ratios” 
 
Three interviewees argued that management in Egypt could also be motivated by an existing opportunity in 
the company’s internal control system or a weakness in current accounting standards or regulations. They 
stated that:  
 
 “Sometimes the existence of opportunity to commit fraud could motivate management to commit financial 
reporting fraud such as in the case of small local companies in Egypt where there is a weak internal control 
system and concentration of power in the hand of one or two persons is the norm”.  
 
“Management could be motivated to commit financial reporting fraud in order to make use of an existing 
opportunity for fraud such as loopholes in accounting and tax regulations especially those related to investment 
and accounting for fair value, capital expenses, and tax laws”.  
 
Some motives for management to commit financial reporting fraud in Egypt were mentioned three times by 
interviewees such as “to increase share prices”, “to overcome weak economic conditions”, “to make the firm 
look more profitable to please investors or owners”. One interviewee added that: 
 
“Management could be motivated to commit financial reporting fraud in order to increase share prices through 
either overstatement of revenues or understatement of liabilities. This is more common in large or listed 
companies” 
Other motivations behind management fraud in Egypt are summarised in table 8.12 below along with their 
frequency of occurrence.  
 
Table 8.12 Other motives behind management fraud 
Management motives Frequency of occurrence 
To avoid bankruptcy 2 
To meet the requirements of the stock market 2 
Pressure from government 1 
The existence of weak legal system 1 
The desire to maintain power 
1 
Lack of monitoring 
1 
Conflicts of interest 
1 
Cover up misappropriation of assets 
1 
For the purpose of mergers and acquisitions or in case of sale of a subsidiary 
1 
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Reduce share prices to make it cheaper for related parties to buy 
1 
Ego and self-esteem 
1 
To show high firm performance in order to get a job at the head quarter of a 
developed country 
1 
Pressure from shareholders to pay dividends 
1 
To gain access to international markets 
1 
 
8.4.7 The Impact of Management Motivations on the Financial Statements 
The current study sought to explore what impact management motivations could have on the financial 
statements and whether external auditors appreciate the impact of management motivations on the financial 
statements. Data collected via the interviews helped to explore this area in more depth as well as exploring 
areas that were explored by the questionnaire. For instance, “whether external auditors appreciate 
management motivations and its impact on the financial statements in Egypt and why?” and “whether 
external auditors in Egypt are successful in dealing with the impact of management motivations and why”. 
This is discussed in detail in this section. 
 
External auditors’ appreciation of management motivations and its impact  
The interviewees were asked whether external auditors in Egypt actually appreciate the impact of 
management motivations on the financial statements. The results from table 8.13 showed that the majority 
of interviewees (73.3%, 22 interviewees) believed external auditors in Egypt appreciate the impact of 
management motivations on the financial statements.  
Table 8.13 External auditors’ appreciation of management motives and its impact on the financial statements 
 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Yes 22 73.3 73.3 
No 8 26.7 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
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The results also revealed that external auditors in Egypt tend to appreciate the motivations behind 
management fraud and its impact on the financial statements because “management motivations could have 
a direct impact on the financial statements”, “it is the main drive for committing financial reporting fraud”, 
“management is always in a good position to use their power to achieve their goals which might increase the 
likelihood of committing financial reporting fraud”, and “it could have an impact on auditors’ reputation and 
legal liability”.  
 
Almost all interviewees believed that management motivations are appreciated more by external auditors 
working at the Big 4 international audit firms than any other audit firm in Egypt. Comments included: 
 
“The impact of management motivations is appreciated especially by external auditors working at the Big 4 
audit firms because financial reporting fraud could have a devastating impact on the financial statements and 
the auditors’ reputation and legal liability” 
 
“Yes definitely because audit firms started to pay more attention to fraud detection after the 25th of January 
revolution where people requires more transparency and integrity. Also audit firms in Egypt offer consultancies 
in fraud examination which further encouraged them to take the issue of fraud more seriously than before” 
“The impact of management motives on the financial statements is appreciated, but this requires a lot of 
experience in the audit field and differs from one auditor to another according to their knowledge, qualifications, 
and experience” 
“It is only applied on a small scale mainly by some Big 4 audit firms because small audit firms do not care much 
about audit quality and sometimes their audits are limited to test of details and vouching” 
 
Other interviewees believed that management motivations and its impact are not really appreciated in Egypt 
due to “the lack of a strong and effective audit regulatory body that monitors audit quality in Egypt”, “time 
and cost constraints”, “fraud examination is not one of the concerns in audits in Egypt”, “fear of losing audit 
clients”, “high competition in the market among audit firms”, “the difficulty to prove management intent”, 
“delays that could be caused in the audit report if management motivations would to be considered which 
might increase auditors liability”, and “ it requires a lot of experience to use professional scepticism which 
is sometimes lacking”.  
Some interviewees added that: 
“From my experience as an external auditor at the Accountability State Authority (ASA), external auditors in 
other audit firms do not pay much attention to management’s motivation behind fraud and its impact on the 
financial statements. Sometimes they do not even take our comments into consideration. Unfortunately the ASA 
is a supervisory authority and do not have the power to impose penalties on companies for such manipulations. 
However we just report any concerns to a higher authority which could be either those charged with governance 
in a company or the minister of Investment or Petroleum depending on the nature of the company’s operations” 
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“It is not considered because fraud examination is not one of the main concerns of the audit. Audit firms pay 
more attention to risks related to going concern. Unless there is no conditions or circumstances that make 
auditors believe financial reporting fraud risk is high, fraud risk assessments will not be considered” 
“I do not think it is considered because in most cases manipulations could be classified as errors rather than 
fraud. Fraud risk assessment in general could be very time consuming and costly”.  
“Management motivations will only be considered if there are red flags that make external auditors believe that 
the risk of management motivations behind fraud and its impact on the financial statements is high”.  
“Materiality is a key factor in deciding whether management motivations could be a concern for external 
auditors or not” 
How successful are external auditors in dealing with management motivations in Egypt? 
Interviewees were asked how successful they think external auditors are in dealing with management 
motivations and its impact on the financial statements in Egypt. The results revealed that the majority of 
interviewees (70%, 21 interviewees) believed external auditors in Egypt are not successful in dealing with 
the impact of management motivations on the financial statements as shown in table 8.14.  
 
Table 8.14 External auditors’ success in auditing management motives 
 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Successful 9 30.0 30.0 
Not successful 21 70.0 100.0 
Total 30 100.0  
 
The results also revealed that interviewees believed external auditors are not successful in dealing with 
management motivations in Egypt because “external auditors still need guidance on fraud related audit 
procedures, especially how to respond to risk of financial reporting fraud”, “audit firms fear to lose audit 
clients due to high competition in the market among audit firms”, “lack of qualified audit staff and time 
constraints”,  “Lack of an audit regulatory body that monitors audit quality in Egypt and encourages external 
auditors to report fraud cases”,  “weak legal system in Egypt”,  “the audit profession in Egypt is not yet well 
developed and is not mature enough to offer high quality assurance”, “fraud risk assessment is hardly 
considered as part of the audit”, “  lack of fraud awareness in the country and within audit firms in Egypt”, 
and “more focus is given to control risks rather than fraud risks”.  
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Some interviewees said that: 
“More emphasis and guidance are still needed on professional scepticism, management’s motivation behind 
fraud and its impact on the financial statements, and the discussion of the audit team about the susceptibility of 
the client’s firm to fraud”  
“Lack of consistency in complying with the standards which is due to the absence of an effective audit regulatory 
body that encourages external auditors to report fraud cases and enforce compliance with the standards” 
“Management challenges auditors most of the time and sometimes imposes restrictions on the audit scope and 
the fear to lose clients might be an obstacle for auditors to succeed in dealing with the impact of management 
motives”       
“Current weak economic conditions makes it harder for external auditors to find a job and for audit firms to 
recruit more auditors and enhance their audit quality”.  
“Pressure from the board where sometimes the board of directors are made up of shareholders themselves which 
makes the auditors’ job really difficult. This make the auditors face the threat of losing the audit engagement if 
they disagreed with the board”. 
“Inconsistency among audit firms in complying with the requirements of the international audit standards makes 
competition among audit firms in the market really high and puts pressure on auditors who are aiming for high 
audit quality”. 
“Management’s ability to rationalise fraudulent acts as errors or unintentional mistakes and intentions are very 
difficult for auditors to prove or to assess”     
“Management have the ability to cover thefts and manipulate the financial statements figures in a way that might 
be beyond the auditors’ ability to discover”       
“Lack of guidance from the majority of audit firms in fraud risk assessment or in showing the importance of 
assessing fraud risks as part of the audit work, creates this inconsistency”.   
 
Four interviewees added that: 
“The lack of an effective audit regulatory body that enforces that standards and impose penalties for non-
compliance or violation of the standards leads to inconsistency in complying with the standards and the audit 
procedures used”.  
“Sometimes audit firms face a lot of pressure from management either in the form of limitations on their scope 
of audit taking advantage of the time and cost constraints that most audit firms face or threats to audit fees and 
changing them if they did not issue an unqualified audit opinion. External auditors always face the challenge of 
keeping the clients and at the same time follow the requirements of the audit standards in maintaining high 
quality audit”.  
“In most cases when a fraud-related issue is communicated to an audit partner, no further actions are taken 
because of fear to lose the client. In most cases, the client is required to modify the financial statements and then 
a clean report is issued. A qualified opinion is only issued if the client refuses to modify the financial statements 
as requested by auditor” 
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“There is a tendency towards pleasing and keeping audit clients and the external auditors’ independence in Egypt 
is a real concern. Sometimes, there are huge discrepancies between the report of an ASA auditor and the audit 
report from other private audit firms for the same company. The lack of an audit regulatory body for governing 
and regulating all audit firms in Egypt makes it difficult for these audit firms to maintain high audit quality and 
comply with the requirements of the international audit standards all the time” 
 
Some interviewees argued that there is generally a lack of consistency in complying with the requirements 
of the audit standards with regards to fraud risk assessment. Interviewees agreed that Big 4 audit firms tend 
to be relatively successful in dealing with management motivations and its impact on the financial statements 
relative to small audit firms in Egypt. Audit methodologies used by Big 4 audit firms take into consideration 
fraud risk assessment and response as required by ISA240. Audit quality control in Big 4 puts more pressure 
on audit staff to consider fraud risk assessment. This approach is less likely in small audit firms. They added 
that the success of external auditors in auditing management motivations will depend on their qualifications, 
skills, experience, knowledge of the nature of the audit profession in Egypt and the requirements of the 
international audit standards, understanding of clients business and industry, auditor’s integrity, and the type 
of audit firm. 
Comments included: 
“Consideration of management motives is better in Big 4 audit firms as they have their audit methodologies that 
would normally incorporate the three fraud triangle factors in assessing fraud risks. However this depends on 
the qualifications and experience of the auditor”.   
 “Big 4 audit firms might be more successful than small audit firms because they follow the requirements of the 
international audit standards in every stage of the audit process. Small audit firms might not take into 
consideration management’s motivation because of lack of fraud awareness and the role of external auditors in 
fraud detection and the importance of auditor’s independence” 
“Smaller companies are less likely to take management motives into consideration because they face high 
competition in the audit market and strive to keep their audit clients” 
“Small audit firms might deal with fraud if they discovered it by chance but they will not really focus much on 
fraud risk assessment and fraud-related audit procedures” 
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The impact of management motivations on the financial statements 
Interviewees were also asked to explain the impact that management motivations might have on the financial 
statements. The results revealed that all interviewees believed that management motivations to a great extent 
could lead to material manipulations in the financial statements to achieve management’s targets. They also 
agreed that the extent and degree of the manipulations in the financial statements will depend on the type of 
management motives and that is why it is important for external auditors to understand what might motivate 
management to commit financial reporting fraud in any context. This confirms the results of the questionnaire 
that reached the same conclusion.  
The areas or accounts that are more likely to be manipulated by management motives include revenues, 
estimates such as useful life of fixed assets and valuation of investment properties, expenses, manual journal 
entries, assets, cost of goods sold, and accounts receivable. Three interviewees provided examples of 
management motives and how this could impact the financial statements. They said: 
“In Egypt, revenues, expenses, and cash flows are significant risk areas because management might be motivated 
to conceal expenses or overstate revenues to make the company look more profitable or to avoid paying taxes”  
 
“Liabilities can be concealed to get loans from banks or liabilities can be misclassified to make the liquidity 
ratio look better for loan purposes or to meet the bank’s covenant agreements” 
 
“If management wants to get bonuses that are linked to financial performance, then there might be a high 
likelihood that the revenue account will be overstated. If management wants to avoid tax, then revenue will be 
understated”  
 
Two interviewees added that: 
 “Management motivations could lead to manipulations in the financial statements so it is important to 
understand the different management motives in different contexts so that external auditors could pay more 
attention to the most vulnerable accounts”.  
“Management motivation could affect any area of the financial statements especially management’s estimates 
like valuation of investment properties or useful life of fixed assets and manual journal entries especially year 
end journal entries. The problem with the Egyptian context is that there is no regulated market for assets 
valuation which might increase the floor for management’s manipulations” 
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The results revealed that management motivations could lead to manipulations in the profit or loss accounts 
to show better performance or to avoid paying taxes, financial ratios to show better performance in case of a 
need to obtain a loan from banks, and it could even lead to creating a shell company to overstate the 
company’s expenses to avoid paying taxes.  
The results also revealed that management motivations could lead to fictitious goodwill to overstate assets 
through the use of related party transactions, capitalisation of expenses to overstate revenues, manipulations 
in revenue recognition, timing difference, income smoothing, concealed expenses, not recording accruals, 
improper assets valuation, manipulations in estimates such as provisions and reserves, manipulations in 
borrowing costs, fictitious revenue, revenue overstatement or understatement, undisclosed transactions with 
related parties, hidden liabilities, understatement of liabilities and expenses, fictitious expenses, 
understatement of liabilities for getting bank loans, or overstatement of revenues to keep one’s job. 
 
Some interviewees stated that: 
“Management could be motivated to show better company performance by colluding with other managers to 
overstate revenues”.  
 
“Consolidation is vulnerable to management’s manipulations in Egypt. The aim is to overstate assets and 
revenues through the use of different accounting policies during consolidation”  
 
“Management could overstate the cost of goods sold to avoid paying taxes through the purchase of fictitious raw 
materials to increase the cost of inventories”  
 
“Management could overstate inventory through misclassification of assets. For example recording fixed assets 
like parts of machinery as inventory to avoid depreciation expenses”  
 
“Manipulations in the provisions for contingent liabilities and colluding with the company’s lawyer in order to 
hide important information from the auditor so that he/she could not decide on the value of the expected 
contingent liabilities and the appropriate provisions for it”.   
 
“Management might be motivated to manipulate certain accounts like reserves, estimates, assets, revenues via 
creating fictitious revenues, and liabilities via omission of liabilities”.  
 
“In case of tax avoidance, the revenue will normally be understated. In case of loans, revenues will be overstated 
to meet debt covenant agreements”  
 
“Management motivations could lead to improper assets valuation and fictitious revenues and assets, non-
compliance with the accounting standards when preparing the financial statements, overstatement of expenses 
for tax avoidance”  
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8.4.8 The Audit of Management Motivations 
The current study sought to explore how external auditors could deal with the impact of management 
motivations on the financial statements or in other words how external auditors could audit management 
motivations. The interviews helped in exploring this area in more depth. The most commonly mentioned 
techniques were “the use of analytical procedures (mentioned 6 times”, and “paying more attention to high 
risk accounts (mentioned 6 times)”. Two interviewees stated that: 
 
“Using analytical procedures to identify trends and unusual transactions and accounts especially for the past 
three years for revenues and expenses especially travel expenses, payroll expenses, and sales revenues. In case 
there are large or unexplained variances, inquiry of management could help in addition to more substantive tests. 
Analytical procedures especially industry averages, in comparing performance of the same company over years 
or comparing the company’s performance with other companies in the same industry” 
 
“Special attention should be given to some accounts/areas like inventory, accounts payable, accounts receivable, 
assets, revenues, cash, hidden liabilities and expenses, estimates, subsequent events, year end balances accounts, 
management’s override of internal control, impairment of investments, and going concern issues”. 
Other techniques include “management inquiry”, “the use of unpredictable audit procedures”, and “change 
of auditor’s approach to materiality”. Two interviews said that: 
 
“The use of unpredictable audit procedures like auditing small amounts rather than large amounts to assess the 
risk of fraud is quite effective given that management is aware that auditors take into consideration only material 
amounts or surprise physical cash count or inventory count. In case of banks or companies having more than 
one branch, visiting different locations/branches every year could also help”.  
 
“Change of materiality nature/consideration/approach e.g. considering small amounts in the audit sample rather 
than large amounts/values could help auditors to assess the impact of management’s motivations” 
Some interviewees argued that assessing the impact of management’s motivations on the financial statements 
requires a thorough understanding of management’s motives. Their comments were: 
 
“Understanding management’s likely motives by assessing the pressure that management or company faces and 
then think of the accounts that might be vulnerable to management’s manipulations to achieve their targets. 
Understanding the possible motivations behind management fraud and any factors that could give them the 
opportunity to commit fraud like concentration of power or weak internal control or ability to override these 
controls”. 
 
“It depends on the account that is more likely to be affected by management’s motives. For example, in case of 
revenues, analytical procedures and management’s inquiry will be used and then test of details of balances, 
reports will be required from the operations manager about the company’s operations and cost of materials used 
in production showing quantity sold/year”.  
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“Assessing the effect of management’s motivation on the financial statements depending on the type of motive 
(e.g. if the company wants to get loans from bank, there might be high motivation to overstate the revenue so in 
this case more focus will be given to the revenue account and if necessary an adjustment in the account will be 
recommended). If management refused to make the required adjustments, the issue will be reported in the 
management representation letter and the audit report”.  
Two other interviewees added that scrutinising and reviewing journal entries could reveal manipulations 
made by management to achieve certain targets. They said that: 
“Focusing more on manual journal entries rather than automated journal entries especially those around year 
end or subsequent events after the financial statement date. Manual journal entries have less internal control 
than automated journal entries which makes it more risky and vulnerable to manipulations”.  
“All journal entries are scanned to identify unusual manual journal entries, all year end journal entries are 
audited, and correction of errors in financial statements. ACL automated computer tool that helps them to scan 
all journal entries for unusual transactions and trends with special focus on manual journal entries” 
The results of the interviews in this area revealed other techniques that could be used by external auditors to 
assess the impact of management motivations on the financial statements. All these techniques were 
compared and added to the results of the questionnaire in this area to develop a detailed guide that might 
help external auditors audit management motivations. This detailed guide is available in appendix A3.  
8.4.9 The Challenges Facing External Auditors in Egypt  
 
Interviewees were asked if they have other points that they wish to share with regards to the audit profession 
and financial reporting fraud in Egypt. This is an open-ended question that aimed at collecting as much 
details as possible about the nature of external audit and financial reporting fraud in Egypt. Conventional 
content analysis was used to identify common themes and summative content analysis were used for word 
counts. The results revealed three main themes related to the challenges faced by external auditors in Egypt. 
Theme I is related to governance issues in Egypt that impact the likelihood of detecting fraud in Egypt, theme 
II discusses issues related to audit firm’s governance in Egypt, and theme III includes the recommendations 
provided by external auditors in the current study to solve some of these governance issues.  
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Theme I Governance Issues and the Likelihood of Detecting Fraud in Egypt 
Going through the data revealed a common theme related to governance issues in Egypt that impact their 
ability to detect and report about fraud. The results revealed that external auditors in Egypt are less likely to 
detect fraud because they need practical examples and guidance on how to assess and respond to fraud risks 
which is currently lacking in the audit standards. This issue was reported by five interviews in the current 
study. This confirms the results of Kassem and Higson (2012a) who argued that the audit expectation gap 
with regards to fraud detection might exist because the standards provided little guidance to external auditors 
with regards to fraud risk assessment and response.  
The results revealed that not all external auditors in Egypt have the necessary skills to understand the nature 
of fraud and be able to identify fraud risk factors and respond to it as required by ISA240. Four interviewees 
added that some auditors might have the knowledge about fraud risk assessments but not the experience in 
fraud examination. Two interviewees said not all auditors in a team have the required qualifications and 
experience to conduct the audit in accordance with ISAs especially when it comes to fraud risk assessments 
as required by ISA 240. This indicates a lack of compliance with the Egyptian code of corporate governance 
that states that external auditor’s experience, competence and capabilities should be relevant to the size and 
nature of the company’s objectives. One of them said: 
“Time and cost constraints, and auditors’ lack of fraud examination experience are the main challenges for 
external auditors in considering fraud risk assessment” 
 
“Most external auditors are not even well prepared to perform audit engagements and comply with the 
international audit standards either because of lack of knowledge and professional qualifications “ 
Weak internal control system and the existence of vague and complicated accounting standards in some 
sectors in Egypt such as insurance and real estate, make it difficult for external auditors to detect fraud. Two 
interviewees added that: 
“Some sectors in Egypt are more prone to fraud like real estates and insurance. There is always improper 
documentation in the real estate sector making it very difficult for auditors to find audit trails. The insurance 
sector in Egypt do not follow either the Egyptian or the international accounting standards. They have their 
separate accounting standards and depend on outdated and very old laws and regulations that are very difficult 
for external auditors to audit. The audit of insurance companies is also restricted to one or two audit firms in 
Egypt, normally one of the Big 4. External auditors do not have enough experience in the insurance sector 
because the audit is manipulated by just one audit firm” 
“Some companies in Egypt have very weak internal control system which discourages audit firms from 
accepting audit assignments from these clients while others lack integrity and have expectations that external 
auditors will collude to keep their job”  
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The results also revealed that external auditors in Egypt are reluctant to report suspected fraud. Interviewees’ 
comments include:  
If fraud was discovered, external auditors would normally be happy with requiring adjusting entries rather than 
reporting the matter to shareholders or advise the client to consult a lawyer 
 
Unreported fraud cases are much more than reported fraud cases in Egypt 
 
The results also revealed that disclosure in the financial statements is still a concern in the Egyptian context. 
One interviewee said that: 
“Management is always challenging auditors when it comes to unfavourable disclosures such as disclosures 
related to tax payments or compensations to board of directors or management” 
 
The results revealed that corruption imposes a lot of pressure on external auditors in Egypt and this prevents 
external audit to be an effective governance mechanism in the country. One interview said that: 
“Some external auditors in Egypt try hard to fulfil the requirements of the audit standards and maintain due care 
by accumulating sufficient appropriate evidence. However, high corruption in Egypt makes it difficult for external 
auditors to report a client to a higher authority or raise the matter to court” 
 
Two other interviewees mentioned that management imposes restrictions on the scope of audit work and 
uses rationalisation to challenge auditors’ decisions. Their comments included: 
“Management’s rationalisation is a challenge. Sometimes management challenges the auditor and rationalise 
wrong or unacceptable accounting treatments in most cases. Sometimes management imposes restrictions on 
the scope of the audit” 
 
Theme II Audit Firms’ Governance Issues in Egypt 
The results revealed that external auditors still need training on fraud risk assessment and response which is 
currently ignored by audit firms. This issue was mentioned three times by interviewees.  One interviewee 
said that audit firms do not ensure that external auditors fully comply with the requirements of ISA 240. 
Another added that audit methodologies in some audit firms do not incorporate fraud risk assessment. Two 
interviewees argued that: 
“In some audit firms in Egypt, fraud risk assessment is not considered a part of the audit and that there is 
inconsistency in complying with the requirements of the ISAs among audit firms” 
 
“The audit profession in Egypt is not mature and sophisticated enough to deal with things like ethics or fraud in 
a highly professional way” 
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Six interviewees stated that integrity of audit partners and audit clients is a concern sometimes. Some of 
them explained that this could be the result of a lack of regulations related to audit rotation and/or the lack 
of an independent audit regulatory body to monitor auditor’s independence and audit quality. Comments 
include: 
“Sometimes collusion occurs between audit partners and clients making it very difficult for senior auditors and 
audit managers to report a fraud case if it was detected during the normal audit course”.  
 
“Auditor’s independence and integrity is a concern in the Egyptian context because of the lack of a regulatory 
body that oversees audit quality and hold auditors accountable”  
 
“The lack of regulations regarding audit firm rotation or audit partner rotation increase the risk of partners 
colluding with clients”  
“The lack of audit regulatory body that monitors audit quality in Egypt as well as the unstable political and 
economic conditions in the country are factors in the drawbacks in the audit profession in Egypt”. 
 “There are concerns regarding external auditors’ independence in Egypt and this issue will remain as long as 
management decides on the audit fees and have the freedom to change external auditors if they did not issue a 
clean audit report” 
 
Three interviewees said that Full compliance with ISA 240 is currently not given much attention by audit 
firms in Egypt. One of them added that: 
“The lack of consistency in complying with the requirements of the audit standards among audit firms put more 
pressure on audit firms that aim for high audit quality and increase their threat of removal from engagements”  
“Sometimes the audit process is tailored to serve clients’ needs rather than achieve the actual audit objective” 
 
Theme III Recommendations  
The results of the interview revealed some recommendations that were provided by etxernal auditors in the 
current study. These recommendations aim to resolve some of the governance issues that impacts audit 
quality and the likelihood of detecting financial reporting fraud in Egypt. If more attention was given to fraud 
detection by audit firms and audit regulators, more fraud cases will be detected and reported by external 
auditors in Egypt. 
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Four interviewees said an independent audit regulatory body is needed in Egypt to monitor audit quality 
including their compliance with the audit standards and auditors’ integrity. Comments include: 
“There is a need for an effective independent regulatory body responsible for deciding on external audit fees to 
maintain external auditors’ independence and to enhance the audit quality. This professional regulatory body 
should also be responsible for reviewing audit quality in all audit firms and to ensure that no restrictions are placed 
on the scope of the audit and that important audit procedures are not overlooked because of time or cost constraints”  
“There is a need for another audit regulatory body to review and oversee the quality of audits in all audit firms in 
Egypt in addition to the EFSA that is currently only regulating audit firms auditing listed companies. This new 
audit regulatory body can review audit quality and impose penalties on audit firms that do not comply with the 
requirements of the international audit standards”. 
Two interviewees recommended that more attention should be given to audit quality control review. They 
added that: 
“Audit quality review should audit random audit files and not specific audit files as currently happening to 
ensure that audit firms are actually taking audit quality and the requirement of audit standards into consideration”  
“Audit quality control procedures need to be reinforced within audit firms in Egypt to ensure audit quality 
standards are complied with consistently”  
One interview suggested giving more attention to the assessment of internal control. He said: 
“External auditors should be required to issue separate reports to shareholders about internal control 
deficiencies” 
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8.5 Summary of Chapter Eight  
 
Chapter eight aims at explaining and describing how the data from the interviews were analysed and 
interpreted and how the results were discussed. Data from the interviews were meant to complement and 
confirm the results of the questionnaire as mentioned in chapters six and seven. The questionnaire included 
a question that sought respondents’ consent to take part of an interview for the purpose of the current study 
and 30 respondents agreed to take part in an interview. The semi-structured interviews were conducted either 
via Skype or Viber. Interviews were recorded and notes were also taken to ensure reliability. The majority 
of interviews data were qualitative and only few were quantitative. Qualitative data was analysed using 
content analysis and Nvivo while SPSS was used to analyse quantitative data.  
 
The results from the interviews showed that the majority of interviewees believed ISA 240 is useful in 
helping external auditors assess and respond to the risk of financial reporting fraud. However they also stated 
that ISA lacks practical guidance and examples in fraud risk assessment and response. The results also 
showed that financial reporting fraud is common in Egypt and improper revenue recognition and improper 
assets valuations still the most common types of financial reporting fraud in Egypt. The majority of external 
auditors in Egypt came across financial reporting fraud cases where management was involved. However 
their responses and reactions to the detected fraud cases varied widely which indicates a lack of consistency 
among audit firms in assessing and responding to fraud risks. These results confirm the results of the 
questionnaire.  
 
The motives to commit fraud was perceived as the most significant factor in assessing the risk of financial 
reporting fraud. This also confirms the results of the questionnaire that found management motives a key 
factor in committing financial reporting fraud. Rationalisation still seems to be ignored by external auditors 
which again confirms the results of the questionnaire that showed external auditors give more attention to 
management motives and opportunity to commit fraud while less attention if not any to management 
rationale. The results also revealed that rationalisation and management integrity are less likely to be 
considered by external auditors in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud compared to management 
integrity and the opportunity to commit fraud. External auditors perceived management integrity and 
rationalisation as the most difficult fraud factors to assess. However they believed that management motives, 
opportunity, and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities are relatively easier to assess. The interviewees were asked 
about the audit procedures or techniques that could be used to assess management motives behind fraud, 
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opportunity to commit fraud, rationalisation, management integrity, and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities. 
Their responses were summarised in tables along with the number of times each technique was cited. The 
results of the interviews in this area helped to complement and confirm the results of the questionnaire. Data 
collected from both techniques helped in developing some guides for external auditors that might help them 
to assess the risk of financial reporting fraud. This is discussed in detail in the next chapter “Chapter Nine: 
Findings and Contribution of the Current Study”.  
 
Regarding the motivations behind management fraud in Egypt, interviewees believed that “the desire to get 
bonuses” and “the need to get finance” are still the most commonly cited management motives in the 
Egyptian context. All interviewees stated that management motivations will have a direct impact on the 
financial statements and could lead to manipulations in the financial statement figures and disclosure that 
could be material to the financial statements. They suggested some techniques that might help external 
auditors audit management motivations and its impact on the financial statements. These techniques were 
summarised in tables in this chapter along with how many times each was cited. The results also revealed 
that external auditors in Egypt face challenges related to fraud detection, compliance with audit standards, 
audit quality, relationship with audit clients, auditors’ independence, and audit quality. These challenges 
could have implications for audit regulators in both Egypt and the wider context.  
 
The next chapter will summarise the main findings of the current study and will explain how the current 
study contributed to both knowledge and practice in the area of fraud detection and the audit profession.  
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Chapter Nine: 
Findings and Contribution of the Current Study 
9.1 Introduction 
The current study aims at helping external auditors properly assess and respond to the risk of financial 
reporting fraud in an effort to increase the likelihood of detecting it. This required the current study to explore 
the significance of the various fraud factors in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud, and how external 
auditors could assess these fraud factors. It examines the motivations behind management fraud, the impact 
of management motivations on the financial statements, and how external auditors could deal with the impact 
of management motivations on the financial statements. The current study was conducted in the Egyptian 
context and data was collected from external auditors working at different audit firms in Egypt. This required 
a thorough understanding of the nature of the audit profession and financial reporting fraud in Egypt. Due to 
the scarcity of fraud research in the Egyptian context and in particular the lack of empirical evidence in these 
two areas. The current study sought to explore the extent by which external auditors in Egypt are aware of 
and are complying with the requirements of ISA 240/ESA 240 with regards to financial reporting fraud, and 
the nature, likelihood, and types of financial reporting fraud in Egypt.  
Mixed research methods were used for data collection, namely an online questionnaire and semi-structured 
interviews. The use of mixed methods helped in depicting a complete picture of the current research issues. 
The interviews were meant to complement and confirm the results of the questionnaire. The interviews 
helped to confirm the results of the questionnaire in areas related to the compliance of external auditors with 
ISA 240, and the significance of the various fraud factors. The interviews helped in exploring some research 
issues in more depth via the use of probe questions. This includes issues related to the reasons behind the 
significance of the various fraud factors, alleged financial reporting fraud cases in Egypt, the assessment of 
the various fraud factors, the impact of management motivations, and how external auditors could deal with 
it. The interviews also helped in exploring research areas that have not been explored by the questionnaire. 
For instance, the use and limitations of ISA/ESA 240, the likelihood and types of financial reporting fraud 
committed in Egypt, and whether external auditors appreciate management motivations and its impact on the 
financial statements and whether they are successful in deal with them.  
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The aim of this chapter is two folds. First it summarises and discusses the main findings of the current study 
based on the results from both the questionnaire and semi-structured interviews. Second it shows how the 
current study contributed to both knowledge and practice.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 9.2 summarises and discusses the main findings of 
the current study. Section 9.3 explains how the current study contributed to both knowledge and practice. 
Section 9.4 summarises chapter nine.  
9.2 The Main Research Findings 
The current study explored the significance of the various fraud factors in assessing the risk of financial 
reporting fraud, and how external auditors could assess these fraud factors. It examined the motivations 
behind management fraud, the impact of management motivations on the financial statements, and how 
external auditors could assess the impact of management motivations on the financial statements. It also 
explored the extent by which external auditors in Egypt are aware of and are complying with the requirements 
of ISA 240 with regards to financial reporting fraud, the nature/likelihood of financial reporting fraud in 
Egypt, and the limitations of ISA/ESA 240. These research issues are discussed in detail in this section.  
9.2.1 External Auditor’s Knowledge of and Compliance with ISA 240 and ESA 240 in Egypt 
External auditors in Egypt are required to comply with the Egyptian Standard on Auditing 240 (ESA 240) 
related to their responsibility for fraud detection. ESA 240 is just a translation of the International Standard 
on Auditing (ISA 240) as explained in chapter five. However the lack of empirical evidence with regards to 
external auditors’ knowledge and compliance with ISA/ESA 240 in Egypt motivated the current study to 
explore this issue. Both the questionnaire and interviews conducted by the current study helped in exploring 
this area. However, the interviews helped in confirming the results of the questionnaire in this area as well 
as exploring this area in more depth through probe questions. In particular, the interviews helped to explore 
the fraud factors that external auditors do not take into consideration while assessing the risk of financial 
reporting fraud.  
The findings revealed that external auditors in Egypt are aware of the requirements of ISA/ESA 240 with 
regards to the assessment of financial reporting fraud. However, external auditors were more familiar with 
ISA 240 than ESA 240. This indicates that ISA 240 might be more commonly used and referred to by external 
auditors in Egypt than ESA 240.  
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With regards to the compliance of external auditors in Egypt with ISA 240, the results of the current study 
revealed a lack of consistency in complying with ISA 240 among and within various audit firms in Egypt. 
Some auditors fully comply with the requirements of the standards while others partially comply with the 
standards especially when considering the three fraud triangle factors (i.e. motives to commit fraud, 
opportunity, and rationalisation) and management integrity in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. 
The results revealed that generally external auditors in Egypt seem to give more attention to management 
motives and opportunity to commit fraud while less attention is given to management’s integrity and 
rationalisation. Some external auditors are being selective in their consideration of the three fraud triangle 
factors and management integrity in the assessment of the risk of financial reporting fraud.  However, 
management integrity and rationalisation of fraud are more likely to be overlooked in assessing the risk of 
financial reporting fraud. Three interviewees stated that: 
 
“ISA 240 is not quite applied in Egypt. We are still distant from proper fraud risk assessment and detection. We 
only refer to the requirements of the international standards in our documentation”    
 “There is no audit manual that helps or requires fraud risk assessment as part of the audit in my company. 
However, the focus is more into control risks”         
 “ISA 240 is not fully complied with in Egypt because compliance with ISA 240 requires also companies in 
Egypt with strong and effective internal control systems. Ineffective or weak internal control systems are very 
common in companies in Egypt”          
This finding confirms the results of Hassink et al. (2010) who found that there are great differences among 
audit firms regarding compliance with the relevant auditing standards in relation to fraud risk assessments.  
It also supports Wahdan et al (2005) who found that there is compliance gap between auditing requirements 
and actual practices in Egypt. The findings confirm the results of Higson (2003) and Albrecht et al. (2008) 
who stated that external auditors and audit regulators spend much time looking at opportunity through the 
assessment of internal controls, increasingly recognising the importance of management motivations through 
the business risk approach, and probably do not spend much time on rationale of management or management 
integrity.  
 
The results also revealed that auditors’ compliance with ISA 240 and ESA 240 seem to increase with more 
audit experience while the type of audit office does not seem to have an impact on external auditors’ 
awareness and compliance with ISA 240 and ESA 240. 
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9.2.2 The Usefulness and Limitations of ISA 240 and ESA 240 
The current study sought to explore whether external auditors think ISA 240 and ESA 240 actually help them 
in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud and whether there are any limitations in these two standards. 
This research issue was only explored via the interviews that offered rich details in this area.  
 
The findings from the interviews revealed that ISA 240 and ESA 240 were generally perceived useful by the 
majority of external auditors in the current study. Interviewees stated that ISA/ESA 240 have helped them 
to understand their responsibility for fraud detection which in turn protects the external auditors from being 
liable in case fraud was undetected in an audited client’s company.  
Interviews also said the standards helped them to understand the nature of clients industry, planning for the 
audit, and the discussion with the audit team about fraud related matters and the susceptibility of clients to 
fraud. They added that the standard explained the meaning and nature of fraud, the meaning of fraud risk 
factors, the importance of considering the fraud triangle factors and management’s override of internal 
controls, and the meaning and importance of professional scepticism.  
 
However all interviewees believed that ISA/ESA 240 alone cannot be used as a tool for assessing or detecting 
financial reporting fraud and that audit firms normally prepare their own practical guidance and checklists 
to assess fraud risks. They added that there are limitations in ISA 240/ESA240 that should be considered by 
audit regulators. Interviewees believed that the limitations of ISA/ESA 240 are that they lack important 
details such as how the different types of fraud are committed and what audit procedures the external auditors 
need to follow in each case, lack practical examples that might help in properly assessing and responding to 
fraud risks including the three fraud triangle factors and management integrity, lack examples of 
management’s inquiry about fraud related matters that could help external auditors to be more sceptical, lack 
of fraud-related audit procedures, lack of guidance on how to assess motivations and how to collect evidence 
about the intent of management to commit fraud, and lack of guidance on collusion which is very common 
in most fraud cases. 
 
Other interviewees argued that the audit standards are very limited and  sometimes very vague or complicated 
to follow because of lack of audit procedures in certain areas such as how could external auditors assess 
management’s override of internal controls, and how to document the discussion with the team about client’s 
susceptibility to fraud.  
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Others said the standards are generic and offer very general guidelines, are not tailored to specific industry 
or client’s business, show what the auditors should do to assess fraud risks but does not show how they could 
do this, and are rather theoretical guides than practical guides. Some of their comments were: 
 “ISA 240 is useful however, the standard alone cannot be used for fraud risk assessment because it lacks practical 
guidance and audit procedures that would help auditors comply with the requirements of the standards in practice. 
Detailed explanation of the requirements of the standards is also required” 
 
 “ISA 240 is useful in understanding the different risks associated with the financial statements and in knowing 
about management override of controls and the importance of management’s integrity but it is just a guideline 
that lacks practical applications and examples. It shows what the auditors should do to assess fraud risks but does 
not show how” 
Four interviewees stated that audit firms should provide audit staff with guidance that offers practical 
interpretation of ISA 240 and its requirements. They also added that understanding and applying the standard 
requires enough years of audit experience, proper fraud training and skills, and the existence of an effective 
audit regulatory body that ensures consistency in complying with the standard. Two of them said: 
“ISA 240 is very useful in helping external auditors assess the risk of financial reporting fraud however it is 
quite important for every audit companies to provide its audit staff with a guide that offers practical interpretation 
of the standard and its requirements. Understanding and applying the requirements of the standard requires 
enough years of audit experience because what matters in assessing fraud risks is how sceptical the auditor is or 
in other words the quality of questions asked in case of management inquiry” 
 
“The application of the standard requires the existence of an effective audit regulatory body to ensure 
consistency in complying with the standards which is currently lacking in Egypt. Understanding the 
requirements of the standards requires proper training, skills, and experience. Sometimes due to time and cost 
constraints, auditors might not be able to fully comply with the requirements of the standards” 
 
Three interviewees mentioned that they depend on the guidelines prepared by their companies to assess the 
risk of fraud rather than depending on the standard and that fraud risk assessment is not really a priority for 
the audit in Egypt. They stated that:  
“Yes ISA 240 is useful but it is not quite applied in Egypt. We are still distant from proper fraud risk assessment 
and detection. We only refer to the requirements of the international standards in our documentation”    
 “The standard is very useful in explaining the meaning and importance of professional scepticism which is an 
important skill for any auditors. However, because fraud detection and fraud risk assessment is not the main 
concern of the audit profession in Egypt, the existence of such standard does not have an impact on the quality 
of the audit performed by his company. There is no audit manual that helps or requires fraud risk assessment as 
part of the audit in my company. However, the focus is more into control risks”         
 “ISA 240 is very useful but not fully complied with in Egypt because compliance with ISA 240 requires also 
companies in Egypt with strong and effective internal control systems. Ineffective or weak internal control 
systems are very common in companies in Egypt”          
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Two other interviewees stated that the requirements of the ISA 240 is embedded in a software that they use 
to assess and respond to fraud risks but they have never actually referred to the standard. Another interviewee 
stated that fraud risk assessment is the responsibility of more senior audit staff such as the senior audit 
manager and in some cases the audit partner. Two more interviewees added that the quality of fraud risk 
assessment will depend on the skills that an auditor has and the amount of time and resources allocated for 
the audit. They argued that: 
 “In my opinion, ISA 240 represents merely guidelines, useful but in the right hands. Because the quality of risk 
assessment process depends on how professional the auditor is” 
“ISA 240 is useful in explaining the responsibility of external auditors for fraud which protects external auditors 
in terms of legal liability.   It also includes examples of the different fraud risk factors and high risk accounts such 
as revenue. However generally full compliance with ISAs in Egypt is not guaranteed because of work load, and 
shortage of staff sometimes” 
 
9.2.3 Financial Reporting Fraud in the Egyptian Context  
The scarcity of fraud research in the Egyptian context motivated the current study to explore the nature, 
types, likelihood, and alleged financial reporting fraud cases in Egypt. Both the questionnaire and interviews 
helped to investigate alleged financial reporting fraud cases in Egypt that was discovered by external auditors 
in the current study. However, the interviews helped in exploring this area in more depth especially with 
regards to how external auditors detected these alleged financial reporting fraud cases. The interviews also 
explored areas that have not been explored by the questionnaire such as the nature, likelihood and types of 
financial reporting fraud in Egypt.   
The findings revealed that all types of financial reporting fraud have presence in Egypt, however “improper 
revenue recognition” and “improper assets valuation” are more common. This supports the findings of a 
study released in March 1999 by the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO) that showed improper revenue recognition and improper assets valuation as the most common types 
of financial reporting fraud in other contexts. While, expense and liability understatements were less frequent 
(cited in Beasley, et al. 2000).  
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The findings revealed that financial reporting fraud is common in Egypt and unlikely to be reported by 
external auditors and that sometimes external auditors offer recommendations to management assuming 
fraud is an error rather than reporting it to those charged with governance or withdrawing from the 
engagement. Three interviewees believed that financial reporting fraud is common in Egypt because of “the 
fear to lose the job”, “high competition in the market place”, and “the unemployment problem in Egypt”.  
 
The findings from the interviews also revealed that financial reporting fraud in Egypt is more common in 
small companies, companies where management have motivations to commit financial reporting fraud, and 
in unlisted companies. Financial reporting fraud is relatively rare in joint stock companies, large companies, 
companies audited by any of the Big 4 audit firms, and listed companies that are subject to the supervision 
of the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority. The results showed that financial reporting fraud in Egypt 
is more likely to take place in construction companies, family-owned businesses, and companies preparing 
consolidated financial statements. In listed companies it is more common to find cases of overstated 
revenues, inflated stock prices, improper assets valuation, concealed liabilities and expenses. While in small 
companies and limited companies understatement of revenues is common to avoid paying taxes.  
 
The results also revealed that in more than half the reported cases in the current study, management was 
involved in committing financial reporting fraud. This indicates that management are more likely to commit 
financial reporting fraud in Egypt. This supports the results of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
(ACFE) in 2014 that found that managers were involved in 46.2% of the fraud cases that were reported from 
the Middle East and North Africa. However out of the 52 cases reported in the ACFE study only two cases 
were found in Egypt.  
The showed that although audit experience seemed to have an impact on the likelihood of detecting financial 
reporting fraud, this impact was only minimal. The type of audit firm seems to have no impact on the 
likelihood of external auditors detecting financial reporting fraud. 
The findings revealed that in most of the fraud cases (35 cases) external auditors required adjusting entries 
rather than reporting the matter to those charged with governance and shareholders. In 17 fraud cases the 
matter was referred to the audit committee, a higher level of management, the board of directors, or the audit 
partner. The fraud was only reported to shareholders and a qualified opinion was issued in only two cases 
and the auditors withdrew in only one case. No legal actions were taken in all cases.  
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The findings from the interviews confirmed the results from the questionnaire in this area. The findings from 
the interviews also revealed that the actions taken by external auditors and the audit partners in these 
suspected financial reporting cases were inconsistent. In some cases external auditors and their partners either 
withdrew from the engagement or issued a qualified audit report while in other cases audit partners just 
required adjusting entries or even taken no action. This lack of consistency in reacting to fraud risk 
assessment indicates that external auditors still need guidance on how to respond to fraud risks. These 
findings also indicate the existence of poor corporate governance mechanisms in Egypt. For instance, the 
fact that auditors did not report the suspected fraud to those charged with governance in most cases as 
required by ISA 240 indicates lack of compliance with ISA 240 requirements with regards to reporting fraud. 
The standard requires auditors to report the matter to a third party outside the organisation in case 
management and those charged with governance were suspected of fraud. However this did not happen in 
the cases reported by external auditors in the current study. This also raises concerns about the effectiveness 
of audit committees in Egypt as a monitoring governance mechanism. This confirms the results of a study 
conducted by Samaha et al (2012) who found that audit committees in Egypt are weak and hardly considered 
as an effective corporate governance supervisory mechanism. The authors explained that the phenomenon 
of non-compliance may also be attributed to the present unbalanced political situation, prevalent corruption, 
and deteriorating law where non-compliance with the legal requirements often go unpunished encouraging 
more non-compliance.  
 
The weakness of the legal system in Egypt was also evident in the work of the World Bank (2009), Wahdan 
et al, 2009, and Anis 2014 who found that there is lack of rules that state auditors’ rights and obligations, 
lack of a strong independent professional organisation to guarantee auditors’ rights with the auditees, lack of 
standardised measures for audit quality, and that almost no lawsuits have ever been brought against audit 
firms in Egypt in the past. This might impact the auditors’ incentives to maintain audit quality in Egypt and 
in particular to report suspected fraud. The findings of the current study also explain the results of the ACFE 
in 2014 where they reported that external audit was the least effective technique for detecting fraud around 
the world given that only 5.4% of the fraud cases reported in their study were detected by external audit. If 
external auditors are not reporting alleged fraud cases, their efforts in combating fraud will not be recognised. 
The results from the ACFE also revealed that no fraud cases in their study was reported by external auditors 
in the Middle East and North Africa which is consistent with the findings of the current study.  
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The data collected via the questionnaire and interviews about how financial reporting fraud schemes were 
detected in each case was compiled in table 9.1 below. The table shows the types of financial reporting fraud 
committed in the alleged fraud cases, how external auditors detected each, and whether the data was collected 
via the questionnaire, the interviews, or both.  
 
    Table 9.1 Techniques used by external auditors to detect financial reporting fraud cases in Egypt 
 
Type of Financial 
Reporting Fraud 
Detection methods Source of Data  
Improper assets 
valuation 
 Examining assets valuation 
 Re-performance which helped in discovering that the 
company did not comply with the entity global fixed 
assets policy 
 Inspection of ownership contracts revealed that assets 
were bought for personal use 
 Using IT audit 
Questionnaire 
  Checking prices of inventory with suppliers 
 Inquiry of operations manager 
 Confirmation with banks 
 Tip-offs from an employee of the company 
 Reviewing the work-in-progress account 
 Reviewing the company’s accounting policy for 
depreciation 
 Inquiry of management and those charged with 
governance 
Interviews 
  Re-calculation revealed that the wrong depreciation 
method was used on assets.  
 Re-calculating cost of raw materials used in production 
can help identify inventory overstatement 
 Inventory count 
Questionnaire and 
interviews 
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 The use of analytical procedures such as comparison of 
gross margin in the current year with that of previous 
years 
 Physical examination 
Improper revenue 
recognition 
 Paying attention to red flags like slow moving 
accounts receivable  
 Reviewing journal entries related to purchases 
 Documentation revealed important details were 
missing such as the date of the transaction 
 Reviewing sales contracts were reviewed to reveal the 
overstatement of revenues. 
 Missing proof of actual sale  
 Discussion with the company’s sales representatives 
 Using professional scepticism 
  External confirmation 
 Inquiry of accounts receivable accountant 
Interviews 
  Conducting fraud risk assessment during the planning 
stage 
 Using substantive tests  
 By chance through the use of normal audit procedures 
suggested by the standards such as inspection of 
documents, re-performance, or recalculation 
 Deeper analysis of fraud related controls that failed 
internal control testing by the audit firm 
 Review of budgeted income and provisions 
 Comparing bank reconciliation with the customer 
account 
 Looking for problems with accounts receivable 
confirmations and missing sales invoices 
 Using variance analysis 
 Discussion with the accountant about revenue 
recognition  
Questionnaire 
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 Observing management’s attitude during the 
engagement and paying attention to red flags such as 
limitations imposed by management on the scope of the 
audit  
 Designing anti-fraud audit procedures 
 Using IT audit 
 Examination of unusual transactions 
 Third party confirmations 
 Checking the adequacy of the company provisions and 
reserves 
 The use of an expert such as an actuarial in insurance 
companies  
 Understanding the flow of transactions 
 Performing test of controls and identifying weaknesses 
in the internal control system such as lack of 
commitment to competence, lack of proper financial 
records, and high risk of management override of 
internal controls 
 Investigating tip-offs from customers, employees, and 
whistle blowers 
  Understanding the business and the nature of its 
industry revealed that the company was overstating 
commission revenue. 
 Performing the cut-off and reasonableness tests 
 Auditing the revenue cycle which revealed fake sales 
 Inquiry of and discussion with management  
 Using analytical procedures (mainly comparing profits 
in the current year with that of previous years) 
Questionnaire 
and interviews 
 
 
Concealed 
liabilities  
 
 Reviewing loans and bank debt covenant agreements 
and terms of contracts 
 
 
Interviews 
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 Examining payroll records helped in identifying  paid 
lawyer’s fees that indicated the existence of lawsuits 
against the company that were not disclosed by 
management  
 Reviewing tax regulations  
 Comparing the recorded amount of tax liability on the 
balance sheet and the tax expense account on the 
income statement 
  Comparing management disclosure to information in 
contracts might reveal unrecorded liabilities  
 Understanding the client’s industry 
 Asking for positive confirmation 
 Using variance analysis 
 Using substantive tests 
 Tracking unusual items in liabilities 
 Increasing the audit sample 
Questionnaire 
  Reviewing a complete list of all liabilities Questionnaire 
and interviews 
Concealed 
expenses  
 Documentation 
 Confirmation  
 Looking for the company’s location and ownership  
Interviews 
  Understanding the client’s industry 
 Using variance analysis 
 Using substantive tests 
 Tracking unusual items in expenses 
 Comparing management disclosure to information in 
contracts might reveal unrecorded expenses  
Questionnaire 
Improper disclosure   Tip-offs from an employee of the company  Interviews 
  
 
 Bank confirmations 
 
 
Questionnaire 
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 Comparing reports from the operational department 
with the report from the finance department 
 Inspection of documents revealed a related party 
transaction that was not disclosed my management  
 
9.2.4 The Significance of the Various Fraud Factors  
The current study sought to explore the significance of the following various fraud factors in assessing the 
risk of financial reporting fraud. These factors include management motives, management integrity, 
rationalisation, opportunity, and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities. Both the questionnaire and interviews in the 
current study helped to explore this research issue. However, the interviews helped in confirming the results 
of the questionnaire in this area and also to explore the reasons behind the significance of the various fraud 
factors.  
The findings of both the questionnaire and interview revealed that “management motives to commit fraud” 
is the most significant factor in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. This supports the results of 
prior studies that found management motivation behind fraud a key factor for assessing the risk of financial 
reporting fraud (Grazioli, et al., 2006; Elayan and Meyer, 2008; Erickson et al., 2006; Higson, 2011; Gary 
Becker, 1968; Reinstein et al., 1998; Davies, 2000; Coenen, 2008; Hasnan et al., 2008; Ramamoorti et al., 
2009; Wells, 2001; Higson, 2011; Pedneault, 2004a; Grazioli et al., 2006; Hogan et al, 2008). 
The interviewees in the current study believed management motive is a key factor in committing financial 
reporting fraud because it could have a direct impact on the financial statements. Four interviewees believed 
that management motives are more significant than opportunity for fraud because with the lack of motive an 
existing opportunity for fraud will not matter and will not be enough for a fraud perpetrator to take the risk 
of committing fraud.  Their comments were: 
 
“Management motives could have a direct impact on the financial statements such as in the case of management’s 
override of internal control to achieve his/her motives. In this case it does not matter how strong the internal 
control system is” 
 
“Management could manipulate the financial statements figures to achieve their goals. Thus, understanding 
management motives would indicate the accounts that might be manipulated by management to achieve their 
goals”.  
 
“There has to be a reason for management to commit fraud such as the desire to get bonuses. Otherwise, why 
would they commit fraud and bear its risk?”  
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“Financial reporting fraud is more likely to be committed by management who will not take this risk unless they 
have a strong motive to do so. This is more likely to happen when performance is linked to financial targets or 
management wants to meet the budget”. 
 
“Unless somebody has a motive to commit fraud, he or she will not take that risk. Integrity goes hand in hand 
with motives. If someone has a strong motive to commit fraud and is lacking integrity, committing fraud will be 
much easier and more likely to happen”.  
 
Others interviewees added that management motives are particularly important in the Egyptian context 
because of the poor economic conditions that might force companies to go bankrupt as well as the weak 
internal control systems in most companies in Egypt which makes opportunity for fraud common anyway. 
Their comments were: 
“Motive is a key for committing fraud and the main driver for committing any fraudulent act not just in Egypt. 
However in Egypt it is more likely to be the key driver for committing financial reporting fraud because running 
companies and saving them from bankruptcy in the current weak economy and political unrest is very difficult”.  
 
“In Egypt opportunities for fraud will always be found either because of weaknesses in the internal control systems 
of companies or loopholes in accounting and tax regulations. Thus, without a motive to commit fraud, there will 
be no reason for management to commit financial reporting fraud and to bear its risks”.  
 
“Motives could have a direct impact on the financial statements especially in the Egyptian context and when it 
comes to the choice of accounting policies and decisions related to estimates. Rationalisation is also important 
but always directly related to motives. That is if someone has the motive to commit fraud, he/she will always 
rationalise it” 
 
The findings also revealed that more experienced auditors rated management motives as either a most 
significant or significant factor in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. However audit experience 
only have a minimal impact on external auditors’ consideration of management’s motives in assessing the 
risk of financial reporting fraud. The type of audit office appeared to have a strong impact on external 
auditors’ appreciation of management motives. Big 4 audit firms and international audit firms other than the 
Big 4 tend to regard management motives as a key factor in assessing financial reporting fraud more than 
the other types of audit firms.  
The findings revealed that the second most significant fraud factor is “management integrity”. This finding 
supports the findings of Emma et al (2009) who found that audit risk decreases as the evidence for 
management’s integrity increases and that the evaluation of management integrity is a critical part of 
developing an audit opinion as to the fairness of the presentation of financial statements.  
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One interviewee stated that: 
“Integrity is the key to committing fraud because without integrity committing fraud will not be possible even 
if the other fraud factors exist”.  
The results support the body of knowledge that found management integrity a significant factor in explaining 
the reasons behind fraudulent behaviours in general and financial reporting fraud in particular (Albrecht et 
al., 1984; Woefel and Woefel, 1987; Loebbecke and Willingham, 1988; Carpenter and Reimers, 2005; 
Rezaee and Riley, 2010; Chen et al., 2013).  The results also revealed that management integrity and 
rationalisation were perceived somehow equally significant by external auditors in the current study. This 
indicates that there is a likely link between rationalisation and integrity where external auditors seems to 
consider them equally significant. This might be because people with low integrity tend to rationalise 
fraudulent acts more. This was supported by Albrecht et al (1984) who suggested that integrity should replace 
rationalisation because personal integrity affects the probability that an individual may rationalise 
inappropriate behaviour. The results of the interviews confirmed this where two interviewees mentioned that 
although rationalisation could be an important factor, it will always be related to the level of management 
motivations and integrity. That is because if management have the motivations to commit fraud and lacks 
integrity, rationalisation will be more likely. The results of the interviews, however, showed that 
rationalisation was not mentioned at all as the most significant factor. This finding confirms the previous 
results of the questionnaire that showed external auditors give more attention to management motives and 
opportunity to commit fraud while less attention if not any to management rationale.  
 
The results revealed that “opportunity to commit fraud” and “fraud perpetrators’ capabilities” were perceived 
as equally significant by external auditors in the current study. This shows how important fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities might be in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. This supports the current body of 
knowledge that found fraud perpetrators’ capabilities a significant factor in assessing the risk of financial 
reporting fraud (Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004; Vona, 2008, Omar and Din (2010; Kassem and Higson, 2012). 
The results also indicate that there might be a link between opportunities to commit fraud and some of the 
traits or capabilities that fraud perpetrators might possess. For instance, “capacity to exploit internal control 
weaknesses”, “authoritative position within the organisation”, and “confidence that fraud perpetrators will 
not be detected or if caught will get out of it” could all be the result of weaknesses in the internal control 
system that could create a high risk of opportunity to commit fraud. Too much power in the hand of one 
person could increase the risk of that person abusing his/her power which might also create an opportunity 
to commit fraud as well as increase the risk of management override of internal control (Wells, 2005).  
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This supports Vona (2008) who argued that a person’s position in the organisation contributes to the 
opportunity to commit fraud and there is a direct correlation between opportunity to commit fraud and the 
ability to conceal the fraud. This also supports the results of Omar and Din (2010) who found that without 
the capability to exploit control weaknesses for the purpose of committing and concealing the fraud act, no 
fraud can occur.  
Five interviewees perceived opportunity to commit fraud as the most significant fraud factor. They justified 
this by stating that weaknesses in internal control sometimes encourages people to commit fraud, committing 
fraud is easier when the consequences are not severe, committing fraud will be difficult without an existing 
opportunity to commit fraud. Three of them stated that: 
 
“Although weaknesses in internal control is a red flag for an existing opportunity to commit fraud, even in a 
strong control system management override of internal control could make fraud perpetration more likely”.  
 
“Opportunity to commit fraud is always related to existing weaknesses in the company’s controls which is very 
common in Egypt. Even if a person has a motive to commit fraud, without an opportunity to commit fraud, fraud 
will be difficult to commit or at least will be less likely to happen”.  
 
 “Opportunity is a key because it could happen as a result of weaknesses in internal control system which can be 
easily observed and is always the main concern for any audit” 
 
The findings of the current study have implications for external auditors and audit regulators. ISA 240 
requires external auditors to consider the three fraud triangle factors and management integrity in assessing 
the risk of financial reporting fraud. However with no guidance regarding the significance of these fraud 
factors, external auditors might assume that all factors have the same significance and thereby overlook the 
most significant factor(s). This might impact the quality of fraud risk assessments and thereby the likelihood 
of detecting financial reporting fraud. The findings of the current study suggests that external auditors should 
give more attention to management motivations and management integrity compared to opportunity for 
fraud. Management integrity should replace rationalisation of fraud as suggested by Albrecht et al (1984). 
However external auditors should keep in mind that rationalisation of fraud could be a sign for low 
management integrity. That is because people with low integrity tend to rationalise fraudulent acts and 
unethical behaviour more.  
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Fraud perpetrators’ capabilities should be considered while assessing the opportunity for fraud given that 
they both appeared to have equal significance. External auditors should keep in mind that only people with 
certain capabilities will be able to exploit weaknesses in the internal control system. These capabilities were 
explored by the current study and are discussed in a further section in this chapter. Currently the audit 
standards did not require external auditors to consider fraud perpetrators’ capabilities in their fraud risk 
assessment. However, given the significance of this factor, the findings from the current study suggests that 
audit regulators should consider incorporating fraud perpetrators’ capabilities in fraud risk assessments.  
The findings of the current study also suggest a change in the shape of the current fraud triangle model to a 
layered fraud triangle or a pyramid. That is to reflect the significance of each fraud factor with more weight 
given to management motives and management integrity compared to opportunity for fraud as shown in 
figure 9.1. 
Figure 9.1 The New Fraud Triangle Model or Fraud Pyramid 
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Management integrity 
Management Motives 
Alert to external auditors: 
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existing opportunity for 
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9.2.5 Fraud Perpetrators’ Capabilities  
The current study sought to explore whether external auditors in the current study think that fraud 
perpetrators’ capabilities should be considered in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. Currently 
the audit standards did not require this. However the results of prior literature showed that fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities is a significant factor in understanding fraudulent behaviours. This motivated the current study 
to explore the opinion of audit professionals in this matter.  
The questionnaire results showed that the majority of external auditors in the current study believed that 
fraud perpetrators’ capabilities should be considered in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. The 
respondents of the current study was then asked to rank the traits that could enhance management’s 
capabilities to commit financial reporting fraud. The results of the questionnaire revealed that “the capacity 
to exploit internal control weaknesses” is the most significant trait in assessing management’s capabilities to 
commit financial reporting fraud. This was followed by “authoritative position within the organisation”, 
“capacity to understand accounting systems”, and “confidence that the fraud perpetrator will not be detected 
and if caught will get out of it easily”. The least significant trait was “the ability to deal with stress”.  
9.2.6 The Assessment of Fraud Factors  
The current study sought to explore how external auditors could assess the various fraud factors including 
management motives, opportunity, rationalisation, fraud perpetrators’ capabilities, and management 
integrity. The current study also explored the difficulty of assessing these various fraud factors. Both the 
questionnaire and interviews helped in exploring these areas, however the interviews helped in exploring 
this area in more depth through the use of probe questions and discussions with the interviews in the current 
study. The interviews also helped in exploring the reasons behind the difficulty of assessing the various fraud 
factors.  
The findings revealed that external auditors in the current study perceive management integrity and 
rationalisation of fraud as the most difficult fraud factors to assess compared to management motives, fraud 
perpetrators’ capabilities, and opportunity to commit fraud. This might explain why external auditors in the 
current study pay less attention to management integrity and rationalisation in the assessment of the risk of 
financial reporting fraud.  
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The results of the interviews revealed that management integrity was perceived as difficult to assess because 
there is no guidance in the audit standards on how to assess management integrity, external auditors are not 
trained on assessing management integrity, management integrity is intangible, unobservable, and could be 
highly subjective, and the difficulty in assessing management integrity arise with the lack of evidence about 
management integrity. Interviewees viewed rationalisation a very difficult factor to assess because it cannot 
be seen and is intangible, very difficult to observe, can be easily hidden by clever management, is very hard 
to assess alone without considering the motives and opportunity to commit fraud, requires a lot of experience 
and personal judgment, is difficult to create a benchmark or standards to help auditors assess rationalisation 
because it differs from one person to another, and is very difficult to proof especially with the lack of 
guidance. Two interviewees viewed opportunity as the most difficult fraud factor to assess because it requires 
a lot of observation to discover weaknesses in a client’s internal control system which could be very time 
consuming, and it requires a lot of effort from auditors to understand and assess the client’s internal control 
system which is something that is currently overlooked in some audit firms. Two interviewees mentioned 
that assessing fraud perpetrators’ capabilities could be difficult because the audit standards did not require 
external auditors to consider it. They said:  
 
“Given the time and cost constraints and the high competition in the audit market in Egypt, it might not be practical 
for external auditors to assess fraud perpetrators’ capabilities especially with the lack of guidance in this area”.  
 
“Sometimes the power of management can lead to collusion which is very difficult to detect and also there is 
generally lack of awareness of fraud, integrity, and ethical behaviour in companies operating in Egypt. This makes 
employees vulnerable to management’s abuse and manipulation and thus understanding fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities in this case will not make a difference in assessing fraud risks”. 
 
The findings also revealed that management integrity should not be assessed separately from rationalisation 
of fraud. One interviewee stated that “in case the risk of management integrity was assessed as low, this will 
eventually reduce the risk of rationalisation”. This supports the earlier discussion about the existing link 
between rationalisation and integrity. This also supports prior research that suggests replacing rationalisation 
with integrity as it is more observable (Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004).  
With regards to the assessment of the various fraud factors, the results of both the questionnaire and 
interviews in this area were compiled to develop detailed guides for external auditors to help them assess the 
various fraud factors. The detailed guides are available in Appendix A3.  
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9.2.7 The Motivations behind Management Fraud in Egypt 
The current study sought to explore what might motivate management in Egypt to commit financial reporting 
fraud. Both the questionnaire and interviews conducted by the current study helped to address this research 
issue. However, the interviews helped in exploring this issue in more depth and at the same time confirmed 
the questionnaire results in this area. In the questionnaire, respondents of the current study were given a list 
of motives behind management fraud and were asked to rank these motives according to their likelihood of 
occurrence in Egypt. However, in the interview, respondents were given an open-ended question about the 
motivations behind management fraud. This helped in collecting as much details as possible from 
respondents as they were not restricted or biased by a list of management motives.  
 
The findings revealed that “the desire for remuneration or to get a bonus” is the most likely motive behind 
management fraud in the Egyptian context. The results of the interviews revealed that management in Egypt 
are more likely to commit financial reporting fraud to get bonuses especially if it is linked to financial 
performance or to achieving certain targets. This motive was mentioned fifteen times by interviewees. 
Interviewees added that this management motive is more likely to lead to overstatement of revenues and is 
more common in large companies or listed companies in Egypt. One interviewee stated that: 
“Management is more likely to overstate revenues in this case. This is more common in large and listed 
companies”  
 
This finding supports the findings of other research studies that found the desire to increase management’s 
remuneration a common motivation to commit financial reporting fraud in other contexts (Jones, 2011; 
Rezaee and Riley, 2010; Cheffins, 2009; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004; Chowdhury and Wang, 2009; Cheffins, 
2009; Jones, 2011; Mckee and Santore, 2008; Dunn, 1999; Anderson and Tirrell, 2004; Chesney and Gibson-
Asner, 2005; Sen, 2007; Donoher et al., 2007; Elayan and Meyer, 2008; Cullinan et al., 2008; Robison and 
Santore, 2008; Albrecht et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2008; Jaenicke 2001; Mckee and Santore, 2008;  Beasley 
et al., 2010; Troy et al., 2011).  
 
The findings also revealed that “the need to get or maintain finance for the business” is the second most 
likely motive behind management fraud in the Egyptian context. This is similar to the findings of prior studies 
that found the desire to obtain finance could motivate management to commit financial reporting fraud in 
other contexts (Dechow et al., 1996; Beasley et al., 1999; Dunn, 1999; Anderson and Tirrell, 2004; Beasley 
et al., 2010; Firth et al., 2011). This finding also supports Kamel and Elbanna (2010) who found that one of 
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the main incentives for manipulating earnings in Egypt is to enhance the chances of obtaining a bank loan. 
However, their research was exploring the motivations behind earnings management in Egypt rather than 
financial reporting fraud. The third most commonly cited motivation behind management fraud in Egypt as 
found in the questionnaire and interviews is “to conceal company’s financial distress or to avoid bankruptcy”. 
The results of the current study also supports the results of prior studies that found management might 
commit financial reporting fraud to conceal company’s deteriorating financial condition in other contexts 
(Beasley et al., 1999; Kapardis, 2002; Rosner, 2003; Albrecht et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2008; Hasnan et 
al., 2008; Beasley et al., 2010; Firth et al., 2011). 
The desire to avoid paying taxes seems to be common in Egypt as found by the current study. The findings 
from the interviews added that the desire to avoid paying taxes is more common in small companies or 
family-owned businesses in Egypt. One interviewee added that: 
 
“Management could commit financial reporting fraud in order to avoid paying taxes especially in small 
companies and family owned businesses”  
 
Other management motives that were found by the current study include: “the need to cover up assets 
misappropriated for personal use”, “to avoid delisting from stock exchanges and to meet the requirements of 
the stock market”, “to survive in the market in case of high level of competition in the market, monopoly, 
weak economic conditions, or political unrest”, “personal sudden need for money or personal gain”, 
“pressure from government in state-owned companies”, and “Ego and self-esteem”. Some interviewees 
added that management could commit financial reporting fraud in Egypt to keep their job (mentioned 6 
times), for personal financial gain or need (mentioned 5 times), to meet budgets (mentioned 5 times), to 
survive in the market (mentioned 5 times), or to meet bank’s debt covenant agreements (mentioned 4 times). 
Their comments were: 
 
“Management could commit financial reporting fraud to meet or to reduce budget variances especially when 
budget is unrealistic or targets are very difficult to achieve”   
 
“Management could commit financial reporting fraud to survive in the market especially when there is monopoly 
or high competition in the market” 
 
“Management could commit financial reporting fraud to meet bank’s debt covenant agreements which could 
lead to manipulations in equity and ratios such as liquidity ratios” 
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The findings of the current study in this area thus support the results of Firth et al. (2011) who found 
management is motivated to overstate revenue to avoid being de-listed from the stock exchange in other 
contexts, Hasnan et al (2008) who found no relationship between politically connected firms and financial 
reporting fraud and Kamel and Elbanna (2012) who found that state-owned enterprises are less eager to 
maximise their offering proceeds than privately owned companies in Egypt. The results of the current study 
also supports the findings of Anderson and Tirrell (2004), Ball (2009), Rezaee and Riley (2010), and 
Dorminey et al. (2011) who found that ego and self-esteem could motivate management in other contexts to 
commit financial reporting fraud, Drew (2012) and Cressey (1950) who found personal sudden need for 
money could motivate management to commit financial reporting fraud in other contexts, and Omar and Din 
(2010) who found high degree of competition in the market could motivate management to commit fraud.  
The results of the current study showed that the desire to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts, pressure from 
family-owned businesses, and culture and norms were mentioned as likely motivations behind management 
fraud in Egypt. This finding supports the results of Rezaee (2003), Albrecht et al (2008), Beasley et al (2010), 
and Perols and Lougee (2010) who found that the desire to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts could motivate 
management to commit financial reporting fraud in other contexts. It also support prior studies (Anderson 
and Tirell, 2004; Albrecht et al., 2010; Jara and Lopez, 2011; Connelly et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2008; Hasnan 
et al., 2008) that found pressure from family-owned businesses motivate management to commit financial 
reporting fraud in other contexts, and Zahra et al. (2005) who culture and norms motivates management to 
commit financial reporting fraud in other contexts.  
The findings from the interviews added that the desire to increase share prices could motivate management 
in Egypt to commit financial reporting fraud. This could happen through either overstatement of revenues or 
understatement of liabilities and is more common in large or listed companies. This supports the results of 
Kamel and El Banna (2010), Beasley et al. (1999). One interviewee added that: 
 
“Management could be motivated to commit financial reporting fraud in order to increase share prices through 
either overstatement of revenues or understatement of liabilities. This is more common in large or listed 
companies” 
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The results of the current study also revealed that greed, taking revenge, social status comparisons, coercion, 
and crime of passion could motivate management in Egypt to commit financial reporting fraud. This supports 
the results of Albrecht et al. (2008) who found that executives’ greed is a motive to commit fraud, 
Ramamoorti et al. (2009) who found that taking revenge, social status comparisons, and crimes of passion 
could motivate management to commit financial reporting fraud in other contexts, and Boyel et al. (2012) 
who found evidence that coercion by CEOs could force management to commit financial reporting fraud.  
Three interviewees argued that management in Egypt could also be motivated by an existing opportunity in 
the company’s internal control system or a weakness in current accounting standards or regulations. They 
stated that:  
 
 “Sometimes the existence of opportunity to commit fraud could motivate management to commit financial 
reporting fraud such as in the case of small local companies in Egypt where there is a weak internal control 
system and concentration of power in the hand of one or two persons is the norm”.  
 
“Management could be motivated to commit financial reporting fraud in order to make use of an existing 
opportunity for fraud such as loopholes in accounting and tax regulations especially those related to investment 
and accounting for fair value, capital expenses, and tax laws”.  
 
The complete list of motivations behind management fraud in the Egyptian context is summarised in table 
9.2. The table includes complied date from the questionnaire and interviews. All motives are ranked from 
the most likely to the least likely motives. The ranks were based on perceptions of external auditors in the 
Egyptian context. The table includes the source of data to show whether the data comes from the 
questionnaire or interviews. 
Table 9.2 The motivations behind management fraud in Egypt 
Rank Management’s motives Source of Data  
1 Desire to increase/get management’s 
remuneration 
Questionnaire and interviews 
2 Need to get/maintain finance for the business Questionnaire and interviews 
3 Conceal company’s financial distress or to 
avoid bankruptcy 
Questionnaire and interviews  
4 Pressure from owner in family-owned 
businesses 
Questionnaire 
5 Meeting/beating analysts’ forecasts Questionnaire 
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6 Cover up assets misappropriated for personal 
use 
Questionnaire and interviews  
7 Avoid delisting from stock exchanges and to 
meet the requirements of the stock market 
Questionnaire and interviews 
8 To survive in the market in case of high level 
of competition in the market, monopoly, weak 
economic conditions, or political unrest 
Questionnaire and interviews 
9 Personal sudden need for money or personal 
gain 
Questionnaire and interviews  
10 Greed Questionnaire 
11 Pressure from government in state-owned 
companies 
Questionnaire and interviews 
12 Social status comparisons  Questionnaire 
13 Culture and norms  Questionnaire 
14 Ego and self-esteem Questionnaire and interviews 
15 Pressure from coercion  Questionnaire 
16 Ideology Questionnaire 
17 Taking revenge  Questionnaire 
18 To avoid paying taxes especially in small 
companies and family owned businesses 
Interviews  
19 To keep their job  Interviews 
20 To meet budgets or to reduce budget variances 
especially when budget is unrealistic or targets 
are very difficult to achieve  
Interviews 
21 To meet bank’s debt covenant agreements 
which could lead to manipulations in equity 
and ratios such as liquidity ratios  
Interviews 
22 To increase share prices  Interviews 
23 The existence of an opportunity to commit 
fraud  
Interviews 
24 To make the firm look more profitable to please 
investors or owners  
Interviews 
25 The existence of a weak legal system Interviews 
26 The desire to maintain power  Interviews 
27 Lack of monitoring  Interviews 
28 Conflicts of interest Interviews 
29 For the purpose of mergers and acquisitions or 
in case of sale of a subsidiary  
Interviews 
30 To reduce share prices to make it cheaper for 
related parties to buy 
Interviews 
31 To show high firm performance in order to get 
a job at the head quarter of a developed country 
Interviews 
32 Pressure from shareholders to pay dividends  
To gain access to international markets  
Interviews 
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9.2.8 The Impact of Management Motivations on the Financial Statements  
The current study sought to explore what impact management motivations could have on the financial 
statements and whether external auditors appreciate the impact of management motivations on the financial 
statements. Data collected via the interviews helped to explore this area in more depth as well as exploring 
areas that were explored by the questionnaire. For instance, “whether external auditors appreciate 
management motivations and its impact on the financial statements in Egypt and why?” and “whether 
external auditors in Egypt are successful in dealing with the impact of management motivations and why”. 
The findings from the questionnaire revealed that the majority of external auditors in the current study 
believed management motivations could often impact the figures and disclosures in the financial statements, 
some of them thought that management motivations could occasionally impact the figures and disclosures in 
the financial statements, while other said that management motivations will impact the financial statements’ 
figures and disclosures all the time.  
The results of the interviews revealed that external auditors in Egypt appreciate the impact of management 
motivations on the financial statements because “management motivations could have a direct impact on the 
financial statements”, “it is the main drive for committing financial reporting fraud”, “management is always 
in a good position to use their power to achieve their goals which might increase the likelihood of committing 
financial reporting fraud”, and “it could have an impact on auditors’ reputation and legal liability”. Almost 
all interviewees believed that management motivations are appreciated more by external auditors working at 
the Big 4 international audit firms than any other audit firm in Egypt. This supports the findings of Wahdan 
et al (2005) who found that audit quality tend to be better in Big 4 audit firms in Egypt than smaller audit 
firms.  
 
Interviewees comments include: 
 
“The impact of management motivations is appreciated especially by external auditors working at the Big 4 
audit firms because financial reporting fraud could have a devastating impact on the financial statements and 
the auditors’ reputation and legal liability” 
 
“Yes definitely because audit firms started to pay more attention to fraud detection after the 25th of January 
revolution where people requires more transparency and integrity. Also audit firms in Egypt offer consultancies 
in fraud examination which further encouraged them to take the issue of fraud more seriously than before” 
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“The impact of management motives on the financial statements is appreciated, but this requires a lot of 
experience in the audit field and differs from one auditor to another according to their knowledge, qualifications, 
and experience” 
“It is only applied on a small scale mainly by some Big 4 audit firms because small audit firms do not care much 
about audit quality and sometimes their audits are limited to test of details and vouching” 
 
Other interviewees believed that management motivations and its impact are not really appreciated in Egypt 
due to “the lack of a strong and effective audit regulatory body that monitors audit quality in Egypt”, “time 
and cost constraints”, “fraud examination is not one of the concerns in audits in Egypt”, “fear of losing audit 
clients”, “high competition in the market among audit firms”, “the difficulty to prove management intent”, 
“delays that could be caused in the audit report if management motivations would to be considered which 
might increase auditors liability”, and “ it requires a lot of experience to use professional scepticism which 
is sometimes lacking”.  
Some interviewees added that: 
“From my experience as an external auditor at the Accountability State Authority (ASA), external auditors in 
other audit firms do not pay much attention to management’s motivation behind fraud and its impact on the 
financial statements. Sometimes they do not even take our comments into consideration. Unfortunately the ASA 
is a supervisory authority and do not have the power to impose penalties on companies for such manipulations. 
However we just report any concerns to a higher authority which could be either those charged with governance 
in a company or the minister of Investment or Petroleum depending on the nature of the company’s operations” 
“It is not considered because fraud examination is not one of the main concerns of the audit. Audit firms pay 
more attention to risks related to going concern. Unless there is no conditions or circumstances that make 
auditors believe financial reporting fraud risk is high, fraud risk assessments will not be considered” 
“I do not think it is considered because in most cases manipulations could be classified as errors rather than 
fraud. Fraud risk assessment in general could be very time consuming and costly”.  
“Management motivations will only be considered if there are red flags that make external auditors believe that 
the risk of management motivations behind fraud and its impact on the financial statements is high”.  
“Materiality is a key factor in deciding whether management motivations could be a concern for external 
auditors or not” 
The majority of interviewees believed external auditors in Egypt are not successful in dealing with the impact 
of management motivations on the financial statements because “external auditors still need guidance on 
fraud related audit procedures, especially how to respond to risk of financial reporting fraud”, “audit firms 
fear to lose audit clients due to high competition in the market among audit firms”, “lack of qualified audit 
staff and time constraints”,  “Lack of an audit regulatory body that monitors audit quality in Egypt and 
encourages external auditors to report fraud cases”,  “weak legal system in Egypt”,  “the audit profession in 
Egypt is not yet well developed and is not mature enough to offer high quality assurance”, “fraud risk 
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assessment is hardly considered as part of the audit”, “  lack of fraud awareness in the country and within 
audit firms in Egypt”, and “more focus is given to control risks rather than fraud risks”.  
Some interviewees said that: 
“More emphasis and guidance are still needed on professional scepticism, management’s motivation behind 
fraud and its impact on the financial statements, and the discussion of the audit team about the susceptibility of 
the client’s firm to fraud”  
“Lack of consistency in complying with the standards which is due to the absence of an effective audit regulatory 
body that encourages external auditors to report fraud cases and enforce compliance with the standards” 
“Management challenges auditors most of the time and sometimes imposes restrictions on the audit scope and 
the fear to lose clients might be an obstacle for auditors to succeed in dealing with the impact of management 
motives”       
“Current weak economic conditions makes it harder for external auditors to find a job and for audit firms to 
recruit more auditors and enhance their audit quality”.  
“Pressure from the board where sometimes the board of directors are made up of shareholders themselves which 
makes the auditors’ job really difficult. This make the auditors face the threat of losing the audit engagement if 
they disagreed with the board”. 
“Inconsistency among audit firms in complying with the requirements of the international audit standards makes 
competition among audit firms in the market really high and puts pressure on auditors who are aiming for high 
audit quality”. 
“Management’s ability to rationalise fraudulent acts as errors or unintentional mistakes and intentions are very 
difficult for auditors to prove or to assess”     
“Management have the ability to cover thefts and manipulate the financial statements figures in a way that might 
be beyond the auditors’ ability to discover”       
“Lack of guidance from the majority of audit firms in fraud risk assessment or in showing the importance of 
assessing fraud risks as part of the audit work, creates this inconsistency”.   
Some interviewees argued that there is generally a lack of consistency in complying with the requirements 
of the audit standards with regards to fraud risk assessment. Interviewees agreed that Big 4 audit firms tend 
to be relatively successful in dealing with management motivations and its impact on the financial statements 
relative to small audit firms in Egypt. Audit methodologies used by Big 4 audit firms take into consideration 
fraud risk assessment and response as required by ISA240. Audit quality control in Big 4 puts more pressure 
on audit staff to consider fraud risk assessment. This approach is less likely in small audit firms. They added 
that the success of external auditors in auditing management motivations will depend on their qualifications, 
skills, experience, knowledge of the nature of the audit profession in Egypt and the requirements of the 
international audit standards, understanding of clients business and industry, auditor’s integrity, and the type 
of audit firm. 
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Comments included: 
“Consideration of management motives is better in Big 4 audit firms as they have their audit methodologies that 
would normally incorporate the three fraud triangle factors in assessing fraud risks. However this depends on 
the qualifications and experience of the auditor”.   
 “Big 4 audit firms might be more successful than small audit firms because they follow the requirements of the 
international audit standards in every stage of the audit process. Small audit firms might not take into 
consideration management’s motivation because of lack of fraud awareness and the role of external auditors in 
fraud detection and the importance of auditor’s independence” 
“Smaller companies are less likely to take management motives into consideration because they face high 
competition in the audit market and strive to keep their audit clients” 
“Small audit firms might deal with fraud if they discovered it by chance but they will not really focus much on 
fraud risk assessment and fraud-related audit procedures” 
 “The lack of an effective audit regulatory body that enforces that standards and impose penalties for non-
compliance or violation of the standards leads to inconsistency in complying with the standards and the audit 
procedures used”.  
“Sometimes audit firms face a lot of pressure from management either in the form of limitations on their scope 
of audit taking advantage of the time and cost constraints that most audit firms face or threats to audit fees and 
changing them if they did not issue an unqualified audit opinion. External auditors always face the challenge of 
keeping the clients and at the same time follow the requirements of the audit standards in maintaining high 
quality audit”.  
“In most cases when a fraud-related issue is communicated to an audit partner, no further actions are taken 
because of fear to lose the client. In most cases, the client is required to modify the financial statements and then 
a clean report is issued. A qualified opinion is only issued if the client refuses to modify the financial statements 
as requested by auditor” 
“There is a tendency towards pleasing and keeping audit clients and the external auditors’ independence in Egypt 
is a real concern. Sometimes, there are huge discrepancies between the report of an ASA auditor and the audit 
report from other private audit firms for the same company. The lack of an audit regulatory body for governing 
and regulating all audit firms in Egypt makes it difficult for these audit firms to maintain high audit quality and 
comply with the requirements of the international audit standards all the time” 
 
The findings of the current study also revealed that management motivations to a great extent could lead to 
material manipulations in the financial statements to achieve management’s targets. Some interviewees 
added that the extent and degree of the manipulations in the financial statements will depend on the type of 
management motives and that is why it is important for external auditors to understand what might motivate 
management to commit financial reporting fraud in any context.  
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The areas or accounts that are more likely to be manipulated by management motives include revenues, 
estimates such as useful life of fixed assets and valuation of investment properties, expenses, manual journal 
entries, assets, cost of goods sold, and accounts receivable. Three interviewees provided examples of 
management motives and how this could impact the financial statements. They said: 
“In Egypt, revenues, expenses, and cash flows are significant risk areas because management might be motivated 
to conceal expenses or overstate revenues to make the company look more profitable or to avoid paying taxes”  
 
“Liabilities can be concealed to get loans from banks or liabilities can be misclassified to make the liquidity 
ratio look better for loan purposes or to meet the bank’s covenant agreements” 
 
“If management wants to get bonuses that are linked to financial performance, then there might be a high 
likelihood that the revenue account will be overstated. If management wants to avoid tax, then revenue will be 
understated”  
 
Two interviewees added that: 
 “Management motivations could lead to manipulations in the financial statements so it is important to 
understand the different management motives in different contexts so that external auditors could pay more 
attention to the most vulnerable accounts”.  
“Management motivation could affect any area of the financial statements especially management’s estimates 
like valuation of investment properties or useful life of fixed assets and manual journal entries especially year 
end journal entries. The problem with the Egyptian context is that there is no regulated market for assets 
valuation which might increase the floor for management’s manipulations” 
Three interviewees provided examples of management motives and how this could impact the financial 
statements. For instance, management might be motivated to conceal expenses or overstate revenues to make 
the company look more profitable or to avoid paying taxes, liabilities could be concealed to get loans from 
banks or to meet bank covenant agreements, revenues could be overstated so that management could get 
bonuses. The results of the current study supports the results of Dey et al. (2008) who found support that 
management in Egypt are motivated to overstate revenues through using income-increasing accounting 
techniques to increase their bonuses and pay less tax.  
The results revealed that management motivations could lead to manipulations in the profit or loss accounts 
to show better performance or to avoid paying taxes, financial ratios to show better performance in case of a 
need to obtain a loan from banks, and it could even lead to creating a shell company to overstate the 
company’s expenses to avoid paying taxes. The results also revealed that management motivations could 
lead to fictitious goodwill to overstate assets through the use of related party transactions, capitalisation of 
expenses to overstate revenues, manipulations in revenue recognition, timing difference, income smoothing, 
concealed expenses, not recording accruals, improper assets valuation, manipulations in estimates such as 
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provisions and reserves, manipulations in borrowing costs, fictitious revenue, revenue overstatement or 
understatement, undisclosed transactions with related parties, hidden liabilities, understatement of liabilities 
and expenses, fictitious expenses, understatement of liabilities for getting bank loans, or overstatement of 
revenues to keep one’s job. Some interviewees stated that: 
“Management could be motivated to show better company performance by colluding with other managers to 
overstate revenues”.  
 
“Consolidation is vulnerable to management’s manipulations in Egypt. The aim is to overstate assets and 
revenues through the use of different accounting policies during consolidation”  
 
“Management could overstate the cost of goods sold to avoid paying taxes through the purchase of fictitious raw 
materials to increase the cost of inventories”  
 
“Management could overstate inventory through misclassification of assets. For example recording fixed assets 
like parts of machinery as inventory to avoid depreciation expenses”  
 
“Manipulations in the provisions for contingent liabilities and colluding with the company’s lawyer in order to 
hide important information from the auditor so that he/she could not decide on the value of the expected 
contingent liabilities and the appropriate provisions for it”.   
 
“Management might be motivated to manipulate certain accounts like reserves, estimates, assets, revenues via 
creating fictitious revenues, and liabilities via omission of liabilities”.  
 
“In case of tax avoidance, the revenue will normally be understated. In case of loans, revenues will be overstated 
to meet debt covenant agreements”  
 
“Management motivations could lead to improper assets valuation and fictitious revenues and assets, non-
compliance with the accounting standards when preparing the financial statements, overstatement of expenses 
for tax avoidance”  
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9.2.9 The Audit of Management Motivations  
The current study sought to explore how external auditors could deal with the impact of management 
motivations on the financial statements or in other words how external auditors could audit management 
motivations. Both the questionnaire and interviews helped to explore this area, however the interviews helped 
in exploring this area in more depth. The results from both data collection methods helped in developing a 
detailed guide that might help external auditors assess the impact of management motivations on the financial 
statements or in other words how external auditors could audit management motivations. The guide is 
available in Appendix A3.  
 
It can be noticed from the guide that the most commonly mentioned techniques to audit management 
motivations in both the questionnaire and interviews in the current study were “requiring management to do 
the necessary adjustments if the risk of fraud was highly assessed because of management motivations. If 
management refused to make the required changes, a qualified opinion or disclaimer will be issued depending 
on materiality”, “the audit of significant accounts such as revenues, cash, estimates, classification of assets, 
capitalised assets, liabilities, subsequent events, inventory, year-end accounts, impairment of investments, 
going concern, and disclosures”, “the use of analytical procedures”, and “understanding and assessing 
client’s internal control especially the risk of management override of controls and the existence of fraud 
controls”.   
The results from the interviews showed that the most commonly mentioned techniques were “the use of 
analytical procedures (mentioned 6 times”, and “paying more attention to high risk accounts (mentioned 6 
times)”. Two interviewees stated that: 
 
“Using analytical procedures to identify trends and unusual transactions and accounts especially for the past 
three years for revenues and expenses especially travel expenses, payroll expenses, and sales revenues. In case 
there are large or unexplained variances, inquiry of management could help in addition to more substantive tests. 
Analytical procedures especially industry averages, in comparing performance of the same company over years 
or comparing the company’s performance with other companies in the same industry” 
 
“Special attention should be given to some accounts/areas like inventory, accounts payable, accounts receivable, 
assets, revenues, cash, hidden liabilities and expenses, estimates, subsequent events, year end balances accounts, 
management’s override of internal control, impairment of investments, and going concern issues”. 
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Other techniques include “management inquiry”, “the use of unpredictable audit procedures”, and “change 
of auditor’s approach to materiality”. Two interviews said that: 
 
“The use of unpredictable audit procedures like auditing small amounts rather than large amounts to assess the 
risk of fraud is quite effective given that management is aware that auditors take into consideration only material 
amounts or surprise physical cash count or inventory count. In case of banks or companies having more than 
one branch, visiting different locations/branches every year could also help”.  
 
“Change of materiality nature/consideration/approach e.g. considering small amounts in the audit sample rather 
than large amounts/values could help auditors to assess the impact of management’s motivations” 
 
Some interviewees argued that assessing the impact of management’s motivations on the financial statements 
requires a thorough understanding of management’s motives. Their comments were: 
 
“Understanding management’s likely motives by assessing the pressure that management or company faces and 
then think of the accounts that might be vulnerable to management’s manipulations to achieve their targets. 
Understanding the possible motivations behind management fraud and any factors that could give them the 
opportunity to commit fraud like concentration of power or weak internal control or ability to override these 
controls”. 
 
“It depends on the account that is more likely to be affected by management’s motives. For example, in case of 
revenues, analytical procedures and management’s inquiry will be used and then test of details of balances, 
reports will be required from the operations manager about the company’s operations and cost of materials used 
in production showing quantity sold/year”.  
“Assessing the effect of management’s motivation on the financial statements depending on the type of motive 
(e.g. if the company wants to get loans from bank, there might be high motivation to overstate the revenue so in 
this case more focus will be given to the revenue account and if necessary an adjustment in the account will be 
recommended). If management refused to make the required adjustments, the issue will be reported in the 
management representation letter and the audit report”.  
Two other interviewees added that scrutinising and reviewing journal entries could reveal manipulations 
made by management to achieve certain targets. They said that: 
“Focusing more on manual journal entries rather than automated journal entries especially those around year 
end or subsequent events after the financial statement date. Manual journal entries have less internal control 
than automated journal entries which makes it more risky and vulnerable to manipulations”.  
“All journal entries are scanned to identify unusual manual journal entries, all year end journal entries are 
audited, and correction of errors in financial statements. ACL automated computer tool that helps them to scan 
all journal entries for unusual transactions and trends with special focus on manual journal entries” 
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9.2.10 The Challenges Facing External Auditors in Egypt  
 
Interviewees were asked if they have other points that they wish to share with regards to the audit profession 
and financial reporting fraud in Egypt. This is an open-ended question that aimed at collecting as much 
details as possible about the nature of external audit and financial reporting fraud in Egypt. Conventional 
content analysis was used to identify common themes and summative content analysis were used for word 
counts. The results revealed three main themes related to the challenges faced by external auditors in Egypt. 
Theme I is related to governance issues in Egypt that impact the likelihood of detecting fraud in Egypt, theme 
II discusses issues related to audit firm’s governance in Egypt, and theme III includes the recommendations 
provided by external auditors in the current study to solve some of these governance issues.  
 
Theme I Governance Issues and the Likelihood of Detecting Fraud in Egypt 
Going through the data revealed a common theme related to governance issues in Egypt that impact their 
ability to detect and report about fraud. The results revealed that external auditors in Egypt are less likely to 
detect fraud because they need practical examples and guidance on how to assess and respond to fraud risks 
which is currently lacking in the audit standards. This issue was reported by five interviews in the current 
study. This confirms the results of Kassem and Higson (2012a) who argued that the audit expectation gap 
with regards to fraud detection might exist because the standards provided little guidance to external auditors 
with regards to fraud risk assessment and response.  
The results revealed that not all external auditors in Egypt have the necessary skills to understand the nature 
of fraud and be able to identify fraud risk factors and respond to it as required by ISA240. Four interviewees 
added that some auditors might have the knowledge about fraud risk assessments but not the experience in 
fraud examination. Two interviewees said not all auditors in a team have the required qualifications and 
experience to conduct the audit in accordance with ISAs especially when it comes to fraud risk assessments 
as required by ISA 240. This indicates a lack of compliance with the Egyptian code of corporate governance 
that states that external auditor’s experience, competence and capabilities should be relevant to the size and 
nature of the company’s objectives. One of them said: 
“Time and cost constraints, and auditors’ lack of fraud examination experience are the main challenges for 
external auditors in considering fraud risk assessment” 
 
“Most external auditors are not even well prepared to perform audit engagements and comply with the 
international audit standards either because of lack of knowledge and professional qualifications “ 
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Weak internal control system and the existence of vague and complicated accounting standards in some 
sectors in Egypt such as insurance and real estate, make it difficult for external auditors to detect fraud. Weak 
internal control system and poor governance could increase the risk of financial reporting fraud. The most 
prominent organisational weakness that contributed to corporate fraud in the ACFE global fraud study in 
2016 was a lack of internal controls followed by an override of existing internal controls.  
Two interviewees added that: 
“Some sectors in Egypt are more prone to fraud like real estates and insurance. There is always improper 
documentation in the real estate sector making it very difficult for auditors to find audit trails. The insurance 
sector in Egypt do not follow either the Egyptian or the international accounting standards. They have their 
separate accounting standards and depend on outdated and very old laws and regulations that are very difficult 
for external auditors to audit. The audit of insurance companies is also restricted to one or two audit firms in 
Egypt, normally one of the Big 4. External auditors do not have enough experience in the insurance sector 
because the audit is manipulated by just one audit firm” 
“Some companies in Egypt have very weak internal control system which discourages audit firms from 
accepting audit assignments from these clients while others lack integrity and have expectations that external 
auditors will collude to keep their job”  
 
The results also revealed that external auditors in Egypt are reluctant to report suspected fraud. Interviewees’ 
comments include:  
If fraud was discovered, external auditors would normally be happy with requiring adjusting entries rather than 
reporting the matter to shareholders or advise the client to consult a lawyer 
 
Unreported fraud cases are much more than reported fraud cases in Egypt 
 
The results also revealed that disclosure in the financial statements is still a concern in the Egyptian context. 
This finding supports the findings of prior studies (Rahman, 2002; Hassan and Power, 2009; World Bank, 
2009; Dahawy and Conover, 2007; Kassem and Higson, 2015) that found that proper and full disclosure in 
the financial statements is less likely in Egypt. One interviewee in the current study said that: 
“Management is always challenging auditors when it comes to unfavourable disclosures such as disclosures 
related to tax payments or compensations to board of directors or management” 
 
The results revealed that corruption imposes a lot of pressure on external auditors in Egypt and this prevents 
external audit to be an effective governance mechanism in the country. One interview said that: 
“Some external auditors in Egypt try hard to fulfil the requirements of the audit standards and maintain due care 
by accumulating sufficient appropriate evidence. However, high corruption in Egypt makes it difficult for external 
auditors to report a client to a higher authority or raise the matter to court” 
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Two other interviewees mentioned that management imposes restrictions on the scope of audit work and 
uses rationalisation to challenge auditors’ decisions. Their comments included: 
“Management’s rationalisation is a challenge. Sometimes management challenges the auditor and rationalise 
wrong or unacceptable accounting treatments in most cases. Sometimes management imposes restrictions on 
the scope of the audit” 
 
Theme II Audit Firms’ Governance Issues in Egypt 
The results revealed that external auditors still need training on fraud risk assessment and response which is 
currently ignored by audit firms. This issue was mentioned three times by interviewees.  One interviewee 
said that audit firms do not ensure that external auditors fully comply with the requirements of ISA 240. 
Another added that audit methodologies in some audit firms do not incorporate fraud risk assessment. Two 
interviewees argued that: 
“In some audit firms in Egypt, fraud risk assessment is not considered a part of the audit and that there is 
inconsistency in complying with the requirements of the ISAs among audit firms” 
 
“The audit profession in Egypt is not mature and sophisticated enough to deal with things like ethics or fraud in 
a highly professional way” 
 
Six interviewees stated that integrity of audit partners and audit clients is a concern sometimes. Some of 
them explained that this could be the result of a lack of regulations related to audit rotation and/or the lack 
of an independent audit regulatory body to monitor auditor’s independence and audit quality. Comments 
include: 
“Sometimes collusion occurs between audit partners and clients making it very difficult for senior auditors and 
audit managers to report a fraud case if it was detected during the normal audit course”.  
 
“Auditor’s independence and integrity is a concern in the Egyptian context because of the lack of a regulatory 
body that oversees audit quality and hold auditors accountable”  
 
“The lack of regulations regarding audit firm rotation or audit partner rotation increase the risk of partners 
colluding with clients”  
“The lack of audit regulatory body that monitors audit quality in Egypt as well as the unstable political and 
economic conditions in the country are factors in the drawbacks in the audit profession in Egypt”. 
 “There are concerns regarding external auditors’ independence in Egypt and this issue will remain as long as 
management decides on the audit fees and have the freedom to change external auditors if they did not issue a 
clean audit report” 
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Three interviewees said that Full compliance with ISA 240 is currently not given much attention by audit 
firms in Egypt. One of them added that: 
“The lack of consistency in complying with the requirements of the audit standards among audit firms put more 
pressure on audit firms that aim for high audit quality and increase their threat of removal from engagements”  
“Sometimes the audit process is tailored to serve clients’ needs rather than achieve the actual audit objective” 
 
The findings of the current study in this area supports the results of Wahdan et al (2005) who found that there 
is a scarcity of experienced auditors in Egypt, along with variations of the auditor’s judgements. The authors 
added that during the interviews, auditors stressed the facts that laws do not include rules that state their 
rights and obligations, there is no strong independent professional organisation to guarantee their rights with 
the auditees, there are no standardised measures for audit quality, and there is no separation between the 
auditing service and other services provided to the auditees by the auditors. The findings of the current study 
supports the results of a study conducted by the World Bank in Egypt in 2009 where the findings revealed 
that auditor independence is addressed in the legal and regulatory framework, however, not consistently 
complied with in practice, auditors often remain with their clients for extensive periods, often exceeding ten 
years, which may influence auditor’s independence,  and boards are not required or encouraged to ensure the 
integrity of the financial reporting process. The findings of the current study also supports Anis (2014) who 
found that there is no mandatory auditor rotation in Egypt; however, some international companies and 
medium size national companies have a specific condition to change the auditor every three to five years and 
some big audit firms have internal policies to change the audit partner every seven years. The author added 
that auditors have indicated many challenges that might affect the application of mandatory auditor rotation 
in Egypt such as the significant gap between the audit quality of big auditing firms and that of other auditing 
firms; the lack of a wide pool of qualified auditors to choose from when changing auditors; the significant 
variation in audit fees between big auditing firms and other auditing firms in Egypt; and that almost no 
lawsuits have ever been brought against audit firms in the past. 
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Theme III Recommendations  
The results of the interview revealed some recommendations that were provided by external auditors in the 
current study. These recommendations aim to resolve some of the governance issues that impacts audit 
quality and the likelihood of detecting financial reporting fraud in Egypt. If more attention was given to fraud 
detection by audit firms and audit regulators, more fraud cases will be detected and reported by external 
auditors in Egypt. 
 
Four interviewees said an independent audit regulatory body is needed in Egypt to monitor audit quality 
including their compliance with the audit standards and auditors’ integrity. Comments include: 
 
“There is a need for an effective independent regulatory body responsible for deciding on external audit fees to 
maintain external auditors’ independence and to enhance the audit quality. This professional regulatory body 
should also be responsible for reviewing audit quality in all audit firms and to ensure that no restrictions are 
placed on the scope of the audit and that important audit procedures are not overlooked because of time or cost 
constraints”  
“There is a need for another audit regulatory body to review and oversee the quality of audits in all audit firms 
in Egypt in addition to the EFSA that is currently only regulating audit firms auditing listed companies. This 
new audit regulatory body can review audit quality and impose penalties on audit firms that do not comply with 
the requirements of the international audit standards”. 
 
Two interviewees recommended that more attention should be given to audit quality control review. They 
added that: 
“Audit quality review should audit random audit files and not specific audit files as currently happening to 
ensure that audit firms are actually taking audit quality and the requirement of audit standards into consideration”  
“Audit quality control procedures need to be reinforced within audit firms in Egypt to ensure audit quality 
standards are complied with consistently”  
 
One interview suggested giving more attention to the assessment of internal control. He said: 
“External auditors should be required to issue separate reports to shareholders about internal control 
deficiencies” 
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9.3 The Contribution of the Current Study 
The current study contributed to both knowledge and practice in various ways. This is discussed in detail in 
this section. 
Contribution to knowledge  
The current study contributed to knowledge in various ways. First, the current study explored financial 
reporting fraud in a context that has hardly been explored before in prior literature. Most of prior studies 
were focusing on developed countries while hardly any study explored financial reporting fraud in the 
Egyptian context. There were huge gaps in the literature in areas related to the nature and likelihood of 
financial reporting fraud in Egypt, whether external auditors in Egypt actually consider fraud risk 
assessments in their audits, and whether the audit profession faces any challenges. There was also no 
empirical evidence as to whether external auditors in Egypt comply with the International Audit Standards 
related to financial reporting fraud detection (i.e. ISA 240). All these gaps were filled in and explored by the 
current study.  
Second, the current study added to the current body of knowledge by exploring the significance of the fraud 
triangle factors (i.e. motives to commit fraud, opportunity to commit fraud, and rationalisation of fraud) in 
the assessment of financial reporting fraud. The results of prior literature were mixed with regards to the 
significance of the three fraud triangle factors which results in an inconclusive evidence in this area. The 
findings of the current study in this area suggest a change in the shape of the current fraud triangle model to 
a layered fraud triangle. That is to reflect the significance of the three fraud triangle factors with more weight 
given to management motives to commit fraud. Prior studies hardly explored the interaction and significance 
of the three fraud triangle factors together with management integrity and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities in 
the assessment of financial reporting fraud. The current study was the first to explore which of these fraud 
factors are most significance in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud and the rationale behind this.  
Third, very few prior studies explored the significance of management integrity in assessing the risk of fraud 
and no study has actually provided a guide on how could external auditors assess management integrity. The 
current study was among few studies that provided empirical evidence that management integrity is a 
significant factor in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. The current study was the first to explore 
how external auditors could assess management integrity.  
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Fourth, fraud perpetrators’ capabilities has hardly been explored in prior literature. Particularly, its 
significance in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud, whether it should be considered by external 
auditors in their fraud risk assessments, the traits that enhances management capabilities to commit financial 
reporting fraud, and how it could be assessed by external auditors. The current study thus filled in these gaps 
in the literature by exploring all these areas.  
Fifth, the assessment of the three fraud triangle factors has hardly been explored before in prior literature. 
The current study was the first to expand knowledge to this area by exploring how external auditors could 
assess these fraud factors. Sixth, there was a lack of consensus in prior literature regarding what might 
motivate management to commit financial reporting fraud and very few studies explored impact of non-
financial motives on the perpetration of financial reporting fraud by management in different contexts. 
Management motivation to commit financial reporting fraud has hardly been explored in the Egyptian 
context. Thus, the current study was the first to explore management motivations in the Egyptian context, 
added to the current body of knowledge in this area, and was among few studies that explored non-financial 
management motivations. The current study also provided a list of motivations behind management fraud in 
the Egyptian context. The list was based on insights from prior literature and the audit profession in Egypt. 
The list of motives was also ranked according to their likelihood in the Egyptian context.  
Seventh, very few studies explored the impact that management motivations could have on the financial 
statements however no study has actually provided a guide on how external auditors could assess the impact 
of management motivations. The current study was among few studies to explore the impact of management 
motivations on the financial statements but it was the first to provide detailed guidance in this area. The 
current study was also the first to explore how external auditors could audit management motivations. The 
findings of the current study suggest that external auditors should view the audit of financial statements as 
the audit of management motivations. That is because management are responsible for the preparation of the 
financial statements and their motivations could have an impact on the fair presentation of the financial 
statements. If external auditors focus on management motivations and its impact while conducting their 
audits, this might increase the likelihood of detecting financial reporting fraud.  
The current study also offers recommendations to researchers, external auditors, audit regulators, and the 
Egyptian government that might help them combat financial reporting fraud.  
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Contribution to practice  
The current study contributes to practice by providing guidance and recommendations to external auditors 
and audit regulators in the area of financial reporting fraud detection. This might help external auditors 
properly assess and respond to the risk of financial reporting fraud. This might in turn increases the likelihood 
of detecting financial reporting fraud, narrow the audit expectation gap, and reinforce investors’ confidence 
in the audit profession. The findings of the current study also has implications for audit regulators.  
The audit standards (ISA 240) requires external auditors to consider the three fraud triangle factors and 
management integrity in their fraud risk assessments. However the standards provided no guidance to 
external auditors on how to assess these factors. Lack of guidance in this area will lead to inconsistency in 
external auditors’ fraud risk assessments and thus will impact audit quality. This in turn might reduce the 
likelihood of detecting financial reporting fraud and thereby put the reputation of audit firms at risk as a 
result of increased litigation costs. The current study was the first to propose detailed guides that might help 
external auditors assess the three fraud triangle factors and management integrity.  
The audit standards did not provide guidance to external auditors on the significance of the three fraud 
triangle factors. This might make external auditors overlook the most significant factor(s) by assuming that 
all factors have the same significance. This might impact the quality of fraud risk assessment and thereby 
the likelihood of detecting financial reporting fraud. The current study provided guidance to external auditors 
on the significance of the three fraud triangle factors that might help external auditors to give more attention 
to the most significant factors. The findings of the current study suggest that management motives is the 
most significant factor in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud and thus should be given more 
attention compared to rationalisation and opportunity. The findings of the current study also suggest 
replacing rationalisation by management integrity while keeping in mind that rationalisation of fraud could 
be a red flag for low management integrity.  
The current study provided empirical evidence that fraud perpetrators’ capabilities could be significant in 
assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. The findings of the current study revealed that fraud 
perpetrators’ capabilities could have the same significance as opportunity for fraud and should be considered 
by external auditors in their fraud risk assessments. The current study also provided examples of traits that 
could enhance management’s capabilities to commit financial reporting fraud. These traits could alert 
external auditors of the existence of high risk of fraud perpetrators’ capabilities to commit financial reporting 
fraud. The current study provided a guide to external auditors on assessing fraud perpetrators’ capabilities. 
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Although the audit standards do not currently require external auditors to consider fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud, the findings of the current study suggest that 
audit regulators should start taking this factor into consideration.  
The current study provided empirical evidence that management motivations is not only the most significant 
factor in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud but also could have a direct impact on the financial 
statements. This implies that external auditors should understand management motivations, its impact on the 
financial statements, and how could they deal with it. The current study provided a list of motivations behind 
management fraud in the Egyptian context and provided support to the most likely management motives in 
other contexts. It also provided detailed guidance on how management motivations could impact the financial 
statements, the accounts or areas in the financial statements that are more vulnerable to manipulations by 
management, and how external auditors could audit management motivations. This could help external 
auditors properly assess and respond to the risk of financial reporting fraud.  
The guidance provided to external auditors in the current study will not only benefit the audit profession in 
Egypt but also in other contexts where the international audit standards are used. The current study was the 
first to provide guidance related to the assessment of the fraud factors and their significance which are not 
currently provided by the international audit standards. The current study is among few studies that suggested 
external audit should be viewed as the audit of management motivations rather than just the audit of the 
accounting figures. This approach might be more effective in increasing the likelihood of detecting financial 
reporting fraud and in turn narrowing of the audit expectation gap. This might not only reduce litigations 
costs and reputational risks that audit firms face but also might reinforce investors’ confidence in the audit 
profession.  
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Value to Society  
The current study aims at helping external auditors properly assess and respond to the risk of financial 
reporting fraud. That is in an effort to increase the likelihood of detecting financial reporting fraud. The cost 
of financial reporting fraud to any society is massive. This does not only include financial loss but loss of 
confidence in the capital market and the value of the audit profession. The findings of the current study have 
implications for external auditors and audit regulators that might help in combating financial reporting fraud 
if it was taken into consideration. The recommendations provided by the current study are also meant to help 
external auditors, audit regulators, researchers, and the Egyptian government to fight financial reporting 
fraud.  
Egypt in particular is an emerging economy and financial reporting fraud will impact its growth. The risk of 
fraud might be high with the current weak economic conditions and political unrest in the country. Hence, 
raising awareness about fraud in the country and identifying high risk areas for fraud and the challenges that 
the audit profession face in Egypt might help Egyptian regulators to take appropriate actions to mitigate fraud 
risks in the country.  
9.4 Summary of Chapter Nine  
Chapter nine aims at presenting and summarising the main findings of the current study, discusses the results 
of the current study, and explains how the current study contributed to both knowledge and practice. The 
findings from the interviews confirmed and complemented the findings of the questionnaire. Data collected 
through both methods helped in depicting a complete picture of the current research issues. The findings of 
the current study revealed that external auditors in Egypt tend to comply with the requirements of the ISA 
240 with regards to financial reporting fraud detection. However, they tend to give more attention to 
management motives to commit fraud and opportunity to commit fraud than rationale and management 
integrity. The results also revealed lack of consistency in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud.  
With regards to financial reporting fraud in Egypt, the findings revealed that it is common in the country 
especially improper revenue recognition and improper assets valuation, more likely to be committed by 
management, and less likely to be reported by external auditors. This chapter provided details about financial 
reporting cases committed in Egypt including how each is committed, and how the cases were detected and 
dealt with by external auditors.  
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The findings revealed a lack of consistency in dealing with financial reporting fraud cases committed by 
management in Egypt. External auditors rarely withdrew from the audit engagement and in most cases no 
legal actions are taken and the auditors just require some adjustments rather than reporting the matter to 
shareholders.  
The findings of the current study also revealed that management motivations is the most significant fraud 
factor in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. Management motivations could have a direct and 
significant impact on the financial statements and could lead to financial reporting fraud. The current study 
provided guidance to external auditors on how to assess the three fraud triangle factors and management 
integrity, and how to deal with management motivations and its impact on the financial statements. Guides 
on how to assess the three fraud triangle factors and management integrity are available in appendix C of the 
thesis. A list of motivations behind management fraud is also provided in this chapter along with detailed 
guidance on how management motivations could impact different areas of the financial statements.  
The findings of the current study suggest that audit regulators should start considering fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities in assessing fraud risks. External auditors in the current study believed it could be significant in 
assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud and thus should be part of fraud risk assessments. The traits 
that might enhance management capability to commit financial reporting fraud are discussed in this chapter 
and guidance on how to assess fraud perpetrators’ capabilities is available in appendix C of the thesis. The 
current study contributed to both knowledge and practice in various ways that were explained in this chapter.  
The next chapter includes the conclusion and provides some recommendations to help external auditors, 
audit regulators, researchers, and the Egyptian government combat financial reporting fraud. The next 
chapter also explains the limitations of the current study.  
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Chapter Ten: 
Conclusion and Recommendations  
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the conclusion of the current study and offers some recommendations to external 
auditors, audit firms, audit regulators, researchers, and the Egyptian government on how to combat financial 
reporting fraud. The chapter also identifies potential areas for future research.   
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 10.2 presents the conclusion of the current study. 
Section 10.3 explains the limitations of the current study. Section 10.4 offers some recommendations to 
external auditors, audit regulators, the Egyptian government, and researchers. Section 10.5 suggests some 
ideas for future research. Section 10.6 is a summary of chapter ten.  
10.2 Conclusion  
The current study aims at helping external auditors to properly assess and respond to the risk of financial 
reporting fraud. That is in an effort to increase the likelihood of detecting it. In order to achieve this broad 
aim, it was important for the current study to explore the significance of the fraud triangle model, 
management integrity, and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities, how external auditors could assess these various 
fraud factors. The current study examined the motivations behind management fraud, the impact of 
management motivations on the financial statements, and how external auditors could assess the impact of 
management motivations on the financial statements. 
The findings of the current study revealed that not all the factors in the current fraud triangle model has the 
same significance and that management motivations are the most significant factor in assessing the risk of 
financial reporting fraud. This is particularly the case in the Egyptian context because of the poor economic 
conditions and political unrest that might force companies to go bankrupt.  Management integrity is the 
second most significant factor and should replace rationalisation of fraud. However external auditors are 
advised to regard rationalisation of fraud as a red flag for low management integrity. Fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities was perceived as equally significant to the opportunity factor, yet currently ignored by the audit 
standards. Hence, the current study suggest a change in the shape of the current fraud triangle model to be 
like a pyramid. Management motives should form the base of the pyramid and should be given more weight 
than the other factors. Management integrity should be the second level of the pyramid, and opportunity for 
fraud should then follow. 
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External auditors are advised to assess fraud perpetrators’ capabilities as part of opportunity to commit fraud. 
That is because some people have traits or capabilities that could make them more able to exploit weaknesses 
in the internal control system. External auditors in the current study agreed that fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities should be considered in their assessment of financial reporting fraud. The most significant trait 
that could enhance management’s capabilities to commit financial reporting fraud was found to be “the 
capacity to exploit internal control weaknesses”. This was followed by “authoritative position within the 
organisation”, “capacity to understand accounting systems”, and “confidence that the fraud perpetrator will 
not be detected and if caught will get out of it easily”. The least significant trait was “the ability to deal with 
stress”.  
The current study was the first to explore how external auditors could assess management motives to commit 
fraud and provided detailed guidance to external auditors in this area.  The current study found that 
management in Egypt could be motivated to commit financial reporting fraud in order to get 
bonuses/remuneration, or to get finance from banks. The current study provided a list of 32 motivations 
behind management fraud in Egypt. The list of motives was based on the findings from prior literature and 
the perceptions of external auditors in the Egyptian context. The findings also revealed that management 
motivations is a key in committing financial reporting fraud and that it could have a direct impact on the 
financial statements. Management motivations are more likely to affect the figures as well as disclosures in 
the financial statements. It could also lead to improper revenue recognition, improper assets valuation, 
concealed liabilities and expenses, and improper disclosure. The accounts that are more likely to be impacted 
include revenues, inventory, accounts receivable, estimates, tax liability and expense, and cost of goods sold. 
The current study provided guidance to external auditors on how to audit management motivations or in 
other words how to identify management motivations and assess its impact on the financial statements. The 
findings also revealed that although external auditors in Egypt appreciate the impact of management 
motivations on the financial statements, they are not actually successful in dealing with it. That is because 
external auditors still need guidance on how to identify management motives, how to prove management 
intent to commit financial reporting fraud, are more concerned about materiality, fear to lose audit clients 
because of high competition in the market, weak legal system, and the lack of an independent regulatory 
body in Egypt that could monitor audit quality and enhance external auditors’ independence.  
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The findings of the current study revealed various governance issues in Egypt that might impact audit quality 
and the likelihood of detecting financial reporting fraud. These issues are related to audit firms’ governance 
issues, inconsistency in complying with the audit standards, integrity of audit partners and management, the 
existence of weak legal systems, the lack of an effective audit regulatory body, issues with audit rotations, 
and auditor’s independence, qualifications, and experience in fraud detection.  The findings showed that the 
majority of external auditors in the current study are aware of the requirements of ISA 240 and ESA 240 in 
their audit. However, they were inconsistent in complying with the requirements of the audit standards in 
their fraud risk assessments. External auditors generally seemed to give more attention to management 
motives and opportunity to commit fraud compared to rationalisation and management integrity. Audit 
experience seemed to have an impact on external auditors’ compliance with the standards while the type of 
audit firm did not have an impact.  
The findings also revealed that the majority of external auditors agreed that both audit standards are useful 
for external auditors in understanding the types of fraud, the fraud triangle, appreciate the importance of 
professional scepticism, and in understanding their responsibility for fraud detection. However they also 
agreed the audit standards lack practical guidance on how to assess and respond to the risk of fraud and that 
most external auditors depend on the guides provided to them by their audit firms to assess fraud risks.  
Financial reporting fraud seems to be common in Egypt but unlikely to be reported by external auditors. 
Improper revenue recognition and improper assets valuation are the most common types of financial 
reporting fraud in the country. The majority of external auditors in the current study said they discovered 
financial reporting fraud cases were management was involved. The findings also revealed that financial 
reporting fraud is more likely in large companies, listed companies only if management have a motivation 
to commit financial reporting fraud in these companies and that overstatement of revenues will be more 
likely in this case. Family owned business and small companies in Egypt are more likely to understate 
revenues or conceal liabilities and expenses in order to avoid paying taxes. The current study provided a list 
of all the types of financial reporting fraud committed in these cases, how each was committed, and how 
external auditors managed to detect them. In all these fraud cases the actions taken by external auditors varied 
massively however in only one case the fraud was reported to shareholders and in another case the auditor 
withdrew from the audit engagement. In most cases the auditors either requested adjusting entries from 
management rather than reporting the matter to shareholders or referred the matter to the audit partner, those 
charged with governance, or the audit committee but no further actions were taken.  
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10.3 Limitations of the current study 
The current study was the first to explore financial reporting fraud in the Egyptian context as well as the 
impact and implications of management motivations for external auditors. However, like any other study the 
current study has some limitations. One limitation is that the majority of respondents from the current study 
were external auditors working at Big4 audit firms or international audit firms other than the Big4. That was 
due to access restrictions to small/medium size audit firms. However, as explained in chapter six the majority 
of the audit market in Egypt is monopolised by Big 4 audit firms. In addition, external auditors working in 
Big 4 audit firms are more knowledgeable, qualified, and more likely to comply with audit standards than 
other firms. Another limitation is that the majority of the study sample were males and only two were 
females. However, as explained in chapter six this was due to the fact that a high percentage of women in 
Egypt are unemployed.  
A third limitation is that the scarcity of research in areas that was explored by the current study did not allow 
for the discussion of the current study’s findings with prior research findings. For instance there is a lack of 
research in areas such as financial reporting fraud in Egypt, and the audit of management motivations.  
There is also very little research in areas related to the assessment of the different fraud factors and the 
significance of the fraud triangle factors. Future research should explore these areas to allow for the 
comparison and discussion of different research findings.  
A fourth limitation is that the current study did not use probability sampling but used “Stratified purposive 
sampling” to select the sample of the current study. Although the use of probability sampling is important 
for the generalisation of the research findings, the use of stratified purposive sampling helped in achieving 
the same purpose. That is because the stratified nature of this sampling technique is similar to probability 
sampling (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). The current study used mixed research methods and thus the use 
of stratified purposive sampling was more suitable for the current study. Stratified purposive sampling is a 
mixed method sampling technique that requires the researcher to first stratifies the potential participants 
based on certain dimensions using procedures consistent with probabilistic sampling and then purposefully 
selects a small number of cases from each stratum (Creswell and Clark, 2011). The audit profession in the 
Egyptian market includes Big 4 audit firms that controls almost the majority of the audit market in Egypt, 
international audit firms other than the Big 4, medium size national audit firms, and small national audit 
offices. Each type of these audit firms thus forms a stratum from which a suitable number of cases was 
purposefully selected.  
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The selection of these cases depended on certain factors like access to participants, and their years of audit 
experience. Because the current study included technical questions that required respondents with enough 
years of experience in the audit field, only respondents with two years of experience or more were included 
in the sample. Respondents who have insufficient knowledge or experience may deliberately guess at the 
answer, a tendency known as “uninformed response” which reduces the reliability of data (Saunders et al, 
2009) and thus participants having less than two years of audit experience were excluded from the selection 
process. The snowballing technique was also used to look for more participants for the current study.  
The use of probability sampling in the current study would not have also been possible because there was a 
difficulty in specifying the sampling frame. The Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority in Egypt keeps a 
register of individual external auditors licensed to audit listed companies, but this list does not represent the 
total number of external auditors working in Egypt. In addition, these licensed auditors are audit partners or 
owners of audit firms in Egypt who are allowed to sign audited financial statements for listed companies. 
Hence, the list does not represent the population of external auditors in Egypt as it does not include the total 
number of external auditors working in these audit firms.  
Hence for all these reasons the use of stratified purposive sampling and snowballing technique were most 
suitable for the current study. Both techniques helped in collecting a sample of 150 respondents out of each 
83 took part in the questionnaire and 30 took part in the interviews for the purpose of the current study.  
10.4 Recommendations  
The current study offers some recommendations to external auditors, audit firms, audit regulators, the 
Egyptian government, and researchers.  
Recommendations to external auditors  
 External auditors should try their best to comply with the requirements of the audit standards with 
regards to fraud risk assessments and response. Maintaining their integrity and independence is 
crucial for the quality of the audit and the value they add to the credibility of the financial statements.  
 External auditors need to be aware that although they are not directly responsible for detecting fraud, 
they are still responsible for assessing and responding to the risk of material fraud. The public also 
expects a lot of efforts from external auditors in fraud detection. Public expectations could increase 
litigation costs in case of fraud scandals and auditor’s failure to detect misstatements in the financial 
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statements. The reputation of audit firms and investors’ confidence in the audit profession could be 
impacted if external auditors did not give much attention to fraud detection.  
 In assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud, the current study recommends that external auditors 
should keep in mind that not all fraud factors have the same significance and that they should not 
overlook the most significant factors. The findings of the current study suggest that management 
motives is the most significant fraud factor in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud and thus 
should be given more attention by external auditors.  
 External auditors need to be aware that management integrity should be assessed instead of 
rationalisation of fraud. However external auditors should keep in mind that rationalisation of fraud 
could be a red flag for low management integrity.  
 While assessing opportunity for fraud, external auditors need to keep in mind that only people with 
certain capabilities will exploit weaknesses in the internal control system. This requires external 
auditors to pay more attention to cases where power is concentrated in the hand of one or two people 
in an organisation, people with more knowledge of the system, and high risk of management override 
of internal controls.  
 More attention needs to be given to the motivations behind management fraud and its impact on the 
financial statements rather than just the use of traditional audit techniques. External auditors need to 
be trained on how to identify management motivations and how to deal with them.  
 External auditors should understand management personality especially their level of integrity, what 
might motivate them to commit fraud, their philosophy and operating style, and their level of power 
within the organisation. The current study suggests that management motivations could be the most 
significant factor in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. Thus it is important for external 
auditors to identify factors that might impose strong pressure on management to commit financial 
reporting fraud and also to monitor how management responds to such pressure.  
Recommendations to audit firms: 
 Audit firms should equip external auditors with the required training and skills to help them properly 
assess and respond to the risk of financial reporting fraud especially how to prove management intent. 
 Audit firms should ensure external auditors understand their responsibility for fraud detection, the 
requirements of the audit standards in this aspect, and the impact of ignoring fraud detection on 
auditors’ legal liability and the reputation of the audit firm.  
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 Audit firms should monitor audit quality especially with regards to fraud risk assessments and 
response.  
 Audit firms should ensure that audit partners are taking the right actions when fraud is suspected 
during the audit engagement.  
 Audit firms should ensure that clear guidelines are communicated to the audit engagement team at 
every stage of the audit especially when it comes to fraud risk assessments and the actions that should 
be taken by the audit team in case fraud risk was highly assessed.  
Recommendations to audit regulators 
 Audit regulators should provide guidance to external auditors on the significance of the fraud triangle 
factors and management integrity.  
 Audit regulators should provide guidance to external auditors on how to assess and respond to fraud 
risks especially how to assess the three fraud triangle factors and management integrity.  
  Audit regulators should provide guidance to external auditors on how to use professional scepticism, 
how to detect collusion, and how to prove management intent.  
 Audit regulators should require external auditors to consider fraud perpetrators’ capabilities in their 
fraud risk assessment. The findings of the current study provided evidence that fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities appeared to have similar significance to opportunity for fraud.  
 Auditor’s independence needs more attention from audit regulators. If management is paying the 
audit fees, auditors might be reluctant to report fraud in order not to lose the audit fees. An 
independent audit regulatory body should be responsible for the appointment of external auditors and 
the decisions about the audit fees in order to maintain auditors’ independence.  
Recommendations to the Egyptian government 
 The Egyptian government should establish an independent audit regulatory body that have the power 
to monitor audit quality and impose sanctions in cases of non-compliance with the audit standards.  
 A reform is needed in the legal system in Egypt so that external auditors could be encouraged to 
report fraud cases.  
 The government should require external auditors to have professional qualifications and the needed 
skills before practising auditing in Egypt. No one should be awarded the license to practise audit 
without having proper qualifications and skills. In the meantime there should be a requirement for 
continuing professional education that external auditors should fulfil if they wish to continue 
305 
 
practising auditing in Egypt. Audit firms should ensure these requirements are met before appointing 
any external auditors.  
Researchers have an important role to play in combating financial reporting fraud. More research is still 
needed in that area especially research that could have an impact on the audit profession. The next section 
suggest some ideas for future research in this area.  
 
10.5 Future Studies  
The current study identified some potential gaps in prior literature that warrants future research. For instance, 
the current study was the first to explore how external auditors could assess management integrity and fraud 
perpetrators’ capabilities. Future research is still needed in this area to discover new techniques to help 
external auditors properly assess these two fraud factors. Very few studies including the current study 
explored the significance of fraud perpetrators’ capabilities and whether external auditors should consider 
this factor in their fraud risk assessments. More studies are still needed in this area especially in different 
contexts to see if the perceptions of external auditors in other contexts would differ.  
The current study was the first to explore the audit of management motivations and was among few studies 
that examined the impact of management motivations on the financial statements. Future research should 
replicate the same research ideas but in other contexts to see if new techniques could be used to audit 
management motivations and whether the impact of management motivations on the financial statements 
would differ in different contexts.  
Future studies could also explore if the guidance offered by the current study on fraud risk assessments could 
actually help external auditors properly assess and respond to the risks of financial reporting fraud. This 
could be conducted in Egypt or in any other context. Future studies could also examine the impact of social, 
cultural, and economic factors on the quality of fraud risk assessments conducted by external auditors and 
on what extent external auditors comply with the requirements of ISA 240 regarding financial reporting 
fraud.  
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10.6 Summary of Chapter Ten  
This chapter presents the conclusion of the current study and offers some recommendations to external 
auditors, audit firms, audit regulators, researchers, and the Egyptian government on how to combat financial 
reporting fraud. The chapter also identifies potential areas for future research.  The current study explored 
the significance of the various fraud factors and whether the consideration of the current fraud triangle model 
is enough for effective fraud risk assessments. The findings in this area supported the current body of 
knowledge that found management motives the most significant fraud factor in assessing the risk of financial 
reporting fraud.  
The current study offered guidance to external auditors on how to assess the various fraud factors. This 
includes management motives to commit fraud, opportunity to commit fraud, rationalisation of fraud, 
management integrity, and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities. This has never been explored before in prior 
literature nor by the audit standards.  
The current study explored the motivations behind management fraud in Egypt, and provided detailed 
explanation of how management motivations could impact the financial statements, and detailed guidance 
for external auditors to help them deal with management motivations and its impact on the financial 
statements. The current study also explored the extent by which external auditors in Egypt comply with the 
requirements of ISA 240.  
The current study offered insights on the usefulness and limitations of ISA 240 with regards to the assessment 
of and response of external auditors to the risk of financial reporting fraud. The current study provided 
evidence of the nature, likelihood, and types of financial reporting fraud in Egypt. It also provided examples 
of real financial reporting fraud cases that were detected by external auditors in Egypt. This includes as well 
the techniques used by external auditors to detect the fraud cases and the actions taken by external auditors 
in each case.  
The current study also offers recommendations to external auditors, audit firms, audit regulators, and the 
Egyptian government that might help combat financial reporting fraud. The current study also identified 
potential gaps in the literature that warrants future research in the area of financial reporting fraud.  
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Appendix A1: Questionnaire and Interview Schedule  
This appendix includes a copy of the online questionnaire and interview schedule.  
 
I. Copy of Interview Schedule: 
 
 
 
Information Sheet for Participants  
Dear Participant, 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in the interview which is an integral part of my PhD studies at 
Loughborough University. The topic is about financial reporting fraud in the Egyptian context. 
Financial reporting fraud is a type of internal fraud where the fraud perpetrator alters or manipulate 
the figures and disclosures in the financial statements. Types of financial reporting fraud include 
overstatement of revenues, concealment of expenses and liabilities, improper disclosure, and 
improper valuation of assets. My study aims to explore the impact of management’s motivations 
behind fraud on the financial statements and its implications for external auditors. The results of the 
current study might help external auditors in Egypt to properly assess and respond to risks arising 
from the threat of financial reporting fraud. Hence, your answers are essential in building an accurate 
understanding of this issue. 
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Confidentiality, Data Protection, and Data Storage 
I hereby assure you that your personal data will only be accessible to me and Loughborough 
University for research purposes and will not be shared with any other party without your consent. 
To maintain confidentiality, all personal data collected during the current research will be 
anonymised and participants will be assigned a reference number or code. Data will be stored against 
this number/code rather than against the names of participants.  
Data will be kept in a lockable room with controlled access and all computerised data will be 
password protected and kept on flash memories that will be kept in a secured locked place with 
controlled access. Data backups will also be kept securely in case the original data set was lost 
or damaged. According to Loughborough University’s best-practice guidelines for the storage of 
different types of data, numerical/statistical data will be stored in raw data format for six years 
from completion of the research project, and interview notes will be stored in their original form 
for ten years from completion of the project. All electronic data will be securely electronically 
deleted. 
You have the right to request your data be removed from the research project before 
publishing the final results (expected June, 2016). However, once the final results are 
published, participants will not be able to withdraw their data. In the meantime, published 
results of the current research will be anonymised and no information is published that 
would allow participants to be identified. The results will be owned by Loughborough 
University and myself only for the research purpose. If you have any queries or concerns, 
please do not hesitate to contact me at r.kassem@lboro.ac.uk  
Important Instructions – Please Read 
The interview should last for about an hour. The interview has 22 questions, 16 questions related to 
the current research and 6 questions seeking interviewees’ demographic information for data 
analysis purposes. The interview will be tape recorded unless interviewees requested otherwise. The 
next page includes details about the interview date, time, location, duration, and interview questions. 
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Thanks in advance for your time and participation  
Rasha Kassem 
PhD Candidate  
Loughborough University, UK 
 
 
Interview Schedule 
Participant’s code: 
Participant’s Gender: 
Interview date: 
Interview time: 
Interview location: 
Interview duration:  
Interview mode:  
 
Please take some time to think carefully about the answer for the following questions before the 
interview. Your answer is important for the purpose of the current study.  
Interview Questions: 
1. What is your job title?  
 
2. Where did you do your professional audit training? (Egypt or oversees?) 
 
3. Do you hold any professional qualifications?  If yes, please specify. 
 
4. How many years of audit experience do you have? 
 
5. How old are you? (Please choose from the categories below)  
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a. □ 20 – 30 years old   □ 31 to 40 years old   
b. □ 41 to 50 years old  □  Above 50 years old  
 
6. What is the type of your audit firm? (Please choose from the categories below)  
a. □ Big 4 audit firm          □ International audit firm other than the Big 4   
b. □ Small national audit firm     □ medium national audit firm 
 
7. How common is financial reporting fraud in Egypt?   
 
8. What are the most common types of financial reporting fraud in Egypt? 
 
9. How useful is the International Standard on Auditing (ISA) No. 240 or the Egyptian Standard 
on Auditing (ESA) No.240 in assessing the risks of financial reporting fraud? Why? 
 
10. Which of the following fraud risk factors you think is the most significant in assessing the 
risk of financial reporting fraud? Why? (Fraud risk factors: Motives, opportunities, 
rationalisation, management integrity, or fraud perpetrators’ capabilities) 
 
11. Which of the following fraud risk factors is the most difficult to assess? Why? (Fraud risk 
factors: Motives, opportunities, rationalisation, management integrity, or fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities) 
 
12. How do you assess the following fraud risk factors? (Fraud risk factors: Motives, 
opportunities, rationalisation, management integrity, and fraud perpetrators’ capabilities). 
Please mention if you do not assess any of these fraud risk factors 
 
13. What do you think are the most likely motivations behind management fraud in Egypt?  
 
14. How could management motivations impact on the financial statements?  
 
15. Do you think external auditors appreciate the potential impact of management motivations on 
the financial statements? Why? 
 
16. How successful, do you think, are external auditors in Egypt in assessing management 
motivations? Why? 
 
17. What audit techniques do external auditors use to assess the impact of management 
motivations on the financial statements? 
 
18. Have you ever encountered any suspected financial reporting fraud cases in Egypt where 
management was involved? (If no, proceed to question 22) 
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19. What was/were the type(s) of financial reporting fraud committed in the fraud case(s) you 
have encountered?  
 
20. How did you discover the suspected fraud?  
 
21. What actions did you take to deal with the suspected fraud?  What was the eventual outcome? 
 
22. Are there any points you would like to raise? 
 
 
 
 
 
II. Copy of Online Questionnaire  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial Reporting Fraud Detection: 
Implications of Management's Motivations 
for External Auditors (copy) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 1: Dear Participant 
 
 
This survey is part of my PhD research at the School of Business and Economics, 
Loughborough University, UK. It aims at examining the impact and implications for external 
auditors of management motivations behind financial reporting fraud. It also aims at 
providing a tool for external auditors that might help them detect material misstatements 
arising from financial reporting fraud. As you are aware, fraud in general and financial 
reporting fraud in particular has always been a concern for audit professionals, regulators, 
and the public. Thus, your kind cooperation in this survey will be highly appreciated. Your 
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answers are essential in building an accurate picture of the issues that external auditors 
might face while assessing risks of financial reporting fraud, and will thereby help in 
designing the suggested framework by the current study to detect material misstatement 
arising from financial reporting fraud 
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Page 2: Confidentiality, Data Protection, and Data 
 
Storage 
 
 
I assure you that your personal data will only be accessible to me for research purposes 
and will not be shared with any other party without your consent. To maintain confidentiality, 
all personal data collected during the current research will be anonymised and participants 
will be assigned a reference number or code. Data will be stored against this number/code 
rather than against the names of participants. 
 
 
Data will be kept in a lockable room with controlled access and all computerised data will 
be password protected and kept on flash memories that will be kept in a secured locked 
place with controlled access. Data backups will also be kept securely in case the original 
data set was lost or damaged. 
 
According to Loughborough University's best-practice guidelines for the storage of different 
types of data, numerical/statistical data will be stored in raw data format for six years from 
completion of the research project, interview notes and questionnaire responses will be 
stored in their original form for ten years from completion of the project. All electronic data 
will be securely electronically deleted. 
 
Please keep in mind that you have the right to request your data be removed from the 
research project before publishing the final results. However, once the final results are 
published, participants will not be able to withdraw their data. In the meantime, published 
results of the current research will be anonymised and no information is published that 
would allow participants to be identified. The results will be owned by Loughborough 
University and myself only for the research purpose. 
 
 
If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to email me on 
r.kassem@lboro.ac.uk  
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Page 3: Important Instructions 
 
 
Please read carefully the questions before answering them. Your responses are very 
important for the purpose of the current research, so please attempt to answer all 
questions. 
 
The questionnaire is four pages long and includes four sections and twenty one 
questions. 
 
Please fill in the questionnaire no later than two weeks or as soon as possible. Your 
cooperation is much appreciated. Once you click on the submit button, the questionnaire 
will be sent to me 
 
If you have any queries regarding the questionnaire, please do not hesitate to email me 
on r.kassem@lboro.ac.uk 
 
Thanks in advance for your time and cooperation, 
 
Rasha Kassem 
 
 
Section One 
 
Please indicate your answer by ticking the right box 
 
 
1 Does your company comply with the International Standard on Auditing Number 240 
(ISA 240) in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud?  
 
 Yes                   No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Does your company comply with the Egyptian Standard on Auditing Number 240 
(ESA No.240) in assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud? 
 
 Yes                   No 
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3 Are you familiar with the fraud risk factors that ISA 240 and ESA 240 required 
external auditors to consider in their fraud risk assessment? 
 
 Yes                   No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Do you consider any or all of the following fraud risk factors? How do you 
incorporate them in your fraud risk assessment? 
 
Do you consider  
 
any of the fraud  
 
risk factors  
 
below in your  
 
fraud risk  
 
assessment?  
 
  How do you 
 
Yes No 
incorporate each fraud 
 
factor in your fraud  
  
 
  risk assessment? 
 
Management's motives (Motives are   
 
the forces or pressures that might   
 
make people commit fraud and   
 
could be either financial like the   
 
need for money or non-financial like   
 
revenge)   
 
Management's integrity (Integrity   
 
refers to the degree of honesty   
 
and ethical standards)   
 
Rationalisation (Rationalisation is a   
 
self-justification of a fraudulent   
 
behaviour)   
 
Opportunity (Opportunity is the   
 
chance to commit fraud and could   
 
come about by a weakness in the   
 
company's internal control system)   
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Fraud perpetrators' capabilities (Fraud 
perpetrators' capabilities are the 
personal skills or abilities that enable a 
person to commit fraud) 
 
 
Section Two 
 
 
5 Which of the following fraud risk factors do you consider the most significant factor in 
assessing risks arising from financial reporting fraud? (Please choose only one) 
 
 
 
 Management's motives 
 
 Management's integrity 
 
 Rationalisation 
 
 Opportunity 
 
 Fraud perpetrators' capabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Please rate the following fraud risk factors on a scale of 1 to 5 according to their 
significance in financial reporting fraud risk assessment: '1' denotes that the factor is 
least significant and '5' denotes the factor is most significant 
 
Please rate the following fraud risk factors 
 
1 Least         2 Not           3 Rarely           4                 5 Most 
 
significant     significant     significant     Significant      significant 
 
Management 
 
motives to commit  
fraud 
 
The extent of 
 
Management  
integrity 
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Opportunity to 
commit fraud 
 
Rationalisation to 
commit fraud 
 
Fraud perpetrators' 
capabilities 
 
 
7 Which of the following fraud risk factors do you consider the most difficult to assess? 
(Please choose only one) 
 
 Management's motives 
 
 Management's integrity 
 
 Rationalisation 
 
 Perpetrators' capabilities 
 
 Opportunity to commit fraud 
 
 
 
 
8 What do you think are the abilities/skills needed to enhance management’s capabilities 
to commit financial reporting fraud? 
 
Capacity to understand accounitng systems 
 
Capacity to exploit internal control weaknesses 
 
Ability to deal with stress 
 
Authoritative position withing the organisation 
 
 Confidence that the fraud perpetrator will not be detected or if caught he/she will get 
out of it 
Other 
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8.a  If you selected Other, please specify: 
 
 
 
 
345 
 
Section Three 
 
 
9 Based on your experience and on a scale from 1 to 5, please indicate below to what 
extent do you agree/disagree that the following might motivate management in Egypt to 
commit financial reporting fraud? 
 
Please choose only one answer 
 
1 Strongly 2 
3 Do 
4 
5 
 
not Strongly 
 
disagree Disagree Agree 
 
  know  agree 
 
Desire to increase     
 
management's     
 
remuneration/bonus     
 
Need to get/maintain finance     
 
for the business     
 
Meeting or beating analysts'     
 
forecasts     
 
Conceal the company's     
 
financial distress     
 
Cover up assets     
 
misapproptiated for personal     
 
use     
 
Avoid de-listing from stock     
 
exchanges     
 
Personal sudden need for     
 
money     
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Pressure from government in 
state-owned firms 
 
Pressure from owners in 
family businesses 
 
Ego and self-esteem 
 
Pressure from Coercion 
 
High level of competition in 
the market 
 
Greed 
 
Social status comparison 
 
Taking revenge 
 
Ideology 
 
Culture and norms 
 
Other(s), please specify 
 
 
 
 
10 How often do management motivations influence the figures in the financial 
statements? 
 
 Rarely 
 
 Occasionally 
 
 Often 
 
 All the time 
 
 Do not know 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 How often do management motivations influence disclosure in the financial 
statements? 
 
 Rarely 
 
 Occasionally 
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 Often 
 
 All the time 
 
 Do not know 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 Based on your experience, how can management motivations impact on the 
financial statements? (Please answer in the box below) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 How would you assess the impact of management motivations on the financial 
statements? (Please answer in the box below) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section Four 
 
This section is seeking some demographic information from participants that are mainly 
required for the purpose of the current study 
 
14  How many years of experience do you have in the audit profession? 
 
 
 0-2 Years 
 
 3-5 Years 
 
 6-8 Years 
 
 More than 8 years  
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15  What type of audit firm/office are you working at? 
 
 
 Big 4 International audit firm 
 
 International audit firm other than Big 4 
 
 Medium size national audit firm 
 
 Small audit firm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16  Do you hold any of the following professional qualifications? 
 
 
ACCA 
 
CPA 
 
CFE 
 
Egyptian Society of Accountants and Auditors Certificate 
 
Other 
 
 
 
16.a  If you selected Other, please specify: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 Have you encountered any financial reporting fraud case where management was 
involved? (If you chose 'Yes' please answer questions 18 and 19, if you chose "No" please 
go straight to question 20) 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
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18 What was the type(s) of financial reporting fraud committed in the fraud case(s) 
you have encountered? 
 
Improper revenue recognition 
 
Improper timing difference 
 
Concealed liabilities 
 
Concealed expenses 
 
Improper assets valuation 
 
Improper disclosure 
 
Other 
 
 
 
18.a  If you selected Other, please specify: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 How did you discover that fraud case? What actions did you take? (Please 
answer in the box below) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 Would you agree to take part in a follow up interview for the purpose of the current 
research? 
 
 Yes 
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 No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 If you would like to take part in the interview, please provide your email 
address in the box below 
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Page 4: Thanks for Your Time 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. If you have any 
queries, please do not hesitate to email me on r.kassem@lboro.ac.uk 
 
Rasha Kassem 
 
PhD candidate 
 
Loughborough University, UK 
 
 
 
Please follow this link to return to the: 
 
Bristol Online Surveys Homepage 
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Appendix A2: Coding Books 
This appendix includes a copy of the coding books used to code questionnaire and interview data.  
Questionnaire Coding Book 
Question  
number  Variable name  Coding  
1 Use of ISA 240 1 = Yes, 0 = No 
2 Use of ESA 240 1 = Yes, 0 = No 
3 Knowledge of ISA & ESA 240 requirements 1 = Yes, 0 = No 
4a Consideration of management's motives 1 = Yes, 0 = No 
4b Consideration of management's integrity  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
4c Consideration of rationalisation  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
4d Consideration of opportunity 1 = Yes, 0 = No 
4e Consideration of fraud perpetrators' capabilities  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
4ai Assessment of management's motives  Content Analysis  
4bi Assessment of management's integrity Content Analysis  
4ci Assessment of rationalisation  Content Analysis  
4di Assessment of opportunity  Content Analysis  
4ei Assessment of fraud perpetrators' capabilities  Content Analysis  
5 Most significant fraud risk factor  
1 = management's motives  
2 = management's integrity 
3 = rationalisation  
4 = opportunity 
5 = fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities 
6a Significance of management's motives  
1 = least significant 
2 = not significant 
3 = rarely significant 
4 = significant 
5 = most significant  
6b Significance of management's integrity 
1 = least significant 
2 = not significant 
3 = rarely significant 
4 = significant 
5 = most significant  
6c Significance of rationalisation  
1 = least significant 
2 = not significant 
3 = rarely significant 
4 = significant 
5 = most significant  
6d Significance of opportunity  
1 = least significant 
2 = not significant 
3 = rarely significant 
4 = significant 
5 = most significant  
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6e Significance of fraud perpetrators' capabilities  
1 = least significant 
2 = not significant 
3 = rarely significant 
4 = significant 
5 = most significant  
7 Difficulty of assessing fraud risk factors  
1 = management's motives  
2 = management's integrity 
3 = rationalisation  
4 = opportunity 
5 = fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities 
8 Fraud perpetrators' capabilities skills  
1 = capacity to understand 
accounting systems  
2 = capacity to exploit 
internal control weaknesses 
3 = ability to deal with stress 
4 = authoritative position 
within the organisation 
5 = confidence that fraud will 
not be detected or if caught 
he/she will get out of it 
6 = other  
9 
Management's motivations in Egypt (select all 
that apply)   
9a 
Desire to increase management's 
remuneration/bonus 
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = do not know 
4 = agree 
5 = strongly agree 
9b Need to get/maintain finance for the business 
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = do not know 
4 = agree 
5 = strongly agree 
9c meeting or beating analysts' forecasts 
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = do not know 
4 = agree 
5 = strongly agree 
9d conceal the company's financial distress 
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = do not know 
4 = agree 
5 = strongly agree 
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9e 
cover up assets misappropriated for personal 
use 
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = do not know 
4 = agree 
5 = strongly agree 
9f avoid de-listing from stock exchange  
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = do not know 
4 = agree 
5 = strongly agree 
9g Personal sudden need for money 
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = do not know 
4 = agree 
5 = strongly agree 
9h pressure from government in state-owned firms 
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = do not know 
4 = agree 
5 = strongly agree 
9i pressure from owners in family businesses 
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = do not know 
4 = agree 
5 = strongly agree 
9j ego and self esteem 
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = do not know 
4 = agree 
5 = strongly agree 
9k pressure from coercion 
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = do not know 
4 = agree 
5 = strongly agree 
9l high level of competition in the market 
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = do not know 
4 = agree 
5 = strongly agree 
9m Greed 
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = do not know 
4 = agree 
5 = strongly agree 
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9n social status comparison 
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = do not know 
4 = agree 
5 = strongly agree 
9o taking revenge  
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = do not know 
4 = agree 
5 = strongly agree 
9p ideology 
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = do not know 
4 = agree 
5 = strongly agree 
9q culture and norms  
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = do not know 
4 = agree 
5 = strongly agree 
9r others   
10 
Impact of management motivations on financial 
statements figures 
1 = Rarely 
2 = Occasionally  
3 = Often 
4 = All the time 
5 = Do not know 
11 
Impact of management motivations on financial 
statements disclosures 
1 = Rarely 
2 = Occasionally  
3 = Often 
4 = All the time 
5 = Do not know 
12 
Impact of management motivations on the 
financial statements  Thematic analysis  
13 Auditing management motivations Thematic analysis  
14 Years of audit experience  
1 = (0-2) years  
2 = (3-5) years  
3 = (6-8) years 
4 = more than 8 years  
15 Type of audit office  
1 = Big 4 
2 = International other than 
Big4 
3 = Big national audit firm 
4 = small audit firm 
16 Professional qualifications (select all that apply)   
  ACCA 1 = Yes, 0 = No 
  CPA 1 = Yes, 0 = No 
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  CFE 1 = Yes, 0 = No 
  ESAA 1 = Yes, 0 = No 
  Other    
17 FRF cases where management was involved  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
18 Type of FRF committed (select all that apply)   
  Improper revenue recognition  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
  Improper timing difference  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
  concealed liabilities  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
  concealed expenses  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
  improper assets valuation  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
  improper disclosure  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
  other    
19 Detecting FRF cases & auditors responses Thematic analysis   
20 Participate in an interview  1 = yes, 0 = No 
21 Participants emails  N/A 
 
 
Interview Data Coding for SPSS 
Question  
No Description Themes Codes for SPSS 
1 Job title 
Auditor 
senior auditor 
Audit supervisor 
Audit manager 
Audit partner 
Senior audit partner  
Auditor = 0 
senior auditor =1 
Audit supervisor =2 
Audit manager = 3 
Audit partner = 4 
Senior audit partner = 
5 
2 
Place of audit 
training  
Egypt 
Gulf areas 
UK and Europe 
USA 
Other 
Egypt = 0 
Gulf areas = 1 
UK and Europe = 2 
USA = 3 
Other = 4 
3 Qualifications  
CPA 
ACCA 
CFE 
ESAA 
Other 
CPA = 0 
ACCA = 1 
CFE = 2 
ESAA = 3 
Other = 4 
4 Audit experience  
(2-4) Years  
(5-7) years  
(8-10) years  
above 10 years  
(2-4) Years = 0 
(5-7) years = 1 
(8-10) years = 2 
above 10 years = 3 
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5 Age  
(20-30) 
(31-40) 
(41-50) 
above 50 years old  
(20-30) = 0 
(31-40) = 1 
(41-50) = 2 
above 50 years old = 
3 
6 
Type of audit 
office  
Big 4 
Other international audit 
firm 
National small audit firm 
Accountability State 
Authority  
Big 4 = 0 
Other international 
audit firm = 1 
National small audit 
firm = 2 
Accountability State 
Authority = 3  
7 
How common is 
FRF in Egypt? 
Common 
Very common 
Not common 
Common = 0 
Very common = 1 
Not common = 2 
8 
Types of FRF in 
Egypt 
Improper revenue 
recognition & timing 
difference  
Improper assets valuation 
Concealed liabilities  
Concealed Expenses  
Improper disclosure  Not applicable  
9 
Usefulness of ISA 
240 
Not useful 
Somehow useful 
Useful 
Very useful 
Not useful = 0 
Somehow useful = 1 
Useful = 2 
Very useful = 3 
10 
Significance of 
fraud factors  
Management motives  
Management integrity  
Opportunity 
Rationalisation 
Fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities  
Management motives 
= 0 
Management integrity 
= 1 
Opportunity = 2 
Rationalisation = 3 
Fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities = 4 
11 
Difficulty in 
assessing fraud 
factors  
Management motives  
Management integrity  
Opportunity 
Rationalisation 
Fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities  
Management motives 
= 0 
Management integrity 
= 1 
Opportunity = 2 
Rationalisation = 3 
Fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities = 4 
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12 
Assessment of 
fraud factors      
13 
Management 
motives      
14 
Impact of 
management 
motives on FSs     
15 
External auditors 
appreciation of 
management 
motives 
Yes 
No 
Yes =0 
No = 1 
16 
Audit of 
management 
motivations      
17 
Success in auditing 
management 
motivations  
Successful 
Somehow successful 
Not successful 
Successful = 0 
Somehow successful 
= 1 
Not successful = 2 
18 
Likelihood of 
detecting FRF 
Yes 
No 
Yes =0 
No = 1 
19 
Types of FRF 
detected  
Improper revenue 
recognition & timing 
difference  
Improper assets valuation 
Concealed liabilities  
Concealed Expenses  
Improper disclosure  Not applicable  
20 Detection methods    Not applicable  
21 
Actions taken by 
external auditors    Not applicable  
22 
Challenges facing 
external auditors    Not applicable  
23 Any other points    Not applicable  
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Appendix A3: Proposed Guides to External Auditors  
This appendix includes some guides to help external auditors assess management motivations to commit 
fraud, opportunity to commit fraud, rationalisation of fraud, management integrity, and fraud perpetrators’ 
capabilities.  
Guide I – Assessment of Management Motives  
Techniques to assess management’s motives Frequency 
of Citation 
Source of 
data 
Inquiry of and discussion with management and those charged 
with governance about:  
 Their process for identifying and responding to the risks 
of fraud in the entity including any risks of fraud that have 
been identified by management or brought to 
management's attention.   
 Their relation with related parties 
 Their objectives and goals to determine whether these 
objectives are difficult or unrealistic to achieve or if 
management has any pressure on them to achieve certain 
targets  
18 Questionnaire 
and interviews   
Assessing the effectiveness of the company’s internal control 
system including the design and implementation of controls to 
identify weaknesses that might motivate management to commit 
financial reporting fraud:  
 Pay particular attention to controls designed to identify 
fraud or to prevent frauds from occurring. Assess what 
controls management maintains in relation to Fraud and 
whether they do regular assessment and maintain a fraud 
register (Cited 3 times) 
 Look for weaknesses in the internal control system that 
could induce a pressure/motive to commit fraud such as 
unrealistic targets, management being risk averse 
 Reviewing tone at the top and the extent by which 
management cooperates with the audit team 
 management’s philosophy and operating style (cited 2 
times) 
 the control environment,  
 the existence of proper authorisation (cited twice) 
 the risk of management override of controls 
 the existence of adequate segregation of duties especially 
between CEO and chairman of the board 
 Consider management’s power and ability to alter financial 
results (cited twice) 
 Pay more attention to weaknesses like software errors, the 
existence of unusual transactions, lack of periodic 
reconciliation, lack of corrective actions 
16 Questionnaire 
and interviews  
Understanding the nature of client’s business and industry and the 
nature of business activities and the financial performance and the 
regulatory environment of the company in the current year and 
previous years, especially: 
 Organisation structure  
 Management philosophy and operating style  
9 Questionnaire 
and interviews 
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 Delegation of power and authority  
 Relationship of management with employees  
 Review company’s performance and financial results  
 whether the company is a public listed company and need 
to show a better results to increase its share value 
 Company is in need of finance  
 Understanding management’s objectives 
Looking for factors that might motivate management to commit 
fraud such as the company is losing or in need for finance or 
bonuses that are linked to financial performance, pressure imposed 
on management to achieve certain targets, the desire to get 
bonuses especially if it is linked to financial targets, keep their job, 
avoid penalties, or meet the requirements of a new regulation, 
huge budget variances that cannot be easily justified, pressure 
from shareholders to achieve high returns, high sales targets, weak 
company performance, management’s integrity history, high 
pressure to achieve unrealistic targets, high pressure to meet 
budget    
6 Questionnaire 
and interviews 
Observation of management attitude and operating style 5 Questionnaire 
and interviews 
Examining minutes of  board of director’s meetings and company 
legal documents and contracts  
4 Questionnaire 
and interviews  
Using analytical procedures to identify any unusual transactions 
and trends, especially discrepancies in revenues. 
Comparing the company’s performance to other companies in the 
same industry 
4 Interviews 
Paying attention to fraud indicators that were mentioned in ISA 240 
such as unexplained budget variances. A checklist of these red flags 
always helps. Pay attention to other red flags like: high operating 
losses, decline in customer demands, the existence of new 
regulatory requirements, the use of questionable accounting 
practices, management bonuses is linked to financial performance, 
not taking corrective actions recommended by either internal or 
external auditors, performance linked to financial targets, the need 
for finance or the need to cover losses or the desire to keep the job 
or to get bonuses, whether the company has a code of conduct, 
weaknesses in internal controls, The availability of outstanding 
balances with tax authority 
4 Interviews 
Paying more attention to high risk accounts such as revenue 
recognition, assets, unusual transactions, unusual sales, estimates, 
and profits 
4 Questionnaire 
and interviews  
Observing management’s compensation system and bonuses 3 Questionnaire 
Using audit software that includes a checklist of motives 3 Questionnaire 
Applying professional scepticism 2 Questionnaire 
and interviews 
Assessing the risk of management override of internal control 
through understanding the client’s internal control system and 
whether the controls are effectively operated 
2 Interviews 
Discussion with previous auditors especially regarding 
management attitude and how cooperative it was in previous years 
2 Interviews 
Discussion with the audit team and the audit committee about fraud 
risks 
2 Questionnaire 
and interviews 
Considering whistle-blowers and tips from employees and 
customers 
2 Questionnaire 
and interviews 
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Reviewing company’s financial history 1 Questionnaire 
Discussion with management and senior staff at the planning stage 1 Questionnaire 
Making appropriate communications about fraud risk, and evaluate 
audit evidence related to fraud risk 
1 Questionnaire 
Considering prior fraud incidents 1 Questionnaire 
Inquiries of internal audit 1 Questionnaire 
More focus on journal entry testing, the existence of proper 
authorisation, for example the purchase or disposal of fixed assets 
requires proper authorisation from the board of directors 
1 Interviews 
Focus on tax laws and whether there are any new regulations that 
might affect the company’s profitability and position in the market 
1 Interviews 
Examination of bonuses because it could be manipulated by 
companies who want to reduce expenses to show more profit (e.g. 
according to the Egyptian law, companies should distribute 10% of 
profit as bonuses or remunerations. Some companies choose not to 
distribute all the 10% but some of it and then use the rest to pay 
employees’ salaries and thus reduce the expenses to make the 
company look more profitable in next year) 
1 Interviews 
Understanding and assessing the financial situation of the company, 
the economic condition the country, the extent of political stability, 
the issuance of new regulations that could impact the company’s 
performance 
1 Interviews 
Reviewing company’s records to understand more about the 
company’s performance, check if the company has any going 
concerns problems that might motivate management to manipulate 
the financial statements 
1 Interviews 
Previous experience with clients especially the lack of corrective 
actions for issues identified in previous years 
1 Interviews 
The reactions of management towards fraud inquires and their 
actions toward previous fraud cases 
1 Interviews 
Check the liquidity ratio, state of assets, and company’s position in 
the market 
1 Interviews 
Reviewing budgets to see if budgets are unrealistic 1 Interviews 
Interview the human resource manager to understand incentives 
structure 
1 Interviews 
Investigating previous years audit reports 1 Interviews 
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Guide II – Assessment of Management Integrity 
Techniques Frequency 
of Citation 
Data Source 
Inquires of management, employees, and those charged with governance 
about fraud controls and how they respond to fraud risk, as well as, 
communication with employees regarding their views on business practices 
and ethical behaviour, assessing the company’s code of ethics, and 
understanding the nature, timing and extent of transactions with related 
parties. Discussion with management about fraud controls, past fraud cases 
and how they dealt with it. Management inquiry about fraud whether it was 
committed before and how management dealt with it. Any history of previous 
fraud. Ask the same question by different ways to determine if any of them 
has a tendency to hide important information or to falsify facts. 
17 Questionnaire 
and interviews  
Assessing management’s integrity history by collecting information from the 
market and news about management’s reputation and integrity, conducting 
management’s background check to know more about management’s 
qualifications and years of experience, or using google search to check 
management’s integrity history and reputation in the market or following the 
news and different Egyptian publications especially if it is listed company, 
checking if management had any financial statements restatements history, or 
their personal websites  
17 Questionnaire 
and interviews 
Management qualifications and knowledge will tell what sort of person that 
is. Background of management by exploring their CVs to learn about their 
experience and qualifications. Management who worked before at multi-
national companies are different from those who used to work in local 
companies or governmental institutions. Whether their previous employer had 
a fraud history where management was involved or was at least aware of. 
Background checks through Google search. Background checks by looking 
up the profile of members of the board of directors and top management’s 
profile, their qualifications and experience. Background of management can 
also be obtained through personal interviews and having a look at their 
business cards or personal websites. Sometimes education could show 
management’s awareness of ethics 
9 Interviews 
Assessing management’s and company’s commitment to ethical behaviours 
and values e.g. providing staff with ethics training or handouts about 
acceptable ethical behaviour or having an ethical code of conduct on their 
website, assessing whether management is committed to company's values, 
do management lead by example, assess their adherence to Company's 
policies and procedures, and whether the code is communicated to all 
employees and management at all levels.  
7 Questionnaire 
and interviews  
Understanding and assessing the client’s internal control system could help 
though especially segregation of duties and the existence of proper 
authorisation 
5 Questionnaire 
Observing management reactions to auditors’ requirements and questions and 
to what extent management is cooperative e.g. does management put any 
limitations on the scope of the audit? 
4 Questionnaire 
and interviews 
Checking with the previous auditor whether management integrity and 
attitude with them 
4 Questionnaire 
and interviews 
History of management involvement in previous fraud cases or the existence 
of prior fraud incidents and evaluating how management dealt with it 
4 Questionnaire 
and interviews  
Being aware of some of the red flags like lack of an internal audit department, 
management’s ability to override the internal control system, high turnover of 
senior management, lack of a code of conduct, and whistleblowing hotline, 
3 Questionnaire 
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the existence of improper disclosure and/or improper authorisation,  lack of 
adequate segregation of duties 
Assessing the risk of management override of internal controls 3 Interviews 
Investigating the Whistle blower system Considering whistle blowing hotline 
for tips about management’s integrity and also determine how complaints are 
dealt with 
3 Questionnaire 
Understanding the management control environment including the HR 
policies and procedures, management philosophy and operating style 
especially: the existence of unreasonable acts by management, assessing 
management’s commitment to "do the right thing, assessing management’s 
willingness to cooperate with the auditors.   
3 Questionnaire 
and interviews  
The existence of consistent misrepresentations of the financial statements and 
the frequency of misstatements  
3 Questionnaire 
and interviews  
Applying professional scepticism and having a questioning mind 2 Questionnaire 
Reviewing actions taken by management regarding deficiencies in internal 
control shown in the internal audit report or management report by the 
external auditor 
2 Questionnaire 
Assessing management’s attitude and reaction towards identified control 
deficiencies and audit adjustments and willingness to improve processes and 
reporting quality 
2 Questionnaire 
Review human resource policies and procedures especially the process of 
conducting background checks on new recruits and employees    
2 Questionnaire 
Review previous year audit reports to determine if management had any issues 
with previous auditors to determine the degree of previous auditors’ reliance 
on management’s integrity 
2 Questionnaire 
Determine whether corrective actions were taken by management in response 
to internal control deficiencies 
2 Questionnaire 
and interviews 
The existence of unrealistic budgets that was difficult to achieve but was yet 
achieved by management or unexplained budget variances  
2 Interviews 
The way the company deals with whistle-blowers and the procedures taken to 
protect them and they way they handle the complaints  
2 Interviews 
Assess conflict of interest policy and related party transactions, also we can 
assess disclosure policy and whether management conceal important 
information 
1 Questionnaire 
Inspecting management’s disclosure in the financial statements to determine 
management’s tendency to hide important information 
1 Questionnaire 
Inspection of board of director’s minutes of meetings 1 Questionnaire 
Reviewing actions taken by management in response to fraud 1 Questionnaire 
Discussion with the audit engagement team 1 Questionnaire 
Discussion with employees at all levels about management’s integrity and 
whether they come across any risk factors that indicate management’s lack of 
integrity 
1 Questionnaire 
The existence of litigations against management or the company 1 Questionnaire 
Understanding the nature, timing and extent of transactions with related 
parties 
1 Questionnaire 
The review of authorisation of transactions 1 Interviews 
If management or employees are dealing in gambling business or are 
gambling for leisure  
1 Interviews 
Communication with the company’s lawyer to see if there are any lawsuits 
against the company 
1 Interviews 
Observing management attitude and operating style 1 Interviews 
The use of aggressive accounting policies  1 Interviews 
The existence of unexplained transactions outside the normal course of 
business  
1 Interviews 
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The existence of high management turnover 1 Interviews 
Interview human resource manager to learn more about management integrity 
and the company’s commitment to integrity and ethical values  
1 Interviews 
If the client is an existing client, it will be easier to assess integrity through 
understanding management’s attitude and operating style. However it is 
difficult to assess in the case of new clients especially if there is no known 
history of dishonesty. Sometimes people are very cautious and smart enough 
to hide their dishonest behaviour especially in front of the external auditor.  
1 Interviews 
Discussion with audit partners  1 Interviews 
Considering past experience with the client in case of old clients.  1 Interviews 
 
Guide III. Assessment of Opportunity to Commit Fraud  
Audit Procedures Number of times 
mentioned 
Source of Data  
Understanding and testing the client’s internal 
control system. Any weaknesses in internal controls 
will be highly scrutinised and risk will be assessed as 
either low or high depending on the weakness. 
Materiality will also be taken into consideration 
along with the impact of weaknesses on the fair 
presentation of financial statements 
Weaknesses in internal control especially: 
 lack of customer details 
 lack of credit sales evidence 
 lack of reconciliation 
 lack of monitoring 
 no or weak internal audit department 
(mentioned 4 times) 
 complex organisational structure 
 lack of segregation of duties (mentioned 9 
times) 
 high turnover of management 
 ineffective human resources practices and 
policies 
 lack of commitment to competence 
especially when it comes to the recruitment 
of accounting staff because this might 
increase the risk of errors or abuse because 
of lack of knowledge (mentioned 2 times) 
 weak or ineffective management 
participation 
 weaknesses in the control environment 
(mentioned 2 times) 
 lack of or weak audit committee (mentioned 
2 times) 
 lack of controls on accounts that have 
inherent limitations such as petty cash 
 lack of independent checks on performance 
(mentioned 2 times) 
 ineffective or weak board of directors 
(mentioned 2 times) 
110 Questionnaire and 
interviews  
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 improper authorisation especially in the 
finance department (mentioned 2 times) 
  Lack of proper authorisation  
Exploring the role of internal auditors or the internal 
audit department 
2 Interviews  
Interview staff to assess their competency and 
understanding of the internal control system 
1 Interviews  
Cut off test of revenues, cash counts, emphasis on 
year end balances and comparing it to beginning year 
balances to determine discrepancies especially the 
cash and revenue accounts  
1 Interviews  
Bank confirmations  1 Interviews  
Understanding the company’s rules and procedures  1 Interviews  
Discussion with management about fraud controls  1 Interviews  
Weaknesses identified in the internal audit report 1 Interviews  
Results of previous years’ audits  1 Interviews  
Assess the power of management and their ability to 
override controls  
1 Interviews  
Organisation structure, strengths of corporate 
governance and the existence of effective and 
experienced audit committee  
1 Interviews  
Understanding the company’s industry 1 Interviews  
The use of professional scepticism  1 Questionnaire  
Observation of management and key employees  1 Questionnaire  
 
Guide IV - How could external auditors assess rationalisation of fraud? 
Techniques Frequency of 
citation 
Source of Data  
Understanding the business and its regulatory 
environment 
7 Questionnaire  
Discussion with the audit engagement team   6 Questionnaire  
The existence of unusual behaviours have to be 
questioned 
4 Questionnaire  
Existence of previous fraud incidences 4 Questionnaire  
Investigating whistle blowers 3 Questionnaire  
Observation of management and other staff’s behaviours 3 Questionnaire  
Inquire management about previous fraud cases and how 
it took place, how it was discovered,  and what was the 
action taken 
3 Questionnaire  
Understanding and testing client’s internal control system 
especially ensure segregation of duties 
2 Questionnaire  
The use of an audit software 2 Questionnaire  
Apply professional scepticism 1 Questionnaire  
Having a look at the payroll expense and compare to other 
companies in the same industry 
1 Questionnaire  
The use of analytical procedures followed by discussion 
of management in case there is an unusual 
transaction/account 
1 Questionnaire  
Looking at the organisation chart will help in 
understanding the power in hand of management and 
1 Interviews  
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whether there is any concentration of power in the hand 
of one person. 
Could be assessed as part of assessing management 
integrity 
2 Questionnaire 
and interviews  
Past experience with audited clients  1 Interviews  
Paying attention to some red flags like: the existence of 
unrealistic forecasts, bad relationship with prior auditor, 
history of violation of laws and regulations 
 
1 Interviews 
Knowing the people you are dealing with is the key. 
Understand people’s psychology and mindset to assess 
their rationalisation and motives 
 
1 Interviews 
Observing management responses during the auditors 
inquiry about fraud related matters  
1 Interviews 
Interviewing key people or employees of the company 1 Interviews 
Discussion with management and key employees  1 Interviews 
Looking for any signs of employees dissatisfaction like 
unfair treatment by management or inappropriate 
compensation, are employees or management 
complaining about their pay or promotion 
1 Interviews 
Using professional scepticism  1 Interviews 
Paying more attention to payroll expenses and whether 
employees are satisfied with their pay and the way they 
are being treated in the company 
1 Interviews 
 
Guide V- How could external auditors assess fraud perpetrators’ capabilities?  
Techniques Source of Data 
 Understanding and testing the client’s 
internal control system 
 Paying attention to weaknesses in 
internal control system such as lack of 
segregation of duties or inadequate 
authorisation of transactions 
 Inquiry of management  
 Observation of capabilities of the client’s 
personnel 
 
Questionnaire 
 Should be assessed as part of 
management integrity or opportunity to 
commit fraud, especially while assessing 
the risk of management override of 
internal controls  
 Considering management position and 
power in the company 
 Understanding the weaknesses in the 
company’s internal control system 
 observing management philosophy and 
operating style 
Questionnaire and interviews 
 Requires proper knowledge of people. 
This includes the knowledge of their 
power in the organisation and to what 
Interviews 
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extent they understand the internal 
control system and its weaknesses   
 
Guide X– The Audit of Management Motivations  
Techniques Number of 
times cited 
Source of data  
Inquiry of management and those charged with governance about 
fraud controls, pervious fraud cases and how they dealt with it.   
 
14 Questionnaire 
and interviews 
Special attention should be given to some accounts/areas like 
inventory, accounts payable, accounts receivable, capitalised 
assets, revenues, cash, hidden liabilities and expenses, estimates, 
subsequent events, year end balances accounts, management’s 
override of internal control, impairment of investments, 
classification of assets, disclosure, and going concern issues 
12 Questionnaire 
and interviews 
Set unpredictable procedures as part of audit planning that should 
then be followed throughout the audit such as surprise physical cash 
count or inventory count, testing areas that are not usually tested, 
physical counts of locations that are not normally taken into 
account, increasing the sample taken from a certain period, change 
of materiality (e.g. auditing small amounts rather than large 
amounts to assess the risk of fraud given that management is aware 
that auditors take into consideration only material amounts), and 
changing the extent of tests to be performed. In case of banks or 
companies having more than one branch, visiting different 
locations/branches every year.  
10 Interviews  
Using analytical procedures to identify trends and unusual 
transactions and accounts especially for the past three years for 
revenues and expenses especially travel expenses, payroll 
expenses, and sales revenues. In case there are large or unexplained 
variances, inquiry of management could help in addition to more 
substantive tests. analytical procedures especially industry 
averages, in comparing performance of the same company over 
years or comparing the company’s performance with other 
companies in the same industry  
9 Questionnaire 
and interviews  
Understanding the clients internal control system and focusing on 
test of controls to assess control risk. Weaknesses in internal control 
such as lack of documentations or lack of evidence of sale should 
be questioned by auditors. Management’s high turnover could be a 
red flag for fraud that auditors should take into consideration. 
Understanding management philosophy and operating style. Test 
of controls. Assessing the internal control system to indicate 
processes that have management intervention 
7 Questionnaire 
and interviews  
Understanding management’s likely motives by assessing the 
pressure that management or company faces and then think of the 
accounts that might be vulnerable to management’s manipulations 
to achieve their targets. Understanding the possible motivations 
behind management fraud and any factors that could give them the 
opportunity to commit fraud like concentration of power or weak 
internal control or ability to override these controls. This will 
depend on the motive and the related significant risk. E.g. if the risk 
is revenue recognition then the action would be a cut off test at year 
end and inspecting subsequent period sales returns as well as 
6 Questionnaire 
and interviews  
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inspecting sales transactions made to related parties. It depends on 
the account that is more likely to be affected by management’s 
motives. For example, in case of revenues, analytical procedures 
and management’s inquiry will be used and then test of details of 
balances, reports will be required from the operations manager 
about the company’s operations and cost of materials used in 
production showing quantity sold/year. Assess the effect of 
management’s motivation on the financial statements depending on 
the type of motive (e.g. if the company wants to get loans from 
bank, there might be high motivation to overstate the revenue so in 
this case more focus will be given to the revenue account and if 
necessary an adjustment in the account will be recommended). If 
management refused to make the required adjustments, the issue 
will be reported in the management representation letter and the 
audit report.  
 
Requiring all the necessary adjustments to assure the fair 
presentation of the financial statements results. If management 
refused to do the required adjustments, this needs to be mentioned 
in the management letter under the uncorrected misstatements 
section or a qualified opinion/disclaimer could be issued based on 
materiality  
6 Questionnaire 
The use of audit software that helps external auditors decide on the 
control risk and the right audit procedures to use given a certain 
scenario, especially journal entries analytical tool, scan all journal 
entries and general ledger and the trial balance to determine any 
discrepancies, management inquiry. AS2 audit software is normally 
used in automated audit sample based on amounts of transactions, 
materiality, and unrecorded misstatements. The use of ACL 
software to identify trends and unusual transactions and journal 
entries 
5 Interviews  
Increase the scope of the audit by increasing the sample size which 
sometimes reach 100% for certain accounts that are more likely to 
be manipulated by management such as sales revenues 
5 Interviews  
External confirmation with third parties such as with banks, 
accounts receivable with customers, confirmation of year end 
balances, and revenue testing using computerised 
programmes/software  
5 Interviews  
Auditors need to apply professional scepticism, develop their own 
expectations and compare it to management’s expectations, review 
the assumptions used by management, and assess whether the 
assessment of the previous years’ estimates agree with the actual 
figures or not 
5 Questionnaire 
and interviews  
Focusing more on substantive tests of transactions rather than test 
of controls. 
4 Interviews  
Understanding client’s business and its industry  3 Interviews  
Assigning more experienced audit staff to audit the accounts more 
vulnerable to management manipulations  
3 Questionnaire  
Understand the entity’s control environment and risks during the 
planning stage 
3 Questionnaire 
Increase the nature and extent of audit work 3 Questionnaire 
All journal entries are scanned to identify unusual manual journal 
entries, all year end journal entries are audited, and correction of 
errors in financial statements. ACL automated computer tool that 
3 Questionnaire 
and interviews  
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helps them to scan all journal entries for unusual transactions and 
trends with special focus on manual journal entries, 
Assessment of fraud controls and clients internal control system 
especially the risk of management’s override of internal control 
2 Questionnaire  
More attention should be given to the risk of management’s 
override of internal controls and revenue recognition. This could be 
done through understanding of the business, using analytical 
procedures and paying more attention to the fraud risk factors 
mentioned in the international audit standard number 240. 
2 Questionnaire  
In case of assets valuation and accounts receivable, more evidence 
will be required via positive confirmation and documentation. In 
case of inventory, physical count at year end is recommended  
2 Interviews  
In case of inventory overstatement, physical inventory counts and 
comparisons with recorded amounts in books could be used 
2 Interviews 
Discussion with audit engagement team and audit partner about the 
susceptibility of client to fraud risks.   
2 Interviews  
In case of assets valuation and accounts receivable, more evidence 
will be required via positive confirmation and documentation. In 
case of inventory, physical count at year end is recommended  
2 Interviews  
Give more attention to fraud risk factors 2 Questionnaire  
It all depends on materiality. If the issue will not affect users’ 
decisions, note it down in the management letter, but if it is material 
then choose to either qualify the opinion or issue a disclaimer 
depending on the degree of materiality 
2 Questionnaire  
Based on fraud assessment, if fraud risk is considered as significant 
risk, assess the controls in place to mitigate such risk, design 
detailed audit procedures to cover this risk, and then determine the 
nature, timing, and extent of our audit procedures for the relevant 
areas 
1 Questionnaire 
In case fraud risk is high, rely heavily on substantive tests instead 
of control tests and usually increase the sample size. 
1 Questionnaire 
Based on risk assessment, the audit plan is tailored to focus on high 
risk areas that could significantly affect the financial statements 
1 Questionnaire 
Report the issue to the  audit committee 1 Questionnaire 
Consider the entity’s position in the market 1 Questionnaire 
Understand management’s compensation system to understand the 
extent of pressure on management to achieve targets 
1 Questionnaire 
Inquiries of related parties 1 Questionnaire 
Inquiries of employees about management’s attitude and any 
unreported fraud cases 
 Interviews  
Test for unrecorded liabilities and review recorded liabilities 1 Interviews 
Reviewing bank covenant agreements 1 Interviews 
Testing bank reconciliations to know if there are any outstanding 
balances  
1 Interviews 
Ensuring there is proper cut-offs 1 Interviews 
If the fraud risk might affect the company’s going concern, this will 
be disclosed in the audit report to shareholders 
1 Interviews 
Discussion with audit committee 1 Interviews 
Change the timing, extent, and nature of the audit procedures 1 Interviews 
Detailed assessment of fraud risk factors 1 Interviews 
Considering the quality and level of audit supervision in audit 
engagement like not assigning junior auditors stuff that requires 
subjective judgment and audit experience.  
1 Interviews 
Previous experience with audited clients 1 Interviews 
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More attention is given to budgets and variances as they are subject 
to manipulations 
1 Interviews 
History of management’s integrity 1 Interviews 
In case of high risk of fraud the focus will be more on test of details 
and substantive tests rather than test of controls.  
1 Interviews 
Communication with the audit committee and board of directors 
and even shareholders if fraud was suspected.  
1 Interviews 
Observing management’s reactions to auditor’s questions    1 Interviews 
At the financial statement level, controls over financial reporting 
are always taken into consideration while at the assertion level, 
certain accounts requires more attention and scrutiny like the 
revenue account that is always regarded as a high risk account.  
1 Interviews 
Examination of board of directors minutes of meetings 1 Interviews  
Focusing more on manual journal entries rather than automated 
journal entries especially those around year end or subsequent 
events after the financial statement date. Manual journal entries 
have less internal control than automated journal entries which 
makes it more risky and vulnerable to manipulations.  
1 Interviews  
Communication with the audit committee  1 Interviews 
Communication with those charged with governance 1 Interviews 
Obtaining written ratifications from management related to fraud 1 Interviews 
Interview key people in the company 1 Interviews 
More focus on whistle blowers systems inside the companies,  1 Interviews 
meeting with BOD during the planning stage to understand more 
about the company and their attitude     
1 Interviews 
inspecting budget and try to understand how/why company did or 
did not meet budgeted targets,  
2 Interviews 
Inspecting minutes of board of directors meetings,  1 Interviews 
Auditors’ past experience is needed  1 Interviews 
focus on revenue accounts and sales returns especially those at year 
end, using analytical procedures,  
1 Interviews 
Testing cash cycle and post-closing receipts of receivables or cash 1 Interviews 
reviewing authorisations 1 Interviews 
Management’s background checks 1 Interviews 
Decisions regarding fraud risk assessment and response are taken 
by the audit manager or audit partner.  
1 Interviews 
Refer the matter to either the audit manager or audit partner or the 
audit committee  in case of suspected fraud or high risk of 
management motives 
1 Interviews 
Discussion with the internal auditor 1 Interviews 
Discussion with audit engagement team 1 Interviews 
Paying attention to the risks the company is facing that might 
motivate management to commit financial reporting fraud such as 
need for finance or loss of a major customer.  
1 Interviews 
Increase the timing and extent of substantive procedures. E.g. focus 
on year end transactions and journal entries and increasing the 
sample size.  
1 Interviews 
focus on certain accounts like accounts receivable and revenue,  1 Interviews 
review of dues from related parties, 1 Interviews 
Reading BOD reports and minutes of meetings to assess possible 
motives that might lead to financial reporting fraud, 
1 Interviews 
Paying more attention to unrecorded liabilities  1 Interviews 
Investigating related parties’ transactions and whistle-blowers 
lines.  
1 Interviews 
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Pay more attention to cut off tests and year-end sales revenue, the 
revenue account in general is a high risk account and always gets 
much attention.  
1 Interviews 
Include small amounts in the sample below the materiality 
threshold.  
1 Interviews 
  
